Trust v. St. Louis Housing Authority et al

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED. A separate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on 3/3/15. (JWJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

SHARNAE TRUST,
Plaintiff,
v.

ST. LOUIS HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al. ,
Defendants.

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No. 4:13CV1686 RLW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
21). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. Upon review of the pleadings, the
Court finds that summary judgment in favor of Defendants is warranted.
Background

Plaintiff participated in the federal Section 8 rental assistance program. (Compl. ~ 26,
ECF No. 1) Defendant St. Louis Housing Authority ("SLHA") paid Plaintiffs landlord $900 per
month, and Plaintiff paid zero, for an apartment located in Florissant, Missouri. (Id.

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26-27)

However, SLHA terminated Plaintiffs rental assistance on July 30, 2013 , after Plaintiff stabbed
her brother with a metal tool on May 22, 2013 , allegedly in self-defense. (Id.

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27-28, 33)

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with first degree assault and armed criminal action. (Id. at
~34)

The SLHA issued a "Notice of Program Termination" to Plaintiff on May 31 , 2013 and
attached a copy of a newspaper article and a copy of the charge information printed from the
Missouri court website "Case.net." (Id. at ~~35-36) Plaintiff requested an informal hearing,
which was held on July 11 , 2013. (Id.

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39-40) Plaintiff was represented by counsel during

the hearing. (Id. at ~ 41) Plaintiff testified on her own behalf, claiming that she acted in selfdefense and denying that she engaged in criminal activity. (Id. at~ 46) In addition, Plaintiffs
mother corroborated Plaintiffs story, and Plaintiff introduced a copy of an Ex Parte Order of
Protection she obtained against her brother in 2012. (Id. at ~~47-48) On July 17, 2013 , the
hearing officer affirmed the termination of Plaintiffs Section 8 Voucher assistance, finding
sufficient evidence to support the termination. (Id. at ~ 50) The hearing officer considered
Plaintiffs testimony, which indicated that she and her brother had an altercation and that she
called the police. During the police inquiry, Plaintiff and her brother continued to argue, and
Plaintiff picked up a metal object and stabbed her brother. (Hearing Decision, Pl. ' s Ex. B, ECF
No. 1-2)
On August 27, 2013 , Plaintiff filed a Complaint in federal court alleging a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim for alleged violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process (Count I);
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) and 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) for alleged deprivation of her
right to a fair and impartial hearing with a decision based on a preponderance of the evidence
(Count II); and violation of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, Mo. Rev. Stat.§
536.100, et seq. by terminating her Section 8 assistance without rendering the decision based on
a preponderance of credible evidence (Count III). Defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment on June 16, 2014, asserting that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to
Plaintiffs Complaint because Plaintiff violated the Obligations of the Family thereby justifying
the termination of Section 8 assistance. Plaintiff responds that self-defense is an absolute
defense to Defendants ' claims that she violated the Section 8 Voucher Program rules. She also
asserts that Defendants violated her due process rights by relying on hearsay evidence to
terminate her assistance.

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Legal Standards
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for
summary judgment only if all of the information before the court show "there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The court must view
the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 63 F.3d 771 , 775 (8th Cir. 1995).
The moving party has the initial burden to establish the non-existence of any genuine
issue of fact that is material to a judgment in its favor. City ofMt. Pleasant, Iowa v.

Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc. , 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). Once this burden is
discharged, if the record does in fact bear out that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then
shifts to the non- moving party, who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts
showing there is a genuine dispute on that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986).
When the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its
pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ .P. 56(e). The non-moving party "must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In fact, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party which would
enable a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324. Self-serving, conclusory statements, standing alone, are insufficient to defeat a well-

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supported motion for summary judgment. 0 'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 64 F.3d 1188, 1191
(8th Cir. 1995).
Discussion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff is unable to show that Defendants violated her
constitutional right to due process, her rights to an informal hearing under Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") regulations, and her rights under the Missouri Administrative Act. 1
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States .. . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ...
In order to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff "must [first] show she was
deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and the laws' of the United States; second, she
must also show that the defendants acted under color of state law." Lind v. Midland Funding,
L.L.C. , 688 F.3d 402, 405 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155

(1978) ). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deprived her of her right to Due Process under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.2 Although the Complaint does not specify
whether Plaintiffs claim alleges a substantive or procedural due process claim, review of th~
pleadings indicates that Plaintiffs claim is for a procedural due process violation pertaining to
the grievance hearing procedures. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n p. 6, ECF No. 24)
"To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that [s]he
has a protected property or liberty interest at stake and that [s]he was deprived of that interest
1

In her memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff addresses the
three counts collectively.
2
Because this Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to establish the deprivation of a constitutional
right, the Court need not address the under-color-of-state-law prong. Lind, 688 F.3d at 405.
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without due process oflaw." Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 975 (8th Cir. 1999); see also

Swipies v. Kojka, 419 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2005). Due process requires an opportunity to be
heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267
(1970) (citations and internal quotations omitted). In the context of termination of government
benefits, "these principles require that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the
reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any
adverse witnesses and by presenting [her] own arguments and evidence orally." Id. at 267-68.
Plaintiff claims that she was not allowed to confront adverse witnesses, and the Housing
Authority erred in relying solely on hearsay evidence to affirm the termination of her Section 8
Voucher. Defendants respond that Plaintiff received due process in that she attended an
informal hearing where she had the opportunity to, and in fact did, present evidence. Defendants
contend that the SLHA section pertaining to the informal hearing does not mandate that SLHA
present witnesses, only that the Plaintiff "may" question any witness called by the SLHA.
Further, Defendant asserts that the hearing officer did not base her termination decision on
hearsay evidence, as the documents submitted were probative and reliable, and both Plaintiff and
her mother testified.
The Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to Plaintiffs due
process claim such that summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is warranted. Under

Goldberg, to comport with due process, the termination process employed by the housing
authority must meet five requirements:
(1) timely notice from the housing authority stating the basis for the .proposed
termination, (2) an opportunity by the tenant to confront and cross-examine each
witness relied on by the housing authority, (3) the right of the tenant to be
represented by counsel, (4) a decision, based solely on evidence adduced at the
hearing, in which the reasons for the decision are set forth, and (5) an impartial
decision maker.

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Clarkv. Alexander, 85 F.3d 146, 150 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-71).
Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that, under Goldberg she received a proper
termination hearing. Rather, her argument centers on the evidence presented at the hearing.
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants erroneously relied on hearsay evidence to meet
its burden of proof. Plaintiff argues that evidence of the arrest and pending charges is
insufficient evidence to terminate her Section 8 Voucher assistance. Plaintiff also argues that
she was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses as mandated by the regulations.
At the outset, the Court notes that "deference must be shown to the factfinding of local
housing authorities." Clark, 85 F.3d at 151. This deference is not absolute, but it is significant.

Id "Accordingly, to insure compliance with federal law, the reviewing court must be satisfied
that the hearing officer's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence." Id at 152.
The St. Louis Housing Authority "has the burden of persuasion and must initially present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case" that Plaintiff engaged in violent criminal
activity. Basco v. Machin , 514 F.3d 1177, U 82 (11th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff concedes that the
housing authority may use hearsay evidence to meet its burden of production. Id Indeed, the
regulations provide that " [e]vidence may be considered without regard to admissibility under the
rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings." 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5). '" [H]earsay
may constitute substantial evidence in administrative proceedings as long as factors that assure
the underlying reliability and probative value of the evidence are present. "' Basco, 514 F.3d at
1182 (quoting U S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Webb , 595 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1979) (internal
quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff first argues that evidence of Plaintiffs arrest and pending charges does not
constitute sufficient evidence. The Court finds that, in this case, the hearsay evidence presented
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by Defendants contained substantial indicia of reliability. The case law from other federal
district courts upon which Plaintiff relies is inapposite. In Young v. Maryville Haus. Auth. , No.
3:09-CV-37, 2009 WL 2043891 , at *8-*9 (E.D. Tenn. July 2, 2009), the court found that the
hearing officer' s sole reliance on a police report was insufficient to support the hearing officer' s
decision where the plaintiff disputed a number of the statements in the report. Likewise, in
Rivera v. Town of Huntington, No. 12-CV-901(DRH)(ARL), 2012 WL 1933767, at *6-*7
(E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2012), the court found that evidence of plaintiffs arrest and pending charges
did not constitute substantial evidence that plaintiff possessed cocaine because the plaintiff never
admitted to possessing cocaine, and nothing in the evidence indicated that the substance was in
fact cocaine.
Iri the case at hand, Plaintiff does not dispute that she stabbed her brother. 3 In support of
her decision to terminate Section 8 assistance, the hearing officer relied on the newspaper article,
the felony charges for first degree assault and armed criminal action printed from Case.net, and
Plaintiffs admission that she stabbed her brother and was subsequently arrested. (Hearing
Decision, Pl. ' s Ex. B, ECF No. 1-2) While Plaintiff asserts that she performed the act in self-

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Plaintiff presents no support for her assertion that merely claiming she acted in self-defense is
"an absolute defense to Defendants' claims that she violated the Section 8 Voucher Program
rules." (Pl. ' s Mem. in Opp' n pp. 1-3, ECF No. 24) Plaintiff cites to the Missouri Revised
Statutes pertaining to the use of force in self-defense. However, she does not cite to any relevant
HUD regulation indicating that a self-defense claim precludes the Defendants from terminating
her Section 8 Voucher assistance. -Indeed, the regulations define violent criminal activity as "any
criminal activity that has as one of its elements the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force substantial enough to cause, or be reasonably likely to cause, serious bodily injury
or property damage." 24 C.F.R. § 5.100. Plaintiff acknowledged that she stabbed her brother
and injured him. (Compl. if 33 , ECF No. 1) Likewise, while she asserted self-defense at the
hearing, the officer explicitly found that Plaintiffs actions constituted a violation of the family
obligation to refrain from violent criminal activity. (Hearing Decision, Pl. ' s Ex. B, ECF No. 1-2)
Further, Defendants have the right and obligation to manage the Section 8 Voucher program
independent of the state criminal justice system and need not wait until Plaintiff is convicted to
initiate termination proceedings. Young, 2009 WL 2043891, at *9.
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defense, the Defendants were not required to wait until a conviction on the assault charges
"before initiating the process to terminate a Section 8 program participant on the grounds of
criminal activity." Young, 2009 WL 2043891 , at *9. As noted by the Young court, the housing
authority "has the right, and obligation, to administer its Section 8 program independently of the
operation of the state or federal criminal justice system." Id. Indeed, the HUD regulations
provide that " [t]he PHA may terminate assistance for criminal activity by a household member
as authorized in this section if the PHA determines, based on a preponderance of the evidence,
that the household member has engaged in the activity, regardless of whether the household
member has been arrested or convicted for such activity." 24 C.F.R. § 982,553(c).
Here, although Plaintiff is still awaiting her state criminal trial, her testimony that she
stabbed her brother corroborated both the newspaper article regarding the arrest and the pending
charges found on Case.net. Thus, the Court finds that the hearing officer' s decision terminating
Plaintiffs Section 8 housing assistance is based on a preponderance of the evidence such that
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. See Pickett v. Forest, No. 4: 1 l-cv-02445-RBH,
2013 WL 267627, at *7-*8 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2013) (granting summary judgment in favor of the
housing authority where sufficient evidence supported the termination of plaintiffs Section 8
housing assistance based on police reports and the plaintiffs corroborating statements at the
hearing); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) ("Factual determinations relating to the individual
circumstances of the family shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence presented at the
hearing.").
With regard to Plaintiffs claim that Defendants denied her right to cross-examine
witnesses, the undersigned notes that Defendants did not present witness testimony at the
hearing. While Plaintiff argues that the regulations mandate that she have the opportunity to

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confront and cross-examine witnesses, the applicable regulation states, " [t]he PHA and the
family must be given the opportunity to present evidence, and may question any witnesses." 24
C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5). As correctly stated by the Defendants, the regulation does not obligate
the housing authority to present witnesses. Because Defendants presented evidence that was
probative and reliable that Plaintiff engaged in violent criminal activity, the absence of witnesses
in this case did not violate Plaintiffs right to due process. Plaintiff does not dispute that she was
given the opportunity to examine documents before the hearing or that she had the opportunity to
present evidence at the hearing. 4 She presented her self-defense evidence, which the hearing
officer carefully considered. Nonetheless, the hearing officer properly found the preponderance
of the evidence consisted of Plaintiffs testimony and the evidence presented by the Defendants,
and that evidence was sufficient to terminate Plaintiffs Section 8 assistance. (Hearing Decision,
Pl. ' s Ex. B, ECF No. 1-2) The Court finds that, based upon the facts of this case, Defendants did
not violate Plaintiffs rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, under
the regulation pertaining to informal hearings pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 982.555, or under the
Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, Mo. Rev. Stat.§§ 536.100 et seq. Therefore,
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs Complaint. Pickett, 2013
WL 267627, at *8.

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Plaintiffs reliance on Taylor v. City of Decatur, Ala., No. CV-09-S-1279-NE, 2010 WL
8781926 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 2, 2010) is misplaced. In that case, the court found that the hearing
officer erroneously relied on the case file and newspaper article to uphold the termination of
benefits where there was "no indication that plaintiff had access to either of these items prior to
the administrative hearing, or any notice that the file and newspaper article would be relied upon
during the hearing." Id. at *9. The Taylor court explicitly limited hits holding to the facts before
it, stating that it was "not holding that an informal hearing officer can never rely on hearsay
evidence. The court' s holding is simply that the procedures followed here, taken as a whole,
were not sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process requirements." Id.
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Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
21 ) is GRANTED. A separate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this

3rd

day of March, 2015.

~~Lb/do

RONNIE L. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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