Harris v. Transamerica Life Insurance Company

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. # 7 ] is granted. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 4/23/14. (KJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
NORMA J. HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:14-CV-186 (CEJ)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Plaintiff has responded in opposition, and the issues are fully briefed.
I.

Background

Plaintiff Norma Harris brings this action against defendant TransAmerica Life
Insurance Company for breach of contract. Plaintiff claims that she was the named
beneficiary of a life insurance policy in the amount of $58,000 issued by defendant to
insure the life of her then-husband, Mack G. Hammond. When Mr. Hammond died,
defendant failed to pay plaintiff the proceeds of the policy. She seeks to recover the
amount of the policy in addition to statutory and punitive damages, and attorney’s
fees.
II.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. A viable complaint must
include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. The factual allegations
of a complaint are assumed true and construed in favor of the plaintiff, “even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Id. at 556. When
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court generally does not consider
matters outside the pleadings. However, the Court may consider materials attached
to the complaint as exhibits, materials “embraced by the pleadings,” and materials that
are part of the public record. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079
(8th Cir.1999).
III.

Discussion

Defendant first argued that, because plaintiff was divorced from Mr. Hammond
at the time of his death, plaintiff’s status as a beneficiary was revoked pursuant to Mo.
Rev. Stat. §461.051.1 However, after plaintiff pointed out that Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 461.073 narrowed the application of § 461.051 to exclude life insurance policies,2
defendant conceded this point and adopted a new argument.
Defendant now argues that the express terms of the divorce settlement
agreement between plaintiff and Mr. Hammond revoked plaintiff’s status as beneficiary.
The divorce settlement agreement was incorporated into the decree of dissolution
entered by the family court. Defendant attached a certified copy of the agreement to
its memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss. The agreement provides:
1

Section 461.051 provides: “If, after an owner makes a beneficiary designation, the
owner’s marriage is dissolved or annulled, any provision of the beneficiary designation in favor
of the owner’s former spouse or a relative of the owner’s former spouse is revoked on the date
the marriage is dissolved or annulled...”
2

Section 461.073 states, in relevant part: “Section[]... 461.051... do[es] not apply to
property, money or benefits paid or transferred at death pursuant to a life or accidental death
insurance policy... unless the provisions of [461.051] are incorporated into the insurance policy
or the beneficiary designation in whole or in part by express reference.” Mo. Rev. Stat. §
461.073(6).

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In the event either party has life insurance which pays upon the insured’s
death to the other spouse certain benefits, it is agreed that the
beneficiary of said policy shall give up or renounce said benefits so that
said insurance benefits shall be paid to the alternate beneficiary or if no
alternate beneficiary is named, then the proceeds of said life insurance
policy shall be paid to the deceased party’s estate.
[Doc. #8-2]. Defendant argues that this language removed plaintiff as beneficiary,
and because no alternate beneficiary was named, the proceeds of the policy should be
paid to Mr. Hammond’s estate.
Plaintiff was granted leave to file a sur-reply, in which she argued that the Court
cannot consider the divorce settlement agreement in the context of this motion to
dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as that document was neither attached to, nor
referenced by, the complaint. However, the decree of dissolution and settlement
agreement are public records of which the Court may take judicial notice. Accordingly,
the Court can consider those documents without converting the instant motion into a
motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). See Porous Media
Corp., 186 F.3d at 1079. Plaintiff does not contest the validity or application of the
divorce settlement agreement. That document establishes that plaintiff renounced her
status as a beneficiary of the life insurance policy at issue.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. #7] is granted.

___________________________
CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 23rd day of April, 2014.

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