Daugherty v. Steak N Shake

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Steak N Shake's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10 ) is GRANTED with regard to Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages and DENIED with regard to Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's request that the Court refer this case to the Department of Justice is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have until July 24, 2014 to file an answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. ( Response to Court due by 7/24/2014.) Signed by Magistrate Judge Shirley P. Mensah on 7/10/14. (ARL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL KEITH DAUGHERTY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEAK N SHAKE,

Defendant.

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Case No. 4:14-cv-152-SPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Steak N
Shake (“Defendant”).

(Doc. 10).

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. (Doc. 13). For the
reasons stated below, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion in part and deny it in part.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, acting pro se, brings this action alleging disability discrimination with regard to

public accommodations in violation of Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. § 12182 et seq. (the “ADA”), and race discrimination with regard to public
accommodations in violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et
seq. (the “Civil Rights Act”). Plaintiff alleges that he and three of his friends, all of whom are
disabled (one using a motorized wheelchair and the rest using canes) and African American,
went to a Steak N Shake restaurant for breakfast, and no one came to wait on them. He and his
friends attempted to get the waitress’s attention but were ignored.

Meanwhile, two white

gentlemen received full service. The only customers in the restaurant were Plaintiff, his three
friends, and the two white gentlemen.

In the “Relief” section of his form complaint, Plaintiff states, “I would like the Court to
give me the chance to bring this discrimination before its court, with the hopes that no one else
would have to suffer the pain and heartache we experienced for being African American +
Disabled.” Plaintiff also states that he seeks money damages in the amount of $150,000, and he
states that the wrongs alleged are continuing to occur. (Doc. 1).
Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim because he seeks only monetary damages, which are not permitted under the statutes at
issue. (Doc. 10). In his Response, Plaintiff states that he is “requesting permanent injunctive
relief” and $750,000 as remedy. (Doc. 20, at 1). Lastly, Plaintiff requests in his Response that
the Court refer this case to the Department of Justice, arguing that he can demonstrate that Steak
N Shake shows a pattern or practice of discrimination in how it treats African-American
individuals with disabilities. (Id.).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the

factual allegations in the complaint, but it need not accept legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim satisfies the plausibility
standard “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.(citing Twombly, 550 U.S.,
at 556).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, [the
court holds] ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, . . . to less stringent standards than

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formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)); see also Whitson v. Stone Cnty. Jail, 602
F.3d 920, 922 n. 1 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[P]ro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than
other parties . . . .’”) (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008));
Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 798 (8th Cir. 2010) (construing a pro se litigant’s pleadings
broadly).
III.

DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff Seeks Injunctive Relief in His Complaint
Defendant moves to dismiss both Plaintiff’s Civil Rights Act claim and his ADA claim

on a single ground: that Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages and not injunctive relief.
Defendant is correct that a plaintiff bringing claims under Title II of the Civil Rights Act
or Title III of the ADA may obtain injunctive relief but not monetary damages. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000a-3 (providing that when any person has “engaged . . . in any act or practice prohibited by
[Title II], a civil action for preventative relief, including an application for a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved
. . . .”); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (“When a plaintiff brings
an action under [Title II of the Civil Rights Act], he cannot recover damages.”); Woods v. Wills,
400 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1163 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (noting that Title III of the ADA “borrows the
remedies and procedures set forth in . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a)” and stating, “It is well
established that individual claims for damages based on alleged disability discrimination in
violation of Title III of the ADA are precluded, and injunctive relief is the only available
remedy.”); Stebbins v. Legal Aid of Arkansas, 512 F. App’x 662 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Title III of the

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ADA does not provide for private actions seeking damages . . . .”). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for
monetary damages will be dismissed.
However, I disagree with Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff is seeking only monetary
damages. In the section of the form complaint that states, “Relief: State briefly and exactly what
you want the Court to do for you,” Plaintiff states:
I would like the court to give me the chance to bring this discrimination before its
court, with hopes that no one else would have to suffer the pain and heartache we
experienced for being African American + Disabled.
(Doc. 1, at p. 4). Read liberally, this can be construed as a request for injunctive relief to prevent
future discrimination by Steak N Shake against Plaintiff and others. Moreover, Plaintiff also
noted in his Response that he is “requesting permanent injunctive relief.” (Doc. 20, at p. 1).
Defendant suggests that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed because he has not
articulated the specific injunctive remedy he is seeking and because no practical injunctive relief
exists. However, the sole case Defendant cites in support of that argument is one in which the
plaintiff conceded that injunctive relief would be impossible because the buildings whose
structure violated Title III of the ADA had been torn down and no longer existed. See Brown v.
Berhndt, No. 1:12-CV-00024-KGB, 2013 WL 1497784, at *4-*5 (E.D. Ark. April 10, 2013).
Here, although Plaintiff does not mention a specific form of injunctive relief in his Complaint,
there is nothing to suggest that an injunctive remedy would be impossible. For example, there
may be training or policy changes that would provide a remedy, and discovery may shed light on
the most appropriate specific remedy. Cf. Franck-Teel v. Hampton, No. CV-05-71-E-BLW,
2005 WL 2847231, at *1 (D. Idaho Oct. 28, 2005) (“Plaintiff may be able to develop through
discovery facts showing that injunctive relief is available in the form of training or policy
changes . . . .”).

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In sum, when read liberally, as is required for a pro se pleading, Plaintiff seeks injunctive
relief in his Complaint and not merely monetary damages. Thus, Defendant’s argument that
Plaintiff fails to state a claim on this ground is rejected.
B. Plaintiff’s Request for Referral to the Department of Justice Is Denied
Plaintiff requests in his Response that the Court refer this case to the Department of
Justice. As Defendant points out, however, Plaintiff does not provide any authority that would
support such a referral and the Court is unaware of any such authority. Thus, I decline to refer
this case to the Department of Justice.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a request for injunctive

relief under Title III of the ADA and Title II of the Civil Rights Act. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Steak N Shake’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
10) is GRANTED with regard to Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages and DENIED with
regard to Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request that the Court refer this case to the
Department of Justice is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall have until July 24, 2014 to file an
answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint.
/s/Shirley Padmore Mensah
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 10th day of July, 2014.

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