Jones v. Beelman Truck Company

Filing 74

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to respond out of time to defendants motion to determine the value of medical treatment is GRANTED. [Doc. 66] The Clerk of Court shall detach and docket plaintiffs respons e, which was submitted as an attachment to its motion for leave. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Beelman Truck Company's motion to determine the value of medical treatment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. [Doc. 46] The moti on is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a determination that the statutory presumption set forth in Missouri Revised Statute § 490.715.5 applies in this case, and DENIED to the extent it seeks a ruling from the Court determining the exact dollar amount of the value plaintiffs medical treatment.. Signed by District Judge Charles A. Shaw on 7/28/2015. (MRC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
RAYMOND K. JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
BEELMAN TRUCK COMPANY,
Defendant.

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No. 4:13-CV-252 CAS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: (1) plaintiff Raymond Jones’
motion to respond out of time to defendant’s motion to determine the value of plaintiff’s medical
treatment under Missouri Revised Statute § 490.715.5, and (2) defendant Beelman Truck Company’s
(“Beelman”) motion to determine the value of plaintiff’s medical treatment. For the following
reasons, the Court will grant plaintiff’s motion to respond out of time, and grant in part and deny in
part defendant’s motion to determine the value of plaintiff’s medical treatment.
Background
In the early morning hours of January 17, 2008, while walking along the highway leading
toward his home, plaintiff was struck by a Beelman tractor-trailer operated by Steven Reinhardt.
The accident occurred on Missouri Route 221, near its intersection with U.S. Highway 67 in
Farmington, Missouri. Plaintiff alleges he suffers serious and permanent injuries. He brings this
suit against Beelman in two counts: negligence (Count I) and negligent failure to train (Count II).
Trial is set for August 24, 2015, and pretrial materials are due August 4, 2015.

Discussion
A.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Respond to Out of Time to Defendant’s Motion to Determine
Value of Medical Treatment

Pursuant to the Case Management Order, on January 14, 2015 defendant filed its motion to
determine the value of plaintiff’s medical treatment pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute
§ 490.715.5.1 Plaintiff’s response was due January 26, 2015, but no response was ever filed. On
July 22, 2015, nearly six months after it was due, plaintiff moved for leave to respond to the motion.
In the motion, plaintiff’s counsel attempt to excuse their late filing stating they did not
receive notice of defendant’s motion through CM/ECF, and did not know that motion had been filed.
As defendant tactfully notes, plaintiff’s counsel’s statement is incorrect and based on a logical
impossibility. Counsel Clinton Roberts stated that he does not receive filings through CM/ECF
although he has entered his appearance in this case. A review of the docket sheet, however, shows
that Mr. Roberts has not entered his appearance in this case. Even if he had, counsel has known for
two years that he is not receiving CM/ECF filings, and has done nothing to rectify the problem.
Also, despite not receiving CM/ECF notifications, Mr. Roberts apparently does not review the
docket sheet and left a pending motion unopposed for six months.
More incredible, however, is counsel Joseph Bauer’s statement that he did not receive a copy
of defendant’s motion through CM/ECF and was unaware such a motion had been filed. This is the
second time Mr. Bauer has used this excuse to request an extension. More than eighteen months

1

The Court issued the Case Management Order (“CMO”) on March 22, 2013, following the
parties’ submission of a Joint Scheduling Plan. As modified by Orders issued December 4, 2013,
May 8, 2014, June 13, 2014, and November 14, 2014, the CMO required “any motion to limit
evidence of the value of medical treatment rendered to the plaintiff, pursuant to § 490.715.5, Mo.
Rev. Stat., shall be filed by January 14, 2015.” See Doc. 40, Part I.5 (emphasis in original).
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ago, in his first motion for an extension of time of the deadlines in the CMO, Mr. Bauer stated that
“he never received any electronic notifications in this case, and was unaware of the deadlines in the
[CMO].” See Doc. 18. At that time, the Court indicated it was reluctant to alter the deadlines for
this reason, but did not want to severely prejudice plaintiff for the actions of his attorney. The Court
granted the motion, and extended the deadlines in the CMO. Mr. Bauer entered his appearance and
specifically requested to be served through CM/ECF, stating “please include the undersigned
[Joseph L. Bauer] as a recipient of e-filings and rulings.” See Doc. 12. The Clerk of Court entered
Mr. Bauer on the docket sheet and he began receiving filings through CM/ECF.
Defendant’s motion to determine value of medical treatment includes an appropriate
certificate of service stating that the document was served on all counsel of record through the
Court’s CM/ECF system. The receipt of service shows that a copy of the motion was electronically
mailed to Mr. Bauer and two other individuals at his firm: “[e-mail]” and
“[e-mail].” Mr. Bauer has participated fully in this case through CM/ECF as
evidenced by the many documents he has filed through the system. In fact, he fully responded to
the other two motions filed by defendant on the same day as the current motion. Even assuming Mr.
Bauer did not receive notice that the motion had been filed, a cursory review of the docket sheet
would show the pending motion, which Mr. Bauer would likely be expecting because the deadline
for filing the motion had been set by the CMO.
Although the Court is not inclined to allow plaintiff to file his response six months late, the
Court has reviewed the response, and finds that it does not alter the Court’s substantive ruling on
defendant’s motion. Thus, the Court will grant plaintiff leave to file the response out of time, and
will proceed to rule on defendant’s motion to determine the value of plaintiff’s medical treatment
pursuant to § 490.715.5.
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B.

Defendant’s Motion to Determine the Value of Plaintiff’s Medical Treatment

Pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute § 490.715.5, defendant has filed a motion seeking to
limit the value of the medical treatment rendered to plaintiff to the dollar amount necessary to satisfy
his financial obligations to his health care providers. Section 490.715.5 states as follows:
(1) Parties may introduce evidence of the value of the medical treatment rendered
to a party that was reasonable, necessary, and a proximate result of the negligence
of any party.
(2) In determining the value of the medical treatment rendered, there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that the dollar amount necessary to satisfy the financial
obligation to the health care provider represents the value of the medical treatment
rendered. Upon motion of any party, the court may determine, outside the hearing
of the jury, the value of the medical treatment rendered based upon additional
evidence, including but not limited to:
(a)

The medical bills incurred by a party;

(b)

The amount actually paid for medical treatment rendered to a party;

(c)

The amount or estimate of the amount of medical bills not paid which such
party is obligated to pay to any entity in the event of a recovery.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, no evidence of collateral sources shall be made
known to the jury in presenting the evidence of the value of the medical treatment
rendered.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.715.5.
The statue establishes a rebuttable presumption that the amounts actually paid to a medical
provider represent the value of a plaintiff’s medical treatment. See id.; see also Deck v. Teasley,
322 S.W.3d 536, 541 (Mo. 2010). The rebuttable presumption “places the burden of producing
substantial evidence to rebut the presumed fact on the party against whom the presumption
operates.” Deck, 322 S.W.3d at 539. To decide whether the presumption is rebutted, the Court
“need only determine that the evidence introduced in rebuttal is sufficient to support a finding
contrary to the presumed fact.” Id. (citing 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al, McCormick On Evidence § 344
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(6th ed. 2006)). Here, the Court must determine if plaintiff has presented “substantial evidence” that
the value of his medical treatment is an amount different from the dollar amount necessary to satisfy
the financial obligation to his health care providers.
Plaintiff has not met his burden of presenting substantial evidence to rebut the presumption
established by § 490.715.5. In fact, plaintiff’s response to the motion presents no evidence to rebut
the presumption. Instead, plaintiff states without any relevant case citation that defendant’s motion
is premature. Plaintiff states he can overcome the presumption at trial, and “has no obligation to do
so prior to trial.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 2). Plaintiff’s argument ignores the Case Management Order.
The Court’s standard Case Management Order requires parties to file any motion to
determine the value of medical treatment shortly after the close of discovery and prior to (or
simultaneously with) filing dispositive motions. The original CMO and each of the four amended
CMOs issued in this case have included the deadline for filing such a motion. Plaintiff has known
of this deadline for more than two years. His belated response states that defendant “puts the cart
before the horse” by filing the motion on the date set out in the CMO, and states plaintiff will
overcome the statutory presumption at trial. Plaintiff includes no relevant case law and does not
explain his reasoning.
The statutory language indicates the determination should occur “outside the hearing of the
jury,” and case law indicates the determination is appropriate for a pretrial hearing. See Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 490.715.5; Deck, 322 S.W.2d at 539. In Deck v. Teasley, for example, plaintiff presented
three experts in the field of health care administration to testify at a pretrial hearing and rebut the
statutory presumption. See id. at 539. In stark contrast to plaintiff in Deck, here plaintiff presents
no evidence to rebut the presumption—no affidavits, no medical bills, no payment receipts. Plaintiff

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relies instead on his unsubstantiated statement that he does not have to produce this evidence prior
to trial.
If the presumption is not rebutted, “then the only evidence of the value of medical treatment
rendered is the dollar amount necessary to satisfy the financial obligation to the health care
providers.” Id. at 541. Because plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to rebut the
presumption, the statutory presumption remains in effect and defendant’s motion should be granted
to the extent it seeks a determination that the presumption applies in this case.
In deciding this motion, the Court’s role is limited to determining whether the presumption
is rebutted by substantial evidence. The Court is not to weigh the evidence and make a final
determination of the value of medical treatment. Id. (“The trial court further erred in the present
case because the court did not limit its role to determining whether the presumption was rebutted
by substantial evidence.”); see also Montgomery v. Wilson, 331 S.W.3d 332, 339 (Mo. Ct. App.
2011). Instead, the Court is to submit the issue to the jury for adjudication. Thus, although
defendant is entitled to the statutory presumption, to the extent defendant’s motion seeks a ruling
from the Court determining the exact dollar amount of the value of medical treatment rendered, the
motion will be denied.

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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to respond out of time to defendant’s
motion to determine the value of medical treatment is GRANTED. [Doc. 66] The Clerk of Court
shall detach and docket plaintiff’s response, which was submitted as an attachment to its motion for
leave.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Beelman Truck Company’s motion to
determine the value of medical treatment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. [Doc. 46]
The motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a determination that the statutory presumption set
forth in Missouri Revised Statute § 490.715.5 applies in this case, and DENIED to the extent it
seeks a ruling from the Court determining the exact dollar amount of the value plaintiff’s medical
treatment.

__________________________________
CHARLES A. SHAW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this

28th

day of July, 2015.

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