Downing et al v. Goldman Phipps PLLC et al

Filing 187

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for class certification [# 170 ] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Class Plaintiffs Gray, Ritter & Graham, P.C., Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLC, and Looper Ree d & McGraw, P.C., are appointed as class representatives to represent the following class: All persons and entities that provided or paid for common-benefit services, materials, and/or related expense items (except Defendants), They are also appointe d to represent the following subclass: All persons and entities that provided common-benefit services (except Defendants). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Patrick J. Stueve, Todd E. Hilton, and Bradley T. Wilders, of Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, 460 Nichols Rd. Suite 200, Kansas City, MO 64112, are appointed as Class Counsel. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 7/14/15. (EAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

DON M. DOWNING, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
GOLDMAN PHIPPS PLLC, et al.,
Defendants.

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)
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)
) Case No. 4:13CV206 CDP
)
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)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before me on plaintiffs’ motion for class certification under
Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The proposed
class members are lawyers and their clients who undertook a collective effort to
litigate their claims against Bayer related to contamination of the United States rice
supply by Bayer’s genetically modified rice. Plaintiffs allege that the defendant
law firms used some of their own litigation work product when representing
different clients in state-court cases against Bayer. The plaintiffs seek to certify a
class of all “persons and entities that provided or paid for common-benefit
services, materials, and/or related expense items (except Defendant).” They also
seek to certify a subclass limited to those who “provided common-benefit
services.”

The proposed class satisfies Rule 23(a) and plaintiffs have shown that a Rule
23(b)(3) class is appropriate because common issues predominate over individual
issues. The central common issue in this case is whether and to what extent the
defendants were unjustly enriched, and because of the way the class plaintiffs
arranged their collective litigation efforts in the underlying rice litigation, that
common question predominates over any questions specific to individual class
members. This action is uniquely suitable for class certification, and that form of
litigation is superior to any other form. I will grant the motion for class
certification.
I. Background1
A. Multi-District Litigation
This dispute has its origin in the continuing multi-district litigation (MDL)
that began after the introduction of Bayer’s genetically modified rice into the
United States domestic rice supply.2 The spread of Bayer’s rice caused the price
for U.S. rice to plummet. Thousands of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri and Texas rice farmers (referred to as “producers”) and others involved in
the rice business (referred to as “non-producers”) filed suit against various Bayer
entities in federal and state courts.
1

This background is stated only for the purposes of ruling on this motion and does not relieve
any party of its duty to prove facts at a later date.
2

See, generally, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, No. 4:06MD1811 CDP.

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To make the MDL more manageable for the plaintiffs, this court appointed
Don Downing and Adam Levitt as Co-Lead Counsel of a leadership group of
attorneys. A common-benefit trust fund (the CBF Trust) was ordered established
to compensate attorneys for services rendered on behalf of all the plaintiffs;
Downing and Levitt were named as Co-Trustees of the Trust. That order required
that a portion of any recovery obtained by plaintiffs in federal court cases be set
aside and contributed to the Trust. Non-producer plaintiffs were to contribute
seven percent of any gross recovery for common-benefit attorney’s fees and an
additional three percent for common-benefit costs.3 The order allowed
contributions to the CBF Trust to be made from recoveries in state court cases only
if ordered by the state court or if plaintiffs in those cases consented.
The Co-Lead Counsel and additional attorneys at their request (collectively,
the common-benefit attorneys) were directed to manage pretrial proceedings on
behalf of all MDL plaintiffs. Over the course of five years, the common-benefit
attorneys performed a variety of work, including, among other things, drafting a
master consolidated complaint against Bayer under the laws of five states;
successfully opposing Bayer’s dispositive motions, reviewing, coding, and
managing more than 2.8 million pages of documents; and taking or defending 167
depositions across the United States and internationally. They also conducted
3

Producer plaintiffs were assessed eight percent for fees and three percent for costs.

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three bellwether trials in this court; the trials resulted in plaintiffs’ verdicts under
the laws of Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
The Phipps legal team4 opposed the creation of the CBF Trust, including the
requested allocation of legal fees by the leadership counsel; the Phipps legal team
sought, in the alternative, over $13 million that it claimed as reimbursement for its
own common-benefit fees. Downing Decl. Ex. L, ECF No. 170-14. Stephen B.
Murray, Sr., the Murray Law Firm, Charles A. Banks, and the Banks Law Firm,
PLLC, objected to the creation of the CBF Trust but did not object to the Special
Master’s Report and Recommendation regarding payment of common-benefit
attorney’s fees from the CBF Trust. Downing Decl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 170-1.
On December 6, 2012, this court ordered that the common-benefit attorneys’
expenses be paid from the Trust. Those expenses totaled less than the amount
collected by the CBF Trust fund’s three-percent cost assessment, and the Co-Lead
Counsel have proposed distributing the surplus on a pro-rata basis to the
contributing parties.5 On the same date as the expenses order, this court also
awarded up to $72 million in attorneys’ fees. However, only approximately $56.5
million of that potential award has been obtained by the Trust.

4

This group included Goldman Phipps PLLC, Martin J. Phipps, Mikal C. Watts, Mikal C. Watts
P.C., and Keller Stolarczyk PLLC.
5

Downing Decl. at ¶¶ 21, 26, ECF No. 170-1.

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B. This Case
The named Class Plaintiffs are three law firms who incurred legal fees and
advanced expenses while performing common-benefit work.6 They seek to
represent not only other law firms but also any other persons (such as clients) who
paid for common-benefit services and expenses. In addition to the law firm Class
Plaintiffs, the Co-Trustees of the Trust are also plaintiffs, suing on behalf of the
Trust itself.
The Class Plaintiffs bring unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims on
their own behalf and on behalf of a class and subclass against two groups of
defendants: the Phipps Group7 and the Murray Group8. The class is defined as “all
persons and entities that provided or paid for common-benefit services, materials,
and/or related expense items . . . .” 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 59–60, ECF No. 128. The
subclass is limited to those who provided the common-benefit services. Id. Both
6

The law firms named as Class Plaintiffs are Gray, Ritter & Graham, P.C., of St. Louis,
Missouri; Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLC, with offices in Illinois, New York,
New Jersey, Connecticut, and California; and Looper Reed & McGraw, P.C., a Texas law firm.
7

The Phipps Group is made up of the following law firm defendants: Goldman Phipps PLLC,
Goldman Pennebaker & Phipps P.C., Phipps Cavazos PLLC, Mikal C. Watts P.C., Keller
Stolarczyk PLLC, and Banks Law Firm PLLC; as well as individual lawyer defendants Martin J.
Phipps, Mikal C. Watts, and Charles A. Banks. Martin Phipps and his firms are citizens of and
headquartered in Texas. Mikal Watts and Mikal C. Watts P.C. are citizens of Texas. Keller
Stolarczyk is a citizen of Texas. Charles Banks and the Banks Law Firm PLLC are citizens of
Arkansas. The Phipps Group served together as co-counsel in the federal and state court
genetically modified rice cases that Goldman Phipps PLLC and its predecessor law firms filed
against Bayer.
8

The defendants in the Murray Group are the Murray Law Firm and individual lawyer Stephen
B. Murray, Sr. Both are citizens of Louisiana.

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Class and Subclass exclude the defendants in this action. Counts I and III assert
unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims, respectively, by the class against the
Phipps Group Defendants. Counts II and IV assert unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit claims, respectively, by the subclass against the Murray Group.
II. Discussion9
The class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted
by and on behalf of the individual named parties only. To come within the
exception, a party seeking to maintain a class action must affirmatively
demonstrate his compliance with Rule 23.” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct.
1426, 1432 (2013) (citations omitted); see also Luiken v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC,
705 F.3d 370, 372 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (“[A] plaintiff has the burden
of showing that the class should be certified and that the requirements of Rule 23
are met.”). Rule 23 contains two subsections that must be satisfied.
Rule 23(a) sets out four threshold requirements for class certification: (1)
sufficiently numerous parties, (2) common questions of law or fact, (3) typicality
of claims or defenses, and (4) adequacy of representation. A class action plaintiff
must also satisfy through evidentiary proof at least one of the provisions of Rule
23(b).” Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1432.
9

Defendants raise a number of arguments attacking the merits of the case. In the Order of July
6, 2015, I denied the Defendants’ multiple motions to dismiss and strike, which raised many of
these same arguments, so I will not discuss them further here. See ECF No. 185.

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A. Rule 23(a) Requirements
A.1. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that “the class be so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.” To be “impracticable” does not mean that joinder must
be impossible, but it does require a showing that it would be extremely difficult or
inconvenient to join all members of the class.” Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of
Am., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 355 (E.D. Mo. 1996). The Eighth Circuit has
established no specific rule as to the necessary size of a class, but it has directed
courts to consider several factors in determining whether joinder is feasible: the
number of persons in the class, the nature of the action, the size of the individual
claims, the inconvenience of trying individual suits, and any other factor relevant
to the practicability of joining all the class members. Emanuel v. Marsh, 828 F.2d
438, 444 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 487 U.S. 1229 (1988).
The defendants argue that there are insufficient class members because the
plaintiffs formed a single “joint venture” when they collectively litigated and
divided the costs of their suit against Bayer. This argument is unavailing for a
number of reasons. First and foremost, the plaintiff chooses how to craft her case.
Cf. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398–99 (1987) (“[T]he plaintiff is
the master of the complaint.”). The plaintiffs have chosen to assert their multiple
claims as a class, not a single claim as a joint venture.

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Second, there is nothing in the record that shows the plaintiffs ever formed a
joint venture. The essential elements of a joint venture under Missouri law10 are
(1) the members’ express or implied agreement; (2) a common purpose; (3) “a
community of pecuniary interest in the common purpose”; and (4) equal right of
control over the venture. Inauen Packaging Equip. Corp. v. Integrated Indus.
Servs., Inc., 970 S.W.2d 360, 371 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Eads v. Kinstler
Agency, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996)). The plaintiffs never
had equal right of control, because the leadership group and Co-Lead Counsel
controlled their collective litigation efforts.
Upon consideration of these factors, I conclude that the proposed class
satisfies the numerosity requirement. There are over 30 law firms that provided
common-benefit legal services, and over 5000 rice producers and non-producers
who had part of their settlements deposited into the CBF Trust fund to pay for fees
and expenses. All would be members of the class. It is clear that joining each of
the putative plaintiffs individually and trying separate suits for each would be
wasteful, duplicative, and time consuming. Joinder is impracticable, and so the
numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is satisfied.

10

The parties appear to agree, at least with respect to this particular issue, that Missouri law
governs.

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A.2. Commonality
The commonality required by Rule 23(a)(2) is that “there are questions of
law or fact common to the class.” The mere presence of factual differences will
not defeat the maintenance of a class action if there are common questions of law
uniting the class members’ claims. DeBoer v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 64 F.3d 1171,
1174 (8th Cir. 1995); Glen v. Fairway Indep. Mortg. Corp., 265 F.R.D. 474, 478
(E.D. Mo. 2010). As the Eighth Circuit held in Paxton v. Union Nat’l. Bank,
commonality “does not require that every question of law or fact be common to
every member of the class . . . and may be satisfied, for example, where the
question of law linking the class members is substantially related to the resolution
of the litigation even though the individuals are not identically situated.” 688 F.2d
552, 561 (8th Cir. 1982) (internal citations and quotation omitted). While plaintiffs
must show that there are questions of law or fact common to the class, they need
not show that all issues raised by the dispute are common. Mosley v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1334 (8th Cir. 1974). Commonality exists only when the
plaintiffs have allegedly been aggrieved by a single defendant or by several
defendants acting in concert. Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96CV0174, 1997
WL 33384270, at *4 (W.D. Mo. June 19, 1997), aff’d sub nom. Canady v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 1163 (8th Cir. 1998).

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Defendants admit that, under the plaintiffs’ collective-effort theory, the
plaintiffs’ class and subclass satisfy the commonality component.11 This court
agrees. Here, all plaintiffs will face a common legal question: whether an unjust
enrichment or quantum meruit action may be based upon the use of an attorney’s
work product by another attorney. They also will face the common issue of
whether collateral estoppel will attach to this court’s previous statements that statecourt plaintiffs (and, hence, their attorneys) received “substantial benefits” from
the common-benefit work.12 The defendants within each group are alleged to have
acted in concert: the members of the Phipps Group served as co-counsel, and the
Murray Group is composed of a law firm and its owner/member. The fact issues
regarding whether the defendants used and benefitted from the common-benefit
work and the value of that work will be identical for each plaintiff.
A.3. Typicality
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” This requirement is
closely tied with commonality. Cf. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,
11

They do argue, however, that plaintiffs cannot meet Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
requirement. That argument will be addressed below.
12

See, e.g., Downing v. Goldman Phipps PLLC, No. 4:13CV206 CDP, 2013 WL 1991531, at *1
(E.D. Mo. May 13, 2013), rev’d and remanded, 764 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 1464 (2015).

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157 n.13 (1982) (“The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend
to merge.”). “Typicality” means that there are “other members of the class who
have the same or similar grievances as the Plaintiff[s].” Donaldson v. Pillsbury
Co., 554 F.2d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). The named plaintiffs
and the class members may be said to have similar grievances if they have been
subjected to the same allegedly unlawful treatment. Rentschler v. Carnahan, 160
F.R.D. 114, 116 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
Here, each of the proposed class members would have essentially the same
grievances as the named plaintiffs – that the defendant attorneys have unjustly
benefitted from work paid for or provided by plaintiffs. I find that typicality has
been established.
A.4. Adequate Representation
The adequacy of representation requirement under Rule 23(a)(4) seeks to
discover conflicts of interest between named representatives and the class they
seek to represent. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997).
A class representative must be part of the class, possess the same interest, and
suffer the same injury as the prospective class members. E. Tex. Motor Freight
Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977).
Here, the Class Plaintiffs have allegedly suffered the same harm and have
the same interests as the prospective class members: they have provided services

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and/or paid for legal expenses as part of a pooled litigation group, and they have
not been reimbursed for the use of those materials by the defendant attorneys. The
Class Plaintiffs have retained a third-party law firm with a record of successful
complex-litigation experience to represent the class in this suit, and there are no
allegations of a conflict of interest between the Class Plaintiffs and the proposed
class. I find that the adequacy component of Rule 23(a)(4) is satisfied.
B. Rule 23(b) Requirements
Plaintiffs assert that this class is appropriate for certification under either
Rule 23(b)(3) or 23(b)(1). To certify a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), the court
must find that: (1) common questions predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members; and (2) class resolution is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3).
B.1. Predominance
“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). When determining whether common
questions predominate, the court must conduct a “limited preliminary inquiry” to
gauge whether, if the plaintiffs’ allegations are true, common evidence could
establish a prima facie case for the class. Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562,

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566 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). If making a prima facie case requires that
members of the proposed class must present different evidence for each member,
then it is an individual question. Id. Courts are less likely to find that common
issues predominate when the governing law varies widely amongst class members.
Cf. In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarb. Plastic Prods. Liab. Litig., 276 F.R.D. 336,
346 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (noting the complications inherent in applying differing
laws).
The parties give some attention to which state’s laws should apply, but I find
that an ultimate choice of law determination is not necessary at this stage in the
litigation. The plaintiffs’ collective litigation efforts were coordinated from
Missouri on orders from this Court entered in Missouri, and they paid into and
were reimbursed from the CBF Trust that was established in Missouri. Thus,
although the plaintiffs themselves are citizens of multiple states, Missouri served
as a proto-clearing house for the plaintiffs’ collective work that is the subject of
this case.
Defendants do not contest Missouri’s status as the hub of the plaintiffs’
collective efforts. Instead, defendants point to substantive differences in the laws
of Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas and argue that the laws of the latter
three states should apply.

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The potential number of states’ laws that can be applied is already limited by
the nature of the plaintiffs’ collective action. It is further limited when considering
that the claims are divided into class and subclass. The claims of the subclass are
directed solely against the Murray Group, which is based entirely out of Louisiana.
Thus, with respect to the subclass, the applicable law is restricted to one of two
states: Louisiana or Missouri. The law governing the claims of the class is
similarly restricted. The Phipps Group argues that the claims against it should be
subject to the laws of Arkansas and Texas. Even if the laws of both states were
applied, the claims of the class would at most require application of two states’
laws.13 The number of potential legal standards is not so many that they would
overshadow the common issues presented in this case. Contrast Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996) (ordering decertification
of class of asbestos plaintiffs from across the country after finding the application
of a choice of law analysis to each plaintiff’s claim exponentially compounded the
individual factual and legal issues).
Defendants also argue that individual questions predominate because the
plaintiffs’ claims will require an inquiry into the specific legal work performed or
paid for by each class member. I do not agree that this kind of individualized factfinding will be required. By pooling their resources, the MDL plaintiffs and their
13

The same may be said if Missouri were to substitute for either Texas or Arkansas.

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lawyers achieved a great deal of efficiency in the prosecution and ultimate
settlement of all their MDL claims. Because they undertook this joint approach to
the underlying litigation, they will not have to show that each individual class
member provided or paid for specific things – instead they can show that they
jointly incurred the expenses that conferred a benefit on the defendants.
This case is easily distinguished from Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 164 P.3d 1028, 1036 (Okla. 2006), relied on by the defendants. That case
involved a failed attempt to certify a class of plaintiffs defined as consumers who
had each contracted for oil changes and been charged a set fee for supplies,
regardless of what actual supplies had been used. Id. at 1031. The court held that
individual issues predominated, because the unjust enrichment claim required
plaintiff-specific inquiries into what supplies were used, the cost of the supplies,
what the customer was told, and whether the customer agreed to pay the fee,
among others. Id. at 1036. Notably, the plaintiffs in Harvell had not pooled their
resources, but instead operated individually when they took their cars in to be
serviced.
The Harvell inquiries necessarily dealt with each plaintiff on an individual
basis. Here, individual attorneys and law firms created work product, but each
service was provided as part of a collective effort on behalf of all the MDL
plaintiffs to prosecute the MDL. To the extent that any defendant used any

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particular piece of work product, the plaintiffs need only show that they created
that work product as part of the collective effort. The same may be said for the
common-benefit expenses. So far as any particular plaintiff was harmed by the
defendants’ use of the materials, the entire class was harmed.
These claims do require evidence of the defendants’ use of the plaintiffs’
common-benefit materials, including the circumstances surrounding that use, and
the value of the benefit thereby obtained.14 That evidence will necessarily be
individualized as to the particular defendants or groups of defendants. But as to

14

Cf. El Paso Prod. Co. v. Blanchard, 269 S.W.3d 362, 372 (Ark. 2007) (proving unjust
enrichment requires a defendant to have received something of value, to which he is not entitled,
under equitable circumstances that require restitution); Sanders v. Bradley Cnty. Human Servs.
Pub. Facilities Bd., 956 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Ark. 1997) (noting that quantum meruit claims are
treated as unjust enrichment and measured by value of benefit conferred); Cnty. Asphalt Paving,
Co. v. Mosley Constr., Inc., 239 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (“[Q]uantum meruit
claim[s require proof] that the plaintiff provided to the defendant materials or services at the
defendant’s request or with the acquiescence of the defendant, that the materials or services had
reasonable value, and that the defendant, despite the demands of the plaintiff, has failed and
refused to pay the reasonable value of such materials or services.”); Vortt Exploration Co. v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990) (“To recover under quantum meruit a
claimant must prove that: (1) valuable services were rendered or materials furnished; (2) for the
person sought to be charged; (3) which services and materials were accepted by the person
sought to be charged, used and enjoyed by him; (4) under such circumstances as reasonably
notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff in performing such services was
expecting to be paid by the person sought to be charged.”). Like Arkansas, Louisiana does not
recognize quantum meruit as an independent basis for recovery and instead construes the claims
as an action in unjust enrichment, Fogleman v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 638 So. 2d 706, 709
(La. Ct. App. 1994), of which there are five elements: (1) an enrichment, (2) an impoverishment,
(3) a causal relationship between the two, (4) the absence of justification for the enrichment or
impoverishment, and (5) no other remedy at law. Id. at 710.

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the plaintiffs, those inquiries remain common to the class and subclass as a whole,
as does the question of whether and to what extent language used in previous
orders is relevant or has any effect on the elements to be proved. Common issues
predominate, and so the first requirement under Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied.
B.2. Superiority of Class Resolution
The final inquiry to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3) looks to whether
class resolution is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Factors include (1) the
class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members; (3) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
and (4) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. Id.
These factors demonstrate the superiority of class resolution. The class
members lack any interest in individually prosecuting separate actions. The MDL
is based in this court, and I am familiar with my own common-benefit orders upon
which the class plaintiffs base many of their arguments. Finally, any difficulties in
managing this class action are dwarfed in comparison to the alternative.
I will certify this class under Rule 23(b)(3), and so I do not need to reach the
Rule 23(b)(1) arguments.

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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for class certification
[#170] is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Class Plaintiffs Gray, Ritter & Graham,
P.C., Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLC, and Looper Reed &
McGraw, P.C., are appointed as class representatives to represent the following
class:
All persons and entities that provided or paid for common-benefit services,
materials, and/or related expense items (except Defendants),
They are also appointed to represent the following subclass:
All persons and entities that provided common-benefit services (except
Defendants).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Patrick J. Stueve, Todd E. Hilton, and
Bradley T. Wilders, of Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, 460 Nichols Rd. Suite 200,
Kansas City, MO 64112, are appointed as Class Counsel.

CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 14th day of July, 2015.

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