Alexander v. UAW

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (see order for details) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss [# 16 ] is granted. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 10/21/2013. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

LARKEN ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UAW,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:13CV376 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Larken Alexander filed this pro se employment discrimination suit
against his former union, UAW, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. He alleges that the union failed to properly represent him
in a grievance procedure against his former employer because of his race, color,
national origin, and disability. Defendant UAW has moved to dismiss. Because
Alexander’s underlying EEOC charge was untimely, I will grant UAW’s motion.
I.

Background1
Plaintiff Alexander, who is black and suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome,

worked for DaimlerChrysler for seventeen years. He was discharged in

1

These facts are taken from Alexander’s complaint and his statements at a Rule 16 conference
held May 31, 2013. They are considered as true for the purposes of this Memorandum and
Opinion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
326–27 (1989).

approximately December 2000 for allegedly striking another employee, who was
white. Alexander was a member of UAW at the time of his discharge.
In response to the termination, UAW filed a grievance on Alexander’s
behalf. However, on November 12, 2001, UAW withdrew the grievance with
DaimlerChysler’s consent. Afterward, Alexander filed a complaint against UAW
with the National Labor Relations Board. On January 30, 2002, after investigating
the matter, the NLRB refused to issue the complaint.
More than ten years later, on January 7, 2013, Alexander filed a charge
against UAW with the EEOC. In his charge, he wrote:
As a union member, I filed a grievance with the UAW
regarding my treatment and discharge from Chrysler in around
December 2000. I was told the union was processing my grievance,
but I was never reinstated, nor have I received any benefits from
Chrysler. I am a black male, and had been accused by a white male of
hitting him. I believe the shop steward was a good friend of the white
employee.
I believe I was denied proper union representation due to my
race, black, color, and in an act of retaliation in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
(Doc. 1-1.) The EEOC issued Alexander a right-to-sue letter on February
13, 2013. The letter indicates that the EEOC closed its file on the charge
because it was not timely filed. (Doc. 6-1.)
Two weeks later, on February 27, 2013, Alexander filed suit in this
court, making mostly the same allegations. He amended his complaint the
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following month, adding, among other things, that UAW also had not
represented him in moving up through the ranks at DaimlerChrysler.
II.

Discussion
UAW has moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which allows a

defendant to assert that a plaintiff’s complaint fails “to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering a
12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the factual allegations of a complaint are
true and construes them in favor of the plaintiff. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989). In addition, pro se complaints like this one must
be liberally construed. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “Pro se
litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Fed.
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008).
A.

Conversion to Summary Judgment Motion Not Necessary
Although defendant UAW moves, in the alternative, for summary

judgment, converting its motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion is
not necessary in this case. When considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider material attached to the complaint and
materials that are public records, do not contradict the complaint, or are
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necessarily embraced by the pleadings. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.,
186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.1999). Here, I conclude that I may consider
UAW’s grievance withdrawal form and Alexander’s NLRB complaint
against UAW, as well as his EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter, as matters
embraced by the pleadings, and need not thereby convert this motion into
one for summary judgment.
B.

Filing Period for Title VII Claims
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite for filing

actions in federal court alleging claims under Title VII. Williams v. Little
Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994). At most, an
individual has 300 days from the date of an alleged unlawful employment
practice to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC. See Hutson v. Wells
Dairy, Inc., 578 F.3d 823, 825–26 (8th Cir. 2009).
This 300-day statute of limitations begins to run when the allegedly
unlawful act is communicated to the plaintiff employee. See Delaware State
College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1980). The limitations period
begins to run when the plaintiff employee knows of the unlawful act, even if
he does not yet know that the act was motivated by discriminatory intent.
See id.; Dring v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 58 F.3d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir.
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1995) (quoting Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 88–89 (4th Cir.
1990) (“To the extent that notice enters the analysis, it is notice of the
employer's actions, not the notice of a discriminatory effect or motivation
that establishes the commencement of the pertinent filing period.”).
In this case, Alexander alleges that UAW discriminated against him
because of his race, color, national origin, and disability when it improperly
withdrew the grievance at issue in November 2001 and failed to represent
him in an attempt to earn a promotion at DaimlerChrysler sometime earlier.
Even if Alexander’s allegations are true, it is much too late. Alexander
amply demonstrated his knowledge that the union had withdrawn its
grievance when he filed an NLRB complaint against it in 2001. At the very
latest, he would have needed to file an EEOC charge sometime in 2002.
At the Rule 16 conference held in this case on May 31, 2013,
Alexander stated that he knew other employees who had been out of work
for ten years but eventually got their jobs back through UAW. Because of
this, Alexander stated, it took him several years to recognize that UAW was
no longer representing his interests. Even assuming his statements are true,
they cannot toll the 300-day limitations period. Under Eighth Circuit law,
the limitations period began when Alexander found out about the act he
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alleges was discriminatory: UAW’s withdrawal of its grievance on his
behalf. UAW’s subsequent failure to get Alexander his job back is, at most,
an inevitable effect of its withdrawal of the grievance. Alexander’s later
discovery that he would not return to work therefore does not affect the 300day limitations period. See, e.g., Cooper v. St. Cloud State Univ., 226 F.3d
964, 968 (8th Cir. 2000) (professor’s Title VII suit against university was
time-barred when act that caused professor’s discharge was university’s
decision not to give professor tenure; 300-day limitations period began when
official tenure decision was announced, not when professor was fired).
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss
[#16] is granted.

CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 21st day of October, 2013.

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