Amerson v. Russell

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Quinn Amerson's Petition [# 1 ] and Amended Petition [# 11 ] for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Amerson's Motion to Appoint Counsel [ # 4 ] is DENIED. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that this Court will not issue a certificate of appealability, as petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right. A separate judgment in accordance with this memorandum and order is entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on February 25, 2013. (BRP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

QUINN AMERSON,

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Petitioner,
vs.
TERRY RUSSELL,
Respondent.

Case No. 4:12-CV-0564 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se petitioner Quinn Amerson is currently incarcerated at the Eastern
Reception, Diagnostic, and Correctional Center in Bonne Terre, Missouri.
Amerson is serving consecutive sentences of life, for second-degree murder, and
10 years, for first-degree assault. As part of a plea bargain, he pled guilty to both
crimes in Missouri state court.
This matter is now before me on Amerson’s two petitions for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as well as his motion for appointment of counsel.
Because Amerson adequately addresses the grounds he wishes to raise and they
can be properly resolved on the basis of the state court record, I will deny his
request for counsel. See Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994).
Further, because the grounds raised by Amerson are either procedurally defaulted
or do not warrant habeas relief, I will deny his petitions.

I.

Factual Background
At petitioner’s plea hearing, the prosecutor summarized the facts as follows.

Petitioner’s cousin Tina Amerson was in a violent and unhappy relationship with
Dary McIntyre. On April 6, 2008, Tina Amerson cut McIntyre with a knife, and
petitioner and another cousin, Shannon Amerson, beat and kicked McIntyre until
he was unconscious. Then the two men loaded McIntyre into the back of a truck,
which petitioner’s cousin Shannon drove to a Mississippi River levee. Petitioner
accompanied his cousin, driving McIntyre’s car. When they arrived at the levee,
they put McIntyre and his car into the water. Afterwards, they returned to Tina
Amerson’s residence, where petitioner washed McIntyre’s blood out of the truck.
McIntyre’s body was eventually found, and an autopsy revealed multiple
knife and stab wounds, as well as blunt force trauma to his head. The autopsy
showed, however, that the cause of McIntyre’s death was drowning.
II.

Procedural History
Petitioner was initially charged with five counts in connection with

McIntyre’s death, including first-degree murder. On July 1, 2009, during
petitioner’s plea hearing, the prosecutor entered an amended information in
accordance with a plea bargain the two sides had reached. The amended
information charged petitioner with second-degree murder, in violation of Mo.

–2–

Rev. Stat. § 565.021,1 and first-degree assault, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. §
565.050.2
Petitioner Amerson, through his defense attorney, waived a formal reading
of the new charges. As relevant here, the amended information stated that
Amerson had committed second-degree murder by “knowingly caus[ing] the death
of Dary W. McIntyre by drowning him.” (Id., p. 12.) In accordance with the plea
agreement, the prosecutor recommended sentencing caps of life and 10 years,
respectively, to be served consecutively.
On that same date, Amerson submitted a written petition to enter a guilty
plea. He signed the petition, indicating that he had read the charges against him,
discussed them with his attorney, and “fully under[stood] every charge made
against” him. He wrote that:
On or about April 6, 2008, I caused serious physical injury to Dary
McIntyre by hitting & kicking him, & that on the same date I, together
with Shannon Amerson, & Tina Amerson caused the death of Darry
McIntyre.
He also signed that he understood his right to a trial and the State’s burden of
proof, and that his attorney had counseled and advised him “on the nature of each
charge” and “all possible defenses” he might have. Finally, he signed that he was
1

In relevant part, the statute states, “1. A person commits the crime of murder in the
second degree if he: (1) Knowingly causes the death of another person or, with the purpose of
causing serious physical injury to another person, causes the death of another person . . . .”
2

Amerson has not challenged the adequacy of his guilty plea to first-degree assault.
–3–

satisfied with his attorney, wished to plead guilty because he was guilty, and
agreed that:
I OFFER MY PLEA OF GUILTY FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY
AND OF MY OWN ACCORD AND WITH FULL UNDERSTANDING
OF ALL THE MATTERS SET FORTH IN THE (INFORMATION)
AND IN THIS PETITION.
(Id., p. 17.)
During the plea hearing, the plea court asked Amerson if he had been able
to read and understand the petition to plead guilty and whether he had been
satisfied with his attorney. Amerson answered in the affirmative. The plea court
also asked the prosecutor to state the facts the State would expect to prove at trial.
The prosecutor described the April 6, 2008 incident and, as is relevant here, stated
that an autopsy showed McIntyre had stab wounds and blunt trauma to the head,
but that his actual cause of death was drowning. The court then asked Amerson
whether he agreed with what the prosecutor had said:
[THE COURT]: Is that essentially what happened in this case?
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Can I answer on his behalf, Judge?
[THE COURT]: Sure.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: It is pretty much. There is some differences
in the factual, as far as what Mr. Amerson perceived. His perception
was that the stab wounds would have been the actual cause of death.
From his perception the body was already dead.
But Mr. Amerson understands and realizes at trial the experts that
would be called to testify would say . . . drowning was the actual cause
of death, and that is why we’re here entering this plea of guilty. But Mr.
–4–

Amerson’s perspective on that date was it was a dead body that he was
transporting.
[PROSECUTOR]: But that would not be – Our evidence would be that
there at the time before he was put into the river, Dary McIntyre, that he
was breathing, and that both these defendants knew it and in some
fashion saw he was breathing.
[THE COURT]: Okay. Whether or not, the essential elements of the
case, which would be the assault, the beating or the hitting or kicking,
do you agree with the Prosecutor’s statement that those things
happened?
[AMERSON]: Yes.
[THE COURT]: Okay. And did you agree with the Prosecutor’s
statement that on or about the 6th day of April 2008 you, acting alone
or in association with other people, may have caused, knowingly caused
the Defendant, Dary W. McIntyre. You disagree that he drowned. But
as your lawyer explained, the expert would come in and say that was the
cause of death. Do you have any dispute that the expert would come in
and say that that is what actually caused his death?
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Do you have a dispute with that?
[AMERSON]: No.
[THE COURT]: Okay. And the facts that the Prosecuting Attorney said
where Mr. McIntyre’s body was placed into the waters of the
Mississippi River, do you have any dispute with that?
[AMERSON]: Yes.
[THE COURT]: You disagree that his body somehow got into the river?
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: You or acting in concert with others. The
body was found in the river; is that correct?
[AMERSON]: Yes.
–5–

[THE COURT]: But you didn’t –
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: He denies personally putting the body in the
water, but he was with the other person when the body –
[THE COURT]: You may have seen somebody else put the body in the
river, but you were actually out there with them; is that right?
[AMERSON]: Yes.
[THE COURT]: Okay. I think that is sufficient to make the elements of
the alleged Court I and Count II that are described.
Do you remember when I asked you to raise your right hand and
promise to tell us the truth? Has everything you told us so far today
been the truth?
[AMERSON]: Yes.
[THE COURT]: Nobody has asked you to come in and tell a lie or take
the blame for somebody else, have they?
[AMERSON]: No, sir.
[THE COURT]: Your plea on Count I, the class A felony of assault in
the first degree, and Count II, the class A felony of murder in the second
degree, both occurring on or about April 6, 2008, in Pemiscot County,
involving a person by the name of Dary McIntyre, were you guilty or not
guilty of those offenses?
[AMERSON]: I don’t allegedly kill him.
[THE COURT]: Do what?
[AMERSON]: Not on killing him, not on allegedly killing him. But,
like beating him, and, you know, driving his car.
[THE COURT]: So you say, yeah, you were involved in the hitting and
kicking, that kind of stuff?
[AMERSON]: Yes.
–6–

[THE COURT]: And you were involved in – You or other people that
you were with were involved in placing his body in the Mississippi
River?
[AMERSON]: Yes.
[THE COURT]: And that he did die. You believe that that did happen?
[AMERSON]: Yes.
[THE COURT]: Alright. I guess you have explained to him kind of
acting alone or in concert with other people.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Yes, sir.
[THE COURT]: That he can be held responsible for the actions of other
people if he knew what was going on, participating in the events.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Yes. And the evidence that may contradict
his versions of events, yes.
(Id., pp. 30–34.) The plea court then accepted Amerson’s guilty plea, finding that
it was made voluntarily with the understanding of the nature of the charges against
him, the range of punishment for such charges.
A.

Sentencing Hearing
At his sentencing hearing on November 19, 2009, Amerson stated that he

“unintentionally took [McIntyre’s] life” and that “Mr. Dary’s death was
unintentional.” (Resp. Ex. A, L. F. p. 54.) The prosecutor stated that he took issue
with the characterization of the killing as “unintentional.” In response, the
sentencing court addressed defense counsel:
–7–

THE COURT: Alright. Your client says he didn’t intend to commit this
act. Does he not want to go to trial? Isn’t intent one of the elements the
State would have to prove in the conviction of a guy?
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Yes, Judge. And I think that . . . when we
talk about intent, there is a type of intent that he would sit around and
plan, well, he is going to be coming by here tomorrow. I want to make
sure I jump him on that day. . . . .
And there is also the level of intent, that is more applicable to this
case. They are at this party. He is under the influence of drugs and
alcohol. Judge, his responsibility in the role, he is not shirking the
matter at all. He understands that. That is why he has pled guilty. He
is accepting responsibility.
But he was at a party. Everyone was under the influence of drugs
and alcohol. An[d] altercations happened between this Dary McIntyre
and his cousin. There is a long history of violence there. He and his
cousin, Shannon, thought they had to intervene in that. There was a
fight. As [the prosecutor] said, Shannon and Quinn, Quinn more
importantly, involved fists and involved kicking.
And at some point there was involvement with Tina with a knife.
Yes, unconscious to the doctor, to the medical physician, Dary McIntyre
at the scene of the assault is laying there unconscious to the doctor. To
the people standing there, Quinn thought he was dead then.
There was a twenty-minute ride out there. Quinn – And again,
Judge, this doesn’t justify his actions of taking the body twenty minutes
away. He was not planning to throw – He did not spend twenty minutes
planning to throw a live person into the water and cause the drowning.
That is what Mr. Amerson thinks of as not did not intend to cause the
death.
THE COURT: Alright. Any legal cause or reason why sentence and
judgment should not now be pronounced?
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: No, Judge.
(Id., pp. 57–59.)
The court pronounced consecutive sentences of life for second-degree
murder, plus ten years for first-degree assault, as recommended by the prosecutor.
–8–

The court acknowledged that this was the same sentence Amerson’s cousin
Shannon had received after being convicted by a jury. The court stated that it
didn’t “see much difference between Shannon’s participation and Quinn’s
participation. They seem to be just about equal.” (Id., p. 59.)
B.

Motion for Post-Conviction Relief
On February 2, 2012, Amerson filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside or

correct his judgment or sentence under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035.
After he was appointed counsel, he amended his motion. In the amended motion,
Amerson argued he was entitled to post-conviction relief because the plea court
had accepted his guilty plea to the second-degree murder charge without a factual
basis. (See generally id., pp. 73–82.) Therefore, he contended, the plea court had
failed to comply with Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.02(e)3 and as such, had
violated his state and federally protected rights to due process and equal
protection. Through his appointed counsel, Amerson wrote, “The Court never
ascertained that Movant knowingly cause the death of Dary W. McIntyre. In fact,
the Court and the parties forged ahead in the face of Movant’s abject denial of
intending to kill McIntyre.” (Id., p. 78.) (emphasis in original).

3

Rule 24.02(e) states, “The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless
it determines there is a factual basis for the plea.”
–9–

On December 29, 2010, the motion court denied Amerson’s Rule 24.035
motion without a hearing. The motion court held that:
The facts recited at the plea hearing provided a valid basis to conclude
defendant was criminally responsible for murder in the second degree
as charged in Count 2 of the amended information. Defendant admitted
that he personally took part in hitting, kicking, and beating McIntyre.
He further admitted that he drove the victim’s car out to the levee,
accompanying his cousin who was driving their SUV with the victim in
the back. It can be inferred that the purpose of taking two separate
vehicles was that Quinn Amerson intended to dispose of the victim’s car
and would need to ride back with his cousin Shannon in the SUV. From
Movant’s admitted participation in both the assault and the subsequent
attempt to conceal the assault by disposing of both the victim and his car
in a location where they would not be found for some time, the plea
court could quite easily conclude that the facts showed more than “mere
presence” and adequately demonstrated Movant’s criminal responsibility
for the act of dumping the victim into the river.
Movant understood the nature of the charges as filed in the amended
information. At the plea hearing, the state explained what they expected
the evidence to be were the case to go to trial, and Movant and his
defense counsel took an active part in that discussion. Discussion was
held on the record about criminal responsibility for the conduct of
others, and defense counsel affirmed that he had previously discussed
that legal theory with his client.
The plea hearing was not constitutionally defective, and therefore the
Movant is not entitled to relief under Rule 24.035.
(Id., pp. 87–88.) (paragraph numbers omitted).
On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District affirmed
per curiam, holding that the motion court had not clearly erred in denying
Amerson’s Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief. In a memorandum
opinion, the Court of Appeals wrote that:
– 10 –

Movant’s burden . . . is to prove both (1) non-compliance with Rule
24.02(e) and (2) that such failure deprived him or her of the actual
knowledge of the factual basis for the charge, thereby rendering his or
her plea unknowing and involuntary and, thus, unconstitutional. . . .
The plea record demonstrates neither an insufficient factual basis for
the plea nor that Movant lacked actual knowledge of the factual basis
for the charge.
(Resp. Ex. D., Amerson v. State, No. SD31126 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2011), at *3
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (italics in original)). The appellate
court noted that at the plea hearing, Amerson “admitted substantial participation in
the crimes and virtually all facts alleged by the state.” Id. Further, the court
reasoned, Amerson had admitted in his plea petition that “he had been advised of
the nature of the charges” and “he was pleading guilty because he was guilty.” Id.
III.

Grounds Raised
Amerson now seeks federal habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In

a petition filed March 26, 2012, he asserted one ground:
(1) The plea court clearly erred by accepting his guilty plea without an
adequate factual basis, thereby violating Amerson’s federal Constitutional rights.
In a later-filed document that Amerson styled as “Petitioner’s First
Amended Writ for Petition of Habeas Corpus,” he asserted an additional ground
for relief:
(2) The trial court was without jurisdiction to convict and sentence him
because the amended information to which he pled guilty did not reflect an
– 11 –

accomplice liability theory and constituted a “variance” from the facts pled by the
State during his sentencing hearing.
IV.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Amerson has also requested court-appointed counsel. There is no

constitutional right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings. See Blair v.
Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1332 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 825
(1991). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2), a court may nonetheless appoint counsel
for a habeas petitioner if it “determines that the interests of justice so require.”
Except when an evidentiary hearing is held, a district court may use its discretion
in deciding whether to appoint counsel. See Abdullah v. Norris, 18 F.3d 571, 573
(8th Cir. 1994). To determine whether appointment of counsel is warranted, the
district court should examine the nature of the litigation, the litigant's ability to do
research and present his claims, and the complexity of the issues. See id.;
Hoggard, 29 F.3d at 471.
I believe Amerson has adequately presented the issues he wishes to raise.
His pleadings are comprehensible and include ample references to both the state
court record and the law upon which Amerson relies. See Glass v. Higgins, 959
F.2d 88, 90 (8th Cir. 1992). He has clearly delineated his alleged grounds for
relief, and neither of his two claims appears legally or factually complex. I do not

– 12 –

believe that either the interests of justice or due process requires the appointment
of counsel, so I will deny the motion.
V.

Petitions for Habeas Relief
A state prisoner must exhaust his state-court remedies before turning to the

federal courts for habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This requirement gives the
State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’
federal rights” by alerting the state courts to the federal nature of the prisoner’s
claims. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
To fulfill the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner must have “fairly
presented” his claim in the state courts. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275
(1971). “Fairly presented” means that the state prisoner must “refer to a specific
federal constitutional right, a particular constitutional provision, a federal
constitutional case, or a state case raising a pertinent federal constitutional issue.”
Abdullah v. Groose, 75 F.3d 408, 411–12 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The prisoner
must fairly present “not only the facts, but also the substance of his federal habeas
corpus claim.” Id. at 411. If the state-law claim presented by the prisoner in state
court was “merely similar to the federal habeas claim,” the prisoner has not
satisfied the “fairly presented” requirement. Id. at 412.
A.

Ground Raised in Amended Petition is Procedurally Defaulted
– 13 –

I will consider the ground Amerson raised in his amended petition first.
Amerson did not raise this ground for relief – that the amended information varied
too substantially from the facts pled at his plea hearing – on his appeal from the
denial of post-conviction relief. Because Amerson did not appeal this claim, he
did not give the Missouri Court of Appeals the opportunity to consider this claim
and correct it if it were wrong. The time to do so has expired. See Wilson v. State,
177 S.W.3d 852, 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 75.01).
Therefore, he has procedurally defaulted on this claim. Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28
F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1994) (to avoid default, claim presented to trial court must
be renewed at appellate court level). See also Sweet v. Devo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1150
(8th Cir. 1997) (claim not raised on post-conviction appeal deemed abandoned).
In order to overcome procedural default, Amerson would have to
demonstrate cause for the default and prejudice from an alleged violation of the
Constitution, or he would have to show that failure to consider the claims would
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 750 (1991). To demonstrate cause, a petitioner must show that “some
objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] efforts to comply” with the
state's procedural rules. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
Amerson argues that he has been “greatly prejudiced” in that he was
convicted and sentenced by a court without jurisdiction. He finds fault with the
– 14 –

amended information, which contained no facts suggesting that Amerson had
acted with others in causing McIntyre’s death. Amerson argues that this
information was defective because it did not put him on notice that he would have
to defend against the accomplice liability theory the State presented at his plea
hearing. Regardless, Amerson does not point to any evidence within or outside of
the record to show – or even attempt to explain4 – why I should excuse procedural
default on the claim he raises in his second ground for relief. He therefore has not
met the “cause” prong of the Coleman test, and he cannot overcome procedural
default that way.
To rely upon the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception to
procedural default, a petitioner must “present new evidence that affirmatively
demonstrates that he is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.” Abdi v.
Hatch, 450 F.3d 334, 338 (8th Cir. 2006). A review of the record shows that
Amerson has not provided any new evidence – much less exculpatory evidence –
that would entitle him to relief from default under this exception.

4

In his amended petition, Amerson cites Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
Construing that petition extremely liberally, see Frey v. Schuetzle, 78 F.3d 359, 361 (8th Cir.
1996), it is possible Amerson intended to state obliquely that the “cause” of his procedural
default was the ineffectiveness of his post-conviction counsel. Regardless, Martinez provides no
help, as it only recognizes such cause when the underlying constitutional claim is ineffective
assistance at trial. Id. See also Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 2012)
(“Martinez offers no support . . . for the contention that the failure to preserve claims on appeal
from a postconviction proceeding can constitute cause.”).
– 15 –

Because it has been procedurally defaulted, I will deny habeas relief on the
ground Amerson raised in his amended petition. See also Weiland v. Parratt, 530
F.2d 1284, 1289 (8th Cir. 1976) (habeas petitioner’s constitutional right to know
the nature of charges he faced did not include right to know he was charged as an
accomplice).
B.

Ground Raised in Original Petition Is Without Merit
In his original habeas petition, Amerson raises an additional ground for

relief. That ground has both state-law and federal-law components. Amerson first
claims the state courts violated Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.02(e), in that
there was no adequate factual basis for his guilty plea to the second-degree murder
charge. That claim is not cognizable. It constitutes an allegation of state-law
error, which is not a basis for habeas relief. Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16
(2010). See also Cranford v. Lockhart, 975 F.2d 1347, 1349 (8th Cir. 1992) (state
court's failure to comply with state rule requiring factual basis for guilty plea does
not deprive defendant of due process, and thus does not warrant habeas relief);
Price v. State, 137 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (Rule 24.02(e) is not
“constitutionally based”).
Amerson also appears to allege that – as a result of the insufficient factual
basis – his plea could not have been knowing and voluntary. Assuming without

– 16 –

deciding that Amerson has exhausted his state remedies as to the federal nature of
this claim, it still does not support his request for habeas relief.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court may grant habeas relief on a
claim decided on the merits in state court only if that adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). “A state court decision is contrary to clearly
established federal law only if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to
that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently that the Supreme Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Restucci v. Spencer, 249 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42 (8th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
It is clearly established federal law that a guilty plea must be knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747–48
nn.4–6 (1970) (collecting cases); United States v. Ochoa-Gonzalez, 598 F.3d
1033, 1036 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618
(1998)). Constitutionally, a guilty plea is not voluntary if induced by threats,
misrepresentation, or improper promises. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 619. A guilty plea
– 17 –

cannot be intelligent unless the defendant first receives “real notice of the true
nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized
requirement of due process.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618 (quoting Smith v. O'Grady,
312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)). In order for a plea to be found invalid on this basis,
the defendant must have had “such an incomplete understanding of the charge that
his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.” Ivy v. Caspari, 173
F.3d 1136, 1142 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645
n.13 (1976)).
Amerson does not allege that his plea was involuntary in the sense that it
was induced by threats or improper promises. Rather, he claims that he has never
admitted to knowingly killing McIntyre as required for a conviction for seconddegree murder under Missouri law. He argues that this allowed him to be
“convicted and then sentenced for an offense [whose] nature he did not
understand.” (Pet., Supp. Attach., p. 4.) At best, Amerson is conflating the
constitutional requirement that he be notified of the nature of the charges he faced
and his preference that he agree with those charges. Due process only requires the
former.
In Henderson, the United States Supreme Court granted habeas relief to a
state prisoner who, like Amerson, argued that he did not understand the nature of
the second-degree murder charge he faced. In that case, the prisoner had never
– 18 –

been informed that intent to cause death was an element of the offense. The Court
distinguished that situation from cases where “the record contains either an
explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense
counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused.” 426
U.S. at 647. See also Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005)
(characterizing the Henderson decision).
Here, the record contains an explicit statement that intent (namely, that
Amerson “knowingly” killed McIntyre) was an element of the second-degree
murder charge.5 The amended information to which Amerson pled guilty
accurately reflected that element. Amerson, through counsel, waived a formal
reading of the amended information. The plea court verified multiple times that
Amerson wished to plead guilty despite Amerson’s contention that the
prosecutor’s facts about how McIntyre died were wrong. Amerson himself
indicated in his written plea petition that he wished to plead guilty because he was
guilty, and he averred that counsel had explained the nature of the charges against
him. In addition, defense counsel represented that he had informed Amerson

5

At sentencing, the court stated, “Your client says he didn’t intend to commit this act.
Does he not want to go to trial? Isn’t intent one of the elements the State would have to prove in
the conviction of a guy?” Defense counsel responded, “Yes, Judge.” (Resp. Ex. A, L. F. pp.
57–58.) In light of that exchange, it would strain common sense to contend that defense counsel
had not informed Amerson of intent element. See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 (even where there
is no such representation on the record, “it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases
defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused
notice”).
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about accomplice liability under Missouri law. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 562.041
(responsibility for conduct of another). The record, taken in its entirety, refutes
Amerson’s contention that he did not understand the nature of the charges to
which he pled guilty. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969) (record
must affirmatively disclose that guilty plea was knowing and voluntary).
C.

Alford Plea
It is worth noting that a defendant need not admit to each element of a crime

in order to enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. See North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). In Alford, the Supreme Court held that a
court may constitutionally accept the guilty plea of a defendant who has not
expressly admitted guilt, as long as his guilty plea represents “a voluntary and
intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to defendant.” Id. at
31. However, if a defendant pleads guilty while protesting innocence, a factual
basis for the guilty plea is constitutionally required. See, e.g., White v. United
States, 858 F.2d 416, 417 n.2 (8th Cir. 1988).
Even if Amerson had intended to enter an Alford plea, the record indicates
there was a constitutionally sufficient factual basis for the court to determine that
his plea was knowing and voluntary. The plea court inquired at length into the
strength of the State’s evidence, including the expected expert testimony that
drowning was McIntyre’s cause of death. After explaining on the record
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Amerson’s version of the facts, defense counsel acknowledged he had discussed
that evidence with his client, and he stated affirmatively that Amerson wanted to
plead guilty. (Id., p. 34.) When the sentencing court effectively offered Amerson
the chance to withdraw his plea (by stating at the sentencing hearing, “Does he not
want to go to trial?”), defense counsel – without objection by Amerson – told the
court to proceed with sentencing. (Id., p. 59.) Amerson repeatedly stated that he
was satisfied with his counsel. (Resp. Ex. A, L. F. pp. 26, 60–62.) All of this
demonstrates that Amerson intelligently pled guilty to second-degree murder,
regardless of whether he admitted to each element of that offense. See Bradshaw,
545 U.S. at 184 (under Ohio law, defendant’s “steadfast assertion” that he did not
shoot victim was not inconsistent with an admission to specific intent to cause
death).
Regardless of the nature of Amerson’s plea, there is enough to satisfy the
due process requirement that Amerson receive “real notice of the true nature of the
charge against him.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618. It is true that colloquy between
Amerson and the motion court at his plea hearing was not ideal.6 Nonetheless, the
record – including the admissions by Amerson in his written plea petition and the

6

For example, Amerson never voiced that he was guilty in response to an inquiry by the
plea court. In response to the plea court’s question “. . . were you guilty or not guilty of those
offenses?,” Amerson stated, “I don’t allegedly kill him.” (Resp. Ex. A., L. F. p. 33.) But see also
Thundershield v. Solem, 565 F.2d 1018, 1021–25 (8th Cir. 1977) (denying habeas relief to
petitioner whose guilty pleas were accepted after similar colloquy).
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representations of defense counsel at the plea and sentencing hearings –
inescapably supports the fact that Amerson’s guilty pleas were knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.
I cannot find that the state court adjudication ran contrary to any clearly
established federal law. Therefore, habeas relief is not warranted on either of the
grounds Amerson has presented.
IV.

Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals

from the final order in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding unless a circuit justice or
judge issues a Certificate of Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To grant
such a certificate, the justice or judge must find a substantial showing of the denial
of a federal constitutional right. Id. § 2253(c)(2). See also Tiedeman v. Benson,
122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). A substantial showing is a showing that issues
are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently,
or the issues deserve further proceedings. Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th
Cir. 1997). I find that reasonable jurists could not differ on either of Amerson’s
claims, so I will deny a Certificate of Appealability on both claims.
Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Quinn Amerson’s Petition [#1] and
Amended Petition [#11] for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Amerson’s Motion to Appoint Counsel
[#4] is DENIED.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that this Court will not issue a certificate of
appealability, as petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
federal constitutional right.
A separate judgment in accordance with this memorandum and order is
entered this same date.

_______________________________
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 25th day of February, 2013.

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