Minor v. Mid-Century Insurance Company
Filing
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OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 14], is granted. A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is entered this same date. 14 Signed by District Judge Henry E. Autrey on 2/12/14. (CLA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CONRAD MINOR,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
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No. 4:12CV549 HEA
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, [Doc. No. 14]. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion is granted.
Facts and Background1
Defendant Mid-Century Insurance Company issued policy number 14
16314-08-20, (Policy A) to Mark Miner2 and Theresa Miner, parents of Plaintiff.
Policy A was effective from December 30, 2009 through June 20, 2010. Defendant
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Defendant has filed a Statement of Uncontroverted Facts. Plaintiff, in contravention of
this Court’s Local Rule 7-4.01(E), failed to specifically controvert any of Defendant’s facts.
Likewise, Plaintiff failed to present his own Statement of Uncontroverted Facts. Consequently,
Defendant’s Statement of Uncontroverted Facts is taken as admitted by Plaintiff.
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Although the caption names Plaintiff Conrad Minor, the policies were issued to Mark
Miner. Defendant believes the correct spelling of Plaintiff’s last name is ‘Miner.”
also issued policy number 14 18405-36-20 (Policy B) to Mark Miner, Plaintiff’s
father. Policy B was effective from January 16, 2010 through July 16, 2010.
Defendant issued policy number 14 16892-97-09 (Policy C) to Mark Miner.
Policy C was effective from JANUARY 14, 2009 through May 14, 2010.
Defendant issued policy number 14 18388-51-89 (Policy D) to Mark Miner.
Policy D was effective from January 16, 2010 through June 16, 2010. Defendant
issued policy number 14 17559-64-23 (E) to Mark Miner. Policy E was effective
from December 16, 2009 through May 9, 2010.
Policies A, B, C, and D each include Endorsement MO 025, and Policy E
includes Endorsement E1179j, relating to under insured motorist coverage. The
language of the endorsements are identical:
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to
recover as damages from the owner or operator of an under insured
motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by an insured
person. The bodily injury must be caused by an accident, and arise
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the under insured motor
vehicle.
The policies define an under insured motor vehicle as:
Under insured motor vehicle--means a land motor vehicle to which a
bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the
accident but its limits for bodily injury liability are less than the limits
of liability for this coverage.
Each Policy’s limit of liability for under insured motorist coverage is
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$100,000.
On May 5, 2010, Plaintiff was seated on the trunk of a vehicle when the
driver, Taylor Cox, drove away and Plaintiff fell from the vehicle.
Cox was insured under two automobile liability insurance policies with
policy limits of $100,000 each. Plaintiff has been paid the policy limits of both of
Cox’s policies.
Cox’s two policies limits of $100,000 are equal to each of Defendant’s
policies. Taken together, Cox’s total policy limits of $200,000 is greater than
Defendant’s policy limits of $100,000.
Plaintiff’s accident did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
an “under insured motor vehicle,” as defined in Defendant’s policies.
The Limits of Liability section of the policies, paragraph e provides:
We will pay no more than the limits stated in the policy regardless of the
number of named insureds, insured vehicles in the household, insured
persons, claims, claimants, policies or under insured motor vehicles
involved in the occurrence.
The Other Insurance provision of the policies states:
1. If any other Underinsured Motorist Coverage applies to a loss
covered hereunder, we will pay only our share. Our share is the
proportion that our limits of liability for Underinsured Motorist
Coverage hear to the total of all applicable limits for Underinsured
Motorist Coverage
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2. We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than your
insured car or your insured motorcycle, unless the owner of that
vehicle has no other insurance applicable hereunder.
3. If any applicable insurance other than this policy is available to an
insured person through us or any other member company of the
Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable
among this policy and all other such policies shall not exceed the
limits provided for the single vehicle with the highest limits of
liability.
The policies contain separate provisions for uninsured motorists coverage
and underinsured motorists coverage. The Policies’ Declarations denominate the
underinsured motorists coverage separately from the uninsured motorists
coverage.
Summary Judgment Standard
The standards for summary judgment are well settled. In determining
whether summary judgment should issue, the Court must view the facts and
inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005). The moving
party has the burden to establish both the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. Once the moving
party has met this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in
his pleadings but by affidavit or other evidence must set forth specific facts
showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson
477 U.S. at 256; Krenik v. Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). “‘Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.’ Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).” Hitt v. Harsco Corp., 356 F.3d 920, 923
(8th Cir. 2004). An issue of fact is genuine when “a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party” on the question. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d at 990. To survive a motion for
summary judgment, the “nonmoving party must ‘substantiate his allegations with
sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor based on
more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.’ Wilson v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir. 1995)(quotation omitted).” Putman v. Unity
Health System, 348 F.3d 732, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2003). “[A] complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The Court will
review the facts in this case with the stated standards in mind.
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Discussion
This is a diversity case, and Missouri law applies. “As with any
other contract, the interpretation of an insurance contract is generally
a question of law, particularly in reference to the question of
coverage.” D.R. Sherry Constr., Ltd. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
316 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Mo.banc 2010), citing H.K. Porter Co. v.
Transit Cas. Co., 215 S.W.3d 134, 140–41 (Mo.App.2006). Missouri
courts interpret terms in an insurance contract according to their plain
meaning. Shahan v. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Mo.banc 1999).
“The plain or ordinary meaning is the meaning that the average
layperson would understand.” Id. Ambiguities are resolved in favor
of the insured. Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 509–10 (Mo.banc
2010). “Missouri ... strictly construes exclusionary clauses against the
drafter, who also bears the burden of showing the exclusion applies.”
Id. “Exclusion clauses are strictly construed against the insurer,
especially if they are of uncertain import.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Haas, 422 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Mo.1968); see also Bituminous Cas.
Corp. v. Walsh & Wells, Inc., 170 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Mo.App.1943).
Spirtas Co. v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 715 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2013).
In interpreting the policies at issue, the Court must adhere to certain rules.
“Rules governing the interpretation of insurance policies are well settled.” Shahan
v. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Mo. 1999) (en banc). In interpreting an
insurance contract, courts “read the contract as a whole and determine the intent of
the parties, giving effect to that intent by enforcing the contract as written.” Mo.
Employers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 149 S.W.3d 617, 625 (Mo.App. 2004).
Language used in an insurance contract is given its plain and ordinary meaning.
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Id.; Farmland Indus. Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo. 1997)
(en banc). Plain or ordinary meaning is the meaning that the average layperson
would understand, as determined by consulting standard English language
dictionaries. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d at 535. Where insurance contracts are written
in plain and unambiguous terms, the court must enforce the policy according to
those terms, Rice v. Fire Ins. Exch., 946 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Mo.App. 1997), and rules
of construction are inapplicable. Mansion Hills Condo. Ass'n v. Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 62 S.W.3d 633, 637 (Mo.App. 2001). The Court may not distort
unambiguous policy language to create an ambiguity. Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v.
Moore, 970 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Mo.App. 1998) (citing Krombach v. Mayflower Ins.
Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. 1992) (en banc)). Nor may a court “use its
inventive powers to ... rewrite a policy to provide coverage for which the parties
never contracted, absent a statute or public policy requiring coverage.” Lang v.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Mo.App. 1998) (citing
Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)).
In order to establish coverage under an insurance policy, plaintiffs are
required to establish: “(1) issuance and delivery of the policy; (2) payment of the
premium; (3) a loss caused by a peril insured against; and (4) notice and proof of
loss to the insurer. Kauble v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 637 S.W.2d 831, 832-33
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(Mo.App.1982).” Valentine-Radford, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co. 990
S.W.2d 47, 51 (Mo.App. W.D.,1999); Missouri Commercial Inv. Co. v.
Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 680 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Mo.App. E.D. 1984); Grossman
Iron & Steel Co. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 558 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Mo.App.1977).
The policy limits of all of Cox’s policies is not less than the coverage limits
of liability of Plaintiff’s underinsured motorist coverage, and therefore, Cox’s
vehicle is not an underinsured vehicle. Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co. of
America, 808 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. banc 1991).
Plaintiff argues that the Policy’s Limits of Liability section is ambiguous,
and that in the Liability section of the policy, the Other Insurance provision
renders the anti-stacking language of the policy ambiguous and unenforceable.
Plaintiff argues that in Defendant’s Limits of Liability section, paragraph a
indicates that it will pay the difference between the actual amount of his damages
and the amount that he has already been paid, or the limits of liability contained in
the policy, whichever is the lesser. According to Plaintiff, by the plain reading of
the language in paragraph a, a is not limited by paragraph c-h. Therefore,
according to Plaintiff, he is not limited by the anti-stacking language contained in
paragraph e.
Plaintiff strains to create an ambiguity. The policy language clearly
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indicates otherwise. Paragraph e, (the anti-stacking clause), clearly reinforces the
limits of liability stated in Paragraphs a and b. Under a and b, Defendant will pay
no more than the limits of liability. Paragraph e reiterates this. Defendant “will
pay no more than the limits stated in the policy regardless of” any other factors.
Nothing could be less ambiguous through repeating the intent that Defendant’s
limit of liability is the policy limit of $100,000 from wherever obtained.
Plaintiff also argues that the “Other Insurance” clause creates an ambiguity.
His reliance on Long v. Shelter Insurance Companies, 351 S.W.3d 692 (Mo App
2011) is misplaced. Unlike the Long other insurance clause, the Other Insurance
clause of Defendant’s policy at issue does not contain any “excess” language
which was the reason for the Long ambiguity. In the matter here, the policy
provides:
Other Insurance
1. If any other Under insured Motorist Coverage applies to a loss
covered herundre, we will pay only our share. Our share it the
proportion that our limits of liability for Underinsured Motorist
Coverage bear to the total of all applicable limits for Underinsured
Motorist Coverage.
2. We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than your
insured car or your insured motorcycle, unless the owner of that
vehicle has no other insurance applicable hereunder.
3. If any applicable insurance other than this policy is available to an
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insured person through us or any other member company of the
Farmers Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable
among this policy and all other such policies shall not exceed the
limits provided for the single vehicle with the highest limits of
liability.
The Other Insurance clause of Defendant’s policy at issue contains an
unambiguous anti-stacking provision, which is reinforced by paragraph e, of the
Limits of Liability section: We will pay no more than the limits stated in the policy
regardless of . . . policies. . .
Plaintiff points to page 6 of the insurance policy for his position that the
policy contains an “excess clause.” As Defendant correctly argues, the policy and
the underinsured motorist endorsement do not contain the “excess” language to
create an ambiguity. The Other Insurance clauses contain general anti-stacking
language that reinforces the anti-stacking clause of the Limits of Liability section.
Conclusion
In interpreting the insurance policy at issue, the unambiguous terms of that
policy establishes that the policy prohibits stacking of policies, and as such,
Plaintiff is not entitled to recover from Defendant because he has already received
an amount equal to the Limits of Liability in the policy.
Accordingly, defendants are entitled to judgments as a matter of law.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary
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Judgment, [Doc. No. 14], is granted.
A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is
entered this same date.
Dated this 11th day of February, 2014.
_______________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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