Ingrassia v. Schafer et al

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 35 ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 35) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Jean C. Hamilton on 1/25/13. (CEL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

THOMAS JAMES INGRASSIA,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
KEITH SCHAFER, et al.,
Defendant(s).

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Case No. 4:12CV62 JCH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Keith Schafer, Felix Vincenz, Alan Blake, Jay
Englehart, Davinder Hayreh, Kristina Bender, Kaylynn Reed, Brenda Swift, Linda Moll, Scott Jordan,
Nancy Amsden, Kevin Fletcher, and Bob Wills’ (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed September 25, 2012. (ECF No. 35). The motion is fully briefed and ready for
disposition.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff Thomas James Ingrassia was civilly committed to the Missouri Sexual Offender
Treatment Center, now know as the Missouri Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services
facility (“SORTS”), in April, 2001. (Complaint (“Compl.”), ¶ 22). Plaintiff eloped from SORTS in
October, 2001, and spent two years at-large and five years in the custody of the county jail and the
Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”). (Id., ¶¶ 22, 23). On August 8, 2008, Plaintiff was
paroled from MDOC, and returned to SORTS to continue his civil commitment. (Id., ¶ 24).

1

The Court’s background section is taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendants dispute
many of the facts as presented by Plaintiff, and further provide their own Statement of
Uncontroverted Material Facts in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.

Upon his arrival at the SORTS facility on August 8, 2008, Plaintiff immediately was placed
on Special Precautions, Visual One-to-One, defined by SORTS policy S-PC. 270, due to risk of
elopement. (Compl., ¶ 25). Under Special Precautions, an employee of SORTS was to follow
Plaintiff twenty-four hours a day, and maintain visual contact at all times. (Id.). Plaintiff initially was
not permitted to venture outside at all. (Id., ¶ 27).2
On August 25, 2008, Defendant Alan Blake wrote an order allowing Plaintiff to go outdoors
to the Hoctor yard two times a day, for thirty minutes at a time. (Compl., ¶ 27). Plaintiff was escorted
to the Hoctor yard by two SORTS employees, and no other SORTS residents were permitted on the
yard while Plaintiff was there. (Id.). Plaintiff complains the Hoctor yard was small, and had no
recreation equipment other than a small basketball court. (Id.). Plaintiff filed numerous team requests
and facility grievances between August 25, 2008, and March 18, 2009, requesting use of a basketball,
kickball, or rubber hand ball, and/or for exercise equipment to be installed in the Hoctor yard. (Id.,
¶ 28). Plaintiff further requested to be allowed access to the Blair recreation yard, which he claims
is approximately twenty-five times larger than the Hoctor yard. (Id., ¶¶ 28-29). All of Plaintiff’s team
requests and facility grievances were denied. (Id.).
Between March 18, 2009, and July, 2009, Plaintiff was allowed access to the Blair yard.
(Compl., ¶ 31). In July, 2009, however, Plaintiff was placed on Total Ward Restriction (“TWR”), and
was restricted from going outdoors at any time. (Id.). Plaintiff’s placement on TWR lasted until
March 30, 2010, at which time he was allowed to go outside periodically until April 27, 2010. (Id.,

2

Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ assertion that he often was verbally abusive to his
assigned 1:1 staff members and other patients on the ward, claiming only that his actions were
appropriate under the circumstances. (See Defendants’ Statement of Uncontroverted Material
Facts (“Defendants’ Facts”), ¶ 11 and Plaintiff’s response thereto).

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¶ 32). Plaintiff was placed back on TWR on April 27, 2010, and was not allowed to go outside again
until August 30, 2011. (Id., ¶¶ 32, 33).3
Plaintiff was permitted outside access beginning August 30, 2011, and was allowed to frequent
the Blair yard between September 20, 2011, and October 27, 2011, when his privileges were again
revoked. (Compl., ¶¶ 33, 42). Beginning November 30, 2011, Plaintiff was granted access to the
outdoors for short “fresh air breaks,” and from December 7, 2011, to the time of filing his Complaint,
he enjoyed access to exercise and recreation in the Blair yard. (Id., ¶¶ 43, 44).
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter on January 9, 2012, seeking declaratory, injunctive
and monetary relief. (ECF No. 1).4 Plaintiff claims his inability to exercise normally through access
to outdoor recreational activities has caused him to suffer physical injury, in that his body has
deteriorated due to a lack of appropriate exercise. (Compl., ¶ 38). Plaintiff claims his damages,
including emotional and mental injuries, were exacerbated because during this time frame (a) he was
recovering from a lumbar disc rupture and disc surgery, and thus greatly would have benefitted from
appropriate exercise, and (b) SORTS employees had placed him on severe food restrictions, resulting
in a rapid ten percent loss in body weight. (Id., ¶¶ 40-41).
As noted above, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on September 25, 2012,
claiming there exist no genuine issues of material fact, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. (ECF No. 35).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
3

Plaintiff apparently acknowledges his lengthy placement on TWR was due at least in part
to his “increased instances of negative and arguably violent behavior.” (Compl., ¶ 35). Plaintiff
maintains this negative behavior resulted from idleness caused by his inability to go outdoors for
exercise and recreation. (Id.).
4

Plaintiff states his Complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Mo.Rev.Stat. § 630.110.1(7). (Compl., PP. 1516).

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The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if, “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The substantive
law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Only disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must
set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not
the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at
247. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 256.
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The Court’s function is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249.
DISCUSSION

I.

Section 1983 Claim
As noted above, in his Complaint Plaintiff asserts Defendants violated his constitutional rights

by restricting his outdoor exercise and recreation privileges. In their Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendants assert this claim is barred by the application of qualified immunity because (1) the alleged
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curtailment did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in the first instance; and (2) even if it did,
it was not clearly established that the curtailment would violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Under Eighth Circuit law, “[q]ualified immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from liability for damages so long as ‘their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Curry v. Crist, 226 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818,
102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). The Court employs a two-part inquiry “to determine
whether a lawsuit against a public official alleging a constitutional violation can proceed in the face
of an assertion of qualified immunity.” Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir.) (citing Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct.
465 (2009).
First, courts [] consider whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury,....the facts alleged show the [official’s] conduct violated
a constitutional right.....Second, courts [] ask whether the right was clearly
established5...
Id. at 951-52 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Unless the answer to both of these
questions is yes, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.” Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d
557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009).
As noted above, with this claim Plaintiff implicates his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a civilly committed resident of SORTS, Plaintiff retains constitutionally protected
liberty interests in essential care items, including adequate exercise. See Covington v. Greenwell,
2006 WL 3247215 at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 8, 2006) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324

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While Saucier set forth the two-part test with a mandatory sequence for analysis, the
Supreme Court has since reversed itself and eliminated the mandatory aspect of the sequential
analysis. Serna, 567 F.3d at 952 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172
L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)).

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(1982); Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1995)). While Plaintiff does not surrender all
constitutional rights by virtue of his lawful detention, however, he “simply does not possess the full
range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).
The United States Supreme Court has held that there must be a mutual
accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions
of the Constitution that are of general application. Additionally, maintaining
institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential
goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional
rights of [detainees]. To accomplish these goals, detention facility
administrators should be given wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed
to...maintain institutional security...and, in the absence of substantial evidence
[that the policies and practices are unnecessary], courts should ordinarily defer
to their expert judgment in such matters.
Strutton v. Blake, 2006 WL 335715 at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 14, 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he has suffered both physical injury, in that his body has
deteriorated due to a lack of appropriate exercise, and emotional and mental injuries, as a result of
Defendants’ restriction of his access to outdoor recreational activities. “Complaints of lack of exercise
in a secured environment constitute a condition of confinement claim.” Strutton, 2006 WL 335715
at *7 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)). In
order to prevail on his claim, Plaintiff must show Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
exercise needs. Covington, 2006 WL 3247215 at *5; Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 448-449
(8th Cir. 1992). “In considering an alleged deprivation of adequate exercise, courts must consider
several factors including: (1) the opportunity to be out of the cell; (2) the availability of recreation
within the cell; (3) the size of the cell; and (4) the duration of confinement.” Wishon, 978 F.2d at 449
(citations omitted). As noted above, however, Plaintiff’s rights must be balanced with Defendants’
need to adopt and execute policies and practices necessary to maintain institutional security. Strutton,
2006 WL 335715 at *4; Wishon, 978 F.2d at 449.

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Upon consideration, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, either because their actions in curtailing his exercise and
recreation activities did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and/or because reasonable officials
in Defendants’ position would not have understood they were violating Plaintiff’s rights. Strutton,
2006 WL 335715 at *4; Wishon, 978 F.2d at 449. With respect to whether the right was violated in

the first instance, the Court notes Defendants provide evidence that, during the time Plaintiff was
denied access to outside recreational activities, he was permitted adequate opportunity to exercise on
his ward. (See Plaintiff’s Dep., PP. 55-59). For example, both in his deposition testimony and in
response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff acknowledges that while on TWR, he was able to do sit-ups,
pushups, and crunches, as well as jog in place, for exercise. (See, e.g., Defendants’ Facts, ¶ 26 and
Plaintiff’s response thereto; Plaintiff’s Dep., P. 27; Bender Affidavit, ¶ 10). Plaintiff further testified
during his deposition that when he was forbidden to exercise in his room or in the ward hallway, he
was taken to the seclusion room to exercise. (See Plaintiff’s Dep., PP. 55-57, 60-61).6 Finally,
Plaintiff admits that when he refused to exercise during his allotted time of 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.
because he preferred to sleep in, Defendants quickly relented and adjusted his exercise schedule. (See
Defendants’ Facts, ¶¶ 43-46; Plaintiff’s Dep., PP. 57-60). These concessions are important, because
given that Plaintiff’s claim is not that he was denied adequate opportunity for exercise entirely, but
only that it was not outdoors and there was no gym equipment, “[s]uch a claim fails to state a
constitutional violation for deprivation of adequate exercise.” Covington, 2006 WL 3247215 at *5.
See also Casey-El v. Greenwell, 2005 WL 2298199 at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 21, 2005) (“Plaintiffs do
not allege that they are denied adequate opportunity for exercise, only that it is not outdoors. Such

6

To the extent Plaintiff complains Defendants’ actions in allegedly locking him in the
seclusion room for hours after he exercised violated his constitutional rights, such claim has not
been pled and is not at issue here.

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claim fails to state a constitutional violation for deprivation of adequate exercise”); Oliver v.
Greenwell, 2005 WL 2406015 at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2005) (same). Under these circumstances,

the Court finds Defendants’ placement of restrictions on Plaintiff’s exercise and recreation activities
did not violate his constitutional rights, as Plaintiff retained the ability to engage in such activities
within the confines of the SORTS facility.
In the alternative, assuming Defendants’ curtailment of Plaintiff’s exercise and recreation
activities did violate his constitutional right, the Court finds such right was not clearly established
under the circumstances presented. “For a right to be deemed clearly established, the contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” Serna, 567 F.3d at 952 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “In
other words, officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing
bright lines.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As noted above, case law
establishes that Plaintiff’s rights must be balanced with Defendants’ need to adopt and execute
policies and practices necessary to maintain institutional security. Strutton, 2006 WL 335715 at *4;
Wishon, 978 F.2d at 449. In the instant case, Plaintiff admits he initially was placed on 1:1 visual
status due to his risk of elopement. Furthermore, Defendants provide undisputed evidence that they
approved the treatment plan placing Plaintiff on TWR and restricting his activities due to safety
concerns, which arose due to Plaintiff’s continuing verbal abuse, intimidating behavior, and failure
to follow staff directives. (See Englehart Affidavit, ¶¶ 5-12). Defendants note Plaintiff was given
frequent opportunities to modify his behavior in order to regain his outdoor privileges, and that when
Plaintiff eventually complied such privileges were in fact restored. (See Englehart Affidavit, ¶ 15;
Bender Affidavit, ¶ 3). The Court thus finds Defendants’ curtailment of Plaintiff’s access to adequate
exercise was necessitated by institutional security concerns, and so even if the restrictions were

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improper, reasonable officials in Defendants’ positions would not have understood they were
violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by implementing them. This portion of Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment must therefore be granted.
II.

Missouri State Law Claim
As noted above, Plaintiff further claims Defendants’ actions violated Mo.Rev.Stat. §

630.110.1(7). (Compl., P. 15). This Court previously has held that § 630.110 does not provide for
a private cause of action. See Bradford v. Blake, 2006 WL 744307 at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 23, 2006).
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claim must therefore be granted.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 35)
is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.
appropriate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 25th day of January, 2013.

/s/Jean C. Hamilton
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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