Halter v. St. Francois County Jail

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. [Doc. 4 ] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $1.00 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Charles A. Shaw on 1/5/15. (KXS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
DALLAS TYLER HALTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ST. FRANCOIS COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:14-CV-1891 CAS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff, an inmate at St. Francois
County Jail, for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee. For
the reasons stated below, the Court finds that plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the
entire filing fee and will assess a nominal partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Furthermore, based upon a review of the complaint, the Court finds that the complaint should be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or
her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an
initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the
prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior sixmonth period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make
monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's
account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these

monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds
$10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff has indicated that he has been unable to attain a copy of his prison account
statement. As such, the Court will simply charge him a nominal initial partial filing fee of $1.00
at this time.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is
frivolous if it Alacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.@ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
328 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). An action is malicious if it is
undertaken for the purpose of harassing the named defendants and not for the purpose of
vindicating a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987),
aff=d 826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not plead
Aenough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.@ Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1950-51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 1949. Second, the
Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51.
This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show

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more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.”

Id.

The Court must review the factual

allegations in the complaint “to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id.
at 1951. When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may
exercise its judgment in determining whether plaintiff’s proffered conclusion is the most
plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. Id. at 1950, 1951-52.
The Complaint
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil
rights. Named as defendants are the St. Francois County Jail and “Jail Administration.”
Plaintiff complains about the conditions of confinement at the St. Francois County Jail,
asserting that there is overcrowding in the cells, black mold on the walls and ceilings of the cells,
federal and state inmates are housed together, and that the inmates are served inadequate food.
Plaintiff also alleges that inmates are given a small clothing allowance due to the overpopulation
at the Jail, and he has not been provided with any law books or access to a law library. Plaintiff
states that inmates have inadequate outside recreation.
Plaintiff complains that he has is being charged a “room and board fee,” but fails to
allege how such a practice would violate his constitutional rights. Plaintiff also complains that in
addition to the room and board fee, inmates are charged for medical care and prescriptions, but
again, he fails to assert how he believes this practice violates the Constitution.

Plaintiff

additionally claims that inmates can only send “envelopes” to their attorneys, but not to friends
and family.

Finally, plaintiff makes various claims relative to the alleged treatment by

defendants of other inmates at the Jail.
In his request for relief, plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.

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Discussion
To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to assert claims against the St. Francois County
Jail, his claims are legally frivolous because the Jail, and the “Jail Administration,” is not a
suable entity.

Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992)

(departments or subdivisions of local government are “not juridical entities suable as such.”).
To the extent plaintiff believes he has made claims against some unnamed individual
defendants, such claims are subject to dismissal. The complaint is silent as to whether any such
defendants are being sued in their official or individual capacities. Where a “complaint is silent
about the capacity in which [plaintiff] is suing defendant, [a district court must] interpret the
complaint as including only official-capacity claims.” Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College,
72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). Naming a
government official in his or her official capacity is the equivalent of naming the government
entity that employs the official. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
To state a claim against a municipality or a government official in his or her official capacity,
plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of the government entity is responsible for the
alleged constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91
(1978). The instant complaint does not contain any allegations that a policy or custom of a
government entity was responsible for the alleged violations of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
As a result, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Even if plaintiff had made claims against an individual defendant in his or her individual
capacity, his assertions would still fail to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff’s complaint is largely
devoid of specific factual allegations against any specific defendant. Instead, he has made
generalized claims against correctional officers and supervisors, believing that these conclusory
allegations should be enough to hold someone responsible for the alleged injustices he has

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spelled out in the complaint. Plaintiff=s complaint does not suffice to properly allege that the
actions were known to one or more particular supervisory officials at the Jail, see Wilson v. City
of N. Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316, 323 (8th Cir. 1986), and it assuredly does not plead adequately
that any supervisor at the Jail acted with the impermissible purpose as required by Iqbal. See
Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995) (Aa general responsibility for
supervising the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish the personal involvement
required to support liability.@).
ALiability under ' 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged
deprivation of rights.@ Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990); see also
Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983
where plaintiff fails to allege defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for
incidents that injured plaintiff); Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (respondeat
superior theory inapplicable in § 1983 suits). In the instant action, plaintiff has not set forth any
facts, as opposed to conclusory assertions, indicating that an individually named defendant was
directly involved in or personally responsible for the alleged violations of plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. As a result, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Additionally, even if plaintiff had made individualized allegations against a defendant,
his conclusory and generalized allegations regarding what he believes to be unlawful conditions
of confinement are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. In order to establish an unlawful conditions of confinement claim in violation of the 8th
Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that he has been subjected to “extreme” deprivations and
been denied “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” See Hudson v. McMillian, 112
S. Ct. 995, 999-1000 (1992); Howard v. Adkinson, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989); Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The focus in a “conditions of confinement” case often falls
on the length of exposure to the purported unsanitary conditions and the level of alleged
filthiness the inmate was supposedly exposed to. See Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026,
1027 (8th Cir. 2003); Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1994) (length of
time required for conditions to be unconstitutional decreases as level of filthiness increases).
Plaintiff’s allegations that he doesn’t believe the inmates receive enough changes in
clothing, that the cells are often “overcrowded,” that the diet provided to the inmates is lacking,
that the cells lack proper ventilation, and that the walls and floors are unsanitary, are not
connected to any unlawful actions allegedly taken by one particular defendant against plaintiff.
Simply put, plaintiff’s nonspecific claims lack any detailed accompanying information, other
than his bald legal conclusions that such conditions are unlawful.

Like the allegations in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, plaintiff’s assertions are nothing more than a A[t]hreadbare recital[] of a cause
of action=s elements@ and are not entitled to an assumption of truth. 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Additionally, plaintiff’s assertion that inmates are charged for such things as medical care
items is not, by itself, an unconstitutional practice. It is true that the Eighth Amendment requires
that “humane conditions of confinement” be provided by prison officials, see Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U .S. 825, 832 (1994), and such requirements “include[s] provision for basic
hygiene.” Whittington v. Ortiz, 307 F. App’x 179, 186 (10th Cir. Jan. 13, 2009) (unpublished
op.) (citing Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir. 1996)). However, plaintiff cannot
state a claim for relief for having to pay for medical care because he has not asserted that he
cannot pay for his own care. Plaintiff has not even alleged that by using his account funds to pay
for such care, his access to courts or some other constitutional requirements have been interfered

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with.1 Plaintiff’s allegation that state and federal prisoners are housed together is also not, by
itself, an unconstitutional practice. In light of the aforementioned, the claims for unlawful
conditions of confinement will be dismissed at this time.
Plaintiff’s generalized assertions regarding his right to put his personal mail in
“envelopes” fails to state a constitutional violation, as written.

The Supreme Court has

recognized that “[i]nmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment.” O'Lane
v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). The addressee as well as the sender of direct
personal correspondence is protected by the First Amendment against unjustified governmental
interference with communication. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (citing
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965)). The Court determines the constitutionality
of prison staff's scrutiny of incoming and outgoing non-legal mail2 by evaluating whether “the
regulation [is] reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Thongvanh v. Thalacker,
17 F.3d 256, 258-59 (8th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff has not provided the Court with information as to what the policy or practice is
with regard to the sending/receiving of personal mail at the Jail. Simply put, plaintiff has failed
to allege that defendants’ actions in failing to allow him to send personal mail “in an envelope”
in some way interfered with his receipt of his mail or his ability to communicate with outside
parties during his incarceration at the Jail. Similarly, plaintiff has not alleged that his free speech
1

Although plaintiff asserts in a conclusory manner that he has not been provided with
law books or access to a law library, this claim does not allege a First Amendment violation. ATo
state a claim [for denial of meaningful access to the courts], inmates must assert that they
suffered an actual injury to pending or contemplated legal claims.@ Myers v. Hundley, 101 F.3d
542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has failed to allege an injury to his ongoing legal claims. As
such, he has not stated a claim for relief.
2

The First Amendment affords greater protection to an inmate's confidential
communications between himself and his counsel of record than to other mail. See Foster v.
Helling, 210 F.3d 378 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Prisoners retain their First Amendment rights of sending
and receiving mail, and prison officials may not read inmates' legal mail.” (citing Thongvanh v.
Thalacker, 17 F.3d 256, 258-59 (8th Cir. 1994)).
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rights have been impeded by such acts. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff has not properly
alleged a violation of his constitutional rights with respect to this claim.
Finally, plaintiff cannot attempt to bring the claims of other inmates before this Court.
Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims alleging mistreatment of other inmates, as plaintiff must
allege a personal loss. See Martin, 780 F.2d at 1337. Plaintiff is not an attorney and is simply
not authorized to assert constitutional claims on behalf of the inmates who reside at the Jail with
him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Therefore, the Court declines to address his arguments on behalf of
other inmates currently incarcerated at the Jail.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED. [Doc. 4]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $1.00
within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance
payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his
prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original
proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

CHARLES A. SHAW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 5th day of January, 2015.
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