Tasic v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal [ECF No. 1 ] filed by Debtor Mirsad Tasic is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the part of the bankruptcy court's order vacating the Clerk's entry of default is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the part of the bankruptcy court's order dismissing Debtor Mirsad Tasic's Adversary case is REVERSED. Signed by District Judge E. Richard Webber on June 4, 2013. (BRP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Case No. 4:13CV00479 ERW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Debtor Mirsad Tasic’s (“Debtor”) appeal of the
Bankruptcy Court’s Order vacating the Clerk’s entry of default, and dismissing Debtor’s
Adversary Complaint against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) [ECF No. 1].
As pertinent for purposes of this discussion and to provide a contextual frame of
reference, the Court incorporates that part of the procedural background recited in its
Memorandum and Order reversing the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of Debtor’s Chapter 13 case,
Case No. 4:13CV00474.
Debtor filed a Chapter 13 Voluntary Petition, and a Chapter 13 Plan, in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on August 14, 2012. Following objections
by the Chapter 13 Trustee to his original and first amended Chapter 13 plans, Debtor filed a
Second Amended Chapter 13 Plan, and, additionally, an “Objection to Claim of Wells Fargo
Bank, NA.” In his Objection, Debtor alleged Wells Fargo Bank, NA (“Wells Fargo”) had no
claim against him or his estate, because the note and deed of trust assigned to Wells Fargo by
Debtor’s original lender contained several defects that caused the instruments to be null and void.
Debtor’s Second Amended Chapter 13 Plan removed Wells Fargo from Schedule D’s list of
secured creditors, and listed Wells Fargo instead as a contingent, disputed and unliquidated
unsecured creditor on Schedule F of the plan. Debtor’s Second Amended Chapter 13 Plan did
not provide for any payments to be made to Wells Fargo.
On December 11, 2012, Trustee filed an “Objection to Confirmation of 2nd Amended
Plan,” praying for an order denying confirmation of the proposed plan, and asserting that: 1)
Debtor lacked sufficient income to fund the plan; 2) the plan contained insufficient funds to
make the guaranteed repayment to general unsecured creditors; and 3) the plan failed to provide
for post-petition mortgage payments and arrears. Trustee’s third asserted ground for objection
further stated: “Schedule D indicates that Debtor believes this is an unsecured debt, but there is
no indication that an adversary [complaint] or motion will be filed to avoid the lien, nor is there
any provision for payment in the event Debtor does not sustain his allegations.”
Wells Fargo filed its “Answer to Debtor’s Objection to Proof of Claim #3-1" on
December 27, 2012, generally denying the allegations contained in Debtor’s objection to its
claim, and asserting that, as it appeared Debtor was attempting to determine the validity of a lien;
the matter should be resolved through an Adversary Complaint. Debtor filed an “Adversary
Complaint to Disallow Claim, to Void Lien and to Quiet Title in Real Property of the Estate”
against Wells Fargo on January 14, 2013, seeking, among other things, a declaration that Wells
Fargo had no claim or lien against him, his estate, or his real property [ECF No. 4-1 at 3-4, 7-30].
Debtor’s Adversary Complaint was served on Wells Fargo, by first class United States Mail
addressed to its bankruptcy department, on January 31, 2013 [ECF No. 4-1 at 34].
A hearing on Debtor’s Second Amended Plan was conducted on January 16, 2013.
During that hearing, Trustee stated his objection to the confirmation of Debtor’s Second
Amended Plan was due, in part, to insufficient income, and because Debtor was not current with
his payments. The Bankruptcy Court informed Debtor that he was “slightly over a payment
behind and the trustee objects.” When the Bankruptcy Court asked Debtor’s counsel if he needed
an amended plan, Debtor’s counsel replied: “The only thing that I saw that they objected to was
insufficient funds and lack of income. And they said something about we hadn’t file[d] the
adversary complaint, which we filed. So, I thought that there wasn’t anything that didn’t allow
for a confirmation of the plan.” Thereafter, the Bankruptcy Court inquired about the challenged
mortgage payment, asking if it was a secured claim, and Debtor’s counsel stated that Debtor had
filed both an objection to the claim, and an adversary complaint. The Bankruptcy Court
responded, “All right. Then let’s let that play out. February 13th at 10 o’clock. Please be
current” The confirmation hearing was continued to February 13, 2013. The trial on Debtor’s
Adversary Complaint was set for April 3, 2013 [ECF No. 4-1 at 4, 31].
On January 23, Trustee filed his Objection to Wells Fargo’s claim (Claim 2), contending
that the claim was ambiguous as to type and amount, and that he could not determine whether the
claim should be fully secured, because the claim did not list the property value of the collateral
securing the debt. In its Response to Trustee’s Objection, Wells Fargo acknowledged that “the
claim is missing certain required information[,]” asserted it would “file an amended claim which
supplies all necessary information[,]” and asked the Bankruptcy Court to deny Trustee’s
On February 13, Debtor’s case was called for the confirmation hearing on his Second
Amended Chapter 13 Plan. When Debtor did not appear, the Bankruptcy Court asked Trustee for
his objection. Trustee asserted: “Plan fails to provide for post petition mortgage payments and
the arrearages.” The Bankruptcy Court then stated: “All right. Plus the debtor is more than one
payment behind. I’ve continued this four times; now I’ll dismiss on both plan payments and
undue delay prejudicial to the creditors.” The Bankruptcy Court entered its Pre-Confirmation
Order and Notice of Dismissal on February 14, 2013. The Order indicated that Debtor’s case
was dismissed upon Trustee’s request, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1) and (4), due to
unreasonable delay and for failure to commence making plan payments.
Debtor filed a “Motion to Set Aside Dismissal” on February 18, alleging that he did not
lack sufficient income to fund the plan, and that he had fully paid all amounts due and owing
under the plan. Debtor argued that the Order’s stated grounds for dismissal were unsupported by
the record. He further contended that his plan should have been confirmed because it conformed
to the model plan provided by the Court, it was supported by the record, the Trustee’s objections
were not well taken, and Debtor had paid the amounts due and owing as of the date of the
Trustee objected to Debtor’s motion to set aside the dismissal, stating: “This case was
dismissed for unreasonable delay. The case was filed on August 14, 2012 and never confirmed.
Confirmation was continued four times before being dismissed at the 2/13/13 docket which
attorney failed to appear.” In his Response to this objection, Debtor argued, due to the
bankruptcy court’s announcement that it would not confirm the plan until after the disposition of
the Adversary case, there was no need for him to appear at the February 13 confirmation hearing,
because the Adversary case was still pending and the confirmation would once again be
continued. Debtor further contended that any delay in confirmation of his plan was due to the
court’s determination to wait until the adversary proceeding was heard and determined. Debtor
asserted that Wells Fargo was in default in the adversary proceeding, that he had filed a request
with the clerk for entry of default judgment, and that this disposition would resolve Trustee’s
objections and allow for confirmation of his plan.
On February 27, 2013, a Clerk’s Entry of Default was entered against Wells Fargo in the
adversary proceeding [ECF No. 4-1 at 4, 40]. On that same date, the Bankruptcy Court denied
Debtor’s motion to set aside the dismissal of his Chapter 13 proceeding.
The bankruptcy court also entered an Order to Vacate the Clerk’s Entry of Default, and an
Order dismissing Debtor’s Adversary case on February 27 [ECF No. 4-1 at 4, 41-42]. In this
February 27 Order, the bankruptcy court stated that the Clerk inadvertently issued the “Clerk’s
Entry of Default, “in that the main case 12-47834-399 was dismissed on February 14, 2013"
[ECF No. 4-1 at 41]. The bankruptcy court vacated and set aside in its entirety the Clerk’s Entry
of Default as improvidently entered, dismissed as moot Debtor’s Complaint, and closed the
Debtor’s Motion to Set Aside the Orders was subsequently denied [ECF No. 4-1 at 5, 4448]. The bankruptcy court’s Order denying the motion included the following language: “This
court stated from the bench on March 6, 2013 its oral ruling on the Motion to Set Aside. Upon
careful consideration and for the reasons set forth on the record on March 6, 2013, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Motion to Set Aside order Vacating Clerk’s Entry of Default and Dismissing
and Closing the Above Styled Adversary Case is DENIED” [ECF No. 4-1 at 47-48]. This ruling
has not been transcribed and is not included in the record on appeal.
Debtor appeals the Order denying his Motion to Set Aside the bankruptcy court’s orders
in his adversary proceeding [ECF No. 4-1 at 49-50]. He filed a separate appeal challenging the
dismissal of Chapter 13 case. As previously mentioned, this Court granted Debtor’s appeal of
the Chapter 13 dismissal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a debtor appeals a bankruptcy court’s order to a district court, the district court
reviews the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.
In re O’Brien, 351 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 2003). Issues committed to the bankruptcy court’s
discretion are reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. In re Zahn, 526 F.3d 1140, 1142 (8th Cir.
2008). An abuse of discretion occurs when the bankruptcy court fails to apply the proper legal
standard or bases its order on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. Id.
A court may set aside an entry of default for good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). A good
cause determination involves consideration as to whether the conduct of the defaulting party was
culpable or blameworthy, whether the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, and whether the
other party would suffer prejudice if the default were set aside. Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg.
Co., 140 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1998).
Debtor raises only one point on appeal, contending:
The bankruptcy court erred and abused its discretion in entering, sua sponte, an
Order vacating the Clerk’s entry of default, and dismissing and closing the
debtor’s adversary case 13-4011, because dismissal of the main case 12-47834 did
not result in automatic dismissal of the debtor’s adversary case nor render the
issues in debtor’s adversary case moot, nor divest the bankruptcy court of
jurisdiction over debtor’s adversary case, in that fairness to the debtor weighed
heavily in favor of the bankruptcy court’s retention of jurisdiction, particularly
since the defendant was in default prior to the debtor’s request for entry of default,
defendant remained in default prior to and at the same time the court overruled
debtor’s motion to set aside its order of dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy
case, the defendant had not filed a motion to set aside default and remained in
default at the time the court entered said Order vacating the clerk’s entry of
default, the debtor was prejudiced by the order vacating the clerk’s entry of
default and dismissing debtor’s adversary case, the court did not have any just
cause to vacate the clerk’s entry of default and to dismiss debtor’s adversary case,
and moreover there was no substantial evidence to support said order vacating the
clerk’s entry of default and dismissing debtor’s adversary case, said order was
against the weight of the evidence, said order erroneously declares the law, and
said order erroneously applies the law.
[ECF No. 4 at 4]. In its brief, Wells Fargo frames the issues as being whether: 1) Debtor’s
adversary proceeding presented a live controversy within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
after Debtor’s Chapter 13 case was dismissed; 2) the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in
declining to exercise jurisdiction over a matter in which it had not expended any judicial
resources; and 3) dismissal of the adversary proceeding was nevertheless correct because Debtor
failed to effect proper service of process on Wells Fargo [ECF No. 8 at 6].
Wells Fargo argues that Debtor’s claims arising under the Bankruptcy Code were mooted
under 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1), by dismissal of his Chapter 13 case, because the parties were
restored to their pre-petition positions and there was no longer any question of dividing the
bankruptcy estate’s assets among creditors or discharging unpaid obligations. Wells Fargo
contends that a bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction over proceedings that cannot affect a
bankruptcy estate, and that, even if the bankruptcy court could have retained jurisdiction over
some components of the adversary proceeding, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to do so.
Alternatively, Wells Fargo asserts that the dismissal should be affirmed because Wells
Fargo was not properly served with process in accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7004(h), in that Debtor did not serve process on it by certified mail sent to its
designated officer, or to an attorney who had appeared on its behalf. Wells Fargo claims that
Debtor served the summons and Adversary Complaint by mailing the documents to Wells Fargo
at an address in Fort Mill, South Carolina, with the line “Attention: Bankruptcy
Department/MAC #D3347-014,” via priority mail. Wells Fargo contends that, had Wells Fargo
filed a motion challenging service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), the
bankruptcy court would have lacked jurisdiction to enter a default judgment and would have been
required to dismiss the adversary proceeding. In his Reply Brief, Debtor argues that Wells Fargo
lacks standing to raise the issue of sufficiency of service of process on appeal, because this issue
was not raised before the bankruptcy court, and the bankruptcy court did not dismiss the
Adversary case on that basis. Debtor further contends that Wells Fargo was properly served, as
he mailed the summons and Adversary Complaint to the address Wells Fargo designated in its
proof of claim as the address where notices should be sent.
The record reveals that the bankruptcy court sua sponte vacated the Clerk’s Entry of
Default, finding it to be improvidently entered, and dismissed, as moot, Debtor’s adversary case
because Debtor’s Chapter 13 case had been dismissed on February 14. “[A] case becomes moot
only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing
party.” Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013)(citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). It is arguable that the bankruptcy court’s sua sponte dismissal was an abuse of
discretion because the dismissal was entered without notice and was based on an improper legal
conclusion. Regardless, the Court’s reversal of the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of Debtor’s
Chapter 13 case is dispositive of this appeal. In its Memorandum and Order separately entered
on this date, the Court found that the bankruptcy court erred and abused its discretion when it sua
sponte dismissed Debtor’s case, without notice and an opportunity for hearing. Thus, the ground
upon which the bankruptcy court based its dismissal of the adversary proceeding no longer
exists. The underlying bankruptcy case has been reinstated.
Wells Fargo is a creditor in Debtor’s Chapter 13 proceeding, and the objections to Wells
Fargo’s asserted claim presented by Debtor’s Adversary Complaint concern the administration of
Debtor’s estate, as they pertain to the determination of the validity, extent, or priority of Wells
Fargo’s asserted mortgage lien against Debtor’s real property. See e.g., Harmon v. United States,
101 F.3d 574 (1996). Debtor’s Adversary Complaint is not moot, but instead, presents a live
controversy within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Consequently, Debtor’s successful
appeal of the dismissal of his Chapter 13 case necessarily requires reversal of the bankruptcy
court’s dismissal in his Adversary case.
However, as to the part of the bankruptcy court’s Order that vacated the Clerk’s Entry of
Default, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the
entry. The bankruptcy court’s order vacating the Clerk’s Entry of Default in Debtor’s Adversary
proceeding was appropriate under the circumstances. The Court finds that, considering the
confusion surrounding the dismissal of Debtor’s Chapter 13 proceeding, and the marginal failure
of Wells Fargo to meet the deadline for its Answer to Debtor’s Adversary Complaint, Wells
Fargo’s conduct was not contumacious and did not exhibit an intentional flouting or disregard of
the court and its procedures. See Johnson, 140 F.3d at 784. The Court further finds that Debtor
will suffer no prejudice from setting aside the entry of default. Id. Debtor’s appeal will be
granted in part, and denied in part.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal [ECF No. 1] filed by Debtor Mirsad Tasic
is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the part of the bankruptcy court’s order
vacating the Clerk’s entry of default is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the part of the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing
Debtor Mirsad Tasic’s Adversary case is REVERSED.
Dated this 4th
day of June, 2013.
E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?