Goins v. Russell

Filing 14

OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition of Sean J. Goins for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [Doc. No. 1], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability will notissue as Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right. A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is entered this same date. Signed by District Judge Henry E. Autrey on 3/5/14. (CLA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

SEAN J. GOINS,
Petitioner,
v.
TERRY RUSSELL,
Respondent.

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Case No. 4:12CV1385HEA

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the petition of Missouri State prisoner Sean
J. Goins for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2254. Respondent has
filed his Response to the Order to Show Cause. Petitioner has filed his Traverse
Response to Respondent’s Response to Show Cause. For the reasons set forth
herein, the petition for habeas corpus will be denied.
Facts and Procedural Background
On March 25, 2009 an indictment was filed in the Circuit Court of the City of
St. Louis charging the Petitioner in Count I with Robbery first Degree and in Count
II with Armed Criminal Action. Thereafter, Petitioner acquired counsel.
The matter was set for trial, however Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to
both charges on September 16, 2009 before the Honorable Michael F. Stelzer.

Counsel for defendant requested a Sentencing Assessment Report1 which was
ordered by the court.
On November 19, 2009 Petitioner appeared with counsel and pursuant to his
plea of guilty, and upon the arguments of his counsel and Assistant Circuit
Attorney Sean O’Hagen on behalf of the state of Missouri, the Defendant was
sentenced to 18 years as to Count I and 3 years as to Count II to be served
concurrently for a total of 18 years.
Petitioner timely filed, on January 4, 2010, a motion for post-conviction
relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035. Counsel was appointed to
represent Petitioner on February 2, 2010. Counsel filed an amended motion on July
29, 2010. In these motions, Petitioner requested a hearing on his Rule 24.035
claims.
In an order dated June 27, 2011, the motion court denied the requests for
hearing and denied the relief sought by Goins. On August 8, 2011, timely notice of
appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District was taken by Goins.
The Missouri Court of Appeals entered its Per Curiam order affirming the
trial court ruling on May 22, 2012. (resp. Ex. D).

1

Under Missouri law, pursuant to the Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission’s
Recommended Sentencing User Guider, a presentence information report may be ordered to
assist the judge in crafting an appropriate sentence for a defendant who has been found guilty of
a felony offense. The report is created by the Missouri Department of Corrections’ Board of
Probation and Parole. See also, 557.026.1 RSMo (2006).

Respondent asserts that all of Petitioner’s grounds for federal habeas relief
lack merit.
Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (AEDPA) applies to all petitions for habeas relief filed by state prisoners
after the statute’s effective date of April 24, 1996. When reviewing a claim that
has been decided on the merits by a state court, AEDPA limits the scope of judicial
review in a habeas proceeding as follows:
An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
In construing AEDPA, the United States Supreme Court, in Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), held that:
Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the
writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set
of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the ‘unreasonable
application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the
state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the
U.S. Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Furthermore, the Williams Court held that “a federal
habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its
independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
A state court’s factual findings on a habeas petitioner’s federal grounds are
presumed to be correct. 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (e) (1); Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841,
845 (2010). Review under §2254 (d) (1) is limited to the record that was before the
state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.
Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). Clear and convincing evidence that the state court factual
findings lack evidentiary support is required to grant habeas relief. 28 U. S. C. §
2254 (e) (1); Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 845.
Petitioner’s grounds for Habeas Corpus Relief
In his pleadings Petitioner sets out two grounds as his entitlement to relief. In
his first ground for relief he contends that his guilty plea was unknowing and
involuntary because there was a not a sufficient factual basis established for the
offense. He claims the facts were insufficient to establishment his participation and
the use of his statements to the police were not facts to constitute his participation

in the offenses charged. For his second ground for relief he asserts that he received
ineffective assistance of post-plea counsel because after the guilty plea, counsel did
not inform petitioner of the possibility of withdrawing his guilty plea. Petitioner
notes here that he inquired of his attorney after he pleaded guilty whether he could
withdraw his plea and his attorney post-plea did not inform him that he could do
so.
Discussion
The guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because there was a not a
sufficient factual basis established for the offense
Here the Petitioner alleges that the entry of his plea was based upon
statements that were not tantamount to facts relating to his complicity. He insists
that when the prosecutor introduced his statements made to the police this created
confusion and ambiguity as to the facts establishing a basis for the plea of guilty to
the robbery first degree and armed criminal action offenses. He further states that
the state court in this regard erred in violation of his Constitutional rights as
established through the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.
On review of the adverse ruling the Missouri appellate court observed the
basis upon a plea of guilty is factually sufficient. The Missouri Court noted from
the record below that the State recited certain facts in support of the charges and
from that statement of facts concluded:

…the prosecutor recited the factual basis for the charges, stating that
Movant “forcibly stole U. S. currency, a cellular telephone and clothing items
owned by Terrance Cole, and in the course thereof…used a dangerous instrument.”
Further, the prosecutor stated that Movant “acting with others, committed the
foregoing felony by, with, or through the use, assistance or aid of a dangerous
instrument.” Movant admitted to the facts as recited by the State and confirmed his
plea was voluntary….[T]he record contains allegations of Movant’s direct
participation in the crime, which Movant admitted to under oath.
Goins v. State of Missouri, 367 S.W.3d 161 (Mo.App. E.D.2012).
The appellate court held that the court had numerous facts before it that would
support a factual basis for the guilty plea. The court explained the nature of the
charges and confirmed that Petitioner understood that by pleading guilty, he was
admitting the essential elements of the charges against him.
The Court is required to review the record de novo, but the review is limited in
scope. This Court is not at liberty to substitute its rulings for those of the state
court. The role and function of this court is narrowly limited. The standard by
which the Court reviews the record on a habeas petition, as set forth above, is that
relief may only be granted if the decision by the state court (1) resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d).

In reviewing whether the State Court’s decision involved an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, the Court examines the ultimate legal
conclusion reached by the Court, id. at 784, not simply the statement of reasons
explaining the State Court’s decision. See Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1291–
92 (11th Cir.2011) Wright v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th
Cir.2002); Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 696 (5th Cir.2001); Hennon v. Cooper,
109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir.1997).
Here, Petitioner has failed to present the Court with any misstated law and/or
facts and fails to establish how the state court’s ruling is contrary to the applicable
standards in habeas matters. The record, including the transcript of the guilty plea
and sentencing, the ruling on the Rule 24.035 motion, and the opinion of the
Missouri Court of Appeals clearly demonstrates the failure of Petitioner to
substantiate his claim under 28 U. S. C. § 2254. The facts, as stated on the record
as a whole, clearly establish a basis for each offense. The Petitioner admitted the
facts as stated and he even apologized to the victims which itself is an admission of
the facts. The point is denied.
Ineffective assistance of post-plea counsel because counsel did not inform
petitioner of the possibility of withdrawing his guilty plea
Petitioner argues that because his attorney did not inform him after he had
entered his plea of guilty that he could withdraw his plea of guilty and therefore his
Sixth amendment right to counsel has been denied. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S.668 (1984). Notably, Petitioner does not allege how this might have
prejudiced his rights or how he might have been entitled to withdraw his plea of
guilty. Respondent argues in opposition to the claim that the failure to plead
sufficiently constitutes a default that precludes federal court review of the claim.
Smith v. Groose, 9 98 F. 3d1439 (8th Cir. 1993). Respondent further argues that
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice. Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U. S. 478 (1986).
Nowhere in the pleadings or otherwise in the record does Petitioner set forth
any circumstances that would establish a basis for a withdrawal of his plea of
guilty or establish ineffectiveness of counsel in a Strickland sense. Indeed, as noted
in the appellate court opinion “[w]hether to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea is at the discretion of the trial court, and such relief is reserved for such
limited circumstances as a showing of fraud, mistake, fear, persuasion, or the
holding out of false hopes.” (Ex. D, p.7). A criminal defendant is not entitled as a
matter of right to withdraw his plea of guilty. Petitioner cannot satisfy the
Strickland two pronged standard of counsel’s representation falling below an
objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice.
Likewise, in this Court whether to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea is within the Court’s discretion.
We review the district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cruz, 643 F.3d 639, 641 (8th

Cir.2011). A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea that has been accepted
by the court if he demonstrates “a fair and just reason for requesting the
withdrawal.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B). The defendant bears the burden of
showing such a reason. Cruz, 643 F.3d at 642. Moreover,
[e]ven if such a fair and just reason exists, before granting the motion a
court must consider “whether the defendant asserts his innocence of the
charge, the length of time between the guilty plea and the motion to
withdraw it, and whether the government will be prejudiced if the court
grants the motion.”
United States v. Ramirez–Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir.2006)
(quoting United States v. Nichols, 986 F.2d 1199, 1201 (8th Cir.1993)). If
the defendant does not demonstrate fair and just grounds, the court need not
consider these additional factors. United States v. Wicker, 80 F.3d 263, 266
(8th Cir.1996) (quotation and citation omitted).
United States v. Norvell, 729 F.3d 788, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2013). Petitioner failed to
establish any basis for withdrawing his guilty plea, thus, there was no fair and just
reason for allowing a withdrawal. The State Court’s refusal to afford Petitioner
relief was not contrary to nor is an unreasonable application of federal law, and
accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
The decision of the state court was reasonable as to each ground submitted by
the Petitioner and this court will provide it with the deference that is required under
these circumstances.

Certificate of Appealablity
The federal statute governing certificates of appealability provides that “[a]

certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
A substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right requires that “issues
are debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently,
or the issues deserve further proceedings.” Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th
Cir. 1997). This Court finds that Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right. A Certificate of Appealability will therefore
not be issued.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition of Sean J. Goins for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, [Doc. No. 1], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability will not
issue as Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a federal
constitutional right.
A separate judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is
entered this same date.
Dated this 5th day of March, 2014.
______________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE