Young v. St. Alexius Hospital et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 42:1983 (prisoner) filed by Plaintiff Ronnie Young. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is GRANTED. IT IS F URTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.75 within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to issue upon plaintiff& #039;s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, because the allegations are legally frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's pendent state-law claim for medical malpractice, and that this claim is DISMISSED, without prejudice. A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. (Initial Partial Filing Fee due by 4/23/2012.) Signed by Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 3/22/12. (CSG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
RONNIE YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
ST. ALEXIUS HOSPITAL, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:12-CV-254-SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the application of Ronnie Young
(registration no. 507298), an inmate at the Southeast Correctional Center, for leave
to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee. For the reasons
stated below, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.75. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, based upon a review of the complaint, the Court finds
that this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma
pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has
insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess
and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater

of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account; or (2) the average
monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income
credited to the prisoner's account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having
custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court
each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully
paid. Id.
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account
statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his
complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1),(2). A review of plaintiff's account statement
indicates an average monthly deposit of $8.75, and an average monthly account
balance of $.10.

Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee.

Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.75, which is 20
percent of plaintiff's average monthly deposit.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed
in forma pauperis at any time if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either
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in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544,570 (2007).
In reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the
complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff,
unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32
(1992).
The Complaint
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Southeast Correctional Center, seeks monetary relief
in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against defendants St. Alexius Hospital, BarnesJewish Hospital, Dr. Barra Barnes, Dr. Martin A. Docherty, Nurse Brooke A.
Shepard, Nurse Mark Canada, Debbie Harrison ("PCA"), Nurse Cindy Murphy,
Heather Reeves (St. Alexius Hospital employee), Dr. Bruce Stoliar, Nurse Jamie
Swanston, Dr. James A. Junker, and St. Louis City Police Officers Nathaniel
Burkemper, Patrick Daut, and Unknown Hill. In addition, plaintiff asserts a pendent
state-law claim for medical malpractice.
Plaintiff alleges that after being detained on August 6, 2009, on a claim of
possible drug consumption, defendant police officers Daut and Burkemper took him
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to St. Alexius Hospital for treatment. Plaintiff claims that he told hospital personnel
he had not consumed any drugs and that he had no need for medical attention. The
officers informed medical personnel that they had seen plaintiff swallow two "eight
balls" of cocaine; however, according to plaintiff, this was a deliberate fabrication.
Plaintiff states that "earlier in the day he had injected drugs," and that he made both
the medical staff and police officers aware of this fact. Plaintiff claims that medical
personnel proceeded to treat him, without his permission, causing him constipation,
headaches, stomach cramps, sleep deprivation, mental anguish, lung constriction, and
recurring nightmares. In addition, plaintiff alleges that the defendant medical
personnel engaged in a "deliberate and substantial departure from normal medical
practices."
Discussion
I. Section 1983 claims
A. Defendants St. Alexius Hospital and Barnes-Jewish Hospital
Having carefully reviewed plaintiff's allegations, the Court finds no claim or
indication that any of the alleged constitutional violations were the result of a policy
or action on behalf of St. Alexius or Barnes-Jewish or to an action by anyone
representing official policy on their behalf. Rather, plaintiff alleges, under a
respondeat superior theory, that his claims against the two hospitals are due to their

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employment of the numerous defendant doctors and nurses who allegedly ignored his
version of the facts and "provid[ed] mistreatment."
The Court will dismiss the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) as to
defendants St. Alexius Hospital and Barnes-Jewish Hospital, because the respondeat
superior theory of liability is inapplicable in § 1983 actions. See Boyd v. Knox, 47
F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995). Moreover, “[a] corporation acting under color of state
law will beheld liable only for its own unconstitutional policies." Sanders v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1993). Because plaintiff does not
identify any alleged official hospital policies or customs, he has failed to state a claim
or cause of action against either of the two hospital defendants.
B. Defendants Burkemper, Daut, and Hill
Plaintiff brings this action against the three individual St. Louis City police
officers, Burkemper, Daut, and Hill, in their official capacity. See Egerdahl v.
Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995)(where a complaint is
silent about defendant’s capacity, Court must interpret the complaint as including
official-capacity claims); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). Naming
a government official in his or her official capacity is the equivalent of naming the
government entity that employs the official. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). To state a claim against a municipality or a government
official in his or her official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom
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of the government entity is responsible for the alleged constitutional violation.
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
The instant complaint does not contain any allegations that a policy or custom
of a government entity was responsible for the alleged violations of plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. As such, the complaint is legally frivolous and fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted as to defendants Nathaniel Burkemper, Patrick
Daut, and Unknown Hill.
C. All Remaining Defendants
Plaintiff's medical mistreatment claims against the ten remaining defendant
doctors, nurses, and hospital employees will also be dismissed pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim for unconstitutional medical mistreatment, a plaintiff
must plead facts sufficient to indicate deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d
174, 175 (8th Cir. 1995). To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege that
he suffered objectively serious medical needs and that defendants actually knew of
but disregarded those needs. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.
1997). Furthermore, to state a claim of deliberate indifference, “the prisoner must
show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement
with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”
Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995). Medical malpractice
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alone is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment. Smith v. Clarke, 458 F.3d 720,
724 (8th Cir. 2006).
According to plaintiff, he "had not swallowed anything" immediately prior to
his arrest, and the police officers "deliberately fabricated a story to hospital
personnel" regarding the two "eight balls" of cocaine. Plaintiff told the defendant
hospital employees he did not want them treating him or injecting him with any
medicine, "stating that such was not needed." In essence, plaintiff is claiming that
upon his admission to each of the defendant hospitals, he was not suffering any
objectively serious medical needs. As such, he cannot possibly state a claim for
deliberate indifference.

See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (to state claim for

unconstitutional medical mistreatment, plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to indicate
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs). Moreover, plaintiff alleges that the
defendant doctors and nurses were presented with two different accounts of whether
he had, in fact, ingested two "eight balls" of cocaine, and that he disagreed with their
decision to render him treatment. These allegations simply do not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference. See Estate of Rosenberg, 56 F.3d at 37 (mere disagreement
with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation). For
these reasons, the complaint will be dismissed as legally frivolous and for failure to
state a claim against defendants Dr. Barra Barnes, Dr. Martin A. Docherty, Brooke

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A. Shepard, Mark Canada, Debbie Harrison, Cindy Murphy, Heather Reeves, Dr.
Bruce Stoliar, Jamie Swanston, and Dr. James A. Junker.
II. State-Law Claim for Medical Malpractice
Because plaintiff's federal § 1983 claims will be dismissed, the Court will also
dismiss his remaining pendent state claim for medical malpractice. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (if federal
claims are dismissed before trial, remaining state claims should also be dismissed);
Hassett v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 851 F.2d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1988) (where
federal claims have been dismissed, district courts may decline jurisdiction over
pendent state claims as a matter of discretion).
In accordance with the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall pay an initial partial filing
fee of $1.75 within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed
to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to
include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number;
and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause
process to issue upon plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, because the allegations are
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legally frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction
over plaintiff's pendent state-law claim for medical malpractice, and that this claim
is DISMISSED, without prejudice.
A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 22nd day of March, 2012.

_________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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