Winston v. Deekens et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $4.53 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to Clerk, United States District Court, and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original p roceeding. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to issue upon the complaint because the complaint is legally frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or both. An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. 2 ( Initial Partial Filing Fee due by 3/17/2014.) Signed by District Judge Jean C. Hamilton on 2/17/14. (CLA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
DEANGELO DON’VIRGIL WINSTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLENE DEEKENS, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:14CV189 SPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of DeAngelo Winston (registration no.
21879), an inmate at St. Louis City Justice Center, for leave to commence this action without
payment of the required filing fee. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the plaintiff
does not have sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee and will assess an initial partial filing
fee of $4.53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, The Court will dismiss this action under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or
her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an
initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the
prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior sixmonth period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make
monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's
account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these
monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds

$10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account statement
for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of
plaintiff's account indicates an average monthly deposit of $26.67, and an average monthly
balance of $15.00. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the
Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $4.53, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average
monthly deposit.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is
frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
328 (1989). An action is malicious if it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing the named
defendants and not for the purpose of vindicating a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F.
Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd 826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987).
To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1950-51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 1949. Second, the
Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51.
This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show
more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.”

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Id.

The Court must review the factual

allegations in the complaint “to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id.
at 1951. When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may
exercise its judgment in determining whether plaintiff's conclusion is the most plausible or
whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. Id. at 1950, 51-52.
The Complaint
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
constitutional violations at the St. Louis City Justice Center (“SLCJC”). Named as defendants
are Charlene Deekens (Director, Department of Public Safety, Division of Corrections), Dale
Glass (Commissioner, Division of Corrections), Leonard Edwards (Superintendent, SLCJC),
Reginald Moore (Social Services, SLCJC), Sheila Troupe (Social Worker, SLCJC), Terri Coats
(Constituency Services, SLCJC), Unknown Bratcher (Nurse, SLCJC), Unknown Luster (Mental
Health Services, SLCJC), Unknown Mitchell (Major, SLCJC), Unknown Bond (Captain,
SLCJC), Unknown Hassell (Lieutenant, SLCJC), Janice Ellison (Social Services, SLCJC),
Unknown Miller (Constituency Services, SLCJC), and Unknown Shaw (Sheriff’s Deputy,
SLCJC).
The allegations in the complaint are almost entirely conclusory and fail to allege specific
facts that would, if proven, give rise to relief. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Shaw subjected
him “to unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by unwarranted abuse by being maliciously
punched and choked by . . . Shaw.” Plaintiff does not allege, however, that he suffered any
injuries as a result of the alleged beating. Plaintiff alleges that he told defendants Coats, Moore,
Edwards, Deekens, and Glass about the incident but that they failed to do anything for him.
Plaintiff complains that on November 24, 2013, he requested to be fed halal meals only
because of his religious beliefs. Plaintiff says that his request was refused, and he claims that he
refused to eat the food that was available to him.

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Plaintiff asserts that on December 4, 2013, Hassell and Bond filed a false conduct
violation against him and he was placed in segregation for several days.
Plaintiff continued to refuse to eat, and on December 8, 2013, Luster and Bratcher placed
plaintiff on suicide watch. As a result, all of his property was removed from his cell. Plaintiff
claims this action violated SLCJC’s hunger strike policy.
Plaintiff maintains that defendants Moore, Coats, Miller, Deekens, Edwards, and Glass
did not address his grievances in his favor.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants Troupe, Moore, Edwards, and Glass denied him access to
legal materials and to the law library. Plaintiff does not allege that any pending or contemplated
legal claims were harmed.
Discussion
Pretrial detainee § 1983 claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
See Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir.2007) (stating “[t]his makes little difference as
a practical matter, though: Pretrial detainees are entitled to the same protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment as imprisoned convicts receive under the Eighth Amendment.”).
“Claims under the Eighth Amendment require a compensable injury to be greater than de
minimis.” Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2008). In the instant case, plaintiff
does not allege that he suffered any injury as a result of being punched and choked by Shaw. As
a result, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
ALiability under ' 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged
deprivation of rights.@ Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990); see Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (ABecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and

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' 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official=s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.@). In the instant action, plaintiff
has not set forth any facts indicating that defendants were directly involved in or personally
responsible for denying him halal meals in accordance with his faith. As a result, plaintiff’s First
Amendment religion claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
To state a claim under ' 1983 for unconstitutional placement in administrative
segregation, a prisoner “must show some difference between his new conditions in segregation
and the conditions in the general population which amounts to an atypical and significant
hardship.” Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff has made no such
allegations. E.g., Hemphill v. Delo, 124 F.3d 208 (8th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) (four days
locked in housing unit, thirty days in disciplinary segregation, and approximately 290 days in
administrative segregation not atypical or significant). As a result, plaintiff’s due process claims
relating to his placement in administrative segregation do not state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
Plaintiff=s claim that defendants Bond and Hassell gave him a false conduct violation is
not actionable under ' 1983. See Glick v. Sargent, 696 F.2d 413, 414 (8th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
Plaintiff’s claim that defendants Bratcher and Luster placed him on suicide watch while
he was admittedly on a hunger strike do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
AOnly persons who cause or participate in the [constitutional] violations are responsible.
Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the
violation.@ George v. Smith, 507 F. 3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). As a result,
plaintiff’s claim that Moore, Coats, Miller, Deekens, Edwards, and Glass did not redress his
grievances fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

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ATo state a claim [for denial of meaningful access to the courts], inmates must assert that
they suffered an actual injury to pending or contemplated legal claims.@ Myers v. Hundley, 101
F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any injury to a pending
or contemplated legal claim. As a result, his access-to-the-courts claim fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF
No. 2] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $4.53
within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance
payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his
prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original
proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to
issue upon the complaint because the complaint is legally frivolous or fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or both.
An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 17th day of February, 2014.

/s/ Jean C. Hamilton
JEAN C. HAMILTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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