Hamilton v. Russell et al

Filing 65

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants George Lombardi and Terry Russell to dismiss the third amended complaint [Doc. #46] is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of defendants George Lombardi and Terry Russell to dismiss Count I of the second amended complaint [Doc. #21] is moot. An order of partial dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 2/19/2015. (KMS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES J. HAMILTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TERRY RUSSELL, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:14-CV-766-CEJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendants Terry Russell
and George Lombardi to dismiss plaintiff’s third amended complaint for failure to
state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issues are fully briefed.
I.

Background

Plaintiff James J. Hamilton brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Hamilton is imprisoned at the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional
Center (ERDCC) in Bonne Terre, Missouri. Russell is the warden of the ERDCC and
Lombardi is the director of the Missouri Department of Corrections. In Count I of
the complaint, which is the only allegation against defendants, Hamilton alleges
that defendants failed to protect him from assault by another inmate.
On January 17, 2014, an inmate in House 3 of the ERDCC attempted to
extort canteen items from Hamilton and threatened to assault him after he refused
to comply. Hamilton “attempted to seek help from a guard at the guard’s desk,”
but “[n]o guards or other officials were present.”

Third Am’d Compl. ¶ 65.

Hamilton returned to his cell, where the attacker then assaulted him, injuring his
shoulder (the first assault). No guards were present during the first assault. After

the first assault, Hamilton sought assistance at the guard’s desk, and still no guards
were present. Hamilton then returned to his cell, whereupon the attacker entered
and assaulted Hamilton again (the second assault).

Hamilton’s chest, face, and

head were injured during the second assault. Hamilton sought aid at the guard’s
desk for a third time, but the desk was still unstaffed.

Guards later arrived and

took Hamilton to the manager of House 3, then to segregation.
Hamilton claims that defendants failed to protect him from assault by a
violent inmate, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hamilton alleges that Russell
and Lombardi “knew of and deliberately disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s
health and safety” because they “knew that the ERDCC was inadequately staffed,”
and that inadequate staffing and monitoring created “an excessive risk that inmates
would be subject to assault by other inmates.” Id. ¶¶ 91, 93–94, 97, 99–100.
II.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.

The factual

allegations of a complaint are assumed true and construed in favor of the plaintiff,
“even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals

based on a

judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations”); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears “that a
recovery is very remote and unlikely”). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in
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support of his claim. Id. A viable complaint must include “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570; see
also id. at 563 (“no set of facts” language in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46
(1957), “has earned its retirement.”). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555.
III.

Discussion

To state a claim against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff
“must show a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Beck v. LaFleur, 257 F.3d 764, 765–
66 (8th Cir. 2001).

Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits,

plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 676 (2009).

Moreover, in pleading an Eighth Amendment violation,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678–79 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.,
550 U.S. at 556, 557, 570). When the “well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—
but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)).
“[T]he

eighth

amendment’s

prohibition

against

cruel

and

unusual

punishment requires prison officials to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee’
inmate safety by protecting them from attacks by other prisoners.” Young v. Selk,
508 F.3d 868, 871–72 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994)). “Of course, prison officials do not commit a constitutional violation
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every time one prisoner attacks another.” Id. (citations omitted). Rather, “[p]rison
officials act unreasonably . . . when they are ‘deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of serious harm [to a prisoner].’”

Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d

439, 446 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Young, 508 F.3d at 872). To state a plausible
deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must plead sufficient facts to meet two
requirements: “The first requirement tests whether, viewed objectively, the
deprivation of rights was sufficiently serious. The second requirement is subjective
and requires that the inmate prove that the prison officials had a ‘sufficiently
culpable state of mind.’”

Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (internal citation omitted).
Under

the

first

requirement,

an

alleged

deprivation

is

“‘objectively,

sufficiently serious,’ [if] the official’s failure to protect resulted in the inmate being
‘incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Young,
508 F.3d at 872 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

An assault by one inmate

against another constitutes “serious harm.” Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191, 1198
(8th Cir. 1996).

“[T]he assailant’s conduct can provide the court ‘the most

probative evidence of the degree and type of risk that [the prisoner] faced.’”
Nelson, 603 F.3d at 447 (quoting Young, 508 F.3d at 872).
Hamilton alleges that he was assaulted by the attacker twice, and he
provides facts to support the allegation of serious harm.

Absent from the

complaint, however, are any facts plausibly suggesting that Hamilton was
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of that serious harm before
the attacker threatened him.

Hamilton does not allege that the attacker had

previously engaged in threatening or assaultive conduct toward him or other
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prisoners, which could have indicated an existing substantial risk. Indeed, the facts
alleged in the complaint do not indicate that a substantial risk to Hamilton existed
prior to the moment of the attacker’s threat.

However, after the first assault,

there was a substantial risk that Hamilton would be harmed in a second assault, as
he was. Thus, the complaint alleges sufficient facts to meet the first requirement to
state a deliberate indifference claim against defendants.
Under the second requirement, “[a]n official is deliberately indifferent if he or
she actually knows of the substantial risk and fails to respond reasonably to it.”
Young, 508 F.3d at 873 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844–45).

Deliberate

indifference is “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or
safety” and “describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence” but
“something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or
with knowledge that harm will result.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (quotations and

citations omitted). “An obvious risk of a harm justifies an inference a prison official
subjectively disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmates.” Lenz v.
Wade, 490 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2007).

But a “‘single incident, or a series of

isolated incidents, usually provides an insufficient basis upon which to assign
supervisor liability.’” Id. at 995–96 (quoting Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 138
(8th Cir. 1989)); see also Jensen, 94 F.3d at 1197–98; Falls v. Nesbitt, 966 F.2d
375, 378 (8th Cir. 1992) (“A ‘pervasive risk of harm’ requires evidence of frequent
violence or sexual assaults which places a prisoner or group of prisoners in
reasonable fear for their safety . . . . In every case, a ‘pervasive risk’ is something
more than a single incident and something less than a riot.”).

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Hamilton alleges no facts to suggest that the two assaults were more than
isolated instances that occurred in quick succession.

While it is alleged that

inadequate staffing in House 3 created an obvious risk to prisoner safety from
potential assaults, the complaint sets forth no facts plausibly suggesting such a risk
was obvious. Hamilton does not allege a pattern of inmate assaults in House 3, by
the attacker or by other prisoners.

Nor does Hamilton set forth facts plausibly

suggesting that violence in House 3 was pervasive, such that defendants must have
been aware of the risk of assault. Hamilton’s threadbare recital of the knowledge
requirement of a deliberate indifference claim, without any facts from which to
plausibly infer that knowledge, is insufficient. See Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d
976, 981 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A] warden’s general responsibility for supervising the
operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement.”) (citation
omitted).
Additionally, the complaint is devoid of facts plausibly suggesting that House
3 was inadequately staffed.

The complaint makes no mention of the number of

guards required to be present at any given location, only that no guards were
present during the two assaults. The mere fact that guards were not present at the
precise time the assaults took place does not give rise to a plausible inference that
House 3 is inadequately staffed, such that defendants may be held liable. Finally,
no facts alleged in the complaint plausibly suggest that defendants were
subjectively reckless in failing to address any staffing inadequacies.
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For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that the third amended
complaint fails to state a claim for relief against defendants Lombardi and Russell
that is plausible on its face.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of defendants George Lombardi
and Terry Russell to dismiss the third amended complaint [Doc. #46] is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of defendants George Lombardi
and Terry Russell to dismiss Count I of the second amended complaint [Doc. #21]
is moot.
An order of partial dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 19th day of February, 2015.

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