Warren v. Lee Group Management LLC et al
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. [Doc. 2] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to issue upon the complaint, because the complaint and su pplement are legally frivolous and fail to state a claim or cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to appoint counsel is DENIED asmoot. [Doc. 4] A separate Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Charles A. Shaw on 3/4/14. (JWJ)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
SHARON WARREN,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEE GROUP MANAGEMENT LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 4:14-CV-145 CAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the application of Sharon Warren for leave to commence
this action without payment of the required filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Upon consideration
of the financial information provided with the application, the Court will grant plaintiff leave to
proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). For the reasons stated below, the Court
will dismiss this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous
if “it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989).
An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-
51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must
determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51. This is a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the “mere
possibility of misconduct.” Id. The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint “to
determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1951. When faced with
alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in
determining whether plaintiff’s proffered conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more
likely that no misconduct occurred. Id. at 1950-52.
In reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must
also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly
baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
The Complaint and Supplement
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief for the violation of her constitutional rights in this action
brought against defendants Lee Group Management LLC (“Lee Group”), Saint Louis Housing
Authority (“SLHA”), and Public Storage. Plaintiff asserts that she received housing assistance
payment vouchers under “the Section 8 Rent Subsidy Program” and rented a unit at 8114 Frost
Avenue, in St. Louis, Missouri, from Lee Group beginning in 2010. Plaintiff states that Lee Group
“took [her] to court” in January 2013, “saying [she] owed rent.” Lee Group obtained a judgment
against her, but plaintiff states that she did not receive a fair hearing. In addition, plaintiff complains
that SLHA told her she would not receive future rent vouchers, because she “owed for damages .
2
. . to unit 8114.” Plaintiff’s housing assistance payments were terminated on February 2, 2013.
Plaintiff claims that SLHA and Lee Group conspired against her by changing “amounts on [her]
security deposit and numbers on a judgment” and are “frauding [sic] her out of money.” She further
claims that Lee Group had breached an implied warranty of habitability and refused to refund her
security deposit and that Public Storage “sold [her] belongings without proper cause.” In addition,
plaintiff generally asserts supplemental state law claims for “personal injury and loss of use,” as well
as negligence.1
Discussion
On page 1 of the complaint, plaintiff states that her ground for filing this case in Federal
Court is as follows: “My constitutional right were [sic] violated life liberty and the pursuit of
happiness." The Court will liberally construe the complaint and supplement as having been brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that she was deprived of a right secured
by the Constitution of the United States and that the deprivation was committed by a person acting
1
Plaintiff alleges that her furnace and hot water tank were defective and that an inspection
was supposed to have been performed “through HUD.” Plaintiff summarily states that HUD, which
is not a named defendant in this action, was negligent in failing to properly inspect her rental unit.
2
Although the Court must liberally construe plaintiff's factual allegations, it will not supply
additional facts or construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.
As such, the Court will not construe this action as having been brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
given that plaintiff has failed to assert, and it does not appear, that diversity of citizenship exists in
this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Moreover, plaintiff does not claim that this action arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and thus, federal question jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 would be inapplicable. In addition, the Court will not liberally construe the
complaint as having been brought against the Department of Housing and Urban Development for
negligence, because plaintiff does not claim, nor is there any indication, that she has exhausted her
administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2675; see
also Modica v. Reyna, 2009 WL 2827975 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (the FTCA requires that tort claims be
brought against the United States and not its federal agencies and employees).
3
under color of state law. Lind v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., 688 F.3d 402, 405 (8th Cir. 2012). In
the instant action, plaintiff does not allege, nor does it appear, that defendants Lee Group and Public
Storage are state actors within the meaning of § 1983. See Andrews v. City of W. Branch, Iowa, 454
F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2006) (to state claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege violation of
constitutional right committed by person acting under color of state law). Furthermore, plaintiff’s
allegations against Lee Group and Public Storage simply do not rise to the level of constitutional
violations and fail to state a claim or cause of action under § 1983. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009) (legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action that are supported by mere conclusory statements are not entitled to the assumption of truth).
Moreover, under Missouri law, SLHA is a political subdivision of the State of Missouri.
Green v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 911 F.2d 65, 68 (8th Cir. 1990) (SLHA is not an agency or
department of the City of St. Louis) (citing State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 13,
16 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (SLHA is a municipal corporation independent from St. Louis, deriving
its status as a public entity from an act of the General Assembly, and thus is a political subdivision
of the State of Missouri; it exists to further the state interest in housing its urban citizens, and does
not act as the arm of local government)). In Missouri, “Public Housing Authorities . . . are Statutory
Municipal Corporations under [V.A.M.S.] § 99.040, and insofar as a Housing Authority establishes,
maintains and operates a Housing Project, it exercises only governmental functions which are
subject to governmental immunity.” Tyler By and Through Tyler v. Housing Authority of Kansas
City, 781 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing State ex rel. St. Louis Housing Authority v.
Gaertner, 695 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (claims against Housing Authority barred by
sovereign immunity)); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989) (state
is not a “person” under § 1983); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999)
4
(en banc) (§ 1983 suit cannot be brought against state agency). As such, this action will be
dismissed as to defendant SLHA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff is now contesting a previously-entered Missouri
state-court judgment, her remedies lie not in federal district court, but rather with the Missouri state
courts or the United States Supreme Court. Federal district courts are courts of original jurisdiction;
they lack subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state court decisions. Postma
v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 74 F.3d 160, 162 (8th Cir. 1996). “Review of state court decisions may
be had only in the Supreme Court.” Id. For these reasons, the Court will dismiss this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because plaintiff’s federal claims will be dismissed, all remaining supplemental state claims
for personal injury, loss of use, and negligence will also be dismissed without prejudice. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (if federal claims are
dismissed before trial, remaining state claims should also be dismissed); Hassett v. Lemay Bank &
Trust Co.,851 F.2d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1988) (where federal claims have been dismissed, district
courts may decline jurisdiction over pendent state claims as a “matter of discretion”).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED. [Doc. 2]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to
issue upon the complaint, because the complaint and supplement are legally frivolous and fail to
state a claim or cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel is DENIED as
moot. [Doc. 4]
5
A separate Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
CHARLES A. SHAW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 4th day of March, 2014.
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?