Scruggs v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER-- HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Greyhound Lines, Inc., Joseph Kaylor, and Barbara Boyds Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7 ) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED. An appropriate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Jean C. Hamilton on 06/11/2013. (CLK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

STEPHANIE B. SCRUGGS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff(s),
vs.
GREYHOUND LINES, INC., et al.,
Defendant(s).

Case No. 4:12CV2080 JCH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Greyhound Lines, Inc. (“Greyhound”), Joseph
Kaylor, and Barbara Boyd’s Motion to Dismiss, filed November 8, 2012. (ECF No. 7). The motion
is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
BACKGROUND
On July 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended (“Title VII”). (ECF No. 6, P. 19).1 The Charge named Greyhound as respondent, and
alleged discrimination on the basis of race. (Id.). It stated in its entirety as follows:
I.

1

I was employed by the above named company as a bus driver beginning on
or about 4/17/10. I was taken out of service on or about 3/7/11. On or about
5/9/11, I was informed that I had been terminated. The actions were based
on customer complaints. I believe I was terminated due to my race, black.
The employer took the word of some customers rather than my word as an
employee. I am aware of other black drivers who have been suspended
and/or terminated based on customer complaints. I am not aware of any
white drivers about whom customers have complained.

While the Charge presumably was dually filed with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights
(“MCHR”), Plaintiff attaches to her Complaint a Notice of Right to Sue only from the EEOC.
(ECF No. 6, P. 18). The Court thus treats Plaintiff’s claims against Greyhound, Kaylor and Boyd
as arising solely under Title VII.

II.

On or about 3/7/11, I was informed by Barbary [sic] Boyd (black), my
immediate supervisor, and Joseph Kaylor (white), City Manager, that I was
being taken out of service because I acted unprofessional. On about 5/9/11,
Ralph Kindell, the union rep, informed me that I had been terminated.

III.

I believe I was taken out of service and terminated due to my race in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

(Id.). The EEOC issued Plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on July 12, 2012, permitting
Plaintiff to bring a Title VII claim in state or federal court against Greyhound. (Id., P. 18).
On July 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed a second Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, which
was dually filed with the MCHR. (ECF No. 6, P. 21). The Charge named Amalgamated Transit
Union (“ATU”) as respondent, and stated in its entirety as follows:
On March 17, 2011, I filed a grievance against my employer with the above
referenced union due to my termination. My union steward represented me
during three grievance steps, but I was unable to get my former job back.
In or around November 2011, I was informed by a union representative that
my grievance was going to be referred to arbitration. On or around July 9,
2012, almost a year and half after filing my initial grievance, Bruce Hamilton,
President, informed me via a telephone conversation that my grievance was
not going to proceed to arbitration. On July 11, 2012, I received a letter from
Bruce Hamilton, President, reiterating our telephone conversation.
For the above stated reasons, I believe that the union failed to adequately
represent me.
(Id.). The EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue on July 27, 2012, permitting Plaintiff to
bring a Title VII claim in state or federal court against ATU. (Id., P. 20). The MCHR issued its
Notice of Right to Sue on this latter Charge on September 10, 2012. (Id., P. 23).
On October 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Wrongful Termination Petition (“Complaint”) against
Defendants Greyhound, Kaylor, Boyd, ATU and Bruce Hamilton in the Twenty-Second Judicial
Circuit Court of St. Louis City, Missouri. (ECF No. 6). Defendants Greyhound, Kaylor and Boyd

-2-

removed the matter to this Court on November 7, 2012, on the bases of both diversity and federal
question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1).2
STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion dismiss, the Court must view the allegations in the complaint in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008). The
Court, “must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted). The Complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level,” however, and the motion to dismiss must be granted if the Complaint
does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007) (abrogating the “no set of facts” standard for
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Furthermore, “the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (pleading offering only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action” will not do)).
DISCUSSION
I.

Individual Defendants Kaylor And Boyd
Upon consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against Defendants

Kaylor and Boyd fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted, as “[i]t is well settled in the
Eighth Circuit that individuals are not subject to individual liability under Title VII…” Ebersole v.

2

To date, Defendants ATU and Bruce Hamilton have not yet been served with the Complaint.
-3-

Novo Nordisk, Inc., 2011 WL 6115655, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2011) (citations omitted). See also
Roark v. City of Hazen, Ark., 189 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[A] supervisor may not be held
liable under Title VII.”); Herrero v. St. Louis Univ. Hosp., 929 F.Supp. 1260, 1266 (E.D. Mo. 1996),
aff’d, 109 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Court notes that supervisors … are not individually liable
under Title VII … as they are not the employer to whom those statutes are directed.”); Lenhardt v.
Basic Inst. Of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[S]upervisors and other employees
cannot be held liable under Title VII in their individual capacities.”). Kaylor and Boyd are both
Greyhound supervisors, and are being sued in their individual capacities.3 Thus, because Plaintiff
can plead no set of facts that would expose Kaylor and Boyd to individual liability under Title VII,
those claims must be dismissed.
II.

Defendants Greyhound, ATU And Hamilton
In addition to the case pending in this Court, Plaintiff has two other cases pending in the

Eastern District of Missouri. On August 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Employment Discrimination
Complaint against ATU and Bruce Hamilton, alleging a Title VII violation.

Scruggs v.

Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1700, et. al., No. 4:12-CV-01442-ERW, ECF No. 1 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 8, 2012). That same day, Plaintiff filed an Employment Discrimination Complaint against
Greyhound, Kaylor and Boyd, also alleging a Title VII violation. Scruggs v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
et al., No. 4:12-CV-01443-SNLJ, ECF No. 1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 8, 2012). Plaintiff filed an Amended
Employment Discrimination Complaint in this latter suit on October 29, 2012, naming only
Greyhound as a Defendant. See Id., ECF No. 7.

3

There is no indication in Plaintiff’s Complaint that she intended to sue Kaylor and Boyd in their
official capacities.
-4-

Plaintiff’s earlier Complaints allege facts and circumstances identical to those alleged here.
Specifically, all three Complaints relate to negative employment actions taken against Plaintiff
following an incident where passengers accused Plaintiff of locking them aboard a heated Greyhound
bus. Plaintiff alleges Greyhound engaged in race discrimination when it took the word of the
passengers over hers. Plaintiff further alleges ATU and Hamilton failed adequately to represent her
in her grievance against Greyhound following the termination. The three Complaints contain the
same evidence, the same right to sue letters from the EEOC and MHRC, and substantially the same
statement from Plaintiff.
Upon consideration, the Court finds the claims against Defendants Greyhound, ATU, and
Hamilton are duplicative, and therefore must be dismissed. See, e.g., Coffman v. Blake, 2006 WL
2338243 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2006); Kforce, Inc. v. Surrex Solutions Corp., 436 F.3d 981, 984 (8th
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (“It is well settled in Missouri that a party cannot be compensated for
the same injury twice.”); Norber v. Marcotte, 134 S.W.3d 651, 661 (Mo. App. 2004) (citations
omitted) (“While a single transaction may invade more than one right, a plaintiff may not be made
more than whole or receive more than one full recovery for the same harm.”). Because the two
previous claims arise out of the same conduct, allege identical facts, and ask for identical relief as
the case here, the claims against Defendants Greyhound, ATU, and Hamilton will be dismissed as
duplicative.4
CONCLUSION

4

Defendants ATU and Hamilton did not join in the instant Motion to Dismiss, because as noted
above they have yet to be properly served with process. The Court nevertheless will dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against them sua sponte under the above reasoning, as Plaintiff has been
afforded notice and an opportunity to respond to the Greyhound Defendants’ claims, and it is in
the interest of justice and fairness to the parties to dismiss. See Church of Jesus Christ
Christian/Aryan Nations of Missouri v. Obama, 2011 WL 4916569, at *1 n. 1 (W.D. Mo. Oct.
17, 2011).
-5-

Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Greyhound Lines, Inc., Joseph Kaylor, and
Barbara Boyd’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is
DISMISSED. An appropriate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 11th day of June, 2013.

/s/Jean C. Hamilton
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-6-