Ryan v. Ameristar Casino St. Charles, Inc.

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Count I and Motion for Remand (ECF No. 17 ) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is remanded to the Circuit Court for St. Charles County, Mis souri. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Compel (ECF No. 15 ) is DENIED as MOOT. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion Requesting an Extension of the Designation of Neutral/ADR Conference (ECF No. 22 ) is DENIED as MOOT. Signed by District Judge Ronnie L. White on November 21, 2014. (Memorandum and Order and Docket Sheet mailed to Circuit Court for St. Charles County, Missouri.) (BRP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARLA RYAN,
Plaintiff,
V.

AMERISTAR CASINO ST. CHARLES, INC.,
Defendant.

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No. 4:14CV488 RLW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Count I
and Motion for Remand filed on October 27, 2014 (ECF No. 17). Also pending is Defendant's
Motion to Compel filed on October 15, 2014 (ECF No. 15). With regard to Plaintiffs motion to
dismiss, Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition on November 6, 2014. Plaintiff did not
file a reply, and the time for doing so has expired. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Compel on November 6, 2014. The time for Defendant to file its reply
memorandum has also expired. Thus, the Court finds the motions fully briefed and ready for
disposition. Based upon the memoranda and responses thereto, the Court will grant Plaintiffs
Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Count I and Motion for Remand and deny as moot
Defendant' s Motion to Compel.
Background

Plaintiff initially filed an employment discrimination Petition in the Circuit Court of St.
Charles County, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. Chapter 213; and Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 290.140. Plaintiff generally asserts that she was employed by Defendant Ameristar

Casino from September 5, 1995 through July 5, 2013. Her most recent position was as Dual
Lead Casino Supervisor. She alleges that Defendant learned ofFacebook messages that were of
a personal and sexual nature between Plaintiff and Joseph Schmidt, another employee of
Defendant. Defendant terminated Plaintiff but not Mr. Schmidt. Plaintiff alleges that as a
female employee, she received disparate treatment compared to similarly situated male
employees.
The Defendant removed the case to federal court on March 17, 2014 based on a federal
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question. On October 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Count I and
Motion for Remand, requesting that this Court dismiss her federal claim under Title VII and
remand the remaining two state law claims to the Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Missouri.
Defendant argues that the Court should deny Plaintiffs motion because she has provided an
insufficient explanation for dismissal and because dismissal would unfairly prejudice Defendant
and result in a waste of judicial resources.

Discussion
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs request only
by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Plaintiff contends that she seeks
dismissal with prejudice, such that Defendant is assured that she will not refile the federal claim.
Further, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant will not be prejudiced because it can apply the
information gathered thus far to the state action. Defendant, however, argues that it has
expended considerable time, effort, and expense preparing its defenses and that Plaintiff has no
legitimate basis for dismissing her federal claim. Instead, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff is
merely trying to delay the prosecution of her case, seek a more favorable court forum, and avoid
an adverse ruling on Defendant' s Motion to Compel.

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The Court has discretion in deciding whether to allow a party to voluntarily dismiss a
case. Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm. , Inc., 187 F.3d 941 , 950 (8th Cir. 1999). In
determining whether to allow a voluntary dismissal, courts consider the following factors:
"'whether the party has presented a proper explanation for its desire to dismiss; whether a
dismissal would result in a waste of judicial time and effort; and whether a dismissal will
prejudice the defendants. "' Retz v. Seaton, 741F.3d913, 917 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hamm,
187 F.3d at 950). However, "a party is not permitted to dismiss merely to escape an adverse
decision nor to seek a more favorable forum. " Hamm , 187 F.3d at 150 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the Court will allow Plaintiffs voluntary dismissal. As presented by
Plaintiff, she seeks dismissal with prejudice, precluding her from refiling the federal claim. She
seeks to pursue only the state law claims presented in Counts II and III. Further, and more
importantly, this case has not progressed to the level of wasted judicial time and effort or
prejudice to the Defendant. The case has only been pending since March ofthis year, and the
case was recently reassigned to the undersigned United States District Judge. Further, under the
the Case Management Order issued in May, discovery is still ongoing; the dispositive motion
deadline has not passed; and the trial date is set for August, 2015, nearly a year from now.
While the Defendant argues that it has already expended much time, effort, and money in
defending this case, Defendant's efforts are confined to removal, filing a motion to compel, and
responding to Plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal. The parties have yet to complete
discovery, no dispositive motions have been filed, and the trial setting is next year. Thus, the
Court finds that Defendant "has not been required to expend time and expense with respect of
dispositive motion or trial" and has not shown prejudice precluding voluntary dismissal. Mason
v. Sailormen Inc. , No. 4:1 l-CV-637 CAS, 2012 WL 1957413, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May 31, 2012);

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but see Davis v. Bemiston-Carondelet Corp., No. 4:05CV941DDN, 2006 WL 1722277, at *2
(E.D. Mo. June 20, 2006) (denying plaintiffs motion to dismiss where the parties spent time
preparing the case, the case had been pending for a year, and plaintiff was likely to re-file the
claims which could make the case again removable to federal court). Therefore, the Court will
grant Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary Dismissal.
Plaintiff also requests that this Court remand the case to state court because the Court no
longer has original jurisdiction. Plaintiff suggests that the Court, in its discretion, should decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S .C. §
1367(c)(3), " [t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
under subsection (a) if .. . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction." "A district court' s decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after
dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary." Carlsbad

Tech. , Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc. , 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). Further, where all federal law claims are
dismissed before trial, "'the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine - judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to
exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. '" Augustine v. Bank ofAmerica, NA .,
No. 4:11CV2251CDP, 2012 WL 1379654, at *6 (E.D. Mo. April 20, 2012) (quotingBarstadv.

Murray Cnty., 420 F.3d 880, 888 (8th Cir. 2005)).
Here, the remaining two claims are under Missouri state statute. The undersigned finds
that the state court is better suited to rule on these issues and declines to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Myers v. Sander, No.
4:13CV2192 CDP, 2014 WL 1303647, at *4 (E.D. Mo. April 1, 2014); IS. v. Washington Univ.,
No. 4:11CV235 SNLJ, 2011WL2433585 , at *5 (E.D. Mo. June 14, 2011). Thus, the Court will

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remand the remaining claims to the Circuit Court of St. Charles, Missouri, from where it was
initially removed. 1
Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Count I
and Motion for Remand (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is remanded to the Circuit Court for St.
Charles County, Missouri.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Compel (ECF No. 15) is
DENIED as MOOT.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion Requesting an Extension of the
Designation ofNeutral/ADR Conference (ECF No. 22) is DENIED as MOOT.
Dated this~ Day of November, 2014.

RONNIE L. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Defendant requests costs and attorney' s fees, should the Court grant Plaintiff's motions. The Court will deny this
request. The parties may use the discovery conducted so far in the state court action, and, as demonstrated in
Plaintiff's response to the Motion to Compel, Plaintiff is willing to withdraw some of the objections to the discovery
sought in the motion. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Def. ' s Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 20)

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