Ryals v. Astrue

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be entered this same date.. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 1/8/14. (KKS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LAURA A. RYALS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,1 Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 4:13-CV-10(CEJ)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for review of an adverse ruling by the Social
Security Administration.
I. Procedural History
On November 8, 2010, Laura A. Ryals filed an application for supplemental
security income, Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (SSI), with an alleged onset date
of September 1, 1990.2 (Tr. 28-31). Plaintiff’s application was denied both on initial
consideration and reconsideration, based on a finding that she had resources in excess
of $2,000. (Tr. 47-52, 110-12). Plaintiff requested a hearing from an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 113).
Plaintiff appeared for a hearing on May 19, 2011. (Tr. 134-44). The ALJ issued
a decision denying plaintiff’s application on May 26, 2011. (Tr. 10-12). The Appeals
Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on November 1, 2012. (Tr. 2-5).
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision stands as the Commissioner’s final decision.

1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on
February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d), she is substituted for Michael J.
Astrue as the defendant in this case.
2

Plaintiff previously received supplemental security income benefits. (Tr. 10).

II. Evidence before the ALJ
The ALJ found that plaintiff owned real estate in Camden County, Missouri, that
had a value in excess of the allowable limit.
In June 2009, an amended divorce decree disposed of property between plaintiff
and her ex-husband. Plaintiff was awarded a two-acre parcel in Camden County valued
at $5,000. No mortgage was listed. She was also awarded the home she lived in, two
additional residential properties, and a timeshare in Florida.
In her SSI application filed in November 2010, plaintiff listed all the properties
she was awarded in the 2009 divorce. Plaintiff stated that she had signed the two
additional residential properties over to her daughter at no cost,3 and that she no
longer owned the timeshare because she had stopped making payments. She still
owned the Camden County property, which she stated had a value of $500, a tax
assessed value of $500, and a mortgage payment of $115. (Tr. 29-30).
Property records show that in 2008, 2009, and 2010, the Camden County
property4 had a market land value of $13,000, a market improvement value of $200,
and an assessed value of $2,510. (Tr. 61, 65, 71-72). A real estate tax receipt for the
tax year 2010 also lists the assessed value of the property as $2,510, and shows that
plaintiff paid $102.58 in taxes. (Tr. 133A).

3

A LexisNexis property report shows the entry of a quit claim deed transferring
one of the residential properties from plaintiff to her daughter Melanie Mild in
September 2010. (Tr. 53). At the time of plaintiff’s divorce in June 2009, the property
was valued at $100,000. (Tr. 21).
4

The property records state that the Camden property consists on one acre, not
two. There is no evidence in the record concerning when and for how much plaintiff
disposed of the additional acre she was awarded in the divorce.
-2-

Plaintiff appeared at the May 19, 2011, hearing without a lawyer. She signed
a waiver of her right to be represented; when the ALJ asked her whether she wanted
to delay the hearing to obtain representation, she stated that she wanted to proceed
without a representative. (Tr. 133, 137). She had brought her 18-year-old daughter
Melanie Mild with her as support.5

(Tr. 139-40). Ms. Mild testified that she had

previously lived in a trailer on the property. Plaintiff denied that there was ever a
trailer on the property. (Tr. 141).
Plaintiff testified that the Camden property was “less than an acre. It’s just
land. And I pay $155 for taxes a year.” Contrary to her statement in her application,
she testified that she did not have a loan on the property. She opined that, following
the crash in the real estate market, the land was worth less than $500. (Tr. 137-39).
She did not identify any basis for her opinion. She also stated that in December 2010
the property was valued at $2,000 for property tax purposes. (Tr. 138, 142). As
stated above, the tax assessed value of the property was $2,510.
In the decision entered on May 26, 2011, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s assertions
concerning the value of the Camden property were not fully credible and that the
property exceeded $3,000 in value. Three thousand dollars represents the resource
limitation for an individual with a spouse.

20 C.F.R. §416.1205(c).

Plaintiff was

unmarried at the time and the correct limitation is $2,000. Id.
III. Legal Standard

5

Their was some confusion as to whether Ms. Mild was present as her mother’s
representative, a witness, or for support. See Tr. 139 (plaintiff states she understood
she could have someone come and represent her and she brought her daughter to act
“like a lawyer”); 140 (When asked whether she is there as representative or witness,
Ms. Mild answers “Most likely probably like a witness. I don’t know); 142 (plaintiff
states, “I just want her here for support.”)
-3-

The ALJ’s findings will be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole.

Gladden v. Callahan, 139 F.3d 1219, 1222 (8th Cir. 1998).

“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough so that a reasonable
mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion.” Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d
722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir.
2001)). The ALJ’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Carlson v. Astrue, 604 F.3d
589, 592 (8th Cir. 2010).
IV. Discussion
The sole issue before the Court is whether the ALJ properly found that the value
of the Camden property exceeded the allowable limit for an individual. Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ erred by relying on the value assigned by the local taxing authority and
by failing to consider the salability of the property and the expenses necessary to
complete a sale.
Under the Social Security Act, an individual is eligible for SSI benefits if (i) she
is aged, blind, or disabled and (ii) her countable income and resources fall below
$2,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205(c) (setting limit for individuals not
residing with spouse). An individual’s home is not considered a countable resource.
29 C.F.R. § 416.1210(a); § 416.1212(b).
The Social Security Administration defines resources as:
cash or other liquid assets or any real or personal property that an
individual (or spouse, if any) owns and could convert to cash to be used
for his or her support and maintenance. If the individual has the right,
authority or power to liquidate the property . . ., it is considered a
resource. If a property right cannot be liquidated, the property will not
be considered a resource of the individual (or spouse).
§ 416.1201(a)(1). Nonliquid resources, including land, are “evaluated according to
their equity value.” § 416.1201(c)(1). “The equity value of an item is defined as: (i)
-4-

[t]he price that [the] item can reasonably be expected to sell for on the open market
in the particular geographic area involved; minus (ii) [a]ny encumbrances.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1201(c)(2).
Substantial evidence supports a finding that the value of the land in 2010
exceeded the allowable resource limit of $2,000. According to public records, the
market value of the land in 2010 was $13,000, with a value of $2,510 for tax
assessment purposes. (Tr. 58; 133A). There was no evidence of any mortgage, tax
lien, or other encumbrance on the property to be subtracted from the value of the
land. The only evidence that the land’s value was below $2,000 came from plaintiff’s
unsupported testimony. The ALJ rejected her testimony as not credible, a finding that
plaintiff does not challenge.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider whether the property could be sold
and at what price. The regulations make provision for unsalable property: Property
is not a countable resource “so long as the individual’s reasonable efforts to sell it have
been unsuccessful.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.1245(b). “Reasonable efforts to sell property
consist of taking all necessary steps to sell it in the geographic area covered by the
media serving the area in which the property is located, unless the individual has good
cause for not taking these steps.” § 416.1245(b)(3). An individual takes “necessary
steps” by listing the property or undertaking to sell the property herself. Id. An
individual will be found to have “good cause” for failing to make reasonable efforts to
sell if she was prevented from doing so “by circumstances beyond his or her control.”
Here, there is no indication that plaintiff undertook the necessary steps to sell the
property or was prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond her control.
Indeed, there is no evidence that she desired to sell the property.

-5-

With respect to plaintiff’s contention that there is no evidence regarding a
probable sale price for the property, it is reasonable to conclude that “[t]he price that
[the] item can reasonably be expected to sell for on the open market in the particular
geographic area involved” is at least as great as the tax-assessed value of $2,510.
See Attia v. Social Sec. Admin., 88 Fed. Appx. 142, 144 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming ALJ’s
determination that value of land exceeded $2,000 based on tax-assessed values and
realtor’s estimates, even though land ultimately sold for less than $2,000). Plaintiff
also argues that, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.1244(b), the costs of completing a sale should
be subtracted from the sale price and that the ALJ erred in failing to develop the record
with respect to these costs.

The regulation she cites applies to the valuation of

proceeds after a property has been sold and is inapplicable to the present case.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be
entered this same date.
___________________________
CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 8th day of January, 2014.

-6-