Muhammad v. Steele

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition of Rasheed I. Muhammad for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability shall not be issued in this case. A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/16/2016. (NEB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
RASHEED I. MUHAMMAD,
Petitioner,
v.
TROY STEELE,
Respondent.

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Case No. 4:13-CV-0311-AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the petition of Missouri state prisoner Rasheed
Muhammad for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On November 26,
2008, Petitioner entered a blind plea of guilty in the Circuit Court of St. Louis, Missouri,
to second-degree murder and armed criminal action. Petitioner was sentenced on January
23, 2009, to a 25-year term of imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently.
For habeas relief, Petitioner asserts that his constitutional rights were violated in two
ways:
1. Petitioner claims his plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance in promising
Petitioner that he would not be sentenced to more than 20 years if he pled guilty;
and
2. Petitioner claims his plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
advise Petitioner about the feasibility of a self-defense claim or the possibility that
a jury might find for a lesser-included offense on the murder charge.

For the reasons set forth below, the petition for habeas relief will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Charges and Guilty Plea Hearing
On November 26, 2008, Petitioner entered a blind plea of guilty to second-degree
murder and armed criminal action with regard to the July 2, 2007 shooting death of Djuan
Rives. At the plea hearing, Petitioner was informed by the plea court that he would not
be sentenced to more than the state’s recommended sentence of 25 years on each count,
to run concurrently. (Doc. No. 22-3 at 4, 12-13.) The court also informed Petitioner that
it would be unlikely to depart from the State’s recommendation of 25 years because
Petitioner was a persistent offender. The plea court explained to Petitioner at the hearing:
But I also told your attorney that it is very unlikely that I
would cut the recommendation [of 25 years] also because –
and the main reason being is they pled you up as a persistent
offender, and [assistant prosecuting attorney] Monahan tells
me that he would be able to prove that you are a persistent
offender. That’s why I’m putting that on the record also.
(Doc. No. 22-3 at 13-14.)
The State then recited the evidence which it would have tendered at trial:
There were at least seven people that saw the defendant
engage in a verbal altercation with at least seven people and
one of the friends which was Djuan Rives who - - there may
have been some physical contact between the individuals and
several of the witnesses. They noticed that the defendant had
a gun on him, and several of the witnesses also would testify
that the defendant, after Djuan Rives slipped and fell into
him, that the defendant then pulled this handgun, this 9
millimeter Jennings pistol, and shot the victim once in the
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chest and - - which killed him. Witnesses also saw the
defendant hide a 9 millimeter Jennings pistol in the side of a
dumpster which they told police about and was recovered that
night.
Id. at 18-19.
Petitioner agreed that these recited facts were substantially correct. Petitioner also
acknowledged that his attorney fully explained the elements of the crime and any
possible defenses; that she investigated the case to his complete satisfaction; that she
adequately and effectively represented him in defense of all charges; and that Petitioner
did not know of anything she could have done that she had not. Id. at 17, 21-22.
Petitioner then acknowledged the rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea and
acknowledged that no promises or threats had been made to him to induce his plea of
guilty. Id. at 20-24.
The plea court accepted Petitioner’s pleas of guilty, finding that there was a factual
basis for each count and that Petitioner’s pleas of guilty were made voluntarily and
intelligently with a full understanding of the charges and the consequences of pleading
guilty. Id. at 25.
Sentencing Hearing
On January 23, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years on each of the two
counts, to run concurrently.

Petitioner again indicated that his attorney did not

communicate any threats or promises to induce him to plead guilty. Petitioner testified
that his counsel did everything that he asked before he entered a plea of guilty. He
agreed that he was “satisfied with the services rendered to [him] by [counsel],” whether
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or not he was satisfied with the outcome of this case, which the sentencing court
explained was that he would go “to the penitentiary for 25 years.” The sentencing court
found that “no probable cause exists to believe the defendant has received ineffective
assistance of counsel.” (Doc. No. 22-3 at 39-42.)
Motions for Post-Conviction Relief
On June 24, 2009, Petitioner filed an Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or
Correct the Judgment and Sentence, with the assistance of appointed counsel, and a
request for an evidentiary hearing. In his motion Petitioner raised the same two claims at
issue here: that plea counsel promised him the court would sentence Petitioner to no more
than 20 years in exchange for his guilty plea, and that plea counsel failed to advise
Petitioner of the potential for a self-defense claim or that a jury might convict him of a
lesser-included offense including voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.

Petitioner

asserted that he would have gone to trial if he had been aware of the likely 25-year
sentence or the possibility of arguing for self-defense or a lesser included offense, and
that, as a result, his plea was rendered involuntary. Id. at 64-76.
The motion court overruled Petitioner’s post-conviction motion for relief, without
an evidentiary hearing. The motion court found that the record refuted Petitioner’s first
claim, relying upon Petitioner’s own representations at the plea and sentencing hearings
that no threats or promises were made to induce him to plead guilty, and that he was
satisfied with his counsel’s work. Id. at 81-84. The motion court did not respond to the
second claim—that plea counsel failed to advise Petitioner of the possibility of a selfdefense claim or the possibility of a verdict for a lesser-included offense.
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Petitioner’s only argument on appeal was that the motion court improperly failed
to address his second claim. (Doc. No. 22-1 at 10-11.) The Missouri Court of Appeals
ruled that the motion court was required to issue findings and conclusions on all issues
and was not excused from doing so in this case by any recognized exception.
Muhammad v. State, 320 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (“Muhammad I”). The
Missouri Court of Appeals therefore remanded the case for the motion court to issue
findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to Petitioner’s second claim. Id.
On remand, the motion court issued findings and conclusions regarding
Petitioner’s second claim—that defense counsel failed to advise him concerning the
potential of a self-defense claim and the possibility that a jury might have convicted him
of a lesser-included offense. The motion court found this claim to be refuted by the
record, relying on Petitioner’s testimony at the plea and sentencing hearings.
Specifically, the motion court relied on Petitioner’s representations that:
counsel did not refuse to comply with any of his requests, that
she answered all of his questions regarding the charges
pending against him, that he had enough time to discuss the
case with counsel, that he had no complaints or criticisms of
counsel’s representation, that he didn’t know of anything that
she could have done that she didn’t, that he didn’t give her a
list of witnesses to interview in reference to any possible
defense or defense that he might have, that counsel
investigated the case to his complete satisfaction, that he had
been advised of all aspects of his case including legal rights
and possible consequences of his plea, and that counsel had
adequately, completely, and effectively represented him in his
defense to the charges pending against him.
(Doc. No. 22-9 at 51.)

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Petitioner appealed the motion court’s revised opinion only with regard to the
claim that counsel failed to advise Petitioner of the possibility of self-defense or
conviction of a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. (Doc. No. 22-6 at 14.)
Specifically, Petitioner argued that the failure of counsel to so advise him was a factual
issue not refuted by the record, and that Petitioner’s repeated representations that he was
satisfied with counsel should be disregarded, because at the time of the plea, Petitioner
was unaware that a self-defense theory might be viable, or that he might be convicted on
a lesser-included offense. In support of his contentions, Petitioner relied on Bequette v.
State, 161 S.W.3d 905, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (finding the movant, who was convicted
of criminal non-support of his minor children, was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
his motion for post-conviction relief where at the time of the plea defense counsel had not
informed him of the defense of in-kind support). Petitioner did not appeal the motion
court’s ruling with regard to his first claim for relief, i.e., that counsel promised Petitioner
he would be sentenced to no more than 20 years if he pled guilty.
The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court’s denial of Petitioner’s
request for post-conviction relief, holding that the motion court’s findings and
conclusions were not clearly erroneous and agreeing that the record clearly indicated that
Petitioner voluntarily and knowingly entered a plea of guilty. Muhammad v. State, 367
S.W.3d 659, 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (“Muhammad II”). The appellate court first found
that Petitioner’s claim was refuted by the record. Like the motion court, the appellate
court noted Petitioner’s specific acknowledgements that counsel fully explained the
nature of the charges and the elements of those charges, that counsel had explained any
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possible defense, that he had been advised of all aspects of his case and the possible
consequences of his guilty plea, and the affirmation at sentencing that he was satisfied
with the services rendered by counsel. In light of these statements, the court found that
“[t]he record, therefore, clearly demonstrates that defense counsel fully advised
[Petitioner] of the nature of the charges and defenses to those charges.” Id. at 662.
The Missouri Court of Appeals further found that Petitioner’s case was
distinguishable from Bequette, because while in Bequette there was a substantial
possibility that the movant was not aware of a particular “highly technical” defense,
“[s]elf defense is not a technical or sophisticated legal defense that is beyond the
knowledge of a layperson.” Id. at 663. The court concluded that the record did not
support any claim that Petitioner was unaware of the principles of self-defense. The
court similarly stated that it was “not persuaded that the possibility of being convicted of
a lesser offense to second-degree murder is beyond the realm of knowledge of a lay
person.” Id.
Federal Habeas Petition
Petitioner again raises the same two claims in his federal habeas petition.
Respondent argues that Petitioner’s first claim was procedurally defaulted because
Petitioner did not advance the claim when he appealed the denial of his motion for postconviction relief, and Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for the
default, or actual innocence which might excuse this procedural default.

Second,

Respondent argues that even considered on its merits, Petitioner’s first claim fails
because the record reflects that Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
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Respondent argues that Petitioner’s second claim similarly fails because the state courts
reasonably adjudicated the claim. Petitioner filed a traverse, in which he reiterates his
claims and suggests that the Court should consider that Petitioner was assaulted by the
victim and his confederates prior to the victim’s death.

Petitioner also proffers an

eyewitness handwritten statement, which he claims supports that Petitioner was assaulted
prior to shooting Rives. Petitioner asserts that he was outnumbered, could not leave, and
believed his life was in danger, and thus, his claim for habeas relief based on counsel’s
failure to discuss a self-defense theory should be granted. Petitioner also requested
additional discovery to obtain a recording of Petitioner’s statement to police following
the incident.1
DISCUSSION
Applicable Legal Standards
“Ordinarily, a federal court reviewing a state conviction in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254
proceeding may consider only those claims which the petitioner has presented to the state
court in accordance with state procedural rules.” Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082,
1086-87 (8th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Under Missouri law, “a claim must be
presented ‘at each step of the judicial process’ to avoid default.” Id. at 1087 (quoting
Benson v. State, 611 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)). “Failure to raise a claim on
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Because the record is sufficient to fully consider all of the asserted grounds for
habeas relief, the Court will not reopen discovery. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); see also
Chatman v. Steele, No. 4:08CV1656DDN, 2009 WL 5030784, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 14,
2009) (“[P]etitioner is seeking to reopen the record of the state court decisions in his case.
This he may not do, because this court is limited in its habeas corpus jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the record is sufficient to fully consider all of the grounds for
habeas relief.”).
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appeal from the denial of a post-conviction motion erects a procedural bar to federal
habeas review.” Jolly v. Gammon, 28 F.3d 51, 53 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see
also Moore-El v. Al Luebbers, 446 F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Where a claim is
defaulted, a federal habeas court will consider it only where the petitioner can establish
either cause for the default and actual prejudice, or that the default will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.”).
Additionally, where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides that
application for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted unless the state court’s
adjudication
1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The “contrary to” clause is satisfied if a state court has arrived at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or confronts facts that
are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent but arrives at
the opposite result. Strong v. Roper, 737 F.3d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 2013); Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003).

A state court “unreasonably applies” clearly

established federal law when it “identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the

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Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000).
‘[C]learly established Federal law’ for purposes of §
2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the
dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions.
And an
‘unreasonable application of’ those holdings must be
objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error
will not suffice. To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner
is required to show that the state court’s ruling on the claim
being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.
Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (citations omitted). “This is especially
true for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, where AEDPA review must be doubly
deferential in order to afford both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of
the doubt.”

Id. (citation omitted).

“Finally, a state court decision involves an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state
court proceedings only if it is shown that the state court’s presumptively correct factual
findings do not enjoy support in the record.” Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th
Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Promise of Reduced Sentence
First, the Court considers whether Petitioner’s first asserted claim fails as a matter
of procedural default. Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in promising
him a sentence not greater than 20 years was procedurally defaulted in state court because
although the claim was raised in Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief, it was not
preserved on appeal from denial of that motion. Instead, Petitioner’s appeal of the
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motion court’s initial denial of relief focused solely on the motion court’s failure to
address Petitioner’s second argument: that he was not informed of the doctrine of selfdefense. See Doc. No. 6 at 14. Thus, he failed to raise his first habeas claim in appealing
his denial of post-conviction relief. Accordingly, consideration of this claim is barred.
Moreover, even if the Court were to consider this claim on its merits, Petitioner’s
claim would fail. To obtain relief under the Sixth Amendment for ineffective assistance
of counsel, a petitioner must show that his counsel’s performance was both deficient and
prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 58 (1985), the Supreme Court applied Strickland’s two-part test to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims arising in the context of guilty pleas, and explained that to
prevail, a petitioner must show prejudice, an inquiry which “focuses on whether
counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea
process.” Id. at 59. Moreover, “[w]here a guilty plea is challenged under the second
prong of the Strickland test the defendant must show that . . . he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699,
704 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, the motion court reasonably found that Petitioner cannot claim that he was
prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged promise that he would not be sentenced to more than
20 years in prison, because the plea court expressly informed Petitioner prior to his guilty
plea that it was unlikely to deviate from the State’s recommended sentence of 25 years.
The motion court’s adjudication of this claim was factually and legally reasonable. See,
e.g., Tinajero-Ortiz v. United States, 635 F.3d 1100, 1105 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding no
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prejudice because “allegedly omitted information had been ‘fully supplied to [the
petitioner] throughout the plea process’ and the district court had ‘explicitly informed’
the petitioner of the potentially applicable sentences during the plea colloquy”).
Failure to Advise On Self-Defense and Lesser-Included Offenses
Next, the Court considers Petitioner’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in
failing to inform him about the possibility of arguing self-defense at trial, or about the
possibility of lesser-included offenses. Again, relief for ineffective assistance of counsel
requires a petitioner to show that his counsel’s performance was both deficient and
prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Establishing ineffective assistance of counsel is
a “heavy burden,” United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996), because
“[i]n determining whether counsel’s conduct was objectively reasonable, there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Nguyen, 114 F.3d at 704 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (internal
quotations omitted). Furthermore, both prongs of the test must be satisfied for the claim
to succeed; if a defendant fails to make a sufficient showing under one prong, the court
need not address the other. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
In holding that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, the state
courts gave considerable weight to Petitioner’s answers during the plea colloquy. But a
layperson cannot be expected to be aware of all legal defenses, and therefore, the
Petitioner’s representation that his attorney explained all “possible defenses” to his
satisfaction is not dispositive evidence of sufficient representation. The Eighth Circuit
has explained that “[a] guilty plea must represent the informed, self-determined choice of
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the defendant among practicable alternatives; a guilty plea cannot be a conscious,
informed choice if the accused relies upon counsel who performs ineffectively in
advising him regarding the consequences . . . of the feasible options.” Hawkman v.
Parratt, 661 F.2d 1161, 1170 (8th Cir. 1981).
Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by the Missouri courts’ reasoning that “[s]elf
defense is not a technical or sophisticated legal defense that is beyond the knowledge of a
lay person,” Muhammad II, 367 S.W.3d at 663. Similarly, effective counsel should
advise a client of the lesser-included offenses of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter if
those lesser-included offenses are in fact available. See, e.g., Wiggins v. State, No. ED
101660, 2015 WL 1915324, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2015) (distinguishing
Muhammad II, and holding that “while self-defense is evident, the concept of sudden
passion arising from adequate cause is not as evident to a non-lawyer”).
Nevertheless, the Court concludes that counsel’s assistance was not ineffective,
and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.2 In Patrick v. Purkett, No. 4:07CV00974
ERW, 2010 WL 2926230, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2010), a petitioner who bludgeoned
his victim to death following an argument in which the victim swung an electrical cord at
the petitioner brought a habeas corpus claim following his guilty plea. The petitioner
claimed he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to advise him as to the possibility of
arguing self-defense, or of the possibility of being found guilty of lesser-included
2

As the Eighth Circuit has explained, “In reviewing whether the state court’s decision
involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, we examine the
ultimate legal conclusions reached by the court, not merely the statement of reasons
explaining the state court’s decision.” Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted).
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offenses to second degree murder, including voluntary manslaughter or involuntary
manslaughter. The court found that counsel was not deficient because the petitioner
would not have met the requirements for a jury instruction on self-defense or the
proffered lesser-included offenses.

The court explained that the “[p]etitioner’s plea

counsel was not ineffective in failing to suggest that he could proceed to trial and assert
self-defense, or seek to obtain a guilty verdict at trial on the lesser offenses of voluntary
or involuntary manslaughter. The facts alleged demonstrate that none of those trial
strategies would have been viable.” Id. at *6.
Here, too, plea counsel in the instant matter would not have rendered
unconstitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to discuss with Petitioner the
possibility of going to trial under a self-defense theory.

Missouri statutory law

establishes that to receive an instruction on self-defense in a case where lethal force is
used, a criminal defendant must show:
(1) an absence of aggression or provocation on the part of
the defender; (2) a real or apparently real necessity for the
defender to kill in order to save himself from an
immediate danger of serious bodily injury or death; (3) a
reasonable cause for the defendant’s belief in such
necessity; and (4) an attempt by the defender to do all
within his power consistent with his personal safety to
avoid the danger and the need to take a life.
State v. Thomas, 161 S.W.3d 377, 379 (Mo. 2005) (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031). In
light of the facts as Petitioner agreed to them in his guilty plea hearing, Petitioner cannot
show “a real or apparently real necessity for the defender to kill,” a required element of
the defense. While there may have been some physical contact between Petitioner and
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his victim, there is no indication of any perceived need to kill. Nor do the facts suggest
that Petitioner attempted to “avoid the danger and the need to take a life.” Instead, the
facts suggest that Petitioner shot the victim with little or no provocation and as a first
resort upon feeling threatened. No court or jury could rationally find that Petitioner was
justified in shooting Rives in the chest because Rives “slipped and fell into him.” See
Patrick, 2010 WL 2926230, at *3 (“A court or jury could not rationally find that [the
petitioner] was justified in bludgeoning the victim on the head and then strangling her . . .
in order to save himself from further insults, pushes, or strikes from an electrical cord,
and counsel therefore was not ineffective in deciding not to discuss this defense with
Petitioner.”).
Similarly, under Missouri law, voluntary manslaughter would not have been
legally feasible. Voluntary manslaughter is a class B felony, defined as causing the death
of another person under circumstances that would constitute murder in the second
degree,3 except that the death was caused “under the influence of sudden passion arising
from adequate cause.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.023. “Adequate cause” refers to “cause that
would reasonably produce a degree of passion in a person of ordinary temperament
sufficient to substantially impair an ordinary person’s capacity for self-control.” Id. at §
565.002(1).

“Sudden passion” is “passion directly caused by and arising out of

provocation by the victim or another acting with the victim which passion arises at the

3

Pursuant to Missouri law, “A person commits murder in the second degree if he 1)
Knowingly causes the death of another person or, with the purpose of causing serious
physical injury to another person, causes the death of another person . . . .” Mo. Rev.
Stat. Section 565.021.1.
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time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation,” id. at § 565.002(7);
it “may be rage or anger, or terror, but it must be so extreme that, for the moment, the
action is being directed by passion, not reason.” State v. Fears, 803 S.W.2d 605, 609
(Mo. 1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, counsel was not ineffective by failing to discuss a voluntary manslaughter
theory, because no factfinder could reasonably conclude that Petitioner had adequate
cause or experienced sudden passion before shooting Rives. Instead, the facts to which
Petitioner admitted suggest only that Rives and his associates may have approached
Petitioner and that some altercation may have occurred. But the facts suggest that any
physical contact with Petitioner was incidental and insufficient to give rise to a voluntary
manslaughter instruction at trial.
Finally, plea counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise Petitioner of the
possibility of being convicted only of involuntary manslaughter.

A person who

“[r]ecklessly causes the death of another person” commits involuntary manslaughter. See
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.024.1(1).

The Missouri Supreme Court has explained

“recklessness” as it relates to purported self-defense as follows:
Recklessness resembles knowing conduct in one respect in
that it involves awareness, but it is an awareness of risk, that
is, of a probability less than a substantial certainty. By
contrast, to act knowingly is to be aware that the conduct is
practically certain to cause a result. In sum, reckless conduct
is not inconsistent with the intentional act of defending one’s
self, if in doing so one uses unreasonable force.
State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. 2000).

A killing resulting from an

unreasonable belief that the conduct was necessary to save the killer’s own life, therefore,
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can constitute an involuntary manslaughter, a doctrine known as “imperfect selfdefense.” See Beeler, 12 S.W.3d at 298. However, the jury in such a case would need to
“believe the defendant acted unreasonably in defending himself, but not believe
defendant had the requisite intent for second degree murder; that is, he did not knowingly
cause the victim’s death or have a purpose to do great harm to the victim.” Id. at 300; see
also State v. Newberry, 157 S.W.3d 387, 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (a factfinder can only
“draw an inference of recklessness if there is a basis to believe that the defendant did not
knowingly cause the victim’s death or have a purpose to do great harm to the victim”)
(citing Beeler, 12 S.W.3d at 300). Here, Petitioner could not have conceivably claimed
that he did not knowingly cause Rives’s death or have a purpose to do great harm to
Rives when he shot him. The facts do not support such an inference.
Thus, none of the alternative trial strategies proffered by Petitioner would have
been viable, and plea counsel was not ineffective by failing to discuss those strategies
with Petitioner. In sum, while the Court relies on grounds different than those set forth
by the state courts, the Court finds that the decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals did
not violate clearly established federal law and was not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
Furthermore, the Court does not believe that reasonable jurists might find the Court’s
assessment of Petitioner’s claims for habeas relief debatable or wrong, for purposes of
issuing a Certificate of Appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See Miller-El v.
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Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (standard for issuing a Certificate of Appealability)
(quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition of Rasheed I. Muhammad for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability shall not be
issued in this case.
A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 16th day of March, 2016.

________________________________
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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