Scruggs v. Greyhound Lines Inc. et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (see order for details) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process on plaintiff's amended complaint as to defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as neither defendant Boyd nor defendant Kaylor were named as defendants in plaintiffs amended complaint, the Clerk shall remove these defendants from the docket sheet. Signed by District Judge E. Richard Webber on 01/17/2013. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STEPHANIE SCRUGGS,
Plaintiff,
v.
GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,
Defendant.

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No. 4:12CV01443 TCM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s response to the Order to Show
Cause.1 Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s response, the Court will order the
Clerk to issue process on plaintiff’s amended complaint.
Background
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, alleging race discrimination by defendant her former
employer, Greyhound Lines, Inc. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant

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On November 20, 2012 this Court ordered plaintiff to show cause why her
pro se employment discrimination complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
et seq., should not be dismissed as time-barred.

discriminated against her by “taking her out of service” and terminating her
employment.2
Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Greyhound as a bus driver
beginning in April of 2010. She states that after an altercation with some
passengers she was “taken out of service” on or about March 7, 2011. She asserts
that on or about May 9, 2011, she was “informed that she had been terminated.”
She claims that she believes that the termination was racially discriminatory.
Plaintiff has included with her amended complaint a copy of her charge of
discrimination and a copy of her right to sue letter from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Both documents are dated July 12, 2012.
Discussion
"[T]o initiate a claim under Title VII a party must timely file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC and receive a right to sue letter." Stuart v. General
Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 630 (8th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff was required to file her
charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged
discriminatory occurrence. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (providing for such a
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Plaintiff’s amended complaint lacks a certain degree of clarity; however,
plaintiff has attached her charge of discrimination to the amended complaint, which
the Court treats as part of her pleading for all intents and purposes. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c). The charge sets forth plaintiff’s allegations in a most succinct
manner.
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period where claims are filed with “a State or local agency with authority grant or
seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect
thereto ...”). To exhaust administrative remedies an individual must: (1) timely file a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC setting forth the facts and nature of the
charge and (2) receive notice of the right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b), (c), (e).
The complaint alleges that the discrimination occurred on two occasions,
when she was “taken out of service” on March 7, 2011, and when she was
terminated, on May 9, 2011. Plaintiff filed her actual charge of discrimination with
the EEOC on July 12, 2012. Assuming the allegations in favor of plaintiff, the
charge of discrimination was filed outside the permissible 300–day period.
(emphasis added) Therefore, plaintiff's Title VII claims would appear to be timebarred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) and subject to dismissal for failure to timely
exhaust her administrative remedies.
However, in her response to the Order to Show Cause, plaintiff asserts that
she “went to the EEOC to file a complaint” on April 19, 2011, which was within
one month of the first alleged act of discrimination and prior to her termination from
Greyhound. As evidence of her visit to the EEOC, she has attached an EEOC
Intake Questionnaire to her response, which is dated as “received by” the EEOC on
April 19, 2011. Plaintiff states that she spoke to an EEOC investigator on that date
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who told her that she “had to wait until [she went] through the steps with the union
before they [could] start the investigation.” She states, “[T]hat’s the reason I didn’t
file [a charge] at that time.” She claims in her response that:
when I went back to the EEOC and told them what had happened, and
she told me that I was too late and I told here that the man that took my
intake the first time told me to come back after the steps of arbitration.
. . .I didn’t misunderstand him I had someone with me at the time that
he informed me that I had to go through the steps, first. She took my
intake again and issued me the letter of right to sue, and the letter from
the EEOC commission.
The filing of a timely charge with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to a suit in federal court. Rather, it is a condition precedent and, “like a
statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). In Turner v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 708
(8th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained
the kinds of circumstances that can support the equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations:
Generally, equitable circumstances that might toll a limitations period
involve conduct (by someone other than the claimant) that is
misleading or fraudulent. Smith v. McClammy, 740 F.2d 925, 927
(11th Cir.1984) (Title VII case). “Equitable tolling thus far has been
allowed only in those cases where the government has hindered a
claimant’s attempts to exercise her rights by acting in a misleading or
clandestine way.” Wong v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 630, 631 (2d Cir.1988)
(equitable tolling denied even though claimant for social security
disability benefits asserted that illness prevented her from timely filing
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an action in federal district court). And this court has recognized the
principle that “ignorance of legal rights does not toll a statute of
limitations.” Larson v. American Wheel & Brake, Inc., 610 F.2d 506,
510 (8th Cir.1979).
Turner, 862 F.2d at 710; see also, Hill v. John Chezik Imports, 869 F.2d 1122,
1124 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts have generally reserved the remedy of
equitable tolling for circumstances which are truly beyond the control of the plaintiff
or when the conduct of the respondent has lulled the plaintiff into inaction).
Equitable tolling, however, is an exceedingly narrow window of relief.
Under the limitations of § 1915 review, without the benefit of a factual
record, the Court is simply unable to ascertain whether the doctrine of equitable
tolling is available to plaintiff in these circumstances. As the Eighth Circuit noted in
Lawrence v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 132 F.3d 447, 450-51 (8th Cir. 1998), there
are situations where misleading information provided to charging parties by
employees of the EEOC can form a basis for equitable tolling. Because the issue of
whether equitable tolling should be available to plaintiff in this instance will involve
a clear factual record, the matter is more suitable for full briefing, rather than the
limited factual review available to the Court on in forma pauperis review. As such,
the Court will issue process on plaintiff’s complaint.
Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process on plaintiff’s
amended complaint as to defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as neither defendant Boyd nor
defendant Kaylor were named as defendants in plaintiff’s amended complaint, the
Clerk shall remove these defendants from the docket sheet.
So Ordered this 17th day of January, 2013.

E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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