King v. Taylor Express Inc et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of Austin W. Stephens to strike the claims in Counts I and II for punitive damages is DENIED. [Doc. 10] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of Taylor Express, Inc., to dismiss [Doc. 15] is also DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Thomas C. Mummert, III on October 9, 2013. (MCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
PATRICK KING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TAYLOR EXPRESS, INC., and
AUSTIN W. STEPHENS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:13cv1217 TCM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This three-count diversity action is before the Court1 on the motion of defendant Austin
W. Stephens (Stephens) to strike the claims in Counts I and II for punitive damages and the
motion of defendant Taylor Express, Inc. (Taylor Express) to dismiss Count III.2 Plaintiff, Patrick
King, opposes both motions.
Background
The resolution of the pending motions depends on the allegations in the complaint, which
are described below.
Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when the car he was driving on a Missouri highway
was "crushed into a concrete barrier" as a result of being struck by the tractor-trailer driven by
Stephens and owned by Taylor Express. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15, 16-18, ECF No. 1.) Specifically, as
a result of Stephens "negligently and improperly" changing lanes, the right side of his tractor-

1

The case is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge by written consent of
the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
2

Taylor Express first moved to dismiss all three counts against it. In its reply brief,
however, it withdrew its request to dismiss Counts I and II. (See Taylor Express's Reply at 1, n.1,
ECF No. 21.)

trailer hit the left side of Plaintiff's car, causing "both vehicles to simultaneously spin across the
highway until Plaintiff's [car] was crushed into a concrete barrier," thereby "unhooking" both
vehicles, and causing "Plaintiff's [car] to fly into the air before slamming back to ground." (Id.
¶ 16-17.)
In Count I, Plaintiff seeks an award of actual and punitive damages from Stephens and
Taylor Express for negligence. His claim of negligence includes allegations that "Defendants
operated the vehicle in a careless and reckless manner" and "showed a complete indifference to
or a conscious disregard for the safety of Plaintiff" and others. (Id. ¶¶ 24(a), 27.)
In Count II, Plaintiff seeks an award of actual and punitive damages from Stephens and
Taylor Express for "negligence per se." (Id. at 7.) He alleges that the "acts and omissions" he
earlier described violate Missouri statutes governing "the regulation of traffic" and federal
regulations governing motor carriers. (Id. ¶ 32-33.) He supports his request for punitive damages
with an allegation that "[t]he negligence and carelessness of Defendants . . . showed a complete
indifference to or a conscious disregard for the safety of Plaintiff" and others. (Id. ¶ 38.)
In Count III, Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages only from Taylor Express on a
negligence theory. In addition to claims of negligence arising from Taylor Express's hiring,
retaining, supervising, and training Stephens, Plaintiff alleges that Taylor Express was negligent
in maintaining the tractor-trailer driven by Stephens. (Id. ¶ 42.) As before, he premises his
punitive damages request on an allegation that "[t]he negligence and carelessness of Defendant
Taylor Express . . . showed a complete indifference to or a conscious disregard for the safety of
Plaintiff" and others. (Id. ¶ 45.)

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Citing motor vehicle accident cases in which the question was whether the issue of
punitive damages should have been submitted to the fact-finder,3 Stephens argues that Plaintiff's
claim for punitive damages should be stricken pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
Citing McHaffie by and through McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995) (en
banc), Taylor Express argues that Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages must be stricken and,
consequently, Count III must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
because Missouri law bars direct negligence claims against an employer who has admitted
vicarious liability for the negligent acts of his employee, as Taylor Express has done. (See Taylor
Express Answer ¶ 9, ECF No. 14.)
Discussion
Stephens' Motion. "Courts may strike 'from any pleading any insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.'" BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas.
Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f)). This includes a prayer for
punitive damages. See Id. "Striking a party's pleading, however, is an extreme and disfavored
measure." Id. (citing Stanbury Law Firm v. I.R.S., 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000)).
Under Missouri law, "[p]unitive damages may be awarded in a negligence action if the
defendant 'showed complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others.'"

3

The cited cases are: Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 849 (Mo. 1996) (en banc)
(submission of punitive damages issue to court in bench-tried case involving intoxicated
tortfeasor); Stojkovic v. Weller, 802 S.W.2d 152, 154-55 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (submission of
punitive damages issue to jury in case involving intoxicated tortfeasor), overruled on other
grounds, Rodriquez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1996) (en banc); Flood ex rel.
Oakley v. Holzwarth, 182 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (submission of punitive damages
issue to jury in case involving methamphetamine-impaired tortfeasor); Stuart v. Mills, 899 S.W.2d
156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (question whether issue of punitive damages was properly submitted to
jury based on quantity and quality of evidence of whether tortfeasor was intoxicated).

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Stojkovic, 802 S.W.2d at 155 (quoting Menaugh v. Resler Optometry, Inc., 799 S.W.2d 71, 73
(Mo. 1990) (en banc)); accord Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 339 (Mo.
1996) (en banc). The Missouri Supreme Court has "described 'conscious disregard or complete
indifference' as:
an act or omission, though properly characterized as negligent, [that] manifest[s]
such reckless indifference to the rights of others that the law will imply that an
injury resulting from it was intentionally inflicted. Or there may be conscious
negligence tantamount to intentional wrongdoing, as where the person doing the
act or failing to act must be conscious of his conduct, and, [though] having no
specific intent to injure, must be conscious, from his knowledge of surrounding
circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will naturally or probably
result in injury."
Id. (quoting Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 435 (Mo.
1985) (en banc)) (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original). Additionally, the Court notes that
Missouri allows evidence of a failure to follow motor carrier regulations and statutes to support
claims for punitive damages. See e.g., Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Co-op., Inc., 26 S.W.3d
151, 160 (Mo. 2000) (en banc); Coon v. Am. Compressed Steel, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 629, 638-39
(Mo. Ct. App. 2006). Allegations of such failure form the basis for the claims in Count II.
"[T]he federal rules require only notice pleading through 'a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Horras v. Am. Capital Strategies, Ltd.,
— F.3d — , 2013 WL 4711389, *6 (8th Cir. Sept. 3, 2013) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93 (2007)). Plaintiff alleges that Stephens acted in "complete indifference to or a conscious
disregard of" his safety when changing lanes and when violating Missouri statutes and federal
regulations governing motor carriers. (Compl. ¶¶ 27, 38.) These allegations are sufficient to state
a claim under Missouri law for punitive damages. Whether the supporting evidence is sufficient
to submit the claim to the fact-finders is an issue for another day.
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Stephens' motion to strike will be denied.
Taylor Express's Motion to Dismiss. When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, the Court must take as true the alleged facts and determine whether
they are sufficient to raise more than a speculative right to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). The Court does not, however, accept as true any allegation that
is a legal conclusion. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Taylor Express argues that
Count III must be dismissed because the only claim alleged in that count that does not fall within
the McHaffie rule – "once an employer has admitted respondeat superior for a driver's
negligence, it is improper to allow a plaintiff to proceed against the employer on any other theory
of imputed liability," 891 S.W.2d at 826 – is for punitive damages and should be stricken. See
Wilson v. Image Flooring, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 386, 392-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that
dicta in McHaffie that punitive damages might be an exception "to the general rule barring direct
negligence claims against an employer who had already admitted vicarious liability" was
"persuasive," and holding that the McHaffie general rule did not apply to a claim for punitive
damages).
This argument is unavailing for two reasons. One, as explained above, the claims for
punitive damages will not be stricken. See Harris v. Decker Truck Line, Inc., 2013 WL
1769095, *2-5 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2013) (declining to dismiss request for punitive damages
award against trucking company who employed driver who rear-ended plaintiff's car; allegations,
including those of violations of motor carrier regulations and industry standards, were assumed
to be true and were sufficient to support request). Two, allegations in Count III are not only of
Stephens' negligence. There is also an allegation that Taylor Express negligently failed to
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maintain the tractor-trailer that was being driven by Stephens at the time of the accident. See
McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (noting that "it may be possible that an employer . . . may be held
liable on a theory of negligence that does not derive from and is not dependent on the negligence
of an . . . employee").
Taylor Express's motion will be denied.
Conclusion
Under the governing standards, the allegations of Plaintiff are sufficient to survive the
Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(f) challenges.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of Austin W. Stephens to strike the claims
in Counts I and II for punitive damages is DENIED. [Doc. 10]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of Taylor Express, Inc., to dismiss [Doc.
15] is also DENIED.

/s/ Thomas C. Mummert, III
THOMAS C. MUMMERT, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 9th day of October, 2013.

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