Rummel v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants motion to deny Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment as premature [# 23 ] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment [# 18 ] is DENIED without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants motion for an extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment [# 22 ] is DENIED as moot. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 3/20/14. (JWD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
THEODORE RUMMEL
Plaintiff,
vs.
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:13 CV 1743 RWS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before me on Plaintiff Theodore Rummel’s motion for partial summary
judgment [#18] and Defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company’s related motion
to deny or continue the summary judgment motion pending further discovery [#23]. For the
reasons set forth below, I will deny Plaintiff’s motion and grant Defendant’s motion.
Theodore Rummel (“Rummel”) purchased a disability insurance policy from
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (“MassMutual”) in 1998. In October 2009,
Rummel exercised his right to increase his benefits. In March 2010, Rummel experienced a
problem with his back and was unable to work. When Rummel made a claim for disability
income benefits, MassMutual approved the claim in the amount of $12,250 per month, but
refused to pay Rummel amount of benefits he increased in October 2009. Rummel claims he is
owed $17,250 per month. On July 31, 2013, Rummel filed this action in the 22nd Judicial
Circuit Court of Missouri, alleging that MassMutual breached their contract. Rummel also seeks
damages for vexatious refusal to pay. On September 4, 2013, MassMutual removed this action

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to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332.
Rummel now moves for partial summary judgment. Rummel maintains that his motion
presents a narrow question of law: whether MassMutual can use a subsequent disability to claim
that Rummel sustained a recurring disability. Rummel argues that this issue is ripe for judicial
determination because it turns solely on contract interpretation. In response, MassMutual has
filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), asking me to deny Rummel’s motion
as premature or continue the motion pending further discovery.
The purpose of Rule 56(d) is to provide an additional safeguard against an improvident or
premature grant of summary judgment. U.S. ex rel. Bernard v. Casino Magic Corp., 293 F.3d
419,426 (8th Cir. 2002). “[T]he rule should be applied with a spirit of liberality.” Id. “Although
discovery need not be complete before a case is dismissed, summary judgment is proper only if
the nonmovant has had adequate time for discovery.” Robinson v. Terex Corp., 439 F.3d 465,
467 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Pony Computer, Inc. v. Equus Computer Sys. of Mo., Inc., 162 F.3d
991, 996 (8th Cir. 1996)). “Rule 56[d] allows a party to request a delay in granting summary
judgment if the party can make a good faith showing that postponement of the ruling would
enable it to discover additional evidence which might rebut the movant's showing of the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citing Small Bus. Admin. v. Light, 766 F.2d 394, 39798 (8th Cir. 1985)).
This case is still in the relatively early stages of litigation. According to the Case
Management Order entered in this matter, discovery is to be completed by June 30, 2014, and
parties have until August 1, 2014 to file dispositive motions. MassMutual insists that it has not
had adequate time to conduct discovery. At the time MassMutual filed its response, it had not
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yet received Rummel’s medical records or had the opportunity to take depositions. Because
MassMutual has made a good faith showing that additional discovery may inform its response to
Rummel’s motion for partial summary judgment, I will deny the motion as premature. While
Rummel argues that additional discovery is not necessary because his motion turns on contract
interpretation, courts have found it proper to allow discovery even in actions for a simple
declaratory judgment on a contract. See, e.g., Martindale Corp. v. Heartland Inns of Am. L.L.C.,
No. 08–CV–2065–LRR, 2009 WL 362270, at *1 (N.D.Iowa 2009); Nelson v. American Home
Assur. Co., Civ. No. 11–1161 (RHK/FLN), 2011 WL 2397160, at *2 (D.Minn. June 13, 2011).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to deny Plaintiff’s motion for
partial summary judgment as premature [#23] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment
[#18] is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for an extension of time to
respond to Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment [#22] is DENIED as moot.

RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 20th day of March, 2014.

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