Shults v. Steele

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel [# 2 ] and renewed motion for appointment of counsel [# 18 ] are denied. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on August 29, 2014. (BRP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY SHULTS,
Petitioner,
vs.
TROY STEELE,
Respondent.

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Case No. 4:13-CV-2326 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before me are a motion to appoint counsel and a renewed motion to
appoint counsel filed by Petitioner Timothy Shults. I will deny Shults’s motions
for appointed counsel at this time because I believe that he is able to effectively
present his arguments and manage his own case.
Appointment of Counsel
There is no constitutional right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings. See
Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1332 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
825 (1991). Except when an evidentiary hearing is held, a district court may use
its discretion in deciding whether to appoint counsel. See Abdullah v. Norris, 18
F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1994). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2), a court may
appoint counsel for a habeas petitioner if it “determines that the interests of justice
so require.” In making this determination, the Court considers several factors,

including (1) whether the plaintiff has presented non-frivolous allegations
supporting his or her prayer for relief; (2) whether the plaintiff and the court will
benefit from the appointment of counsel; (3) the pro se litigant’s ability to
investigate facts and present claims; and (4) the complexity of the factual and legal
issues. See Battle v. Armontrout, 902 F.2d 701, 702 (8th Cir. 1990); Abdullah, 18
F.3d at 573.
After considering these factors, I believe Shults has demonstrated that he
understands the issues in this case and that he is capable of presenting the facts and
law related to his case. His pleadings are comprehensible and include references to
both the state court record and the law upon which he relies. See Glass v. Higgins,
959 F.2d 88, 90 (8th Cir. 1992). I find that the facts and legal issues surrounding
Shults’s single ground for relief are not so complicated that the appointment of
counsel is warranted. Neither Shults nor this court would substantially benefit
from the appointment of counsel.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitioner’s motion for appointment of
counsel [#2] and renewed motion for appointment of counsel [#18] are denied.

CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 29th day of August, 2014.
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