Alade v. Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Inc. et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -....IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court is GRANTED. [Doc. 11] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, under 28 USC § 1447(c). An appropriate Order of Remand will accompany this Memorandum and Order.. Signed by Honorable Charles A. Shaw on 7/5/2012. (MRC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

OLADIMEJI JACOBS ALADE,
Plaintiff,
v.
BARNES-JEWISH HOSPITAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:12-CV-497 CAS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This removed matter is before the Court on plaintiff Oladimeji Jacobs Alade’s motion to
remand the case to state court. The motion is fully briefed and ready for decision. For the following
reasons, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and plaintiff’s
motion to remand must be granted.
Background
Plaintiff filed this action in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri,
alleging twenty-four state law counts against the defendants: assault (Counts I, XI), battery (Counts
II, XII), false imprisonment (Counts III, XIII), slander (Counts IV, VI, XIV, XVI), libel (Counts V,
VII, XV, XVII), injurious falsehood (Counts VIII, XVIII), invasion of privacy–tortious intrusion
into seclusion (Counts IX, XIX), invasion of privacy–publication of private facts (Counts X, XX),
intentional interference with business relations/expectancy (Count XXI), malicious prosecution
(Count XXII), civil conspiracy (Count XXIII), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count
XXIV).
Plaintiff’s Petition alleges that he began a Residency in Psychiatry with defendant BarnesJewish Hospital, Inc. (“BJH”) in June 2008 under the supervision of defendant Nuri B. Farber and,

at the time, he had a commission in the United States Army Reserve (“USAR”). Plaintiff alleges
that from the first year of his Residency, BJH and Farber showed hostility toward his military career,
and when plaintiff asked for time off in February 2009 for military duties, Farber told plaintiff his
request was “unprofessional” and that plaintiff “should not use any residency time for unprofessional
duties.” Petition at 4, ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff alleges that Farber then began searching for frivolous
reasons to label him as “unprofessional,” which was a pretext for punishing and frustrating
plaintiff’s military career. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Farber’s “‘unprofessionalism’ labels,”
he was placed on an “extra supervision” status. Plaintiff alleges that throughout the next two years
of his Residency, he was falsely accused of abandoning his post and committing HIPPA1 violations,
was placed on administrative leave, suspended from the Residency program, and placed on a
restrictive schedule. In February 2011, defendants informed plaintiff that a committee had decided
not to renew his contract for the fourth year, and that plaintiff would be dismissed from the
Residency program if he did not resign. Plaintiff resigned his Residency under pressure on March
4, 2011. Plaintiff alleges that Farber thereafter began spreading rumors that plaintiff had psychiatric
problems and was unfit to practice medicine.
Plaintiff was given a letter stating that his last day of employment was to be July 11, 2011.
On July 8, 2011, plaintiff was not scheduled to see any patients, but attended a colleague’s
retirement party at BJH dressed in his “military attire.” After leaving the party, plaintiff went to his
office to pack some of his things. There was a loud banging on plaintiff’s office door, and when he
opened the door, he saw a “large contingency” of BJH security personnel with their guns drawn and
pointed at him. The security personnel asked plaintiff if he was armed and he replied that he was

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HIPPA is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
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not. They told plaintiff he would be placed under arrest because, according to information they
received, plaintiff’s employment had been terminated weeks prior.
The security personnel stated they would call the police, and plaintiff agreed and sat down
on his chair waiting for the police to arrive. Immediately thereafter, someone among the security
personnel yelled “take him down,” and the “entire contingency of the BJH security personnel
descended on Plaintiff and beat him until he started going in and out of consciousness.” Petition at
9, ¶ 52. Plaintiff’s clothes were removed and his personal belongings were confiscated, including
his laptop computer.
During the beating, plaintiff developed chest pains, hyperventilated, and experienced a
syncope episode. Although there was an emergency room at BJH, the security personnel took
plaintiff to an outside hospital, transporting him with his hands cuffed to a stretcher. The security
personnel falsely told the EMS responders that plaintiff had a history of schizophrenia and had
multiple prior psychiatric hospitalizations. Plaintiff was taken against his will to John Cochran V.A.
Hospital and then was transferred to St. Louis University Hospital, where he was held for seven
hours before being cleared psychiatrically and discharged.
The next day, July 9, 2011, plaintiff and his brother went to BJH to obtain the return of his
computer and other belongings. They went to the Information Area and plaintiff called the Security
Office to request the return of his property. Plaintiff was informed that his belongings were with
“investigative services” and would not be returned. Plaintiff responded that BJH would hear from
his lawyer. Plaintiff and his brother went to the BJH cafeteria to purchase drinks and then
immediately exited the hospital. Shortly before they entered their car in the parking lot, they were
intercepted by BJH security personnel and plaintiff was seized and beaten. This incident was
captured on security video. Plaintiff was handcuffed and dragged, bleeding, to the BJH security
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center, where he was told he would be charged with six counts of third degree assault and one count
of trespassing. Plaintiff later learned that his picture had been posted at BJH with a warning that he
was not permitted to enter the hospital. Plaintiff had never been told he would not be allowed back
on the BJH grounds, and he knew that pursuant to the letter he received, his employment at BJH did
not officially end for two more days.
Plaintiff was taken against his will to St. Alexius Hospital, with his hands cuffed to the
stretcher, for another psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff was detained for twelve to fourteen hours
before he was evaluated by a psychiatrist at approximately midnight. Plaintiff was finally examined
and was deemed mentally and psychiatrically stable. He was then transported to jail, where he
remained until he was released on bond at approximately 3:30 p.m. on July 11, 2011. Plaintiff was
charged with six counts of assaulting BJH security officers and one count of trespass. The charges
were originally filed by St. Louis City but were converted to state charges. The six counts of assault
were dismissed by the prosecuting attorney after he viewed the videotape of the incident in the BJH
parking lot. The trespass charge was dismissed on December 6, 2011.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 9, 2011, the defendants falsely and maliciously reported
to federal authorities that plaintiff had made “threats” against the United States Government and
United States Army, specifically that plaintiff stated he “worships Osama bin Laden and that the
Fort Hood Army Major Hassan is his hero.” Petition at 14, ¶ 85. This false report triggered an
investigation of plaintiff by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Defense.
Plaintiff was ultimately cleared of all allegations, but the arrest and investigation records are now
part of plaintiff’s military and medical records.
Plaintiff alleges that he lost his job as a result of defendants’ actions, and that when he
applied to other schools to complete his psychiatric residency, defendants blocked his acceptance
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into those programs. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered permanent physical injuries and emotional
injuries as a result of defendants’ conduct, and that he is unable to work as a result of defendants’
false and malicious attempts to label him as mentally ill and mentally unstable, which diminished
his reputation in the medical and military communities. Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages
in each of the twenty-four counts.
Defendants Barnes-Jewish Hospital, BJC Health System, Inc. and Farber removed the action
to this Court on March 16, 2012. Although plaintiff’s Petition asserts only state law claims, the
defendants contend in the Notice of Removal that the Petition turns on substantial questions of
federal law because plaintiff’s factual allegations center on a theory that defendants targeted him
because of his participation in the U.S. Army in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4311, et seq. (“USERRA”). Thus, defendants contend
the petition creates substantial federal issues that confer federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
because the petition “alleges USERRA violations” and “raise[s] significant federal questions
concerning USERRA, its scope and application.” Defendant also assert that the Petition raises
significant federal questions that confer federal question jurisdiction with respect to the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (“EMTALA”). Plaintiff disagrees
and moves to remand the case to state court.
Discussion
The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that all prerequisites to jurisdiction
are satisfied. Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1969). Removal
statutes are strictly construed, and any doubts about the propriety of removal are resolved in favor
of state court jurisdiction and remand. Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of
London, 119 F.3d 619, 625 (8th Cir. 1997). In determining whether a claim “arises under” federal
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law, courts must be “mindful that the nature of federal removal jurisdiction—restricting as it does
the power of the states to resolve controversies in their own courts—requires strict construction of
the legislation permitting removal.” Nichols v. Harbor Venture, Inc., 284 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir.
2002) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941)).
The “mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer
federal-question jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986);
see also Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) (“Not every question of federal law
emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit.”) Federal jurisdiction exists
only in those circumstances where a federal question is presented by a well-pleaded complaint which
shows that either federal law creates the cause of action, or the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
The Supreme Court has called the latter category of federal question cases “special and
small,” Empire Healthchoice Assurance Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006), and has
cautioned that the substantial question of federal law exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule
“must be read with caution.” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809. The relevant inquiry is, “[D]oes a
state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a
federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg, 545 U.S.
308, 314 (2005).
Here, defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.
Although plaintiff’s Petition makes multiple, specific reference to federal statutes USERRA and
EMTALA, and alleges that defendant Farber and BJH showed hostility towards plaintiff’s military
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career, the underlying causes of action do not arise under USERRA or EMTALA within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. None of plaintiff’s claims include a federal cause of action under either
USERRA or EMTALA. All counts of the Petition assert state law claims. The Petition’s references
to alleged violations of USERRA and EMTALA by the defendants are part of the factual
background to plaintiff’s assault, battery, false imprisonment, and other state law claims.
This case is readily distinguishable from the Supreme Court’s Grable case, which is the
primary authority defendants cite to support removal. 545 U.S. 308. Grable was a quiet title action
in which Grable sued Darue to recover real property that the Internal Revenue Service seized to
satisfy Grable’s federal tax deficiency and then sold to Darue. Grable’s quiet title suit specifically
asserted that the IRS’s seizure of the property was invalid because the IRS failed to satisfy the notice
requirements of a federal statute. Grable, 545 U.S. at 310-11. The Supreme Court held that Grable
was properly removed from state court based on federal question jurisdiction even though the
petition only asserted a state law claim. This was because whether Grable was given notice within
the meaning of the federal statute was an essential element of its quiet title claim, the meaning of
the federal statute was actually in dispute, and that dispute was “the only legal or factual issue
contested in the case.” Id. at 315. The Court stated that the meaning of a federal tax law “is an
important issue of federal law that sensibly belongs in a federal court,” and noted the federal
government’s “strong interest in the prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes.” Id. Finally,
the Court determined that federal jurisdiction was “consistent with congressional judgment about
the sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing the application of § 1331,”
id. at 314-15, because only rare state title cases would raise a contested matter of federal law, and
thus federal jurisdiction over such cases would “portend only a microscopic effect on the federalstate division of labor.” Id. at 315.
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In Empire, the Supreme Court observed that Grable occupies a “special and small category”
of cases permitting removal where federal question jurisdiction is predicated on the centrality of a
federal issue, and “emphasized that it takes more than a federal element ‘to open the ‘arising under’
door.” 547 U.S. at 699 & n.5, 701 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 313). Central to Grable’s holding
is that the federal question at issue was “substantial” and a “nearly ‘pure issue of law,’” and its
resolution was “both dispositive of the case and would be controlling in numerous other cases.”
Empire, 547 U.S. at 700 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 313).
Here, in contrast, plaintiff alleges that defendants’ actions violated USERRA and EMTALA,
but does not assert a cause of action under those statutes. None of plaintiff’s state law claims are
based on alleged violations of these federal statutes. As discussed in plaintiff’s memorandum in
support of his motion to remand, plaintiff can establish the prima facie elements of each of his state
law claims without any reference to alleged violations of federal statutes. Plaintiff’s allegations that
the defendants mistreated him because of his military service in violation of USERRA merely form
part of the factual background of the case, by offering an explanation or motive for the defendants’
conduct. Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants violated EMTALA by sending him to other hospitals
for psychiatric evaluation appear to be superfluous, as plaintiff does not assert an EMTALA claim.2
In further contrast to Grable, all of plaintiff’s claims involve the actions of private
defendants, not a federal agency, and require a fact-specific inquiry into defendants’ conduct. The
resolution of plaintiff’s claims would not be controlling in numerous other cases, and this case does
not present a “nearly pure issue of law, one that could be settled once and for all and thereafter

2

The Court notes that plaintiff’s false imprisonment claims are not dependent on a violation
of EMTALA. Plaintiff could assert these claims if he had been held against his will for psychiatric
evaluation at BJH, rather than taken to other hospitals.
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would govern numerous [similar] cases.” Empire, 547 U.S. at 700 (internal quotation marks
omitted). This is the type of intentional tort case traditionally heard in state courts, and to entertain
this action in a federal forum based on federal question jurisdiction would disturb the “balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities,” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, as it would open the door to “a
potentially enormous shift of traditionally state court cases into federal courts.” Id. at 319.
The defendants assert that the “success of [plaintiff’s] state law claims necessarily turns on
the success of his core theory that Defendants violated federal law in retaliating against him.” Defs.’
Opp’n Mot. Remand at 6. Defendants support this assertion primarily by quoting the multiple
references to USERRA and EMTALA in the Petition. Defendants also state that their motive is at
issue in plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and for punitive
damages and, therefore, even if plaintiff’s references to federal statutes relate only to motive, motive
is at issue in the Petition.
While the defendants’ intent is an element of plaintiff’s IIED claim, see, e.g., Gibson v.
Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo. 1997) (en banc), the claim does not present a substantial federal
question. It is not necessary for plaintiff to prove that the defendants violated federal law to show
they acted with the intent to cause him severe emotional distress. Plaintiff’s IIED claim is nothing
like the quiet title claim in Grable, as it does not present a substantial question of federal law that
would be controlling in the case, but rather is a classic state court tort claim.
Defendants’ assertion concerning punitive damages also fails to establish federal question
jurisdiction. As a threshold matter, “There is no independent cause of action for punitive damages
under either federal or Missouri law.” Jackson v. Wiersema Charter Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 1310064,
at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 11, 2009). Defendants have cited no authority to show that a case may be
removed to federal court based on a type of recovery that is merely incidental to the cause of action.
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Further, plaintiff does not need to prove that the defendants violated federal law to establish that
they acted with an evil motive or with reckless indifference to his rights. See Gilliland v. Missouri
Athletic Club, 273 S.W.3d 516, 520 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (standard for imposition of punitive
damages under Missouri law).
Finally, defendants cite Yount v. FedEx Express, 2009 WL 4884418 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 7,
2009), in support of removal. Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Remand at 8. Defendants state that Yount was
properly removed to federal court where the plaintiff alleged violations of USERRA along with state
law retaliation claims. It is an unremarkable proposition that a case alleging a violation of USERRA
may be properly removed to federal court. In Yount, unlike this case, there was no dispute that the
plaintiff’s state petition contained a USERRA claim, and no dispute that removal was proper. Yount
did not concern a motion to remand or a dispute as to whether the plaintiff actually asserted a
USERRA claim, but rather addressed a motion to dismiss the USERRA and other claims as not
properly pleaded. Yount therefore offers no support for the removal of this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that defendants have failed to meet their
burden to prove that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied, as they have not shown that the
state law claims in plaintiff’s Petition necessarily raise a question of federal law so substantial and
disputed as to warrant the exercise of federal question jurisdiction. “This case cannot be squeezed
into the slim category Grable exemplifies.” Empire, 547 U.S. at 701. As a result, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over this case and it must be remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c). Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees associated with the removal will be denied.
Defendants’ motion for more definite statement remains pending for resolution by the state court
following remand.

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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to state court is
GRANTED. [Doc. 11]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the
City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
An appropriate Order of Remand will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

__________________________________
CHARLES A. SHAW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 5th day of July, 2012.

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