Hart v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (Read Full Order.) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to alter or amend filed by defendant 34 is granted to the following extent: the Memorandum and Order Nunc Pro Tunc 32 and Amended Judgment 33 entered on April 22, 2016 are VACATED, and the Judgment entered on March 23, 2016 28 is REINSTATED. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 5/9/2016. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
PATRICIA HART
Plaintiff,
vs.
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INS. CO.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 4:14 CV 1299 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before me on defendant’s motion to alter or amend the
judgment. On March 23, 2016, I granted summary judgment in favor of defendant
on plaintiff’s ERISA claims on the ground that plaintiff was not a participant in the
ERISA plan as a matter of law. [27]. In accordance with that Memorandum and
Order, I entered a Judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. [28]. On
April 20, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, asking that
I amend the dismissal to one without prejudice, as my summary judgment ruling
was based on the fact that plaintiff lacked standing to bring her ERISA claims.
Traditionally, if a plaintiff lacked standing to assert ERISA claims, the Court
dismissed the claims without prejudice, so the Court entered an Amended
Judgment on April 22, 2016, which dismissed plaintiff’s claims without prejudice.

The same day, defendant filed its own motion to alter or amend the
judgment to once again reflect that the dismissal was one with prejudice instead of
without. In support of its motion, defendant cited Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014), in which the United
States Supreme Court clarified that the question of statutory standing is properly
recast as one of statutory coverage – in other words, whether plaintiff “falls within
the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue . . . . [W]e ask whether
[plaintiff] has a cause of action under the statute.” Id. This issue continues to be a
confusing one for courts. See Vander Luitgaren v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada, 765 F.3d 59, 63 n.3 (1st Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that the issue of
whether statutory standing under ERISA is jurisdictional is “complicated” postLexmark). However, since Lexmark it appears that plaintiff’s complaint was
properly dismissed with prejudice the first time and the Judgment should not have
been amended to reflect a dismissal without prejudice. See Grasso Enterprises,
LLC v. Express Scripts, Inc., 809 F.3d 1033, 1040 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying
Lexmark to issue of whether plaintiffs have standing to bring action as
beneficiaries under ERISA); Pennsylvania Chiropractic Ass’n v. Independence
Hosp. Indemnity Plan, Inc., 802 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2015) (whether plaintiff
has standing to pursue ERISA claim as participant or beneficiary is “misnomer”
and post-Lexmark is properly framed as one of “statutory coverage”); Metcalf v.
2

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1281, (D. Ore. 2014) (whether
plaintiff is a “beneficiary” entitled to bring suit under ERISA is not a matter of
standing but a question on the merits after Lexmark). Therefore, I will grant
defendant’s motion to alter or amend, vacate the Memorandum and Order Nunc
Pro Tunc and Amended Judgment entered on April 22, 2016, and reinstate the
Judgment entered on March 23, 2016.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to alter or amend filed by
defendant [34] is granted to the following extent: the Memorandum and Order
Nunc Pro Tunc [32] and Amended Judgment [33] entered on April 22, 2016 are
VACATED, and the Judgment entered on March 23, 2016 [28] is REINSTATED.

_______________________________
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 9th day of May, 2016.

3