Perkins v. Myrtle Hilliard Davis

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant Myrtle Hilliard Davis's affirmative defenses (Doc. 21) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to strike the Defendant Inez Lampkin's affirmative defenses and motion to dismiss (Doc. 30) is DENIED.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shirley P. Mensah on 3/25/15. (LGK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JERRY PERKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MYRTLE HILLIARD DAVIS,
d.b.a. FLORENCE HILL, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:14-CV-1755-SPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to strike the affirmative defenses of
Defendant Myrtle Hilliard Davis (Doc. 21) and Plaintiff’s motion to strike the affirmative
defenses and motion to dismiss of Defendant Inez Lampkin (Docs. 30, 31). The parties have
consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 636(c)(1). (Doc. 28). For the reasons stated below, both motions will be denied.
I.

BACKGROUND
On December 23, 2104, Plaintiff Jerry Perkins (“Plaintiff”), acting pro se, filed an

Amended Complaint against Defendants Myrtle Hilliard Davis Comprehensive Health Center,
Inc. (“Defendant MHD”), and Inez Lampkin (“Defendant Lampkin”). (Doc. 17). He asserts
claims that he was discriminated against and retaliated against based on his gender, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Missouri Human Rights Act. On January 2, 2015,
Defendant MHD filed its Answer, in which it asserted fourteen affirmative defenses. (Doc. 19).
On February 10, 2015, Defendant Lampkin filed a motion to dismiss the claims against her under

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that this Court lacks
jurisdiction over the claims against her. (Doc. 26). She has not filed an answer to the Amended
Complaint.

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II.

DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Strike Defendant MHD’s Affirmative Defenses
In his first motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court strike each of Defendant MHD’s

affirmative defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Rule 12(f) provides, “The
court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter” either on its own or on a motion made by a party. The Court
has broad discretion in resolving a motion to strike. Stanbury Law Firm v. Internal Revenue
Serv., 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000). “In ruling on a motion to strike, the Court views the
pleadings in the light most favorable to the pleader.” Speraneo v. Zeus Tech., Inc., 4:12-CV-578JAR, 2012 WL 2117872, *1 (E.D. Mo. June 11, 2012) (citing Cynergy Ergonomics, Inc. v.
Ergonomic Partners, Inc., 2008 WL 2817106, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 21, 2008)).
Motions to strike are “viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted.” Stanbury Law
Firm, 221 F.3d at 1063 (internal quotation marks omitted). As other courts have observed,
“‘motions to strike can be nothing other than distractions. If a defense is clearly irrelevant, then it
will likely never be raised again by the defendant and can be safely ignored. If a defense may be
relevant, then there are other contexts in which the sufficiency of the defense can be more
thoroughly tested with the benefit of a fuller record—such as on a motion for summary
judgment.’” Shirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., No. 1:13-CV-42 SNLJ, 2013 WL 3457010, at *1
(E.D. Mo. July 9, 2013) (quoting Morgan v. Midwest Neurosurgeons, LLC, No. 1:11-CV-37
CEJ, 2011 WL 2728334, *1 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2011)); see also Speraneo, 2012 WL 2117872,
at*1 (E.D. Mo. June 11, 2012) (quoting same).

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“A motion to strike an affirmative defense should not be granted ‘unless, as a matter of
law, the defense cannot succeed under any circumstances or is immaterial in that it has no
essential or important relationship to the claim for relief.’” Speraneo, 2012 WL 2117872, at *1
(quoting Cynergy Ergonomics, 2008 WL 2817106, at *2, and citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Coble, 720 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D. Mo. 1989)). In addition, “[a] motion to strike should not
succeed unless the party shows that it is prejudiced by the inclusion of a defense or that a
defense’s inclusion confuses the issues.” Id.; see also Shirrell, 2013 WL 3457010, at *1.
Defendant MHD has asserted fourteen affirmative defenses: (1) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted; (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (3) failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; (4) statute of limitations; (5) lawful and legitimate business reasons for
the alleged actions against Plaintiff; (6) good faith; (7) policies against unlawful harassment; (8)
offset of damages; (9) unconstitutionality of punitive damages here; (10) limitation of punitive
damages under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 510.265; (11) request for a bifurcated trial with respect to
punitive damages; (12) after-acquired evidence doctrine; (13) waiver and estoppel; and (14)
reservation of right to plead additional defenses. (Doc. 19).
In his motion, Plaintiff offers brief arguments about why these defenses would be
unsuccessful in this case. However, at this stage of the litigation, the Court cannot say that any of
these affirmative defenses cannot succeed under any circumstances or are immaterial to
Plaintiff’s claims for relief. Moreover, Plaintiff has also not shown that failure to strike these
defenses will prejudice him or will confuse the issues. Therefore, the motion to strike Defendant
MHD’s affirmative defenses will be denied. See Shirrell, 2013 WL 3457010, at *2; Speraneo,
2012 WL 2117872, at *2.

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B. Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses and Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Inez
Lampkin
In his second motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court strike the affirmative defenses
asserted by Defendant Lampkin. However, Defendant Lampkin has not filed any pleading in
which she asserts affirmative defenses. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s motion is directed toward
her affirmative defenses, his motion must be denied.
In the memorandum Plaintiff filed in support of his motion to strike, he also requests that
the Court strike Defendant Lampkin’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 31). However, under the plain
language of Rule 12(f), a motion to strike is properly directed only to a “pleading.” Pleadings are
defined to include a complaint, an answer to a complaint, an answer to a counterclaim, an answer
to a crossclaim, a third-party complaint, an answer to a third-party complaint, and a reply to an
answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). “This Court generally restricts the use of motions to strike to actual
pleadings.” Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Combs, No. 4:13-CV-1813 CAS, 2014 WL 988452, at
*2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 2014) (citing Khamis v. Bd. Of Regents, Southeast Mo. State Univ., 2010
WL 1936228, at *1) (E.D. Mo. May 13, 2010)); Donnelly v. St. John’s Mercy Med. Ctr., 2009
WL 1259364, at *1-2 (E.D. Mo. May 5, 2009; Mecklenburg Farm, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
2008 WL 2518561, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 19, 2008)).
Because Plaintiff’s request to strike is directed to a Defendant Lampkin’s motion to
dismiss and not to a pleading, it must be denied. See Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WL
988452, at *2 (denying a motion to strike because it was “directed to a motion to dismiss and not
to a pleading”). However, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s motion to strike and memorandum
in support to be Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant Lampkin’s motion to dismiss, and the Court
will consider the arguments therein when ruling on the motion to dismiss.

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III.

CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant Myrtle Hilliard

Davis’s affirmative defenses (Doc. 21) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Defendant Inez
Lampkin’s affirmative defenses and motion to dismiss (Doc. 30) is DENIED.
/s/Shirley Padmore Mensah
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated: March 25, 2015.

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