Cope v. Colvin

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner is affirmed, and plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is entered this same date. Signed by Magistrate Judge Terry I. Adelman on 9/11/2014. (KMS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KAREN K. COPE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 4:13CV670 TIA

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision denying Karen K. Cope’s application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et
seq. All matters are pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge, with consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
Commissioner’s final decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record
as a whole, it is affirmed.
I. Procedural History
On March 31, 2010, plaintiff Karen K. Cope applied for disability insurance
benefits (DIB) claiming she became disabled on June 13, 2006, because of visual
impairments due to stroke, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),

anxiety, diabetes, and celiac disease. (Tr. 128-34, 151.) Upon initial
consideration, the Social Security Administration denied plaintiff’s claim for
benefits. (Tr. 76, 77-81.) Upon plaintiff’s request, a hearing was held before an
administrative law judge (ALJ) on November 17, 2011, at which plaintiff and a
vocational expert testified. (Tr. 25-68.) On March 26, 2012, the ALJ issued a
decision denying plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding vocational expert testimony
to support a finding that plaintiff can perform work as it exists in significant
numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 7-21.) On February 4, 2013, the Appeals
Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 1-6.) The
ALJ’s decision thus stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
In the instant action for judicial review, plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, arguing
that the ALJ erred in determining her residual functional capacity (RFC) by failing
to include additional limitations caused by her arthritis and mental impairments,
and by improperly discounting the opinions of her treating and consulting
physicians. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ should have ordered a mental
consultative examination. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in determining
her complaints not to be credible. Plaintiff requests that the final decision be
reversed and the matter be remanded for an award of benefits or for further
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consideration. For the following reasons, the ALJ did not err in her determination.
II. Testimonial Evidence Before the ALJ
A.

Plaintiff’s Testimony
At the hearing on November 17, 2011, plaintiff testified in response to

questions posed by the ALJ and counsel.
Plaintiff last worked on June 13, 2006, as a customer service supervisor at a
call center for a medical equipment distributor. Plaintiff held this position since
2004. Previous employment positions held by plaintiff include work as a dietary
assistant in a hospital from 1988 to 2003; as an inventory clerk/biller at Durable
Medical Goods Co. for nine months in 2003; and as a biller clerk for a medical
equipment distributor from September 2003 to 2004. (Tr. 172.) Plaintiff testified
that she also attended college for a period of time but did not obtain a degree. (Tr.
53.)
Plaintiff testified that she is unable to work because of residual effects from
a stroke. Plaintiff testified that she had had some strokes from which she
recovered but currently experiences visual problems from a third stroke that she
had in 2005. (Tr. 33-34, 38.) Plaintiff testified that she is limited with driving and
has problems looking at paperwork or a computer because of difficulties with
focus. Plaintiff testified that she must rest her eyes after about five to ten minutes
of concentrating on detailed work. Plaintiff testified that she also has dry eyes and
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limited peripheral vision. (Tr. 38-39.)
Plaintiff also testified that she cannot work because of problems she has
getting along with other people. Plaintiff testified that she had many outbursts
while working and that she “did not stay within [her] boundaries at times.”
Plaintiff testified that working under deadlines and within guidelines created a lot
of stress and anxiety and that she would become angry and make inappropriate
remarks during such times. (Tr. 46-47.) Plaintiff testified that she also had
difficulty with supervisors. Plaintiff testified that she takes medication for anxiety
and panic attacks, which helps, and that her anxiety has improved since she
stopped working. Plaintiff testified that she does not see a counselor for her mental
condition because she is “not a talker.” (Tr. 39-40, 50.)
Plaintiff testified that she has arthritis in her low back, hands, knees, and
feet. Plaintiff testified that she sometimes feels it in her hips and that her entire
body hurts at times. (Tr. 37-38.) Plaintiff testified that she experiences the most
pain in her right foot, which causes pain when she walks. Plaintiff takes only overthe-counter medication for the condition. (Tr. 49-50.)
Plaintiff testified that she also has celiac disease and would suffer colitistype symptoms if she did not follow a gluten-free diet. Plaintiff also has
hypertension and diabetes that are controlled with medication. (Tr. 37, 45.)
As to her daily activities, plaintiff testified that she gets up at 4:30 a.m. and
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prepares breakfast for herself and her mother. Plaintiff then drives to a gym, which
is about one mile away, and works out for thirty to forty-five minutes. Plaintiff
testified that she cleans up when she gets home and then prepares lunch. Plaintiff
testified that she cares for her mother, who is unable to walk without assistance
because of painful arthritis. Plaintiff prepares food for her mother and does her
laundry. Plaintiff also helps her mother with bathing and recently had to begin
lifting her in order to assist her. Plaintiff’s mother weighs about 200 pounds.
Plaintiff testified that such lifting has strained her back and arms. (Tr. 40-42.)
Plaintiff testified that she also helps a friend who has cancer by taking her to
perform errands or helping with bills. Plaintiff testified that she primarily provides
moral support for her friend, which includes going to her friend’s house to play
pool with her son. Plaintiff also runs errands for herself in town and cares for two
cats. (Tr. 42-43.) Plaintiff testified that she relaxes after dinner. Plaintiff
sometimes watches television but usually falls asleep while doing so. (Tr. 44.)
Plaintiff testified that she takes breaks from her activities during the day and
usually rests for twenty to twenty-five minutes after about an hour of activity
because her back and legs begin to hurt. Plaintiff testified that she is most
comfortable when she is reclining. Plaintiff testified that she can read or work on
the computer for about twenty to twenty-five minutes before she must stop, blink a
bit, and stretch. (Tr. 48-49.)
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B.

Vocational Expert Testimony
Linda Tolley, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, testified at the hearing

on November 17, 2011, in response to questions posed by the ALJ and counsel.
Ms. Tolley classified plaintiff’s past relevant work as a dietary assistant as
medium work with an SVP level of 7; as a billing clerk as sedentary with an SVP
level of 4; as an inventory clerk as light with an SVP level of 5; as a customer
service representative supervisor as sedentary with an SVP level of 6; and as a call
center operator as light and at the semi-skilled or skilled level. (Tr. 54-57.)
The ALJ asked Ms. Tolley to assume a younger individual at forty-six years
of age1 with no exertional limitations, but that the person should
never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, avoid all exposure to moving
machinery and unprotected heights for hazardous machinery. Only
occasional interaction with the public and occasional interaction with
coworkers, which is basically casual and infrequent. In other words,
you can work near the coworkers but you don’t work with them[.]
(Tr. 57-58.) Ms. Tolley testified that such a person could perform plaintiff’s past
work as a billing clerk. (Tr. 58.) Ms. Tolley testified that such a person could also
perform sedentary work as a data entry clerk, of which 5,500 such jobs exist in the
State of Missouri and 240,000 nationally; and sedentary-to-light work as an office
clerk, of which 15,000 such jobs exist in the State of Missouri and over one million
nationally. (Tr. 60-61.) The ALJ asked Ms. Tolley to assume the individual could
1

Plaintiff’s birthdate is September 3, 1959. As such, she was forty-six years of age on June 13,
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have no contact with the public, to which Ms. Tolley responded that the previous
jobs to which she just testified would not be precluded but the numbers would be
reduced by about fifty-percent given the additional limitation. (Tr. 61-62.)
The ALJ then asked Ms. Tolley to assume the individual had difficulty with
their vision such that she could not use computers or do a lot of paperwork because
of eye strain. Ms. Tolley testified that such a person could not perform the work to
which she had previously testified. (Tr. 62.) When asked to consider an individual
who could engage in this type of work for no more than fifty percent of the time,
Ms. Tolley testified that such a person could perform sedentary work as a small
products assembler, of which 1,500 such jobs exist in the State of Missouri and
100,000 nationally; and eye drop assembler, of which less than 800 such jobs exist
in the State of Missouri and 7,500 nationally. (Tr. 63-64.) Ms. Tolley testified that
such positions would not be available to a person who was limited to performing
fine fingering fifty percent of the time or less, and that such a limitation would
eliminate most work. (Tr. 64-65.)
III. Medical Records Before the ALJ
On October 3, 2005, Dr. Gary H. Myers, a neurologist, opined that
plaintiff’s recent episodes of diplopia, mild headache, and left hand weakness may
be due to transient ischemic attacks (TIA). Plaintiff had been taking aspirin and
2006, the alleged onset date of disability.
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was instructed to switch to Plavix. (Tr. 241.)
Plaintiff contacted her primary care physician, Dr. Martha Reed, on
December 1, 2005, with complaints of lost vision in her right eye, a “funny
feeling” in her head, and feeling cold. Plaintiff was anxious because of her
previous history of stroke. Dr. Reed instructed plaintiff to take aspirin and to rest
for fifteen to thirty minutes. (Tr. 254.)
On December 6, 2005, plaintiff underwent an MRI study of the brain in
response to complaints of headaches and right eye blindness for six days. Results
of the MRI showed interval new left occipital infarct superimposing old ischemic
changes. (Tr. 230.) Dr. Myers noted this MRI to show strokes bilaterally in the
occipital lobes. (Tr. 242.)
In a letter dated December 8, 2005, Dr. Mark H. Spurrier, an
ophthalmologist, informed Dr. Reed that examination showed plaintiff’s signs to
indicate posterior visual pathways disease, and further evaluation was ordered.
(Tr. 215, 236.)
Plaintiff visited Dr. John D. McGarry, a neurologist, on December 13, 2005,
for evaluation involving her recent cerebrovascular accident (CVA). Plaintiff was
forty-six years of age. Plaintiff was noted to be pleasant and cooperative. Plaintiff
reported having experienced vision loss, lightheadedness, left hand weakness, and
vertigo within the previous three months. Plaintiff had no complaints of
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depression or anxiety. Plaintiff reported having frequent pain in her knees, hands,
and neck and that she often experienced stiffness in the morning for about twenty
minutes. Dr. McGarry noted plaintiff’s current medications to be aspirin, Inderal,
Nexium, Singulair, Paxil, Plavix, Reglan, and Pepcid. Physical examination
showed plaintiff to have normal muscle power, tone, and coordination. Sensation
and reflexes were intact. Gait was normal. Examination of the spine was normal.
Neurological exam was remarkable for hemianopia2 versus right visual inattention.
No evidence of vasculopathy was noted. Plaintiff was instructed not to drive until
released by a physician. It was noted that plaintiff may be referred to driving
school for safety evaluation. (Tr. 231-34.)
On December 22, 2005, Dr. Spurrier diagnosed plaintiff with occipital stroke
with some improvement in visual fields. (Tr. 214.)
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Myers on December 29, 2005, who noted plaintiff to
have right hemianopia. No Babinski sign was noted. The remainder of her
examination was within normal limits. Dr. Myers expressed concern regarding
plaintiff’s circulation problems. Dr. Myers instructed plaintiff to undergo
transesophageal echocardiogram (TEE) testing, and a prescription was written for
the test. It was noted that plaintiff took aspirin, Plavix, and folic acid; and Dr.
2

Hemianopia is a blindness or reduction in vision in one half of the visual field due to damage of
the optic pathways in the brain. What is Hemianopia?, Lighthouse Int’l (2014), available at
<http://www.lighthouse.org/about-low-vision-blindness/vision-disorders/hemianopia/>.
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Myers expressed hope that plaintiff’s antiplatelet drugs would prevent additional
strokes. (Tr. 242-43.)
On February 27, 2006, plaintiff reported to Dr. Reed that Dr. Myers
permitted her to drive. It was noted that plaintiff’s symptoms were under control,
and she had no new complaints. Plaintiff reported that she was now a supervisor at
American Home Patients, which she felt was a good fit for her. Plaintiff was
continued on her current treatment regimen. (Tr. 254-55.)
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Spurrier on March 15, 2006, and reported no change
to her peripheral vision. Plaintiff also reported having some trouble seeing to read.
Upon examination, Dr. Spurrier diagnosed plaintiff with right homonymous defect,
status post CVA. (Tr. 213.)
On April 3, 2006, Dr. Myers noted plaintiff to be doing very well on her
current treatment regimen. Plaintiff complained of some difficulty seeing to the
right. It was noted that plaintiff had not yet undergone TEE testing as previously
ordered, and Dr. Myers advised plaintiff of the importance of such testing.
Examination was unchanged from her previous visit, and plaintiff was continued
on her current treatment regimen. (Tr. 244.)
Plaintiff underwent TEE testing on April 27, 2006, which showed mild
mitral regurgitation, trace-to-mild aortic insufficiency, and trace tricuspid
regurgitation, but was otherwise unremarkable. (Tr. 249-50.)
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Plaintiff visited Dr. Reed on September 7, 2006, who noted plaintiff to have
no new complaints. It was noted that plaintiff was looking for new employment,
but was happy that she was off work during the summer so she could be free to
help her family members. Plaintiff was instructed to continue with her medications
and to return in six months. (Tr. 255.)
Plaintiff visited Dr. Reed on March 16, 2007, who noted plaintiff to have no
new complaints. It was noted that plaintiff was not working, but plaintiff reported
that she felt she needed to look after her aging mother. Plaintiff’s arthritis was
noted to be stable. Plaintiff reported being under some stress because her brotherin-law was dying from cancer. Dr. Reed noted plaintiff’s problems to be “1) Stress
reaction, 2) History of elevated alk phos, 3) History of hepatitis, 4) History of CVA
with vision deficit with good recovery, 5) Hypertension, 6) History of ADD, 7)
GERD, 8) Allergic rhinitis, 9) Arthritis.” Dr. Reed refilled plaintiff’s prescriptions
for Plavix, aspirin, Paxil, Reglan, Inderal, Nexium, Singulair, Pepcid, Flonase,
Ativan, and Lidex cream. (Tr. 255-56.) On April 11, Dr. Reed noted recent blood
tests to show very good results. No new recommendations were made for
plaintiff’s treatment. (Tr. 256.)
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Reed on September 21, 2007, and reported recent
chest pain and tightness in her neck. Dr. Reed noted plaintiff to make no other
complaints, and her mood was good. Plaintiff was instructed to continue with her
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medications and was referred for further evaluation. (Tr. 257.)
In October and November 2007, plaintiff visited Dr. Jung H. Lee on three
occasions for her complaints of chest pain. An echocardiogram yielded essentially
normal results except for possible thickened mitral valve with regurgitation and
possible thickened aortic valve with insufficiency. Plaintiff was diagnosed with
stable, asymptomatic mitral valve disease, mitral regurgitation; controlled blood
pressure; and dyslipidemia. (Tr. 280-84.)
Plaintiff visited Dr. Reed on March 6, 2008, who noted plaintiff to have lost
twenty pounds. Plaintiff reported that she exercises twenty minutes, five or six
days a week, by walking two miles. Plaintiff reported having no stroke-like
symptoms, and Dr. Reed noted plaintiff’s mood to be good. (Tr. 257.) On April
11, plaintiff reported to Dr. Reed that she currently works out sixty-to-ninety
minutes a day, four to five times a week, and participates in an organized fitness
program at the gym. Dr. Reed noted plaintiff to be very fit and trim. Plaintiff was
given prescriptions for Plavix, Inderal, Lipitor, Paxil, Prilosec, Reglan, aspirin, and
Ativan. Plaintiff was instructed to take over-the-counter Zyrtec, Aleve, and folate.
Plaintiff was instructed to follow up in six months. (Tr. 258-59.)
On October 6, 2008, Dr. Reed noted plaintiff to continue to exercise and
diet. No changes were made to plaintiff’s treatment regimen. (Tr. 259.)
On February 30, 2009, plaintiff reported to Dr. Reed that she experiences
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shortness of breath and chest tightness when shoveling snow but is able to work
out on the treadmill for twenty minutes with no symptoms. Dr. Reed noted
plaintiff to continue to lose weight. Physical exam was unremarkable. Plaintiff
was continued on aspirin, Plavix, Prilosec, Inderal, Lipitor, Paxil, Reglan, Ativan,
and over-the-counter Zyrtec. (Tr. 259.)
In July 2009, plaintiff was diagnosed with celiac sprue after a small bowel
biopsy revealed evidence of such. Plaintiff was placed on a proton pump inhibitor
and a gluten-free diet. It was recommended that plaintiff undergo ultrasound
testing for her complaints of gas and bloating, but plaintiff refused. (Tr. 262, 276.)
On August 20, 2009, Dr. Reed noted plaintiff to work out daily at the gym
and physical examination showed plaintiff to be fit, strong, and very trim. Plaintiff
was instructed to continue with her current medications. (Tr. 262.)
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Reed on November 23, 2009, and complained of leg
pain associated with taking Lipitor. She reported that she stopped taking Lipitor
two weeks prior and experienced decreased pain. Plaintiff also reported that she
works out faithfully and experiences some lightheadedness afterward. Plaintiff
was instructed to discontinue Lipitor and to continue on her other medications.
(Tr. 261.) In January 2010, plaintiff was informed that blood tests showed overall
good results. (Tr. 261.)
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Reed on February 25, 2010, who noted that plaintiff
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no longer experienced leg pain or dizziness. Plaintiff reported exercising an hour
or more every day and feeling better overall. It was noted that plaintiff could
shovel snow without panting. (Tr. 263-64.)
In a note dated April 7, 2010, Dr. Reed reported that plaintiff had called to
advise that she was applying for disability. Dr. Reed noted that plaintiff had been
at home for the past several years caring for her mother who required supervision
and physical assistance. (Tr. 264.)3
Plaintiff underwent a consultative ophthalmologic examination on June 11,
2010, from which Dr. Robert D. Lewis diagnosed plaintiff with right homonymous
hemianopia with generalized constriction. (Tr. 266-68.)
Plaintiff visited Dr. Reed on June 17, 2010, for a routine examination.
Plaintiff reported her recent ophthalmologic exam and further reported that she had
an event three months prior whereby she awoke with distorted vision associated
with the left eye. Plaintiff reported this vision deficit to have lasted about two
minutes. Plaintiff also reported that her arthritis had become more intense,
especially in the morning when her joints pop. Plaintiff reported having stiffness
in her hands and decreased grip. Plaintiff reported that she continued to work out.
Dr. Reed noted plaintiff’s problems to be visual field deficit in March 2010, adult
3

The record includes a letter from plaintiff to Dr. Reed dated April 3, 2010, in which she advises
that she applied for disability for reasons not previously shared with Dr. Reed, including visual
disturbances that limited her driving and performance of detailed work; previous diagnoses of
ADHD and dyslexia; and anxiety with temper and violent outbursts. (Tr. 252-53.)
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onset diabetes mellitus, and arthritis – especially of the hands. No change in
treatment was prescribed. (Tr. 309-10.)
On July 8, 2010, Dr. Thomas L. Monje conducted a vision examination that
showed plaintiff’s entrance visual acuities to be 20/25 of both the right and left
eyes with glasses. Confrontation fields showed areas of vision forty-five degrees
from fixation to the right and left for the right eye, and ten degrees to the right of
fixation and forty-five degrees to the left for the left eye. No signs of diabetic
retinopathy were noted. (Tr. 275.) During a visit that same date, Dr. Reed
instructed plaintiff to see her neurologist. (Tr. 310.)
In a letter dated July 13, 2010, Dr. Monje summarized the recent results of
plaintiff’s vision examination and noted that plaintiff’s vision qualified her for a
driver’s license with restrictions of right and left outside rearview mirrors. With
respect to work-related abilities, Dr. Monje opined:
Where her job or task requires normal peripheral vision to
perform it, she would not be qualified for it.
Because of her restricted peripheral field of view, her
perception of where she is in her environment may be reduced. This
may present a hazard to those close to her in certain situations.
Karen is capable of sitting, standing, walking, carrying,
handling objects, hearing, speaking, traveling and most normal day to
day activities.
(Tr. 331.)
On August 3, 2010, James Spence, Ph.D., a psychological consultant with
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disability determinations, completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form in
which he opined that plaintiff’s mental impairments of anxiety and history of ADD
were not severe in that they did not cause more than mild limitations in activities of
daily living; maintaining social functioning; and maintaining concentration,
persistence, or pace; nor resulted in any episodes of decompensation of extended
duration. (Tr. 334-44.)
On August 10, 2010, plaintiff visited Dr. James E. F. Alonso for a
neurological examination, who noted plaintiff’s medical history of ocular strokes
and vision disturbances. Plaintiff reported her last episode to have occurred three
weeks prior after she worked out and went to Wal-Mart whereupon her visual field
had wavy lines across the bottom. Plaintiff also reported having occasional
difficulty moving her legs while walking on the treadmill. Plaintiff reported
having no pain, dizziness, or other stroke-like symptoms. Mental status
examination was unremarkable. Examination of the cranial nerves showed right
field decrease, bilaterally, but was otherwise intact. Motor exam was normal with
full muscle strength noted throughout. Sensory exam was intact to light touch
throughout. Coordination exam likewise was normal with steady gait and good
heel, toe, and tandem walking. Dr. Alonso diagnosed plaintiff with history of
ocular stroke with visual disturbances. Plaintiff was instructed to continue with
aspirin and Plavix and to obtain MRI and MRA imaging of the head and neck.
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Plaintiff was instructed to return in six months for follow up. (Tr. 346-47.)
MRAs of the brain and carotid vessels dated August 18, 2010, yielded
negative results. (Tr. 349, 350.) An MRI dated August 30, 2010, showed old
infarcts at the posterior parietal and left occipital region without edema, mass
effect, or abnormal enhancement. Opacification of the left sphenoid was noted.
(Tr. 348.)
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Reed on September 10, 2010, for follow up.
Plaintiff complained of swollen and painful hands, but had no other joint-related
complaints. Dr. Reed noted plaintiff to appear fit and well “apart from [her]
subjective joint complaints.” Plaintiff was instructed to return in three to four
months. (Tr. 355-56.)
Plaintiff visited Dr. C.J. Jos, a psychiatrist, on November 23, 2010, for
evaluation. It was noted that plaintiff sought this evaluation in relation to her
application for disability. Plaintiff reported her main problems to be physical in
nature, including visual defects that caused problems with driving. Plaintiff
reported having no history of psychiatric hospitalizations, suicidal behavior, or
psychosis but reported symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder in that she
obsesses with ideas, needs to straighten things, and has difficulty going into public
bathrooms and touching things. Dr. Jos noted plaintiff’s medical history and
current treatment regimen. Plaintiff reported taking Paxil for twelve years for
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anxiety symptoms and that she takes Ativan as needed for acute anxiety attacks.
Plaintiff reported that she previously took medication for adult onset ADHD but
discontinued the medication after hypertension and stroke. Mental status
examination was normal in all respects. Dr. Jos diagnosed plaintiff with panic
attacks without agoraphobia, history of adult onset ADHD, reported history of
learning disorder, and personality disorder with obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
Dr. Jos assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 65.4 Plaintiff
was instructed to continue with Paxil and Ativan on an as-needed basis and to
continue to have Dr. Reed prescribe the medication. No follow up appointments
were made with Dr. Jos. (Tr. 352-53.)
On January 10, 2011, Dr. Reed noted that plaintiff was continuing with the
disability process and that plaintiff complained of having trouble when trying to
look at close work in that she must wait a period of time for her eyes to focus.
Plaintiff reported that her arthritis was better and that taking over-the-counter
Aleve helped. (Tr. 359-60.)
In a letter to plaintiff’s counsel dated January 21, 2011, Dr. Reed
summarized plaintiff’s medical history, including “recently developed arthritic
4

A GAF score considers “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical
continuum of mental health/illness.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Text Revision 34 (4th ed. 2000). A GAF score between 61 and 70 indicates some mild
symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) or some difficulty in social, occupational,
or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the household), but generally
functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships. Id.
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complaints affecting her hands[.]” Dr. Reed also addressed plaintiff’s mental
condition, writing,
[S]he has a long history of anger management which I have personally
witnessed when she was previously employed [at] our local hospital.
She would lose control and act out in anger in markedly inappropriate
situations such as in front of the CEO of the hospital.
The patient still suffers with problems of anger management. In fact
she wrote a long letter to my office on January 12th describing how
she had become extremely angry because I entered the room for the
visit one hour after the scheduled time. With that visit her [blood
pressure] was elevated and she blames that in part on her extreme
anger during that visit which she did manage to control.
Ms. Cope would have difficulty conforming to the requirements of
work activity due to her poor anger control. This would also interfere
with interactions with co-workers and supervisors and the ordinary
stress of a job situation.
Her other medical problems are all contributing factors to her
emotional state and in fact stress and her anger management would
adversely affect her medical problems of hypertension, diabetes, sprue
and risk of stroke. Her difficulty in maintaining attention will also
interfere with her ability to function in a work situation and cooperate
with co-workers and supervisors as well as to meet sitting and
standing requirements in an ordinary job.
(Tr. 365.)
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Reed on June 24, 2011, and reported her arthritis to
be the same. Plaintiff reported that she could not ride her bike because of pain
associated with hemorrhoids. (Tr. 358-59.)
On October 10, 2011, plaintiff reported to Dr. Reed that she was under stress
because a good friend had cancer. Plaintiff also expressed concern about her
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mother’s care if something were to happen to her. Plaintiff reported that she
almost dropped a pot earlier in the day because of soreness in her left arm after she
had done more of a workout on an exercise machine. Dr. Reed opined that the
episode was probably related to a pinched nerve. (Tr. 358.)
Plaintiff underwent a consultative orthopedic evaluation on December 19,
2011, for disability determinations. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Alan H. Morris that
she had symptoms of pain in her hands and knees when she was fifteen years of
age and was told that she had arthritis. It was noted that no x-rays or
musculoskeletal examinations were ever performed. Plaintiff reported that her
fingers have become crooked over the years and that she currently experienced
difficulty at times with fine activities, such as buttoning buttons and writing.
Plaintiff also complained of aching and swelling about the knees, bilateral hip pain,
and occasional low back pain. Plaintiff reported that she can sit for one hour, stand
for forty-five minutes, walk for forty minutes, and lift up to thirty pounds. Plaintiff
reported that she lives with her mother, is able to bathe and dress independently,
performs housekeeping chores, drives, goes grocery shopping, and cooks. Physical
examination showed plaintiff to be able to walk fifty feet without a cane, with
normal tandem gait and no limp. Heel and toe walking were normal. Plaintiff was
able to squat but with complaints of right knee pain. Plaintiff demonstrated normal
finger and hand control with dressing and undressing. No visible deformities were
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noted about the MP or IP joints of the hands. Plaintiff could oppose the thumb to
all digits and had a full and firm grip bilaterally with no evidence of muscle
atrophy. Plaintiff had full range of motion about the wrists. Deep tendon reflexes
were 3/4 bilaterally with 5/5 anterior tibial strength. Knee examination was
essentially normal, with only slightly limited range of motion noted. Range of
motion about the hips was pain-free. Limited backward extension was noted, but
plaintiff otherwise had full range of motion about the hips. Slightly limited range
of motion about the cervical and lumbar spine was noted. X-rays of the right hip,
right hand and wrist, and lumbar spine yielded negative results. Upon conclusion
of the examination, Dr. Morris diagnosed plaintiff with symptoms of early
osteoarthritis of the hands, but with no abnormal objective physical findings;
bilateral knee pain with no abnormal objective physical findings; bilateral hip pain
with no abnormal objective physical findings; and complaints of spine pain with no
abnormal objective physical findings. (Tr. 371-76, 383-84.)
In a Medical Source Statement (MSS) completed that same date, Dr. Morris
opined that plaintiff could frequently lift and carry up to ten pounds, occasionally
lift and carry eleven to twenty pounds, and never lift and carry twenty-one pounds
or more. Dr. Morris opined that plaintiff could sit for one hour at one time and for
a total of four hours in an eight-hour workday; stand for forty-five minutes at one
time and for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday; and walk for forty
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minutes at one time and for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday. Dr.
Morris further opined that plaintiff could frequently reach, handle, finger, feel,
push, and pull with her right hand and left hand, and could frequently operate foot
controls with her right foot and left foot. Dr. Morris opined that plaintiff should
never climb ladders or scaffolds but could occasionally climb stairs and ramps,
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Dr. Morris opined that plaintiff should
never be around unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts, and should only
occasionally operate a motor vehicle. No other physical limitations were noted.
(Tr. 377-82.)
IV. The ALJ's Decision
The ALJ found that plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act
through December 31, 2011. The ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since June 13, 2006, the alleged onset date of disability.
The ALJ found plaintiff’s visual residuals of stroke to be a severe impairment, but
that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
or medically equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (Tr. 12-16.) The ALJ found that plaintiff had the RFC to perform
work at all exertional levels but with the following limitations:
The claimant should not climb ropes, ladders or scaffolds, and avoid
moderate exposure to moving machinery, hazardous machinery or
unprotected heights. In addition, the claimant is limited to occasional
interaction with the general public and contact with co-workers should
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be casual and infrequent. Finally, the claimant is limited to using
computers and/or completing paperwork for no more than four hours
of an eight-hour workday.
(Tr. 16.) The ALJ found plaintiff unable to perform any past relevant work.
Considering plaintiff’s age on the date last insured, her education, work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that vocational expert testimony
supported a finding that plaintiff could perform other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy, and specifically, small product assembler and
eye dropper assembler. The ALJ therefore found that plaintiff was not under a
disability from June 13, 2006, through December 31, 2011, the date last insured.
(Tr. 19-21.)
V. Discussion
To be eligible for DIB under the Social Security Act, plaintiff must prove
that she is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001);
Baker v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992).
The Social Security Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual will be declared disabled "only if [her]
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not
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only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a
five-step evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The Commissioner begins by deciding whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. If the claimant is working,
disability benefits are denied. Next, the Commissioner decides whether the
claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, meaning that
which significantly limits her ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant's
impairment(s) is not severe, then she is not disabled. The Commissioner then
determines whether claimant's impairment(s) meets or equals one of the
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Appendix 1. If claimant's
impairment(s) is equivalent to one of the listed impairments, she is conclusively
disabled. At the fourth step, the Commissioner establishes whether the claimant
can perform her past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not disabled. Finally, the
Commissioner evaluates various factors to determine whether the claimant is
capable of performing any other work in the economy. If not, the claimant is
declared disabled and becomes entitled to disability benefits.
The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by
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substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir.
2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but enough that a
reasonable person would find it adequate to support the conclusion. Johnson v.
Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). This “substantial evidence test,”
however, is “more than a mere search of the record for evidence supporting the
Commissioner’s findings.” Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence on the
record as a whole . . . requires a more scrutinizing analysis.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
To determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole, the Court must review the entire
administrative record and consider:
1.

The credibility findings made by the ALJ.

2.

The plaintiff's vocational factors.

3.

The medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians.

4.

The plaintiff's subjective complaints relating to exertional and
non-exertional activities and impairments.

5.

Any corroboration by third parties of the plaintiff's
impairments.

6.

The testimony of vocational experts when required which is
based upon a proper hypothetical question which sets forth the
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claimant's impairment.
Stewart v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 581, 585-86 (8th Cir.
1992) (internal citations omitted). The Court must also consider any evidence
which fairly detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. Coleman, 498 F.3d at
770; Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999). However, even
though two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the
Commissioner's findings may still be supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole. Pearsall, 274 F.3d at 1217 (citing Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d
1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[I]f there is substantial evidence on the record as a
whole, we must affirm the administrative decision, even if the record could also
have supported an opposite decision.” Weikert v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 1249, 1252
(8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jones ex
rel. Morris v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole arguing that the ALJ improperly
discredited her subjective complaints, improperly weighed the opinion evidence
from Drs. Reed and Morris, and failed to order a consultative mental examination.
Plaintiff contends that with such errors, the ALJ’s RFC assessment did not include
additional physical and mental limitations attributable to her arthritis and mental
impairments. For the following reasons, the ALJ did not err and her decision is
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supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
A.

Credibility Determination
Before determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must first evaluate the

claimant’s credibility. Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 2007); Tellez
v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2005). In so doing, the ALJ must consider
all evidence relating to the claimant’s subjective complaints, including the
claimant’s prior work record and third party observations as to the claimant's daily
activities; the duration, frequency and intensity of the symptoms; any precipitating
and aggravating factors; the dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication;
and any functional restrictions. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.
1984) (subsequent history omitted). When rejecting a claimant's subjective
complaints, the ALJ must make an express credibility determination detailing her
reasons for discrediting the testimony. Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1066
(8th Cir. 2012); Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir. 1991). “It is not
enough that inconsistencies may be said to exist, the ALJ must set forth the
inconsistencies in the evidence presented and discuss the factors set forth in
Polaski when making credibility determinations.” Cline, 939 F.2d at 565; see also
Renstrom, 680 F.3d at 1066; Beckley v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 1056, 1059-60 (8th Cir.
1998). Where an ALJ explicitly considers the Polaski factors but then discredits a
claimant’s complaints for good reason, the decision should be upheld. Hogan v.
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Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687,
696 (8th Cir. 2007). The determination of a claimant’s credibility is for the
Commissioner, and not the Court, to make. Tellez, 403 F.3d at 957; Pearsall, 274
F.3d at 1218.
In her written decision here, the ALJ set out numerous, detailed
inconsistencies in the record to support her determination that plaintiff’s subjective
complaints were not fully credible. First, the ALJ noted that plaintiff was not fully
compliant with her treating sources’ recommendations, noting specifically that
plaintiff delayed undergoing diagnostic testing as ordered by her doctors; and
indeed, the record shows that plaintiff refused recommended ultrasound testing.
E.g., Gulliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 2005) (failure to take
advantage of physician’s offer to refer to specialist weighs against credibility);
Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2004) (subjective complaints
not credible where claimant cancelled physical therapy appointments). The ALJ
also noted that despite plaintiff’s claim of impaired driving, she did not participate
in a driving-safety evaluation as suggested by her physician.
The ALJ also noted that plaintiff had worked with her impairments prior to
the alleged onset date and that the record did not show a deterioration of her
functional abilities subsequent thereto. Where a claimant has worked with an
impairment in the past and there is no evidence of significant deterioration, an ALJ
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may find that the impairment is not disabling in the present. See Goff v. Barnhart,
421 F.3d 785, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2005). A review of the record here shows
plaintiff’s activities subsequent to June 2006 not to be limited in any regard. As
noted by the ALJ, plaintiff demonstrated an ability to function independently and
engaged in a variety of physical and interactive activities – including caring for her
elderly mother, shopping, visiting with friends and family members, playing pool,
caring for pets, completing household chores, driving, and going to the gym.
These activities are inconsistent with plaintiff subjective complaints of disabling
impairments, including her claim of an inability to interact with others. See
Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2010) (claimant’s actual activities
inconsistent with claim of disability). E.g., Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 558
(8th Cir. 2011) (ability to care for son and frequently ill girlfriend, clean house, do
yard work, leave the house every day, ride in a car, go out alone, shop in stores,
manage finances, use a computer, plays sports occasionally, socialize and play
games with friends and family, and attend religious services inconsistent with
complaints of disabling pain); Halverson, 600 F.3d at 932 (ability to engage in
self-care, care for pet, prepare meals, do laundry, clean house, drive car, run
errands, go out alone, shop, manage finances, and watch television show “normal
range” of daily activities). Indeed, the undersigned notes that plaintiff shared with
her treating physician on more than one occasion that she was satisfied being
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unemployed so she could care for her mother. E.g., Eichelberger, 390 F.3d at 590
(in discounting credibility, ALJ did not err by considering fact that claimant ceased
employment at same time she became primary caregiver to grandchild).
The ALJ also noted medical evidence to show improvement in plaintiff’s
vision, with recent testing showing no major abnormalities, corrected vision of
20/25 in both eyes, and visual acuity at a level permitting qualification for a
driver’s license with the only restriction being use of outside mirrors. The ALJ
also noted objective medical evidence not to support a finding that plaintiff’s
arthritis poses significant functional limitations, given physical examinations and
imaging studies that fail to show major abnormalities. See Ramirez v. Barnhart,
292 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 2002) (ALJ entitled to make factual determination that
claimant’s subjective complaints are not credible in light of objective medical
evidence to the contrary); Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019, 1023 (8th Cir. 1994)
(absence of objective medical evidence supporting subjective allegations is one
factor the ALJ is required to consider).
These reasons to discredit plaintiff’s subjective complaints are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
Accordingly, in a manner consistent with and as required by Polaski, the
ALJ considered plaintiff’s subjective complaints on the basis of the entire record
and set out numerous inconsistencies that detracted from her credibility. Because
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the ALJ’s determination not to credit plaintiff’s subjective complaints is supported
by good reasons and substantial evidence, the Court must defer to this
determination. Renstrom, 680 F.3d at 1065; Goff, 421 F.3d at 793; Vester v.
Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005).
B.

Medical Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly considered the medical opinions

rendered by Drs. Reed and Morris, which supported additional physical and mental
limitations that were not included in the RFC assessment. For the following
reasons, the ALJ did not err in her consideration of this opinion evidence.
In evaluating opinion evidence, the Regulations require the ALJ to explain
in the decision the weight given to any opinions from treating sources, non-treating
sources, and non-examining sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii). The
Regulations require that more weight be given to the opinions of treating
physicians than other sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). A treating physician's
assessment of the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments should be given
controlling weight if the opinion is well supported by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in the record. Id.; see also Forehand v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 984, 986 (8th
Cir. 2004). This is so because a treating physician has the best opportunity to
observe and evaluate a claimant's condition,
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since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most
able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's]
medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the
medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical
findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as
consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
When a treating physician's opinion is not given controlling weight, the
Commissioner must look to various factors in determining what weight to accord
the opinion, including the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, whether the
treating physician provides support for his findings, whether other evidence in the
record is consistent with the treating physician's findings, and the treating
physician's area of specialty. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The Regulations further
provide that the Commissioner “will always give good reasons in [the] notice of
determination or decision for the weight [given to the] treating source's opinion.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
The Regulations likewise require the ALJ to apply the factors set out in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) when weighing opinion evidence obtained from nontreating sources such as consulting physicians. Such opinions, however, do not
generally constitute substantial evidence. Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 589
(8th Cir. 1998).
Against this backdrop, the undersigned reviews plaintiff’s claims regarding
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the weight accorded to Drs. Reed’s and Morris’s opinions rendered in this cause.
1.

Dr. Reed

In her written decision, the ALJ accorded limited weight to Dr. Reed’s
January 2011 opinion that plaintiff’s anger problems and difficulty maintaining
attention would interfere with her ability to function in a work situation, finding
this opinion to be inconsistent with plaintiff’s treatment history and her own
treatment notes. The ALJ did not err in this determination.
Inconsistency with substantial evidence on the record as a whole is itself an
appropriate basis upon which to discount a treating physician’s opinion. Goff, 421
F.3d at 790-91. Here, the ALJ properly noted that Dr. Reed’s finding that
plaintiff’s mental impairment prevented her from engaging in work-related
activities was inconsistent with the record evidence of plaintiff’s treatment history.
Other than Dr. Reed’s statement in her January 2011 letter to counsel, there are no
findings, observations, or recommendations for treatment from any medical source
regarding plaintiff’s alleged anger, attention deficit, or other mental limitations.
Although in her April 2010 letter to Dr. Reed, plaintiff reported having always
been in trouble because of her temper, a review of the medical evidence obtained
from treating physicians, consulting physicians, and specialists shows plaintiff to
have consistently exhibited normal and unremarkable behavior during mental
status examinations, to have been observed to be pleasant and cooperative, and to
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have consistently been observed to be in a “good mood.” Because Dr. Reed’s
opinion that plaintiff’s mental limitations would prevent her from working is
inconsistent with and unsupported by the medical evidence of record, including her
own treatment notes, the ALJ did not err in according limited weight to this
opinion. Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 925 (8th Cir. 2011); Halverson, 600
F.3d at 930.
2.

Dr. Morris

With respect to Dr. Morris’s December 2011 MSS, the ALJ determined to
accord it little weight to the extent Dr. Morris opined that plaintiff was limited in
lifting, walking, sitting, and standing such that she was restricted to no more than
light exertional work; had postural limitations beyond the inability to climb ladders
and scaffolds; had manipulative limitations; and was limited in driving. For the
following reasons, the ALJ did not err in this determination.
The ALJ found that objective medical evidence as well as plaintiff’s
activities of daily living were inconsistent with the above limitations and, indeed,
noted that Dr. Morris’s own examination of plaintiff failed to yield a basis for such
limitations. These reasons are supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Morris’s
examination included diagnostic testing and clinical evaluation that showed no
evidence of abnormalities. Examination of all joints allegedly affected by arthritis
yielded normal results, with range of motion noted to be only slightly limited about
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the knees, hips, and spine. Examination of plaintiff’s hands showed normal finger
and hand control with fine manipulation, full and firm grip, full range of motion,
no evidence of muscle atrophy, and no visible deformities. Despite this objective
evidence of no abnormalities, Dr. Morris nevertheless imposed limitations that
appear to be consistent with and based upon plaintiff’s subjective statements made
during the evaluation. Where a physician’s opinion is largely based on a
claimant’s subjective complaints rather than on objective findings, an ALJ does not
err in giving the opinion limited weight. Renstrom, 680 F.3d at 1064.
In addition, as noted by the ALJ, plaintiff’s actual activities of frequently
working out at a gym, regularly driving, and physically lifting her mother when
assisting her are inconsistent with the exertional and physical limitations as opined
by Dr. Morris. See Goff, 421 F.3d at 790 (ALJ properly discounted physician’s
opinion where claimant testified that she regularly engaged in activities that
exceeded opined limitations); Tellez, 403 F.3d at 956 (substantial evidence
supported ALJ’s decision to discount physician’s opinion given that claimant’s
actual behavior was clearly at odds with limitations described by the medical
source). Cf. Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 557 (2003) (exertional restrictions
in RFC consistent with claimant’s testimony as to such).
Finally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Morris provided no rationale or support for
his opined limitations. An ALJ is permitted to accord limited weight to medical
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opinion evidence in such circumstances. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (“The better
an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that
opinion.”).
In sum, a review of the ALJ’s decision shows the ALJ to have properly
evaluated plaintiff’s limitations in view of the opinion evidence of record and to
have provided good reasons for the weight she accorded the opinion evidence.
Because the ALJ’s determination to accord little weight to the opinions set out in
Dr. Reed’s January 2011 letter and to certain of the opinions expressed in Dr.
Morris’s December 2011 MSS is supported by good reasons and substantial
evidence, the Court defers to this determination.
Finally, contrary to plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ should have ordered a
consultative mental evaluation in order to obtain opinion evidence regarding her
mental impairment, the ALJ was not required to obtain additional evidence given
that the existing evidence of record – including the November 2010 psychiatric
evaluation – provided a sufficient basis for her decision regarding plaintiff’s
mental limitations. See Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995).
C.

RFC Determination
Plaintiff claims that by improperly discounting her credibility and the

opinion evidence of Drs. Reed and Morris in this cause, the ALJ failed to include
additional physical and mental limitations in the RFC that are attributable to her
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arthritis and mental impairments. As discussed above, however, the ALJ properly
considered and weighed the available medical evidence and plaintiff’s credibility.
An ALJ is not obligated to include limitations in an RFC from opinions that she
properly disregarded. Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 969 (8th Cir. 2010). Nor
must an ALJ include in an RFC assessment claimed limitations that she finds not
to be credible. Goff, 421 F.3d at 793 (ALJ must assess claimant’s RFC based on
all relevant, credible evidence in record); cf. Wildman, 596 F.3d at 969 (ALJ’s
RFC determination influenced by finding claimant’s allegations not credible).
The ALJ properly assessed plaintiff’s RFC based upon all the record
evidence in this cause, including medical and testimonial evidence, and the record
contains some medical evidence that supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.
Because substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports this determination,
it will not be disturbed. Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (8th Cir.
2002) (standard for RFC assessment); Casey, 503 F.3d at 691 (court will not
disturb ALJ’s decision if it falls within available “zone of choice”).
VI. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons set out above on the claims raised by plaintiff
on this appeal, the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff was not disabled from June
13, 2006, to December 31, 2011, is supported by substantial evidence on the record
as a whole, and plaintiff’s claims of error should be denied.
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Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner is
affirmed, and plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order is
entered this same date.

__/s/Terry I. Adelman_____________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated this _11th_ day of _September, 2014.

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