Daugherty v. AAA Auto Club of Missouri

Filing 20

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case be statistically closed, subject to being reopened by the parties for judicial review following resolution of the pending arbitration. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 05/13/2015. (CLK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MIA M. DAUGHERTY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AAA AUTO CLUB OF MISSOURI,
Defendant.

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) Case No: 4:14CV1507HEA
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OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and to
Compel Arbitration [Doc. No. 11]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s
motion is granted.
Facts and Background
The present dispute concerns Plaintiff Mia M. Daugherty’s former
employment with Defendant. Plaintiff was hired as a Member Representative (I) in
Defendant’s Communications Center on April 9, 2012. In September, 2013,
Defendant instituted a mutual Arbitration Policy, by which its employees agreed to
submit to binding arbitration of any employment related legal dispute. A “Rollout
Memorandum” dated August 28, 2013, set out the arbitration details and
specifically informed Defendant’s employees that any legal action was to be
submitted to binding arbitration in lieu of in a court of law. Plaintiff signed the

arbitration agreement electronically on September 19, 2013. This agreement
included a mandatory arbitration provision, which provided, in relevant part:
You acknowledge and agree that: (1) you have read
and understand the terms and consequences of this Arbitration
Agreement; (2) you have been given the opportunity to discuss
this Arbitration Agreement with your own private legal counsel
at your own expense and have done so to the extent that you wished
to; and, (3) in consideration of your employment, or continued
employment, you are knowingly and voluntarily entering into,
and agreeing to accept all of the terms, conditions and benefits
of this Arbitration Agreement without any duress or undue influence.
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. . . may be executed in counterparts, signed by an electronic
or facsimile signature, and delivered electronically; each of
the counterparts constitutes an original agreement and all of
them together constitute one agreement. The parties have
read this Arbitration Agreement and hereby voluntarily and
knowingly agree to and accept all of its terms, conditions,
and benefits.
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This Mutual and Binding Arbitration Agreement
(“Arbitration Agreement”) requires you and [ACMO] to
resolve through final and binding arbitration any and all
disputes and claims between you and [ACMO], including,
but not limited to, claims arising out of, related to, or
connected with your employment or its termination.
....
“Arbitrable Claims” means all claims of any nature
or kind arising out of, relating to, or connected with this
Arbitration Agreement or your employment with [ACMO],
including, but not limited to, your application for employment,
the hiring decision, your employment relationship or the
termination of your employment, between you and [ACMO]
and/or any of its employees, agents, officers, or directors, . . .
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Arbitrable Claims include, but are not limited to, any and
all claims based on any federal or state constitution, statute,
regulation, or ordinance or common law, including, but
not limited to, claims for (1) wrongful termination of employment,
harassment, employment discrimination or retaliation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
or any state or local discrimination laws such as the . . . Missouri
Human Rights Act, . . . ; (2) claims for fraud, breach of contract or
covenant (express or implied), unpaid wages and related claims,
defamation, emotional distress, or any other tort claims; (3) claims
for misappropriation of trade secrets or unfair competition; and,
(4) any other legal claims, causes or actions recognized by local,
state or federal law, regulations or ordinances, or federal or state
constitutional provisions.
After Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff filed this suit,
claiming employment discrimination based on her race and gender. Plaintiff seeks
recovery for a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
Discussion
Defendant contends that the arbitration agreement is enforceable under the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and requires dismissal and
an order compelling arbitration. “A dispute must be submitted to arbitration if there
is a valid agreement to arbitrate and the dispute falls within the scope of that
agreement.” Lyster v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 945 (8th
Cir.2001); see also Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., Inc., 31 F.3d 692, 695 (8th
Cir.1994) (“A federal court must stay court proceedings and compel arbitration
once it determines that the dispute falls within the scope of a valid arbitration
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agreement.”). An arbitration agreement “is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” Houlihan, 31 F.3d at 695 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). In addition, because the
FAA declares “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, ... as a
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983); see also Lyster, 239 F.3d at 945.
Plaintiff, acting pro se, has responded to the Motion, arguing that the clause in
the arbitration agreement excluding worker’s compensation claims precludes
dismissal. Plaintiff asserts that she has an ongoing worker’s compensation claim
with Defendant that was denied by Defendant, and that the denial of her medical
treatment is included in the worker’s compensation part of her lawsuit. As such,
Plaintiff argues that this case is an “excluded claim.” Plaintiff’s argument that her
action is an excluded claim is without merit. Worker’s Compensation actions are
separate and distinct from this Civil Rights action, and must be raised in the state
courts. Indeed, Plaintiff herself indicates that she has already filed a worker’s
compensation claim in a different venue. Plaintiff does not challenge the validity
or scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Absent any allegations by Plaintiff to the
contrary, there is no reason to think that the Arbitration Agreement, signed by
Plaintiff, is anything other than a valid employment contract.
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Furthermore, under the plain language of that agreement, the present
litigation falls within the stated scope of the arbitration agreement. Consequently,
Plaintiff’s claim that the arbitration provision should not be given effect because
her lawsuit includes a worker’s compensation claim is squarely contradicted by
controlling precedent. Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of a valid arbitration
agreement.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, stay proceedings and compel arbitration [Doc. No. 11] is granted. The
Court will therefore close this case pending resolution of the arbitration, subject to
being reopened if either party files a motion to seek judicial review pursuant to 9
U.S.C. § 3.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case be statistically closed, subject to
being reopened by the parties for judicial review following resolution of the
pending arbitration.
Dated this 13th day of May, 2015.

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HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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