Alpha Plastics, Inc. v. Corthell

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, [Doc. No. 4 ], is denied. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 08/25/2014. (CLK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ALPHA PLASTICS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRYAN CORTHELL,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:14CV1467 HEA

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order, [Doc. No. 4]. Defendants oppose the Motion. The Court conducted a hearing
on the Motion on August 25, 2014. No evidence was presented. For the reasons set
forth below, the Motion is denied, without prejudice.
Facts and Background1
Plaintiffs filed its verified Petition in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis,
Missouri on August 18, 2014, alleging Defendant had violated the terms of a noncompete agreement he had entered into with Plaintiff, Defendant’s former employer.

Plaintiff is in the business of manufacturing and/or selling and marketing plastic

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The recitation of facts is set forth for the purposes of this motion only and
in no way relieves the parties of the necessary proof thereof in later proceedings.

bottles and jars in Missouri and other states. Defendant was employed by Plaintiff as a
Plant Manager.
Defendant claims Defendant had access to confidential and highly sensitive
non-public information and trade secrets. Further, Plaintiff avers that Plaintiff and
Defendant entered into a Non-Compete Agreement as a condition of and in
consideration for Defendant’s employment.
Plaintiff further avers that the Non-Compete Agreement to which Defendant
agreed provided that Defendant would not work for a competitor of Plaintiff’s while
employed with Plaintiff and for a year after termination of Defendant’s employment
with Plaintiff.
Defendant’s employment with Plaintiff ended in July, 2014, when Defendant
voluntarily terminated his employment. Defendant immediately began working for
Poly-Tainer, Inc., a competitor of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff seeks to have a temporary restraining order entered restraining
Defendant from working for Poly-Tainer.
Discussion
The clear, relevant factors to consider when assessing the propriety of
temporary restraining orders include: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
the presence or risk of irreparable harm; (3) the balancing of the harms of granting or
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denying an injunction; and (4) the public’s interest. CDI Energy Services v. West
River Pumps, Inc., 567 F.3d 398, 401 -402 (8th Cir. 2009), citing Dataphase Systems,
Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981). The party seeking
injunctive relief bears the burden of proving these factors. Lankford v. Sherman, 451
F.3d 496, 503 (8th Cir.2006).
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant is in violation of the Non-Compete Agreement, and
that by virtue of his violation, it is irreparably harmed. Defendant, however, argues
that Plaintiff never signed the agreement, has unclean hands by its actions in inducing
Defendant to join Plaintiff’s workforce and that there is nothing Defendant knows that
could be injurious to Plaintiff.
The irreparable harm factor focuses on the harm or potential harm to the
plaintiff of defendant’s conduct or threatened conduct. Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114. A
plaintiff seeking preliminary injunction must establish that it “is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008). Significantly, the Eighth Circuit
has consistently held that irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate
remedy at law, typically because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an
award of damages. General Motors Corp v. Harry Brown’, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319
(8th Cir. 2009). An irreparable injury is an injury “of such a nature that money
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damages alone do not provide adequate relief.” Hinz v. Neuroscience, Inc., 538 F.3d
979, 986 (8th Cir.2008). If damages will adequately compensate plaintiffs for their
injury, injunctive relief is not appropriate. See Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 353 (8th
Cir.2003).
It is well established that the absence of a finding of irreparable injury is alone
sufficient ground for denying a preliminary injunction. “Failure to show irreparable
harm is an independently sufficient ground upon which to deny a preliminary
injunction.” Watkins v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003); see also General
Motors Corp., 563 F.3d at 319; Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 50607 (1959) (“The basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been
irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.”); Adam-Mellang v. Apartment
Search, Inc., 96 F.3d 297, 299 (8th Cir.1996); “[t]he basis of injunctive relief in the
federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.”
Bandag, Inc. v. Jack's Tire & Oil, Inc., 190 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting
Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07). When there is an adequate remedy at law, a
preliminary injunction is not appropriate. Modern Computer Sys., Inc. v. Modern
Banking Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 734, 738 (8th Cir.1989).
Irreparable harm must be certain and imminent such that there is a clear and
present need for equitable relief. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. F.C.C., 109 F.3d 418, 425 (8th
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Cir.1996). Possible or speculative harm is not sufficient. See Local Union No. 884,
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, & Plastic Workers of Am. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 61 F.3d 1347, 1355 (8th Cir.1995). Furthermore, the remedy at law must be
inadequate. Gen. Motors Corp., 563 F.3d at 319.
Although Plaintiff argues that it is irreparably harmed by the alleged violation
of the Non-Compete Agreement, Plaintiff has not demonstrated how, even assuming a
violation, it is may actually be harmed. No confidential and or proprietary interests
have been presented that Defendant knows or had reason to know. Plaintiff has not
established that Defendant had access to customer lists or contact information, other
than stating that Defendant attended a meeting with a customer. Even if Defendant
may have known of the customers, there is nothing in the record before the Court at
this time which would tend to establish that Defendant is attempting to contact
Plaintiff’s customers to try to persuade them to cease business with Plaintiff and start
engaging in a business relationship with Defendant’s current employer. Plaintiff’s
argued irreparable harm is, at this time, based on Plaintiff’s speculation and perceived
injury.
Moreover, in terms of balancing of the granting the TRO, Plaintiff has presented
no harm it is experiencing at this time, other than its perceived harm that Defendant’s
new employment with a competitor will hurt Plaintiff. Defendant, on the other hand,
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will experience significant harm if the TRO is granted. Defendant, after having
advised Plaintiff of his intent to join Poly-Tainer, relocated his family from Utah to
California. His children have started attending school in the new location, and if the
Court were to enter the TRO, Defendant would be enjoined from making a livelihood
for himself and his family. Balancing these considerations, the Court concludes that
the harm to Defendant is significantly greater than the speculative harm to Plaintiff.
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining
order is denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order, [Doc. No. 4], is denied.
Dated this 25th day of August, 2011.
_______________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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