Hasan v. Colvin

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: In sum, the decision of the ALJ finding Hasan not disabled is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. As a result, the ALJ's decision is affirmed. Accordingly, Judgment will be entered separately in favor of Defendant in accordance with this Memorandum. Signed by Magistrate Judge Abbie Crites-Leoni on 9/30/2015. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
RAED HASAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
) Case No. 4:14CV01608 ACL
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Raed Hasan brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g), seeking judicial
review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s denial of his application for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Hasan alleged
that he was disabled because of high blood pressure, depression, swelling in his legs, heart
problems, and mental health problems. (Tr. 157.)
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that, despite Hasan’s severe impairment of
obesity and non-severe impairments of anxiety and history of left ventricular hypertrophy, he was
not disabled as he had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work
as a store manager and cab driver.
This matter is pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, with
consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). A summary of the entire record is
presented in the parties’ briefs and is repeated here only to the extent necessary.
I. Procedural History
On October 23, 2012, Hasan filed an application for SSI, claiming that he became unable to
Page 1 of 16 

work due to his disabling condition on January 1, 2010. (Tr. 134). Hasan’s claim was denied
initially. (Tr. 73-78.) Following an administrative hearing, Hasan’s claim was denied in a
written opinion by an ALJ, dated September 16, 2013. (Tr. 12-19.) Hasan then filed a request
for review of the ALJ=s decision with the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration
(SSA), which was denied on August 8, 2014. (Tr. 1-5.) Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as
the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. '' 404.981, 416.1481.
In the instant action, Hasan first claims that the ALJ “committed reversible error by failing
to find the severe impairment of depression/PTSD.” (Doc. 14 at 8.) Hasan next argues that the
ALJ erred by “failing to find that Raed Hasan was limited in his ability to commun[icate] in
English.” Id. at 9.
II. Applicable Law
II.A.

Standard of Review
The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial

evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance of the evidence, but enough that a reasonable person would find it adequate to
support the conclusion. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). This “substantial
evidence test,” however, is “more than a mere search of the record for evidence supporting the
Commissioner’s findings.” Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence on the record as a whole . . .
requires a more scrutinizing analysis.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence

Page 2 of 16 

on the record as a whole, the Court must review the entire administrative record and consider:
1.

The credibility findings made by the ALJ.

2.

The plaintiff’s vocational factors.

3.

The medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians.

4.

The plaintiff’s subjective complaints relating to exertional and
non-exertional activities and impairments.

5.

Any corroboration by third parties of the plaintiff’s
impairments.

6.

The testimony of vocational experts when required which is
based upon a proper hypothetical question which sets forth the
claimant’s impairment.

Stewart v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 581, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal
citations omitted). The Court must also consider any evidence which fairly detracts from the
Commissioner’s decision. Coleman, 498 F.3d at 770; Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050
(8th Cir. 1999). However, even though two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the
evidence, the Commissioner's findings may still be supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Young v.
Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[I]f there is substantial evidence on the record as a
whole, we must affirm the administrative decision, even if the record could also have supported an
opposite decision.” Weikert v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). See also Jones ex rel. Morris v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 974, 977 (8th
Cir. 2003).

Page 3 of 16 

II.B.

Determination of Disability
To be eligible for DIB and SSI under the Social Security Act, a plaintiff must prove that he

is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d at 1217; Baker v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992). The Social Security Act defines disability as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual will be declared disabled “only if his physical or
mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(B).
The SSA Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a
person is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520, 416.920; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141-42
(1987); Fines v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 893, 894-95 (8th Cir. 1998). First, it is determined whether the
claimant is currently engaged in “substantial gainful employment.” If the claimant is, disability
benefits must be denied. See 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520, 416.920 (b). Step two requires a
determination of whether the claimant suffers from a medically severe impairment or combination
of impairments. See 20 C.F.R '' 404.1520 (c), 416.920 (c). To qualify as severe, the
impairment must significantly limit the claimant=s mental or physical ability to do “basic work
activities.” Id. Age, education and work experience of a claimant are not considered in making
the Aseverity@ determination. See id.
Page 4 of 16 

If the impairment is severe, the next issue is whether the impairment is equivalent to one of
the listed impairments that the Commissioner accepts as sufficiently severe to preclude substantial
gainful employment. See 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520 (d), 416.920 (d). This listing is found in
Appendix One to 20 C.F.R. 404. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1. If the impairment meets or
equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be impaired. See
20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520 (d), 416.920 (d). If it does not, however, the evaluation proceeds to the
next step which requires an inquiry regarding whether the impairment prevents the claimant from
performing his past work. See 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1520 (e), 416.920 (e).
If the claimant is able to perform the previous work, in consideration of the claimant’s RFC
and the physical and mental demands of the past work, the claimant is not disabled. See id. If the
claimant cannot perform his previous work, the final step involves a determination of whether the
claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy taking into consideration the
claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. ''
404.1520 (f), 416.920 (f). The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if he is not able to
perform any other work. See id. Throughout this process, the burden remains upon the claimant
until he adequately demonstrates an inability to perform previous work, at which time the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the claimant’s ability to perform other work. See
Beckley v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1998).
The evaluation process for mental impairments is set forth in 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520a,
416.920a. The first step requires the Commissioner to Arecord the pertinent signs, symptoms,
findings, functional limitations, and effects of treatment@ in the case record to assist in the
determination of whether a mental impairment exists. See 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520a (b) (1),
Page 5 of 16 

416.920a (b) (1). If it is determined that a mental impairment exists, the Commissioner must
indicate whether medical findings Aespecially relevant to the ability to work are present or absent.@
20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520a (b) (2), 416.920a (b) (2). The Commissioner must then rate the degree of
functional loss resulting from the impairments in four areas deemed essential to work: activities
of daily living, social functioning, concentration, and persistence or pace. See 20 C.F.R. ''
404.1520a (b) (3), 416.920a (b) (3). Functional loss is rated on a scale that ranges from no
limitation to a level of severity which is incompatible with the ability to perform work-related
activities. See id. Next, the Commissioner must determine the severity of the impairment based
on those ratings. See 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520a (c), 416.920a (c). If the impairment is severe, the
Commissioner must determine if it meets or equals a listed mental disorder. See 20 C.F.R. ''
404.1520a(c)(2), 416.920a(c)(2). This is completed by comparing the presence of medical
findings and the rating of functional loss against the paragraph A and B criteria of the Listing of the
appropriate mental disorders. See id. If there is a severe impairment, but the impairment does
not meet or equal the listings, then the Commissioner must prepare a residual functional capacity
(RFC) assessment. See 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520a (c)(3), 416.920a (c)(3).
III. The ALJ=s Determination
The ALJ found that Hasan has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 23,
2012, the application date. (Tr. 14.)
In addition, the ALJ concluded that Hasan’s obesity was a severe impairment; but his
history of left ventricular hypertrophy and anxiety were non-severe medically determinable
impairments as neither impairment causes more than minimal limitation in the Hasan’s ability to
perform basic physical and mental work activities. (Tr. 14-15.) The ALJ found that Hasan did
Page 6 of 16 

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals in severity the
requirements of any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 16.)
As to Hasan’s RFC, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has
the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of medium work, as defined in 20
CFR 416.967(c).
(Tr. 16.)
The ALJ found that Hasan’s allegations regarding the extent of his disability were partially
credible. (Tr. 17.)
The ALJ further found that Hasan is capable of performing past relevant work as a store
manager and cab driver. (Tr. 18.) The ALJ made the alternate finding that Hasan is capable of
performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
The ALJ=s final decision reads as follows:
Based on the application for supplemental security income filed on October 23, 2012, the
claimant is not disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.
(Tr. 19.)
IV. Discussion
As noted above, Hasan raises two claims in this action for judicial review of the ALJ’s
decision denying benefits. The undersigned will discuss Hasan’s claims in turn.
IV.A. Severity Determination
Hasan first argues that the ALJ committed reversible error when he found Hasan’s mental
impairments were not severe.1 Defendant contends that the ALJ properly applied the “special
technique” to find that Hasan’s mental impairments were not severe because there were not more

1

Hasan does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that his history of left ventricular hypertrophy was not
severe.
Page 7 of 16 

than mild limitations in various areas of functioning.

  To be considered severe, an impairment must significantly limit a claimant's ability to do

basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). “An impairment is not severe if
it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant's physical
or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007).
Basic work activities mean the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs, including physical

functions; capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; understanding, carrying out, and
remembering simple instructions; use of judgment; responding appropriately to supervision,
coworkers and usual work situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.152l(b); 416.92l(b). “Severity is not an onerous requirement for the claimant to
meet, ... but it is also not a toothless standard.” Kirby, 500 F.3d at 708.
The ALJ found that Hasan’s “medically determinable impairment of anxiety does not
cause more than minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work
activities and is therefore nonsevere.” (Tr. 14.) As support for this finding, the ALJ indicated
that he had considered the four functional areas set out in the regulations for evaluating mental
disorders and in section 12.0C of the Listing of Impairments (20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1). (Tr. 14.) The ALJ noted that, under the regulations, a mental impairment is not
severe if it results in no more than mild limitations in the first three functional areas (activities of
daily living; social functioning; and concentration, persistence, or pace) and none in the fourth area
(episodes of decompensation). See 20 C.F.R. ' 416.920a. The ALJ found that Hasan’s mental
impairments resulted “in mild restrictions in activities of daily living; no difficulties in maintaining
social functioning; and no difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; and no
episodes of decompensation.” (Tr. 15; emphasis in original.) Substantial evidence supports
these findings. The ALJ reviewed Hasan’s reported activities of daily living, as well as his mental
Page 8 of 16 

health treatment records, including the fact Hasan was diagnosed with adjustment disorder and
PTSD, noting the most problematic symptom detected by the examiner “was decreased sleep and
nightmares.” Id. The ALJ commented:
While there may certainly be some adjustment difficulties caused by the death of
[Hasan’s] daughter in a bus explosion and subsequent relocation of the family to the
US from Iraq, the mental status reports in the file are unremarkable (2F/12, 3F/12,
19, 28), as was his appearance and testimony at the hearing.
Id.
With regard to activities of daily living, the ALJ noted that Hasan indicated in his function
report that he got up, ate breakfast, took his medication, goes to doctor appointments, and watches
television. (Tr. 15, 169.) He also shops for groceries with his wife weekly. (Tr. 172.) Hasan
reported experiencing difficulty with some activities, such as attending to personal care and
performing household chores, but these difficulties appear to arise from his alleged physical
impairments. (Tr. 170.) Hasan’s reported daily activities are consistent with the ALJ’s finding
of “mild” restrictions in this area.
The ALJ next found Hasan had no difficulties in maintaining social functioning. In his
function report, Hasan indicated that he had no problems getting along with family, friends,
neighbors, or authority figures. (Tr. 174, 175.) At the administrative hearing, Hasan testified
that he had conflict with his wife related to their daughter’s death. (Tr. 41, 45.) Hasan explained
that, when he was living in Iraq in 2010, his daughter died in an explosion. (Tr. 41.) Hasan’s
wife blames him for their daughter’s death because his wife had expressed her desire to leave Iraq
due to safety concerns prior to the explosion. Id. As a result, Hasan testified that he tries to
avoid his wife. (Tr. 45.) Hasan also testified that he gets angry easily with his sons. (Tr. 49.)
The medical evidence also reveals that Hasan reported that he felt connected to his family. (Tr.
269, 276, 285, 398, 407, 416, 424, 433.) Hasan did not display anger at his medical appointments
Page 9 of 16 

and was always cooperative. (Tr. 226, 228, 266, 268, 275, 284, 398, 407, 424, 433.) Hasan was
also described as “calm” on multiple visits (Tr. 226, 228, 268), and even “friendly” (Tr. 266) and
“thankful” (Tr. 424) on individual occasions. In sum, the evidence of record reveals that Hasan’s
reported conflict with his wife is not as a result of a mental impairment, but due to his daughter’s
death. Although Hasan testified that he occasionally becomes angry with his sons, there is no
evidence that his relationship with his sons was affected by his mental impairment. The ALJ’s
finding that Hasan has no difficulties in maintaining social functioning is supported by substantial
evidence.
With regard to concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ found that Hasan had no
difficulties. At the hearing, Hasan testified that his family members frequently tell him that he
has said things about which he has no memory. (Tr. 50.) Hasan did not otherwise describe any
difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace at the hearing. The ALJ stated that Hasan’s
medical records consistently note that his memory and concentration were intact. (Tr. 15.) This
is supported by the medical evidence. (Tr. 268, 275, 284, 398, 407, 416, 433.) Thus, the ALJ’s
finding that Hasan has no difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace is supported by
substantial evidence.
Finally, the ALJ found that Hasan had no episodes of decompensation that have been of
extended duration (Tr. 15), and Hasan has not alleged any such episodes. The ALJ’s finding
regarding the fourth broad functional area for evaluating mental disorders is supported by the
record.
In addition to properly analyzing the four functional areas discussed above, the ALJ stated
that the alleged severity of Hasan’s mental impairments is not fully supported by the treatment
records, which consistently report that Hasan’s thoughts were logical and goal-directed, he had no

Page 10 of 16 

hallucinations or other psychotic symptoms present, his judgment was intact, and he was able to
follow instructions. (Tr. 15, 268, 275, 284, 398, 407, 416, 433.) The ALJ stated that, although
Hasan continues to have some residual symptoms even with continued medication compliance, he
remains capable of performing work-related tasks. (Tr. 15.) The ALJ remarked that Hasan may
have adjustment difficulties caused by the death of his daughter and subsequent relocation of his
family to the United States from Iraq, but pointed out that Hasan’s mental status reports are
unremarkable. Id. Finally, the ALJ acknowledged that a non-examining state agency
psychologist expressed the opinion that Hasan’s anxiety-related disorder results in moderate
restrictions of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and
moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr. 15, 61.) The ALJ,
however, indicated that he was giving “little weight” to this opinion due to its inconsistency with
the objective medical evidence. (Tr. 15.) As previously noted, the ALJ found that Hasan had
only “mild” limitations with regard to activities of daily living and no limitations in the other
three areas.
In support of his argument that the ALJ erred in finding his mental impairments were
non-severe, Hasan argues that a physician at Barnes Jewish Hospital noted that Hasan’s depression
and anxiety may have psychotic features that are poorly controlled. (Tr. 357.) On August 23,
2012, a primary care physician noted that Hasan denied suicidal or homicidal ideation but his
depression/anxiety was poorly controlled, and he “may have some psychotic features with
night-time screaming episode.” (Tr. 357.) Hasan had not yet received mental health treatment at
that time. Hasan’s subsequent mental health treatment notes reveal that Hasan did not exhibit any
psychotic symptoms. (Tr. 268, 275, 284, 398, 407, 416, 433.) Thus, Hasan’s argument lacks
merit.

Page 11 of 16 

Hasan also argues that the fact he was assessed Global Assessment of Functioning
(“GAF”) scores of 41-502 on his first six visits to SLUCare Psychiatric Clinic indicates that his
psychiatric condition is severe. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-V), the GAF scale is intended for use by practitioners in making treatment
decisions. American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
32-33 (4th ed.-Text Revision 2000) (“DSM IV-TR”).

The most recent version of the DSM,

however, dropped GAF from inclusion because of its “conceptual lack of clarity (i.e., including
symptoms, suicide risk, and disabilities in its descriptors) and questionable psychometrics in
routine practice.” DSM-V 16 (5th ed. 2013).
Moreover, neither Social Security regulations nor case law require an ALJ to determine
the extent of an individual’s mental impairment based solely on a GAF score.

In fact, the

Commissioner has declined to endorse the GAF scale for “use in the Social Security and SSI
disability programs,” and has indicated that GAF scores have no “direct correlation to the
severity requirements of the mental disorders listings.” See 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764-65,
2000 WL 1173632 (August 21, 2000).

While the Commissioner has declined to endorse the

GAF scale for use in the Social Security and SSI disability programs, GAF scores may still be
used to assist the ALJ in assessing the level of a claimant’s functioning. Halverson v. Astrue,
600 F.3d 922, 930-31 (8th Cir. 2010) (GAF score may be of considerable help in formulating
RFC, but is not essential to RFC’s accuracy).

2

A GAF score of 41-50 is indicative of “[s]erious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe
obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or
school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).” See American Psychiatric Ass’n.,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (Text Revision 4th ed. 2000) (“DSM
IV-TR”).

Page 12 of 16 

In this case, as Hasan notes, he was assessed with GAF scores of 41-50 at his first six
visits to SLUCare, from September 2012 through February 2013. At Hasan’s initial visit in
September 2012, he complained of nightmares every night about death, difficulty sleeping,
experiencing choking sensations in his sleep, anxiety and flashbacks before going to bed, low
concentration, and low mood since his daughter’s death.

(Tr. 267.)

Upon examination,

Evelynn Stephens, M.D., noted calm and cooperative behavior, restricted affect, normal
concentration despite Hasan’s complaints of impairment in this area, intact memory and thought
process, and logical thought content.

(Tr. 268.)

Dr. Stephens diagnosed Hasan with

adjustment disorder 3 with mixed emotional features and post-traumatic stress disorder 4
(“PTSD”), and assessed a GAF score of 41-50. (Tr. 269.) Dr. Stephens prescribed Zoloft5 to
treat Hasan’s PTSD symptoms and prescribed Seroquel6 to treat Hasan’s nightmares and anxiety
before bed. (Tr. 269-70.) Dr. Stephens noted that Hasan’s “most problematic symptom is
decreased sleep and nightmares” on October 11, 2012, and on October 29, 2012. (Tr. 274,
285.)

Hasan continued to complain of nightmares, with no worsening in symptoms in

December 2012, January 2013, and February 2013.

(Tr. 397-415.) On March 28, 2013, Dr.

3

A disorder the essential feature of which is a maladaptive reaction to an identifiable psychological
stress, or stressors, that occurs within weeks of the onset of the stressors and persists for as long as
6 months. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 567 (28th Ed. 2006).
4
Development of characteristic long-term symptoms following a psychologically traumatic event
that is generally outside the range of usual human experience; symptoms include persistently
re-experiencing the event and attempting to avoid stimuli reminiscent of the trauma, numbed
responsiveness to environmental stimuli, a variety of autonomic and cognitive dysfunctions, and
dysphoria. Stedman’s at 570.
5
Zoloft is indicated for the treatment of depression. See WebMD, http://www.webmd.com/drugs
(last visited September 24, 2015).
6
Seroquel is indicated for the treatment of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or sudden episodes of
mania or depression associated with bipolar disorder. See WebMD,
http://www.webmd.com/drugs (last visited September 24, 2015).
Page 13 of 16 

Stephens increased Hasan’s GAF score to 51-60.7 (Tr. 428.)
and reported anxiety at that time.
score of 51-60.

(Tr. 432.)

Id.

Hasan complained of nightmares

On May 9, 2013, Dr. Stephens again assessed a GAF

She noted that Hasan was notably less anxious.

continued to complain of nightmares.

Id.

He

Id. Hasan reported that he experienced some “anxiety

feelings,” and that he talked to friends in the area at times for support. Id.

Dr. Stephens noted

that Hasan had no overwhelming anger, no noted suicidal or homicidal thoughts, no manic or
psychotic symptoms, he was cooperative, and his thoughts were logical and organized. (Tr.
433.)

Dr. Stephens adjusted Hasan’s dosage of medication to treat his nightmares associated

with PTSD.

Id.

The treatment notes discussed above support the ALJ’s finding that Hasan is experiencing
adjustment difficulties caused by the death of his daughter and subsequent relocation to the United
States, but his mental status reports are essentially unremarkable. Hasan’s treating psychiatrist
consistently noted that Hasan’s most problematic symptom was nightmares and related decreased
sleep. The initial low GAF scores assessed by Dr. Stephens appear to be attributed to these
symptoms. Hasan’s nighttime anxiety and nightmares associated with his PTSD, however, would
not be expected to affect his ability to work. Further, there is no direct correlation between
Hasan’s GAF scores and a mental impairment’s severity, and the ALJ had no obligation to credit
or even consider GAF scores in the disability determination.

Thus, Hasan’s reliance on his

GAF scores is without merit.
In sum, the ALJ properly analyzed the impact of Hasan’s mental impairments on the four
functional areas set out in the regulations.

The ALJ discussed the medical evidence of record

7

A GAF score of 51 to 60 denotes “[m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial
speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school
functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).” DSM IV-TR at 34.  
Page 14 of 16 

and cited specific medical evidence, as well as Hasan’s own statements, in support of his
findings.

As the ALJ remarked at the end of the administrative hearing “. . .the mental status

exams look pretty normal,. . .I can understand how [Hasan would] be upset, I just don’t know how
it’s limiting vocationally.” (Tr. 54.) The ALJ’s determination that Hasan’s mental impairments
are not severe is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
IV.B. Step Four Determination
Hasan next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find that Hasan was limited in his
ability to communicate in English at step four of the sequential analysis.

Hasan accurately

notes that Hasan testified at the administrative hearing with the aid of an Arabic interpreter.
(Tr. 37.)

Hasan testified that he can speak and write only limited English.

(Tr. 47.)

Defendant contends that vocational factors, such as a claimant’s English proficiency, are not
relevant at step four of the sequential analysis.
The ALJ found that Hasan has the RFC to perform the full range of medium work.
16.)

(Tr.

The ALJ further found that Hasan was capable of performing his past relevant work as a

store manager and cab driver. (Tr. 18.)
Step four of the sequential analysis denies benefits to a claimant whose impairment does
not prevent him from performing the duties of his previous work.

See 20 C.F.R. ' 416.920(e).

The Secretary has provided that vocational factors, such as education, will not be considered at
step four. Id. ' 416.960(b)(3).

The inability to communicate in English is an element of the

vocational factor of education, see id. ' 416.964(b)(5), which the Secretary’s sequential analysis
reserves for step five. Id. ' 416.920(g). See also Garcia v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
46 F.3d 552, 555-56 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the ability to speak English is not a factor for

Page 15 of 16 

consideration in step four); Ordonez v. Massanari, No. C00-4145-DEO, 2001 WL 34008720, at
* 15 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 13, 2001) (same).
In this case, the ALJ found that Hasan had the RFC to return to his past work at step four
of the sequential evaluation.

The record supports that neither Hasan’s physical or mental

limitations would prevent him from performing the jobs of store manager and cab driver.

The

regulations do not require that the ALJ consider Hasan’s limited ability to communicate in
English in making this determination.

Consequently, the ALJ did not err in failing to consider

Hasan’s inability to communicate in English at step four. Further, the ALJ made the alternative
step five finding that Hasan could perform other work that existed in significant numbers in the
national economy and was therefore not disabled. (Tr. 18.) In so finding, the ALJ considered
that Hasan “is not able to communicate in English, and is considered in the same way as an
individual who is illiterate in English.” Id. Thus, substantial evidence on the record supports
the ALJ’s decision finding Hasan not disabled.
V. Conclusion
In sum, the decision of the ALJ finding Hasan not disabled is supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole. As a result, the ALJ’s decision is affirmed.
Accordingly, Judgment will be entered separately in favor of Defendant in accordance
with this Memorandum.

______________________________
ABBIE CRITES-LEONI
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated this 30th day of September, 2015. 

Page 16 of 16