Affolter v. United States of America

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (see order for details) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that movant shall show cause, in writing and no later than twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order, why the instant § 2255 motion should not be dismissed as time-barred. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if movant fails to comply with this Order, his § 2255 motion will be dismissed. Signed by District Judge E. Richard Webber on 07/26/2013. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CHAD RICHARD AFFOLTER,
Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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No. 4:13CV01413 ERW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on movant’s motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The motion appears to be time-barred,
and the Court will order movant to show cause why the motion should not be
summarily dismissed.
Procedural History
On November 1, 2006, movant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and
possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
846, and being an unlawful drug user in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
On January 19, 2007, the Court sentenced movant to a total term of 135 months’
imprisonment1 and five years supervised release. Movant did not appeal.

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Movant was sentenced to a total term of 135 months’ imprisonment: the
sentenced consisted of 135 months’ imprisonment on Count I and 120 months’

Legal Standard
Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings for the United States
District Courts provides that a district court may summarily dismiss a § 2255 motion
if it plainly appears that the movant is not entitled to relief.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of-(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
A district court may consider, on its own initiative, whether a habeas action is
barred by the statute of limitations. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006).

imprisonment on Count IV, all terms to be served consecutively.
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However, before dismissing a habeas action as time-barred, the court must provide
notice to the movant. Id.
Discussion
A review of the instant motion indicates that it is time-barred under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(1), and is subject to summary dismissal. An unappealed criminal judgment
becomes final for purposes of calculating the time limit for filing a motion under

§

2255 when the time for filing a direct appeal expires. Moshier v. United States, 402
F.3d 116, 118 (2nd Cir. 2005). In this case, the judgment became final ten days after
the judgment was entered on January 19, 2007. Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(b)(1)(2007). As
a result, the one-year period of limitations under § 2255 expired on about January 29,
2007. The instant motion was signed by movant on July 13, 2013.
Movant argues that “the Court has jurisdiction under new law ruling,” Alleyne
v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), and thus should be timely under 28 U.S.C. §
2255(f)(3). In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the
mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an “element” of the criminal offense that
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by submission to the jury. The Court
resolved Alleyne on direct, rather than collateral review, and it did not declare that its
new rule applied retroactively on collateral attack.

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Alleyne enunciates a rule of constitutional law. “[A] new rule for the conduct
of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal,
pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the
new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.” Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
328 (1987) (emphasis added). Generally, however, constitutional rules are not applied
to cases, such as this one, being considered on collateral review. Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 303 (1989). “Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new
rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced.” Id. at 310.
“Two exceptions to the Teague rule, however, permit the retroactive application
of a new rule whenever: 1) the rule places certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe or
otherwise prohibits imposition of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants
because of their status or offense; or 2) the rule announces a new “watershed” rule of
criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding.” In re Carl Green, 144 F.3d 384, 386 (6th Cir.1998), citing Caspari v.
Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396 (1994).2
2

Alleyne is an extension of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The
Justices of the Supreme Court have decided that other rules based on Apprendi do not
apply retroactively on collateral review. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348
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This Court finds that Alleyne does not fall within either of the exceptions to the
non-retroactivity rule, and declines to apply Alleyne in this § 2255 proceeding.
Moreover, even if Alleyne could be found to be retroactive, it simply does not
apply to movant. Movant entered a guilty plea and specifically entered into a plea
agreement with the Government finding that his total offense level for Count I would
be 33 and his total offense level for Count IV would be either 12, 17 or 21, depending
upon his criminal history. After his criminal history was investigated and found to be
a Category I, his total offense level, together, was calculated to be a 33, with an
imprisonment range of 135 months to 168 months. Thus, movant received the minimum
sentence for his total offense level and no facts were used to enhance that minimum
sentence. Thus, Alleyne cannot be said to be applicable to his situation even if it were
available to him in these proceedings. See, e.g., U.S. v. Wimberly, No: 12-2210, 2013
WL 3214988, *1 (6th Cir. June 26, 2013).
As such, the Court finds that movant’s motion to vacate appears to be timebarred.

Movant shall be allowed twenty-one (21) days from the date of this

Memorandum and Order to show cause why the motion should not be summarily
dismissed.

(2004).
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that movant shall show cause, in writing and no
later than twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order, why the instant § 2255
motion should not be dismissed as time-barred.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if movant fails to comply with this Order,
his § 2255 motion will be dismissed.
So Ordered this 26th day of July, 2013.

E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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