McLaughlin v. Steele

Filing 98

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (See Full Order.) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stay previously imposed in this case is LIFTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 80 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent's Motion for Final Ruling 95 is DENIED as moot. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 11/8/2018. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
SCOTT McLAUGHLIN,
Petitioner,
v.
ANNE L. PRECYTHE,
Respondent.

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No. 4:12 CV 1464 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On March 22, 2016, I granted petitioner Scott McLaughlin’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus on two of his twelve grounds for relief. I entered judgment that
same date, vacating his death sentence and ordering that he be sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole, or be given a new penalty hearing. I
denied a certificate of appealability on his remaining claims. The State thereafter
moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) for me to alter or amend my judgment on one of
the claims on which I granted relief. Upon careful consideration, I will deny the
State’s Rule 59(e) motion. I will also deny as moot the State’s pending motion for
“final ruling.”
Legal Standard
Under Rule 59(e), a court may alter or amend a judgment upon a motion
filed no later than twenty-eight days after entry of the judgment. Rule 59(e) gives

the court power to rectify its own mistakes following entry of judgment. White v.
New Hampshire Dep’t of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982). Rule 59(e)
motions are limited, however, to “correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence.” United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist.,
440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
They cannot be used to relitigate old matters or to raise new arguments, tender new
legal theories, or present evidence that could have been offered or raised before the
entry of judgment. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008);
Metro. St. Loius Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d at 933. A Rule 59(e) motion “is not
intended to routinely give litigants a second bite at the apple, but to afford an
opportunity for relief in extraordinary circumstances.” Barnett v. Roper, 941 F.
Supp. 2d 1099, 1104 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (emphasis in Barnett). A district court enjoys broad discretion in
determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 59(e) motion. Metro. St. Louis Sewer
Dist., 440 F.3d at 933.
Status of Proceedings
As noted above, I granted relief to McLaughlin on two of his habeas claims,
but the State requests that I reconsider my decision on only one claim: that the
trial court’s imposition of a death sentence violated McLaughlin’s Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights because Missouri’s sentencing statute and jury
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instructions permitted the trial court, rather than the jury, to make findings of fact
required to render him eligible for the death penalty. In its Rule 59(e) motion, the
State describes an uncertain state of Missouri law regarding whether the “weighing
step” of Missouri’s capital sentencing statute (i.e., step 2 of the 3-step process)
requires a factual determination by a jury and not a judge in order for a capital
defendant to be considered “death eligible” under federal law (see Resp. Mot. to
Alter or Amend, ECF 80 at pp. 9-10). The State argues that I erred in my analysis
of this law and in my determination that the Missouri Supreme Court’s
interpretation and application of the law was unreasonable in light of contrary
precedent from the United States Supreme Court.
While researching the State’s argument, I learned of two capital cases
pending before the Missouri Supreme Court that followed the same track in state
court as McLaughlin’s regarding the same issue of step-2 factual findings.1
Recognizing that the Missouri Supreme Court would have the opportunity to
finally resolve the controlling issue of state law that is central to determining the
issue raised in the State’s Rule 59(e) motion – law that the State itself describes to
be in flux – I determined to stay ruling on the motion pending the supreme court’s
ruling. However, citing increasing and unnecessary “friction” between state and
federal “systems” – apparently caused by my decision to await a ruling from the
1

Those two cases are still pending before the Missouri Supreme Court as I write this
memorandum.
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state’s highest court on the issue that could decide the admittedly unresolved
question raised by the State in its motion – the State insists that I proceed to rule in
order to avoid the “significant costs” of delay. The State makes this request
despite the real possibility that Missouri’s highest court could cure its own
constitutional error that affected McLaughlin’s case and other capital cases now
pending before that court.
The State expresses its desire to seek appellate review of my judgment,
citing the potential benefit such review would have to both it and to McLaughlin,
and averring that the Missouri law central to disposition of the instant motion could
develop in McLaughlin’s favor while this case is on appeal, which would provide
the court of appeals an opportunity to affirm my judgment on that basis. The State
contends that the pendency of its Rule 59(e) motion, however, prevents it from
seeking such further review.2 The State therefore asks that I lift the stay and rule
its Rule 59(e) motion, which would then permit it to seek appellate review without
any further delay.
I stayed this case in deference to the state’s highest court and its expected
decision on an unsettled legal issue that has been squarely put before that court.
Although my intended deference to the state court’s determination comes post2

I question the State’s assertion that the pendency of its motion is the sole cause of the delay in
this action. I am aware of no authority, and the State cites to none, that requires a disappointed
party to file a Rule 59(e) motion before appealing an adverse decision.
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judgment, I nevertheless believe that the circumstances of this case warrant
consideration of “the States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes,” an interest
that is to be “respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 732 (1991). This is especially so here since this case is a capital case,
which must be “policed at all stages by an especially vigilant concern for
procedural fairness and the accuracy of factfinding.” Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
But because “all stages” include appellate review, and I am confident that the
Eighth Circuit will act with such vigilance, I turn now to the substance of the
State’s Rule 59(e) motion.
Discussion
The State argues in its Rule 59(e) motion that I erred as a matter of law on
the merits of McLaughlin’s claim, procedurally erred when I considered the claim
despite its procedural default, and rendered a decision that is subject to the Teague
v. Lane3 retroactivity analysis. I will address each of these contentions in turn.
A.

Merits
The ruling challenged by the State in its motion to alter or amend is that

which granted the claim raised by McLaughlin in Ground 3 of his petition. As to
the substance of my ruling, the State argues that: 1) the Missouri Supreme Court’s
3

489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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decision on the claim was consistent with and not contrary to clearly established
Supreme Court precedent; 2) the Eighth Circuit had already determined that the
jury instructions at issue did not violate Mills v. Maryland4; 3) I was bound by the
Missouri Supreme Court’s application of Missouri law; and 4) I was bound by the
Missouri Supreme Court’s factual findings because McLaughlin did not refute
them by clear and convincing evidence.
1.

Clearly Established Supreme Court Precedent

The State’s first argument is merely a disagreement with my conclusion that
the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to and based on an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona5 and Mills. While the State cites
to additional Supreme Court authority to reargue its position, Rule 59(e) is not
designed to provide an avenue for a disappointed party to relitigate a matter
previously decided by the court. Rodgers v. Univ. of Missouri Bd. of Curators, No.
4:13-CV-1769-JAR, 2014 WL 6083259, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2014). Given
that the State had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this general defense when I
initially considered McLaughlin’s petition, its resurrected argument is not a basis
for relief under Rule 59(e).

3

486 U.S. 367 (1988).

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536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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2.

Eighth Circuit Precedent

The State next argues that I committed a manifest error of law when I failed
to recognize that the Eighth Circuit had already found that the jury instructions
challenged by McLaughlin did not run afoul of Mills. Notably, the State did not
raise this argument before my judgment was entered despite the existence of its
now-cited Eighth Circuit cases when it filed its response to McLaughlin’s claim.
Because this argument could have been raised previously, it is not a proper
argument to be raised in a Rule 59(e) motion. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440
F.3d at 933; Williams v. Roper, No. 4:05CV1474 RWS, 2010 WL 2539671, at *2
(E.D. Mo. June 16, 2010). I will therefore not address it.
3.

Deference to State Court’s Application of State Law

The State also argues that I overstepped my role as a federal habeas court by
reexamining the Missouri Supreme Court’s determination of state law. Contrary to
the State’s argument, I did not reexamine Missouri law or say that the Missouri
Supreme Court misapplied Missouri law; indeed, I expressly recognized my duty
not to do so: “Of course, this court is bound by the state courts’ interpretation of
state law and that interpretation may not be questioned on habeas review.”
(Memo. & Order, ECF 77 at p. 73.) Instead of examining whether the Missouri
Supreme Court properly interpreted and applied Missouri state law, my express
holding was that the Missouri Supreme Court’s interpretation of Missouri law
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involved an unreasonable application of and resulted in a decision that was in
direct contravention to clearly established Supreme Court precedent: “But in this
case, it is this court’s acceptance of that state-law interpretation that leads to the
constitutional problem. [The] Missouri Supreme Court’s . . . interpretation . . . was
based on an unreasonable application of Ring[, which is] what led to a decision
contrary to Ring and Mills[.]” (Memo. & Order, ECF 77 at p. 73.)
The State’s argument that I failed to defer to the state court’s interpretation
of its own law is without merit, and the motion to alter or amend judgment on this
basis will be denied.
4.

Deference to State Court’s Factual Findings

Finally, the State contends that I erred when I “disagreed” with the Missouri
Supreme Court’s factual determination that the jury (and not the trial judge) made
the required factual finding at step 2 of the sentencing process. The State
specifically argues that my “disagreement” with this factual finding cannot provide
a basis to grant habeas relief because it runs afoul of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which
requires me to presume the state court’s factual findings to be correct unless
McLaughlin presents clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption. The
State argues that because McLaughlin did not provide such evidence, I legally
erred in rejecting the supreme court’s factual determination. The State’s argument
is misplaced.
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Section 2254(e)(1) states that “a determination of a factual issue made by a
State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”
However, under § 2254(d)(2), a federal habeas court must grant a habeas petition if
the state court’s adjudication of the merits of a claim “resulted in a decision that
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented at the State court proceeding.” That is what I did here.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet defined the precise relationship
between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1). See Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269,
2282 (2015). However, it has expressly recognized that the deference to be
accorded to state court factual findings “‘does not imply abandonment or
abdication of judicial review[.]’” Id. at 2277 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 340 (2003)). To the contrary, where an examination of the state-court
record compels a federal habeas court to conclude that the state court’s critical
factual determination was unreasonable, relief is warranted. Id. As demonstrated
in my Memorandum and Order, my examination of the state-court record here
compelled such a finding.
I agree with the State that a state court’s factual determinations are not
unreasonable merely because I could have reached a different conclusion in the
first instance. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). But in the circumstances
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of this case and in light of the evidence of record – that is, the instructions given
and the jury’s “no” on the step-2 special interrogatory – no conclusion could be
reached on the question of whether the jury made the required factual finding on
mitigating circumstances that would have made the imposition of the death penalty
constitutionally sound. That was the problem. Both the trial court and the state
supreme court interpreted the jury’s “no” as its factual finding that the mitigating
circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating factors. But, for the reasons set
out in my Memorandum and Order, there was no way that the trial judge or the
supreme court could have known that that was what the jury actually found. The
jury’s “no” was just as likely to have meant that it was deadlocked on the question.
Because the evidence shows that there was no way to know whether the jury made
the factual findings required at the weighing step of the sentencing process to
render McLaughlin eligible for the death penalty, the Missouri Supreme Court’s
presumptive finding that the jury did made the requisite factual finding at this step
was unreasonable.
My examination of the state-court record compelled me to conclude that the
Missouri Supreme Court’s critical factual determination – that McLaughlin’s jury
made the required factual finding at step 2 to make him “death eligible” – was “an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” Because this unreasonable determination of the facts was
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the basis for the supreme court’s ultimate conclusion that the trial court’s
imposition of the death penalty did not violate McLaughlin’s Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury, I did not err in granting McLaughlin habeas relief on this
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2277.
B.

Procedural Default
The State asks that I exercise my discretion to address its newly-raised and

belated argument that, to the extent McLaughlin raised this claim under Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), the claim is procedurally defaulted and not subject
to federal habeas review. The State contends that its failure to raise the proceduraldefault defense when it responded to the claim was mere inadvertence and should
not be construed as an intentional relinquishment of the defense.
Rule 59(e) motions cannot be used to raise arguments or affirmative
defenses that could have – or should have – been raised prior to entry of judgment.
Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d at 933. “The habeas context is no exception
to the prohibition on using a Rule 59(e) motion to raise new arguments that could
have and should have been made before the court entered final judgment.” Jones
v. Steele, No. 4:06CV767RWS, 2010 WL 618474, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 18, 2010)
(citing Bannister v. Armontrout, 4 F.3d 1434, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993)). On this basis,
I decline to entertain the State’s belated procedural-default argument.
Nevertheless, the State waived the procedural-default defense to this claim.
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The State raised procedural default as a defense to several of McLaughlin’s habeas
claims, but not to the Mills-aspect of the claim raised in Ground 3 of the petition.
Instead, the State argued the merits of Ground 3. In these circumstances, I find
that the State’s failure to advance a procedural-default argument to the claim
constituted a waiver of the defense, Jones v. Norman, 633 F.3d 661, 666 (8th Cir.
2011), and I decline to entertain the belated argument on that basis as well.
C.

Teague-Bar
The State argues that the “new rule” announced by my decision is barred by

the non-retroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The State
does not identify the “new rule” that I purportedly announced, nor does my review
of my decision reveal one.
At the time McLaughlin’s conviction became final, the law was clearly
established that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact
on which the legislature conditions an increase in the maximum punishment, Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483
(2000), and that uncertainty regarding the factual underpinnings of a jury’s verdict
requires resentencing, Mills, 486 U.S. at 376-77. My analysis and decision was
based on this clearly established law and was dictated by such precedent. Other
than generally disagreeing with my decision, the State does not specify how I ran
afoul of the Teague principle, nor does it identify the new rule I purportedly
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announced or applied in the case. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416
(2007) (defining “new rule” under Teague).
Because my decision was dictated by governing Supreme Court precedent
existing at the time when McLaughlin’s conviction became final, the decision
neither announced nor applied a new rule. The State’s motion to alter or amend
based on Teague is denied.
D.

Amended Remedy
The State also requests that I amend the judgment to allow for appellate

review without the need of a stay or a request for more time to comply with the
remedy I ordered. Specifically, the State asks that I change my order to resentence
McLaughlin or provide a new penalty-phase trial to “within 180 days of the date
this order becomes final” rather than “within 180 days” of my judgment as it now
states. As discussed above, a Rule 59(e) motion exists for the limited purpose of
correcting a manifest error. The State does not argue that my failure to order the
remedy it now proposes constituted a manifest error; nor does it argue that the
remedy as ordered deprives it of its appellate rights. The State is not entitled to
Rule 59(e) relief on this request. See Barnett v. Roper, No. 4:03CV00614 ERW,
2016 WL 278861, at *13 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 22, 2016), aff'd, 904 F.3d 623 (8th Cir.
2018).

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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stay previously imposed in this case is
LIFTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent’s Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment [80] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent’s Motion for Final Ruling
[95] is DENIED as moot.

_______________________________
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 8th day of November, 2018.

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