Thompson v. Denney

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (see order for details) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his application for writ of habeas corpus as successive [Doc. # 6 ] is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability will issue. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 08/08/2013. (CBL)

Thompson v. Denney

Doc. 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
DOUGLAS THOMPSON,
Petitioner,
v.
LARRY DENNEY,
Respondent.

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No. 4:13CV1241 TIA

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his application for writ of habeas corpus as successive. Petitioner seeks
relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Petitioner also seeks relief
under a recent Supreme Court case, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013).
A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion
to alter or amend judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e); see also United States v. Metro. St.
Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir.2006). Rule 59(e) motions “serve the
limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d at 933. The purpose
of the Rule is to allow the district court “the power to rectify its own mistakes in the
period immediately following the entry of judgment.” Norman v. Arkansas Dep't of
Educ., 79 F.3d 748, 750 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep't of

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Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450(1982)). A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend
must show: “1) an intervening change in controlling law; 2) the availability of new
evidence not available previously; or 3) the need to correct a clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice.” Bannister v. Armontrout, 807 F.Supp. 516, 556
(W.D.Mo.1991), aff'd, 4 F.3d 1434 (8th Cir.1993).
Unfortunately, all of petitioner’s arguments in his motion for reconsideration,
except for one, concern the same legal and factual theories already comprehensively
addressed by this Court in its July 26, 2013 Memorandum and Order. In that
Memorandum and Order, based on a full and fair review of the record, the Court
found that petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus was successive and
issued an accompanying Order of Dismissal.
In the instant motion for reconsideration petitioner’s one novel argument is that
the recent Supreme Court case of McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013),
provides him grounds for relief and allows for modification of the Court’s prior
Order. He is simply incorrect.
In McQuiggin, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner filing a first-time federal
habeas petition could overcome the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1) upon a showing of “actual innocence” under the Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 329 (1995), standard. See McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1928. Critically, the holding
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in McQuiggin was based on the Supreme Court's conclusion that Congress, through
its silence on the issue, had not intended to eliminate the pre-existing equitable
“actual innocence” exception for an untimely first-time filer. See id. at 1934. On the
other hand, the Court expressly recognized that Congress, through § 2244(b), had
intended to “modify” and “constrain[ ]” the “actual innocence” exception with respect
to second or successive petitions. See id. at 1933–34. Nothing in McQuiggin
authorizes a court to ignore or bypass these constraints.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal of his application for writ of habeas corpus as successive [Doc. #6] is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability will issue.
Dated this 8th day of August, 2013.

CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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