Watkins-Israyl v. State of Missouri

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a certificate ofappealability. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 4/11/13. (ARL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CARL G. WATKINS-ISRAYL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI,
Respondent.

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No. 4:13CV439 TCM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s response to the Court’s show
cause order. Petitioner filed a § 2254 case that is twenty-three years beyond the
limitations period, and so the Court directed petitioner to show cause why this action
should not be dismissed. After reviewing the response, the Court finds that it falls
short, and therefore, the Court will dismiss this action without further proceedings.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 4.
Petitioner pled guilty to tampering in 1989. See State v. Watkins, 21CCR580971 (21st Judicial Cir., St. Louis County). He received a suspended execution of
sentence. In 1990 his probation was revoked and he was assigned to the Department
of Corrections for three years’ incarceration.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d):
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
Petitioner asserts that in this case § 2244(d)(1)(C) applies. Petitioner relies on
the recent Supreme Court case Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), in which the
Court held that inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral
proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of
ineffective assistance. Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to advise him that his state conviction could later be used to enhance a federal
sentence; he further argues that if he had been properly advised he never would have
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pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Petitioner also claims that he
asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal but that his attorney failed to do so.
Petitioner’s reliance on Martinez is misplaced. Martinez does not provide a
basis for extending the limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(C), as the Court’s
decision was an “equitable ruling” that did not establish “a new rule of constitutional
law.” Id. at 1319. Moreover, petitioner’s claim that his attorney failed to file a notice
of appeal does not excuse his failure to file a timely § 2254 petition. As a result, the
petition is time-barred.
Finally, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition is untimely. Thus, the Court will not issue a certificate
of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a certificate of
appealability.
Dated this 11th day of April, 2013.

JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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