Addison v. Board of Education et al
OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is GRANTED. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for appointment ofcounsel [Doc. #4] is DENIED without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, plaintiff shall show cause why her action should not be dismissed as timebarred. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to comply with this Order, this action will be dismissed without prejudice. 4 2 ( Show Cause Response due by 10/14/2012.) Signed by District Judge Henry E. Autrey on 9/14/12. (CLA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
ROSALIND ANN ADDISON,
BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
No. 4:12CV1601 HEA
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the application of Rosalind Ann Addison
for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a). Upon consideration of the financial information provided with the
application, the Court finds that plaintiff is financially unable to pay any portion of
the filing fee. Therefore, plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, for unlawful retaliation against defendant the St. Louis City
Board of Education, as well as individual defendants Marlene Davis and Carol HallWhittier.1 Attached to plaintiff’s complaint is a copy of an Equal Employment
Title VII provides a remedy only against an “employer.” The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely held that “supervisors may not be held
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) right-to-sue letter, as well as a charge of
discrimination filed with the EEOC.
“[T]o initiate a claim under Title VII a party must timely file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC and receive a right-to-sue letter.” Stuart v. General
Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 630 (8th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff was required to file her
charge of discrimination with the EEOC (or with the Missouri Commission on
Human Rights (“MCHR”)) within 300 days of the allegedly discriminatory
occurrence. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (providing for such a period where claims
are filed with “a State or local agency with authority grant or seek relief from such
practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto ...”); see also Holland
v. Sam's Club, 487 F.3d 641, 643 & n. 3 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the MCHR is
such an agency per Mo.Rev.Stat. § 213.030). Title VII plaintiffs are required to
exhaust their administrative remedies with the EEOC, or the comparative state
agency, before bringing a formal action. Tyler v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs., 628 F.3d
980, 989 (8th Cir.2011); Harris v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 339 F.3d 635, 638 (8th
Cir.2003) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies requires dismissal of ADA
individually liable under Title VII.” Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly
Community School District, 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Spencer v.
Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)); see
Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 143 F.3d 1103, 1111 (8th Cir. 1998).
action, precluding plaintiff from obtaining review of his ADA claim); Malone v.
Ameren UE, No. 4:09CV00053, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18611, at *6, 2010 WL
750075 (E.D.Mo. Mar. 2, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff for failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to his claims of gender and disability
discrimination). “Exhaustion of administrative remedies is central to Title VII's
statutory scheme because it provides the EEOC the first opportunity to investigate
discriminatory practices and enables it to perform its roles of obtaining voluntary
compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts.” Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water
Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir.1994) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 180–81, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989)). To exhaust
administrative remedies an individual must: (1) timely file a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC setting forth the facts and nature of the charge and (2) receive notice
of the right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b), (c), (e).
The complaint alleges that the discrimination occurred between April of 1987
and August of 2000, when plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff filed her charge of
discrimination with the EEOC on June 13, 2012. Assuming the allegations in favor
of plaintiff, the charge of discrimination was filed outside the permissible 300–day
period. Therefore, plaintiff's Title VII claims appear to be time-barred by 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–5(e)(1) and subject to dismissal for failure to timely exhaust her
administrative remedies. Plaintiff will be directed to show cause why her case should
not be dismissed as time-barred.
Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel will be denied at this time,
without prejudice, as it appears that counsel is not currently warranted.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is GRANTED. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for appointment of
counsel [Doc. #4] is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within thirty (30) days of the date of this
Order, plaintiff shall show cause why her action should not be dismissed as timebarred.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to comply with this Order,
this action will be dismissed without prejudice.
Dated this 14th day of September, 2012.
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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