C.R. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co.

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants motion to deny Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment as premature is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 30.) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for partial summaryjudgment is DENIED without prejudice to Plaintiffs right to assert the arguments therein at an appropriate time in the proceedings, after Defendant has had a full and fair opportunity to complete discovery related to the issues. (Doc. No. 24.). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/14/13. (JWJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

M.R., as next friend of C.R.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:12CV0632 AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This diversity case involving underinsured motorist coverage is before the Court
on the motion of Plaintiff M.R., as next friend of C.R., for partial summary judgment
(Doc. No. 24); and the related motion of Defendant Twin City Fire Insurance Co. (“Twin
City”) to deny or continue Plaintiff’s motion pending further discovery (Doc. No. 30).
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion will be granted and Plaintiff’s
motion will be denied without prejudice.
On May 1, 2011, C.R. was injured in an accident when a car driven by Daniel
Torrence hit a Ford Escort driven by Holly Duncan, in which C.R. was a back-seat
passenger. After the collision, Plaintiff was trapped in his seat and his friend, a minor,
who was seated next to Plaintiff at the time of the collision, died while seated next to him.
The Ford Escort was owned by Duncan’s parents, Charles and Karen Brown. Twin City
provided automobile liability insurance covering the Ford Escort and two other cars
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owned by the Browns. The policy provided for underinsured motorist protection.
Plaintiff alleges that the accident was caused by Torrence’s negligence and resulted in
pain, suffering, and severe bodily injuries to C.R. Plaintiff further alleges that Torrence’s
insurance coverage was insufficient to cover C.R.’s damages. Plaintiff settled claims
against Torrence for the limit of Torrence’s insurance coverage. In the present action,
Plaintiff seeks damages under the underinsured motorist provision of the Twin City
policy issued to the Browns. Based on an amended complaint, filed on August 13, 2012,
Plaintiff also seeks damages for Twin City’s alleged vexatious refusal to pay C.R. under
the underinsured motorist provision.
The Case Management Order issued in this case sets a discovery deadline of June
14, 2013, and a deadline for motions for summary judgment of June 28, 2013. Plaintiff’s
motion for partial summary judgment was filed on November 12, 2012. Plaintiff asks the
Court to decide two legal issues: (1) whether the underinsured motorist provision
excludes a claim for emotion distress; and (2) whether the insurance policy prohibits
“stacking” of underinsured motorist coverage. In response, Twin City has filed a motion
under Rule 56(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., asking the Court to deny Plaintiff’s motion as
premature or continue consideration of Plaintiff’s motion, noting that it has not had
sufficient time to conduct discovery. Twin City has identified specific discovery it has
requested from Plaintiff that bears on the issues raised by Plaintiff.
The Court agrees with Twin City that neither of the issues raised by Plaintiff is ripe

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for judicial determination at this point. The discovery Twin City seeks could impact the
Court’s ruling on these two issues and whether the Court even needs to reach the legal
issues. As such, both legal issues are only potential issues, with Plaintiff seeking what
essentially amounts to an advisory opinion by the Court. Furthermore, until the
completion of this discovery, Twin City cannot be expected to fully respond to the
motion. Summary judgement is not proper if the nonmoving party has not yet had
adequate time for discovery. Robinson v. Terex Corp., 439 F.3d 465, 467 (8th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to deny Plaintiff’s motion
for partial summary judgment as premature is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 30.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment is DENIED without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to assert the arguments therein
at an appropriate time in the proceedings, after Defendant has had a full and fair
opportunity to complete discovery related to the issues. (Doc. No. 24.)

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 14th day of January, 2013.

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