Watson v. Villmer

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. A separate Order of Dismissal will be filed with this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge E. Richard Webber on February 24, 2014. (BRP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
RAFAEL WATSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
v.
TOM VILLMER,
Respondent.

No. 4:14CV00199 ERW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on petitioner=s petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254. The petition is barred by ' 2254’s one-year limitations
period, and the Court will dismiss it without further proceedings.
Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, one count of
statutory rape, and one count of furnishing pornographic material to a minor. Missouri v.
Watson, No. 10SL-CR02453-01 (St. Louis County). On May 17, 2011, the trial court
sentenced petitioner to ten years’ imprisonment. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
Petitioner filed a Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief on August 3, 2011.
Watson v. Missouri, No. 11SL-CC03235 (St. Louis County). He voluntarily dismissed
the motion with prejudice on June 8, 2012. Id. Petitioner filed the instant petition on
January 24, 2014, which is the date on which he placed it in the institutional mail system.
Under 28 U.S.C. ' 2244(d):
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation under this subsection.
The limitations began running when the conviction became final on May 27, 2011,
ten days after the trial court entered its judgment. See Mo. Ct. R. 30.01(a); Mo. Ct. R.
81.04(a). The limitations period ran for 68 days until it was tolled on August 3, 2011, the
day petitioner filed his Rule 24.035 motion. The limitations period began running again
on June 8, 2012, when petitioner dismissed the motion. The limitations period then ran
for another 297 days until April 1, 2013, when it expired. Because petitioner did not file
the instant petition until January 2014, it is barred by the limitations period.
Petitioner argues that he should be entitled to equitable tolling because, as an
inmate at Farmington Correctional Center, he is subject to control movement and has
2

access to the law library only twice per week. Plaintiff also says that he does not have
many resources when it comes to legal work.
Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, the AEDPA=s statutory limitations period
may be tolled if a petitioner can show that (1) he has been diligently pursuing his rights
and (2) an extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2549, 2562 (2010).

Equitable tolling is a flexible procedure that involves both

recognition of the role of precedent and an Aawareness of the fact that specific
circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, could warrant special treatment in an
appropriate case.@ Id. at 2563.
Petitioner has not shown that he diligently pursued his rights or that extraordinary
circumstances stood in his way. All prisoners face the same difficulties as plaintiff. E.g.,
Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (APro se status, lack of legal
knowledge or legal resources, confusion about or miscalculations of the limitations
period, or the failure to recognize the legal ramifications of actions taken in prior
post-conviction proceedings are inadequate to warrant equitable tolling.@). As a result,
petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.
Finally, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition is untimely. Thus, the Court will not issue a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice.
3

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not issue a certificate of
appealability.
A separate Order of Dismissal will be filed with this Memorandum and Order.
So Ordered this 24th day of February, 2014.

E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4