WALLER v. ST CHARLES COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al.,

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall docket this case as Bryon Dean Waller v. St. Charles County Sheriff's Office and John Doe Sheriff. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause pro cess to issue upon the amended complaint, because the allegations are legally frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by Honorable E. Richard Webber on May 15, 2012. (MCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
BYRON DEAN WALLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ST. CHARLES COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 4:12CV00716 ERW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon transfer from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida.1
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed
in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action is malicious if it is
undertaken for the purpose of harassing the named defendants and not for the purpose

Prior to transferring the instant case, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida granted plaintiff in forma pauperis status and collected
his initial partial filing fee.
1

of vindicating a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63
(E.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd 826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987). An action fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570
(2007).
Moreover, in reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court
must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the
plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 32 (1992).
The Amended Complaint
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Suwannee Correctional Institution Annex in Live Oak,
Florida, seeks monetary relief in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against defendants John
Doe (Sheriff) and St. Charles County Sheriff's Office. Plaintiff alleges that the St.
Charles County Sheriff's Office and "detectives and officers who were employed by
[the Sheriff's Office] . . . failed to shut down a critical drug house," causing the
wrongful death of plaintiff's son, James Byron Waller. Plaintiff claims that the drug
house was "under a lengthy investigation by the St. Charles County Sheriff's Office's
Drug Task [F]orce," and that this on-going investigation caused his son's death.
Plaintiff contends that defendants should have "shut down or busted this critical drug
2

house" and that they "showed negligence, willingly and recklessly by allowing this drug
house to operate."
Discussion
Having carefully reviewed the complaint, the Court will dismiss this action
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). As with police departments, a sheriff's office is not a
suable entity under § 1983. See De La Garza v. Kandiyohi County Jail, 2001 WL
987542, at *1 (8th Cir. 2001) (sheriff's departments and police departments are not
usually considered legal entities subject to suit under § 1983); see also Ketchum v. City
of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992)(police departments are not
suable entities under § 1983). Furthermore, mere negligence does not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (mere negligence is not cognizable as
Eighth Amendment violation); Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 188 n.3 (8th Cir.
1986)(Fourteenth amendment due process clause is not implicated by state official’s
negligent act causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property).
Moreover, "[l]iability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct
responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights." Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d
1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir.
1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983 where plaintiff fails to allege defendant was
personally involved in or directly responsible for incidents that injured plaintiff); Boyd
3

v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995)(theory of supervisory liability is inapplicable
in § 1983 suits). Plaintiff does not set forth any facts indicating that the defendant John
Doe sheriff was directly involved in or personally responsible for the violation of
plaintiff's constitutional rights. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims are legally frivolous.
As an additional ground for dismissing this action, the Court notes that plaintiff
is bringing this action against the John Doe sheriff in his official capacity. See
Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995)(where a
complaint is silent about defendant’s capacity, Court must interpret the complaint as
including official-capacity claims); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989).
Official-capacity suits are tantamount to suits brought directly against the public entity
of which the official is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). To
state a claim against a public entity or a government official in his or her official
capacity, a plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of the public entity was
responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 473
(1985); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
Because plaintiff does not claim that a public entity’s policy or custom was responsible
for the alleged constitutional violations, the complaint fails to state a claim or cause of
action under § 1983 as to the John Doe defendant in his official capacity. In addition,
plaintiff's conclusory assertion that the St. Charles County Sheriff's Office "created a
policy or custom under which Constitutional rights were violated" is not entitled to an
4

assumption of truth and is insufficient to state a claim or cause of action under § 1983
as to the individual John Doe defendant in his official capacity. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009)(legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action that are supported by mere conclusory statements are not
entitled to the assumption of truth).
For these reasons, this action is legally frivolous and will be dismissed, without
prejudice, under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall docket this case as
Bryon Dean Waller v. St. Charles County Sheriff's Office and John Doe Sheriff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause
process to issue upon the amended complaint, because the allegations are legally
frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
So Ordered this 15th Day of May, 2012.
_____________________________________
E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5