Hamilton v. Russell et al

Filing 136

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant Margaret Huff for summary judgment [Doc. # 122 ] is denied. An order setting the case for trial on plaintiff's claim in Count VI of the fourth amended complaint will be issued separately. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 1/24/2017. (CLO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES J. HAMILTON,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
JONNA GRUBBS, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 4:14-CV-766-CEJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Margaret Huff for
summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The issues are fully briefed.
Plaintiff James J. Hamilton, an inmate confined at the Eastern Reception,
Diagnostic and Correctional Center (ERDCC) in Bonne Terre, Missouri, brings this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count VI of the fourth amended complaint,
plaintiff claims that Huff, a corrections officer, was deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs.
I. Background
On March 13, 2014, plaintiff was transferred from an administrative
segregation unit in House 1 to an administrative segregation unit in House 2.
Defendant Huff was one of the corrections officers assigned to House 2. Prior to his
arrival, plaintiff was diagnosed with diabetic neuropathy, which causes pain and
swelling of his feet if he ambulates without an assistive device.

He was prescribed

orthotic shoes to alleviate that pain and swelling.
It is undisputed that Huff confiscated plaintiff’s prescribed orthotic shoes
upon his arrival in House 2.

In her affidavit, Huff states that prisoners in

administrative segregation are not allowed to have “regular shoes” and are instead
given “special shoes” for safety reasons.

She further states that an inmate who

needs special shoes for medical reasons must obtain an “medical lay-in” from the
prison medical staff. Finally, Huff states that she “was not aware of any particular
medical need” of the plaintiff or of any risk to plaintiff’s health or safety during his
confinement in administrative segregation. [Doc. # 123-7, ¶¶ 4-6].
Plaintiff submits evidence that a medical lay-in was issued to him on
February 14, 2014, allowing him to use “medical shoes” as a “required” “assistive
device.”

The lay-in was valid for a one-year period.

[Doc. # 69-2] .

Plaintiff

testified that he showed the lay-in to Huff and told her that he had been allowed to
keep them when he was in administrative segregation in House 1. He also told her
that if she took his shoes, his “feet [were] going to start burning” because of his
diabetic neuropathy.

[Doc. 123-10, p. 83]

plaintiff to have his medical shoes.

Nevertheless, Huff refused to allow

Plaintiff further testified that he explained to

Huff that he keeps his shoes on until he goes to sleep because he “cant’ walk
around on the concrete without them.” Id. at pp. 83–84. He told her that he “can
feel the pain” even when he has “to get up to use the bathroom,” though
admittedly not as much pain as when he is “walking around . . . for a long period of
time.” Id. Huff allegedly laughed in response and said, “you are not going to do
too much walking around in the cell.” Id.
Plaintiff was without his shoes for the duration of his confinement in House 2.
He alleges he suffered foot inflammation and pain when he stood or walked in his
cell during those weeks. He also maintains the pain and inflammation caused by
ambulating without the shoes continued for “two to three months” after the shoes

2

were returned to him.

Id. at 84. On April 10, 2014, plaintiff was transferred to

administrative segregation in House 1, where the medical shoes were immediately
returned to him.
II. Legal Standard
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary
judgment shall be entered if the moving party shows “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the court is required
to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must give
that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying
facts. AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). The moving
party bears the burden of showing both the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-

moving party may not rest on the allegations of his pleadings but must set forth
specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of
material fact exists. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Honea, 458 F.3d 788, 791
(8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

Rule 56 “mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
III. Discussion

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In Count VI, plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim that Huff withheld prescribed
treatment from him in deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
brought against Huff in her individual capacity only.

The claim is

See [Doc. #89] (dismissing

official capacity claim). Huff argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on
the merits of this claim or, alternatively, to qualified immunity.
A. Deliberate Indifference
“It is well established that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment extends to protect prisoners from deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.” Gregoire, 236 F.3d at 417 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104).
“This is true whe[re] the indifference is manifested by . . . prison [officials] in . . .
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at
104–05. Deliberate indifference involves both an objective and subjective analysis.
Buckman, 756 F.3d at 1065.
The objective component requires a prisoner to demonstrate an objectively
serious medical need. Id. “A medical need is objectively serious if it . . . has been
‘diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment . . . .’”

Scott, 742 F.3d at 340

(quoting Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784). It is undisputed that a physician diagnosed
plaintiff with having diabetic foot neuropathy and a physician prescribed orthotic
shoes as treatment for that serious medical condition. Huff states that she was not
aware that plaintiff had any medical need. However, that statement is contradicted
by plaintiff’s testimony that he showed Huff the medical lay-in.

Thus, there is a

material factual dispute as to Huff’s knowledge of plaintiff’s serious medical need.
In her motion, Huff claims to have “relied on medical professionals when
determining whether” plaintiff “could have specific shoes in his administrative

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segregation cell.”
affidavit.

[Doc. #123 at 14–15]

Huff makes no mention of this in her

She does not identify the medical professionals she relied on for that

determination and no evidence of record shows that Huff consulted with any
medical professional before or after she confiscated plaintiff’s shoes.

There is a

material issue of fact as to whether Huff knew that the medical lay-in covered
confinement in administrative segregation because plaintiff had been allowed to
keep his medical shoes when he was in an administrative segregation cell in House
1.
Huff also argues that plaintiff’s medical needs were not objectively serious
because he has not demonstrated the effect of the delay in treatment.

But the

“submission of verifying medical evidence [is] unnecessary” where a “need for
medical attention . . . would have been obvious to a layperson,” an even lesser
standard than where the need for treatment has, as here, been diagnosed. Schaub
v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 919 (8th Cir. 2011).

And plaintiff claims Huff

deliberately interfered with his treatment, not delayed it. See Langford v. Norris,
614 F.3d 445, 460 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Where a prisoner needs medical treatment
prison officials are under a constitutional duty to see that it is furnished.” (quotation
marks and citation omitted)); Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir.
2002) (“Prison officials cannot substitute their judgment for a medical professional’s
prescription.” (citation omitted)).
The cases Huff relies on for support are thus inapposite, because they
address the effect of delays in treatment where a condition is undiagnosed,
diagnosed but unknown to the officer, or known to the officer but merely delayed.
See, e.g., Laughlin, 430 F.3d at 929; Thomas v. Banks, 584 F. App’x 291, 291 (8th

5

Cir. 2014) (holding a correctional officer was at most negligent for the delay
obtaining new prescription shoes, where the prisoner’s prescription shoes had been
stolen by another inmate—not confiscated by the defendant—and where the
prisoner’s “medical authorization did not restrict him from work or from wearing
sandals at work, and he did not submit evidence of the work environment or risks
of injury from working in” non-prescription shoes). Those cases do not address a
situation where, as alleged here, a correctional officer is both aware of a prisoner’s
prescribed assistive device, and the officer prevents the prisoner from using it. See
Miller v. Schoenen, 75 F.3d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting summary
judgment where the defendants afforded the prisoner no treatment, and dismissing
their argument that the prisoner’s having suffered no long-term harm meant the
“treatment must have been adequate,” where a jury could conclude that the
prisoner “survived in spite of the defendants’ inadequate treatment”).
Further, the Eighth Circuit has said “a physician’s diagnosis” of a condition
means that the condition is by definition “supported by medical evidence,” thus
satisfying the objective component. Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th
Cir. 1999); see also Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2006);
Johnson v. Hay, 931 F.2d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 1991).

Where a prisoner has a

diagnosed medical condition, whether the prisoner is fortunate to survive unscathed
appears to be immaterial when, as here, a correctional officer deliberately
withholds, rather than delays, prescribed treatment. But even if plaintiff is required
to show that confiscating his shoes had a deleterious effect on him, he alleges that
he suffered significant, painful inflammation of his feet for nearly a month, with
lingering pain for some time thereafter.

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See Jackson, 815 F.3d at 1120 n.5;

Langford, 614 F.3d at 460 (holding “[p]risoners may prove deliberate indifference
by showing that the total deprivation of medical care resulted in pain and suffering”
(quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Huff

has

not

disputed

that

pain

and

inflammation

are

the

natural

consequences of a person with diabetic foot neuropathy having to stand or walk on
the concrete floor of a prison cell without orthotic shoes for support. See Majors v.
Baldwin, 456 F. App’x 616, 617 (8th Cir. 2012) (acknowledging a prisoner’s
“complaints of pain” can make even an undiagnosed condition “so obvious that a
layperson would easily recognize” it, i.e., objectively serious (citation omitted)).
Nor has Huff suggested plaintiff did not need to stand and walk in his cell, i.e., that
he was expected to exclusively lie in bed and to crawl on the floor to reach the
toilet, exercise, obtain food, or carry out his other activities.

See Cummings v.

Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that a prisoner’s allegation
that he was deliberately deprived of an ambulatory device, and was thus “forced to
crawl on the floor,” stated an Eighth Amendment claim). Therefore, at minimum, a
genuine dispute of material fact remains from which a reasonable jury might
conclude that plaintiff had a diagnosed, objectively serious medical need that
required treatment with the prescribed shoes at all times.
As to the subjective component, plaintiff must show “that the defendant
actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded,” his objectively serious medical
need.

McRaven, 577 F.3d at 980 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The

subjective component requires “a mental state akin to criminal recklessness.”
Vaughn, 557 F.3d at 908 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he knowing
failure

to

administer

prescribed

medicine

7

can

itself

constitute

deliberate

indifference.”

Phillips, 437 F.3d at 796.

Consequently, if Huff knew of plaintiff’s

prescription for the shoes and was at least the equivalent of criminally reckless in
confiscating them, a reasonable jury might find her deliberately indifferent for
interfering with that prescribed treatment. See id.
With respect to the actual knowledge prong, a prison official “must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and [she] must also draw the inference.” Bender, 385 F.3d at
1137 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

Correctional officers “cannot substitute

their judgment for a medical professional’s prescription.” Meloy, 302 F.3d at 849
(citation omitted). Thus, a prison official is “not entitled to summary judgment on a
prisoner’s” Eighth Amendment “claim based on the prisoner’s allegations that the
defendant[] deliberately denied him access to medical care and failed to carry out
treatment prescribed by his doctors.” Johnson, 931 F.2d at 461.
The inquiry is whether Huff knew of plaintiff’s prescription and knew that
prescription required him to have access to the shoes even while confined in
administrative segregation.

See Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 568 (8th Cir.

2009) (“Examination of facts known to the prison officials is necessary in order to
determine whether a reasonable official would have known that his failure to take
some

particular

action

to

protect

the

inmate

would

violate

that

law.”).

Circumstantial evidence is admissible to determine this factual inquiry. See Walton,
752 F.3d at 1119. To survive summary judgment, “[i]t is sufficient to show that
the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the
risk and thus must have known about it.” Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856, 862
(8th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Coleman, 114 F.3d at 786

8

(holding knowledge

may be

inferred where a medical condition

is

“well-

documented” or “expressly noted by prison officials,” e.g., in a medical lay-in, and
“the

circumstances

suggest”

the

defendant

“had

been

exposed

to”

that

information).
Huff claims not to have been aware of plaintiff’s medical condition, his
prescription, or the consequences of withholding treatment. Plaintiff testified Huff
was aware of all of those facts: he told her of his condition and, drawing reasonable
inferences in his favor, she read the medical lay-in when he handed it to her. The
medical lay-in says the shoes are required prescription items, and required without
limitation. [Doc. #69-2]

Also, plaintiff states that he described to Huff the pain

and inflammation he would experience without the shoes. See Jones v. Faulkner
Cty., 609 F. App’x 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2015) (recognizing a deliberate indifference
claim where, inter alia, an official was aware of a prisoner’s need for medication but
“intentionally interfered with treatment by withholding the medication”); Olson v.
Bloomberg, 339 F.3d 730, 738 (8th Cir. 2003). Huff’s contention that she lacked
the requisite knowledge raises a genuine dispute of material fact.
Even if a prisoner “satisfies the subjective awareness prong, [an] officer[]
may be found free from liability if [she] responded reasonably to the risk, even if
the harm ultimately was not averted.” Krout, 583 F.3d at 567–68; see Letterman,
789 F.3d at 862; Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1240 (applying this inquiry in the context of
medical needs).

A “plaintiff must show the official knew that their conduct was

inappropriate in light of the risk to the prisoner. . . . Generally, the actor manifests
deliberate indifference by . . . intentionally interfering with treatment or medication
that has been prescribed.”

Letterman, 789 F.3d at 862 (quotation marks and

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citation omitted).

“When evaluating whether an actor deliberately disregarded a

risk, [courts] consider his actions in light of the information he possessed at the
time, the practical limitations of his position and alternative courses of action that
would have been apparent to an official in that position.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

Courts “focus on the mind of the prison official and the

information at his disposal, not the thoughts of third-party actors who do not
disclose their thoughts.”

Id. at 863 (citation omitted).

To survive summary

judgment on this inquiry, the prisoner must “produce[] enough evidence to
question whether the measures taken to abate the risk to him were reasonable.”
Reece, 60 F.3d at 491; see Pietrafeso v. Lawrence Cty., 452 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir.
2006) (holding an official’s mistake in withholding prescribed medications does not
prove deliberate indifference); Dasta v. LeBlanc, 132 F. App’x 98, 100 (8th Cir.
2005).
A prison official is not rendered “immune from liability for his personal
involvement in an alleged constitutional violation” merely because he is “not a
physician and is not engaged in” a prisoner’s “day to day medical care.” Langford,
614 F.3d at 462 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, the refusal
to carry out a prisoner’s prescribed course of treatment or alleged confusion about
whether one is obligated to do so is, without more, insufficient to obtain summary
judgment.

See Erickson v. Holloway, 77 F.3d 1078, 1080–81 (8th Cir. 1996)

(holding a prison official’s alleged refusal to carry out a physician’s prescribed
course of treatment required a trial). To avoid violating plaintiff’s rights Huff need
only have refrained from confiscating the shoes. Huff’s decision to confiscate the
shoes thus raises a reasonable inference that she deliberately disregarded plaintiff’s

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need for his prescription treatment by taking intentional steps to deprive him of it.
See Foulks v. Cole Cty., 991 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that “if a
reasonable official would have known that” a prisoner required treatment, “the
refusal

to

provide

access

to

the

treatment

. . . constitute[s]

deliberate

indifference”).
Huff suggests a reasonable jury could not conclude she exhibited the
equivalent of at least criminal recklessness because prison policy, orders issued by
a senior prison official, and security concerns justified confiscating the shoes. See
Letterman, 789 F.3d at 862–63. Where prison officials enact a policy and “proffer[]
good reasons” based on “rational safety measures for inmates” to enforce that
policy, the “officials’ refusal to deviate from [the] policy [does] not constitute
deliberate indifference or some other unconstitutional conduct.” Turner, 784 F.3d
at 490. But a prison official cannot hide behind a policy or practice that, based on
facts of which the official was aware, would deprive a prisoner of his constitutional
rights.

See Gordon ex rel. Gordon v. Frank, 454 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2006)

(affirming denial of summary judgment and qualified immunity where, inter alia, an
official knew a prisoner had an objectively serious heart condition but nevertheless
required the prisoner to climb stairs because the prisoner had not obtained explicit
medical documentation that he could not ascend stairs).

The difficulty with this

argument is that Huff has submitted no prison policy that requires a medical lay-in
to specifically state that it is applicable even when an inmate is in administrative
segregation. She also presents no evidence that any senior prison official issued an
order prohibiting inmates from keeping medically-prescribed shoes in their

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administrative segregation cells.

Likewise, the security concern presented by

plaintiff’s medical shoes has not been clearly articulated.
Huff’s failure to present evidence of prison policy, an official order, or
legitimate security concerns also raises a fact question as to her intent.

See

Turner, 784 F.3d at 490. A reasonable jury could conclude that Huff “intentionally,
not inadvertently,” withheld plaintiff’s shoes because she did not “request a prison
doctor to examine [plaintiff] to determine the appropriateness of the” prescription,
did not “advise any doctor that [s]he intended to withhold” the treatment, and did
not “contact the originally diagnosing physician” before confiscating the shoes.
Johnson, 931 F.2d at 461–62; see Letterman, 789 F.3d at 862–63.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that genuine disputes of
material fact remain as to each required element of plaintiff’s deliberate indifference
claim against Huff. Therefore, she is not entitled to summary judgment.
B. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as
their conduct in performing discretionary functions ‘does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Meehan v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 936, 940 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

“Qualified immunity provides

ample room for mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
“To overcome the defense of qualified immunity the plaintiff must show: (1) the
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the
deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly

12

established at the time of the deprivation.”

Id. (quotation marks and citations

omitted).
As to the first prong, “whether summary judgment on grounds of qualified
immunity is appropriate from a particular set of facts is a question of law.” Lambert
v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). But “[i]f
there is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts material to the qualified
immunity issue, there can be no summary judgment.” Gregoire, 236 F.3d at 417
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

“When a defendant asserts qualified

immunity at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must produce evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the defendant violated
clearly established law.”

Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir.

2011) (citation omitted).
“When an official’s intent is an element of the § 1983 claim, as it is in Eighth
Amendment” deliberate indifference claims, “and if the official has made a properly
supported motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the plaintiff
‘must identify affirmative evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff has
carried his or her burden of proving the pertinent motive.’”

Burns v. Eaton, 752

F.3d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600
(1998)). Circumstantial evidence is admissible for this purpose. See Walton, 752
F.3d at 1119.
For the reasons discussed above, genuine issues of material fact preclude
summary judgment.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff,

drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, and leaving credibility determinations
to the trier of fact, a reasonable jury might conclude on this record that Huff was

13

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s diagnosed condition when she confiscated his
shoes. See Letterman, 789 F.3d at 862; Langford, 614 F.3d at 460; Phillips, 437
F.3d at 796; Johnson, 931 F.2d at 461; see also Jones, 609 F. App’x at 900;
Majors, 456 F. App’x at 617.

A genuine dispute exists over Huff’s motive for

confiscating the shoes. See Burns, 752 F.3d at 1139; Gordon, 454 F.3d at 864 (“A
medical assessment does not justify qualified immunity when officers ignore it.”).
Thus, a genuine dispute of material fact exists whether Huff deprived plaintiff of a
constitutional right. See Meehan, 763 F.3d at 940; Gregoire, 236 F.3d at 417.
As to the second prong, plaintiff must also establish that the right at issue
was clearly established by March 2014. Meehan, 763 F.3d at 940; see Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). “For a right to be clearly established, the contours
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.”

Meehan, 763 F.3d at 940 (quotation

marks, bracketing, and citation omitted). The official’s conduct is evaluated “from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene possessing the same
information.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The salient question is
whether the state of the law at the time of an incident provided fair warning to the
defendants that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134
S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case,
not as a broad general proposition.” Capps v. Olson, 780 F.3d 879, 885–86 (8th
Cir. 2015) (quotation marks, citation, and ellipses omitted).

But for “a

constitutional right to be clearly established, there does not have to be a previous
case with exactly the same factual issues.”

14

Id. at 886 (quotation marks and

citation omitted). “[G]eneral statements of the law are not inherently incapable of
giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule
already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific
conduct in question . . . .” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The very
action in question need not have been previously held unlawful.
F.3d at 908.

Chambers, 641

“Hence, the issue is not whether prior cases present facts

substantially similar to the present case but whether prior cases would have put a
reasonable officer on notice that the” officer’s action “in these circumstances would
violate” a plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional right. Capps, 780 F.3d at 886
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “‘[I]n an obvious case, [general] standards
can clearly establish the answer, even without a body of relevant case law.’” Id.
(quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).
Huff contends that plaintiff “does not have a clearly established right to have
special shoes in administrative segregation without medical permission.”
#123 at 14–15]

[Doc.

As discussed, plaintiff had medical permission to have his

prescription shoes without limitation, including in administrative segregation; or, at
minimum, a factual dispute exists on that issue.

However, the issue here is not

whether plaintiff was entitled to have “special shoes,” but whether he had the right
to continue a medically-prescribed course of treatment without interference by a
prison guard. Nearly three decades before March 2014, the Supreme Court held
“that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment extends
to protect prisoners from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”
Gregoire, 236 F.3d at 417 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). It was also then clearly
established that the contours of the right to be free from cruel and unusual

15

punishment include an absolute prohibition on a correctional officer “intentionally
interfering with” medical “treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05;
see Johnson, 931 F.2d at 461 (denying qualified immunity).
Huff is not entitled to qualified immunity because genuine factual disputes
remain as to whether she was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical
needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and because the constitutional
prohibition against interference with medical treatment was clearly established at
the time of the alleged violation.

Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim in Count VI will

proceed.
*****
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendant Margaret Huff for
summary judgment [Doc. #122] is denied.
An order setting the case for trial on plaintiff’s claim in Count VI of the fourth
amended complaint will be issued separately.

CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 24th day of January, 2017.

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