Morales v. Cassady

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. [Doc 1 .] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the reasons stated herein, any motion by Petitioner for a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Nannette A. Baker on 9/27/17. (KJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

RICARDO MORALES,
Petitioner,
v.
JAY CASSADY,
Respondent.

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Case No. 4:14-CV-943 NAB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Ricardo Morales’ Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. [Doc. 1.] Respondent filed a response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus. [Doc. 7.] The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United
States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). [Doc. 6] For the reasons set forth
below, Robinson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
I.

Background
The state appellate court found the following facts to be true 1. Beginning in October

1998, P.L. lived with her mother, siblings, and Morales. During that time, Morales statutorily
raped P.L. on numerous occasions. Morales does not contest the factual findings that, during the
same time period and beginning when P.L. was ten years old, Morales touched P.L.’s vagina and
clitoris on multiple occasions. The abuse took place while P.L. was living with Morales in a
number of different locations.

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These facts are taken directly from the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision in Morales’ direct appeal. (Resp’t Ex.
G at 2.) (memorandum supplementing order). A state court’s determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).

In 2009, when she was about twenty years old, P.L. moved out of the home occupied by
Morales and reported the abuse to the police. After an investigation, the State charged Morales
with thirteen counts of statutory rape in the first and second degree and statutory sodomy in the
first and second degree. (Resp’t Ex. C at 12-15.) Morales moved for a judgment of acquittal at
the close of the trial. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion as to Count XI and denied it in
all other respects. (Resp’t Ex. A at 446.) A jury convicted Morales of twelve counts of the
indictment and the trial court sentenced him to 15 years in counts I, III, and IV, to run
consecutively, and 10 years on counts V, VI, VII, and VIII to run concurrently, and 7 years on
counts IX, X, XII, and XIII to run concurrently. (Resp’t Ex. C. at 118-125.)
II.

Standard of Review
“The writ of habeas corpus stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of those held in

violation of the law. Judges must be vigilant and independent in reviewing petitions for the writ,
a commitment that entails substantial judicial resources.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91
(2011). “In general, if a convicted state criminal defendant can show a federal habeas court that
his conviction rests upon a violation of the Federal Constitution, he may well obtain a writ of
habeas corpus that requires a new trial, a new sentence, or release.” Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct.
1911, 1917 (2013). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (AEDPA) applies to all petitions for habeas relief filed by state prisoners after this
statute’s effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-29 (1997). In
conducting habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court is limited to deciding
whether a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings (1) resulted in a
decision that is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on

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an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is
presumed to be correct unless the petitioner successfully rebuts the presumption of correctness
by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the phrase “clearly established federal law refers to the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the
relevant state court decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “In other words,
clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles
set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id. at 72. To
obtain habeas relief, a habeas petitioner must be able to point to the Supreme Court precedent
which he thinks the state courts acted contrary to or unreasonably applied. Buchheit v. Norris,
459 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2006).
A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if
the state court either ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme
Court] cases’ or ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of
[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent.’”

Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–406 (2000)).
A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
Court precedent if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to
the facts of a particular prisoner’s case. Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407–408). “A federal
habeas court making the unreasonable application inquiry should ask whether the state court’s
application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Penry, 532 U.S. at
793. “A state court decision involves ‘an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

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evidence presented in the state court proceedings,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), only if it is shown
that the state court’s presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.”
Evanstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006). A “readiness to attribute error is
inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law.” Woodford v.
Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). AEDPA’s highly deferential standard demands that state court
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt. Id.
III.

Discussion
Morales presents one claim for review. He asserts that the trial court erred in denying his

motion for acquittal, because the State did not present sufficient evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of statutory sodomy in
Counts I, VIII, X, and XIII.

Morales contends that there was not sufficient evidence of

penetration of the victim’s sexual organ to support his convictions.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no one can be deprived of
liberty without due process of law and the Sixth Amendment guarantees that “in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”
U.S. Const. amend. V, VI. “[These] provisions require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury
determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).
“In the interests of finality and federalism, federal habeas courts are constrained by
[AEDPA] to exercise only a limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions.”
Sera v. Norris, 400 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2005). State law defines the elements of state law
crimes. Fenske v. Thalacker, 60 F.3d 478, 480 (8th Cir. 1995). “A judgment by a state appellate

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court rejecting a challenge to evidentiary sufficiency is of course entitled to deference by federal
courts, as is any judgment affirming a criminal conviction.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 323.
A state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if the court finds that “upon the record
evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). The court must presume that
the trier of fact resolved all conflicting inferences in favor of the state and the court must defer to
that resolution. Whitehead v. Dormire, 340 F.3d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 2003). In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, the court is “not permitted to conduct its own inquiry into witness
credibility; that is a task reserved to the [fact finder].” Robinson v. LaFleur, 225 F.3d 950, 954
(8th Cir. 2000).
Missouri state law provides that a defendant is guilty of statutory sodomy in the first
degree “if he has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years
of age.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.062(1) 2. A defendant is guilty of statutory sodomy in the second
degree “if being twenty-one years of age or older, he has deviate sexual intercourse with another
person who is less than seventeen years of age.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.064(1). Under Missouri
law, deviate sexual intercourse is defined as
any act involving the genitals of one person and the hand,
mouth, tongue, or anus of another person or a sexual act
involving the penetration, however slight, of the male or
female sex organ or the anus by a finger, instrument or
object done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the
sexual desire of any person or for the purpose of terrorizing
the victim;

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.010.

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The statutes regarding statutory sodomy and the definition of deviate sexual intercourse were amended effective,
January 1, 2017. The statutory references are to the statue in effect at the time of Morales’ conviction.

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At trial P.L. testified that Morales touched her on her clitoris and inside her vagina;
placed his penis, fingers, vibrators, flashlights, and other objects into her vagina; and he
performed oral sex on her and had her perform oral sex on him at various locations. (Resp’t Ex.
A at 261-62, 264-66, 271-76, 282-90, 295, 297-98, 306-308, 315-318, 323-26.)
The Missouri Court of Appeals denied relief on direct appeal. The state appeals court
found that Morales’ argument was previously rejected in State v. Pollard, 588 S.W.2d 212, 213
(1979), and P.L.’s testimony provided a sufficient basis for a reasonable fact finder to conclude
that Morales’ finger penetrated P.L.’s sex organ regarding Counts I, VIII, X, and XIII. (Resp’t
Ex. G at 6.) The state appeals court quoting Pollard stated:
Anyone with even the most basic or rudimentary knowledge
of the human anatomy of the mouth and the female genitalia
[] would reach the reasonable (and indeed, inevitable)
inference and conclusion from this account of the
defendant’s actions, if believed, without direct evidence that
some degree of insertion or penetration by defendant’s
mouth or tongue occurred during cunnilingus.
Pollard, 588 S.W.2d at 215.
Further, the court found that although P.L. did not specifically testify that penetration
occurred at the locations involving Counts I, VIII, X, and XIII, “Missouri law has never required
such precise verbiage to meet the State’s burden of adducing evidence of penetration.” (Resp’t
Ex. G at 6.) The state appeals court also found that the exact phrase “penetration occurred” is
not required before a jury may reasonably find the occurrence of penetration to support a
conviction of sodomy. (Resp’t Ex. G at 6-7.)
Based on a review of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the state appellate court
did not commit error when determining that there was sufficient evidence to support Morales’
convictions. Granting the deference due to state courts’ interpretation of state law, Morales has

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failed to meet his burden to show that no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence adduced at trial.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Morales’ claim for relief will be denied. The state court’s

findings and conclusions regarding Morales’ claims were not contrary to, nor do they involve an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States, nor did they result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
Because Morales has made no showing of a denial of a constitutional right, the undersigned does
not recommend that a certificate of appealability be issued in this matter.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2); Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
[Doc 1.]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the reasons stated herein, any motion by
Petitioner for a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED.

Dated this 27th day of September, 2017.

/s/ Nannette A. Baker
NANNETTE A. BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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