Houston v. State of Missouri
Filing
5
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioners motion for reconsideration of the denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. #4] is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. re: 4 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by Petitioner Michael J. Houston Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/24/13. (JWJ)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL J. HOUSTON,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI,
Respondent.
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No. 4:13CV1242 AGF
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his application for writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. After reviewing petitioner’s motion in its entirety, the motion will be denied.
Petitioner, a pretrial detainee at St. Louis City Justice Center, filed his petition
for habeas corpus alleging that: (1) DNA evidence was improperly gathered and
introduced in his current state criminal proceedings; (2) as a result of improperly
gathered DNA evidence and purportedly false “eyewitness testimony” he is being
improperly held on detainer past his completed sentence. In essence, in his application
for writ he asserted that his appointed counsel was ineffective because his hearing
dates on his motion to compel production of discovery and DNA witnesses, filed in
March of 2013, had been continued until August. As such, petitioner asserted in a
conclusory manner that he was being denied “discovery and speedy trial” in his state
criminal proceedings.
After reviewing petitioner’s motion and the accompanying exhibits, the petition
was summarily denied and dismissed, without prejudice. The Court found that
petitioner’s claims could be raised at trial and in his subsequent state proceedings and
did not contain the “special circumstances” required for a finding that he had exhausted
his state remedies with respect to his speedy trial rights. See Matthews v. Lockhart,
726 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir. 1984).1 Morever, the Court found that “the question of
1
To the extent petitioner was asserting a denial of his rights under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, he had to have exhausted his state
remedies prior to pursuing his claims in this Court unless “special circumstances”
existed to divest him of this burden. See, e.g., Neville v. Cavanagh, 611 F.2d 673,
675 (7th Cir.1979) (“In the interests of comity between federal and state courts, the
doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies has developed. It applies to pre-trial, as well
as post-trial, habeas corpus petitions.”), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); Hirsch v.
Smitley, 66 F.Supp.2d 985, 986 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (“ ‘[w]hile not explicitly required
by § 2241(c)(3), the interests of comity have caused courts to apply the doctrine of
exhaustion of state remedies to pretrial petitions' ”), quoting Blanck v. Waukesha
County, 48 F.Supp.2d 859, 860 (E.D.Wis.1999); Tran v. Bartow, 210 Fed.Appx. 538,
540 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished opinion) (“[o]nly in ‘special circumstances' will relief
under § 2241 be available to a state prisoner before trial ... and even then only if the
prisoner has exhausted available remedies in the state courts”); Powell v. Saddler, No.
12 C 2928 (N.D.Ill.2012), 2012 WL 3880198 at *3 (“to properly pursue a claim under
§ 2241 a [pretrial detainee] petitioner must have exhausted his state court remedies”).
See also Davis v. Mueller, 643 F.2d 521, 525 (8th Cir.) (noting that the availability of
federal habeas relief while state court proceedings are still pending is limited by the
“‘notion of comity’” and “the proper respect for state functions”), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 892 (1981). The Court reaffirms its prior finding that petitioner failed to allege
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whether the state violated its own speedy trial statute is a matter for the state courts”
and is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Id. at 396.
In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner asserts that he has a conflict with
his appointed counsel. He claims that he has asked his counsel not to waive his speedy
trial rights but she insists she will need more time to prepare for his defense. Petitioner
states that he has filed a pro se motion in his state criminal action seeking removal of
his attorney from his case due to the conflicts that have arisen during her representation
of him. He states that he believes counsel is interfering with his right to speedy trial
under state law.2
any facts showing “special circumstances” that would assist him in evading the
exhaustion requirement.
2
Petitioner refers to “180-day rule” in his motion. The Missouri Speedy Trial
Act, sometimes called the 180-day rule, was repealed effective June 7, 1984. Under
the current Speedy Trial Act, a defendant should be brought to trial “as soon as
reasonably possible” after the defendant indicates he is ready for trial and requests a
speedy trial. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 545.780. The statute provides that the remedy for a
defendant who is not tried “as soon as reasonably possible” is to seek mandamus. Of
course, the Missouri Speedy Trial Act must be distinguished from the Uniform
Detainer Law, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 217.460, which permits incarcerated persons to demand
a trial on a pending charge and require dismissal of the charge if the defendant is not
brought to trial on the charge within 180 days after a proper demand for trial is filed.
Petitioner has not mentioned the Detainer Law in his brief and the Court will not
address it here.
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Unfortunately, this Court cannot involve itself in a conflict between petitioner
and his appointed counsel. Although petitioner may believe that his appointed counsel
is not following his directives with regard to his “speedy trial” rights, he has already
brought the matter to the attention of the state trial court where it should properly be
raised. Furthermore, when a defendant or his counsel is responsible for the delays in
trial, the defendant, by law, is not denied his right to speedy trial. State v. Adams, 691
S.W.2d 432 (Mo.Ct.App.1985); State v. Cannon, 692 S.W.2d 357 (Mo.Ct.App.1985);
State v. Daly, 731 S.W.2d 315 (Mo.Ct.App.1987); State v. Clark, 723 S.W.2d 17
(Mo.Ct.App.1986). As petitioner is aware, his own counsel has sought a continuance
of his case to pursue discovery. Thus, it cannot be said that his speedy trial right has
been breached.
As noted in the Court’s prior Memorandum and Order, from Missouri Case.Net,
it is apparent that petitioner’s issues will be heard at the hearing scheduled for August
5, 2013 in front of the Honorable Bryan L. Hettenbach in the Circuit Court for the City
of St. Louis. As a result, the Court will deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 [Doc. #4] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a certificate of
appealability.
Dated this 24th day of July, 2013.
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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