Gogan v. Siler et al
Filing
68
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment [Doc. # 56 ] is denied. Signed by District Judge Carol E. Jackson on 4/17/2017. (CLO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
EDWARD B. GOGAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFFREY SILER, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 4:14-CV-1902 (CEJ)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition and the issues are fully
briefed.
On March 20, 2012, plaintiff Edward Gogan was taken to the St. Louis County
Justice Center after he was arrested in Clayton on an outstanding warrant. In this
action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff alleges that St. Louis County
corrections officers Jeffrey Siler, Cranston Jones, and James Lively severely beat
him while he was handcuffed with his hands behind his back. He was transported
by ambulance to the emergency room at SSM St. Mary’s Health Center, where he
was admitted for treatment of two broken ribs, a collapsed lung, and a perforated
eardrum. He asserts a § 1983 claim of excessive force in violation of his rights
under the Fourth Amendment and a state law claim of assault and battery.
I.
Background
The parties present widely divergent versions of the facts, beginning before
plaintiff arrived at the Justice Center. The Court sets out abbreviated statements of
the parties’ versions of events. In doing so, the Court expresses no opinion
regarding the credibility of the testimony.
A.
Plaintiff’s Version
Plaintiff Edward Gogan spent the evening of March 19, 2012, drinking beer at
a bar in Clayton, Missouri. Plaintiff’s Deposition [Doc. # 56-1 at 9]. After the bar
closed, he began walking toward home. A Clayton police officer in a patrol car
stopped him and asked for identification. After checking his state ID, the officer
informed plaintiff that there was an outstanding warrant from Jefferson County for
failure to pay child support and that he was under arrest. Plaintiff was handcuffed
with his hands behind his back and placed in the back of the patrol car. Id. at 10.
The Clayton police officer transported plaintiff to the St. Louis County Justice
Center to be processed and held for transfer to Jefferson County. Once inside the
Justice Center, the officer directed plaintiff to take a seat in the booking hallway.
Plaintiff complied. Id. at 13. Approximately five minutes later, a Justice Center
guard escorted plaintiff to a bench in front of the nurse’s station and told him to
wait for the nurse to call his name. Plaintiff testified that the guard stood to the
right of him, at a distance of a few feet. Plaintiff described the guard as a white
man in his late fifties or early sixties, with graying hair. Id. at 13, 15. When pressed
for further details, plaintiff stated that he had not been paying much attention to
him but he thought that the guard was under 6 feet tall and weighed about 180 or
190 pounds. In any event, he “seemed like a bigger fellow” than plaintiff. Id. at 15.
2
Plaintiff subsequently identified defendant Jeffrey Siler as the guard in question and
the Court will refer to him as Siler.1
Plaintiff stood up when he heard his name called. He testified that Siler
hauled him to his feet and told him to “move his ass.” Plaintiff swore at him.
Plaintiff testified that he took a half step before he was knocked unconscious by a
blow to his left ear from behind him. When he regained consciousness he was in
the hospital. Id. at 16. He was unable to describe what happened to him after he
lost consciousness. Id. at 16, 17. He had no memories of interacting with
defendants Jones and Lively. Id.
Plaintiff presented to the emergency department with a collapsed lung,
fractured ribs on both the left and right, and a punctured ear drum. [Doc. # 61-2].
He rated his pain at level 10 on a 10-point scale. He was described as intoxicated,
spitting, and screaming profanities. Id.
B.
Defendants’ Version
Defendant Jeffrey Siler held the rank of captain and was the intake
supervisor on March 20, 2012. Siler Deposition [Doc. # 56-2 at 4]. He testified that
he was present when two Clayton police officers brought plaintiff to the Justice
Center booking area in handcuffs, holding him by both arms. He described plaintiff
as “very drunk, very belligerent” and “acting out verbally.” Defendant Siler asked
the Clayton police officers to bring plaintiff to the counter where nurse Gerard
Kearney was ready to complete an intake evaluation. Plaintiff responded to
Kearney’s questions with profanities. Nurse Kearney determined that plaintiff was
1
Plaintiff was deposed on July 7, 2016. Defendant Jeffrey Siler was deposed on July 21,
2016. In an affidavit dated October 4, 2016, plaintiff states that when he attended Siler’s
deposition he recognized him as the guard who escorted him to the bench in front of the
nurse’s station. Plaintiff’s Affidavit, ¶ 5 [Doc. # 61-1].
3
fit for confinement. Id. at 6-7. Defendant Siler testified that he attempted to
replace the handcuffs the Clayton police officers had used to restrain plaintiff with
Justice Center restraints. Id. at 8. Plaintiff struggled during the switch so defendant
Siler “gave the instruction to place [him] in the prone position to limit his ability to
pull away from us or cause harm to us or anyone else.” Id. at 10. Once plaintiff was
on the floor, he kicked defendant Siler in the stomach “near the private area.” Id.
Defendant Siler grabbed plaintiff’s foot and leg, put it back on the ground, and put
his knees on plaintiff’s back to hold him down. Defendants Lively and Jones pinned
plaintiff’s legs and defendant Siler was able to complete the exchange of the
handcuffs. Id. at 11; 13. Plaintiff was then placed in a restraint chair. Id. at 8; 12.
Nurse Kearney examined plaintiff, who was moaning and had blood coming from
one ear.2 Kearney Deposition [Doc. # 56-5 at 7-8]. Kearney told the defendants
that plaintiff needed to be transported to the emergency room. Id. When asked how
he thought plaintiff sustained his injuries, defendant Siler noted that plaintiff had
been found by the Clayton police at the side of the road and opined that plaintiff
was injured before coming to the Justice Center. [Doc. # 56-2 at 10].
On March 20, 2012, defendant Siler was 42 years old and weighed 375
pounds. Siler Affidavit [Doc. # 56-6]. Defendant Jones is an African-American male
2
There is conflicting testimony regarding whether plaintiff was placed in a “spit hood” and,
if so, when in the process. See Plaintiff’s Dep. [Doc. # 56-1 at 14-15] (denying he has ever
been placed in spit hood); Cranston Jones Deposition [Doc. # 56-3 at 7] (spit hood was
called for when plaintiff was placed in restraint chair but the nurse prevented use because
there was blood coming from plaintiff’s ear); Kearney Dep. [Doc. # 56-5 at 20] (testifying
that medical records state plaintiff was wearing spit hood when he arrived in law
enforcement lobby); Siler Dep. [Doc. # 56-2 at 18) (testifying hood placed on plaintiff
before he went to nurse).
4
and was 28 years old at the time of this event. [Doc. # 56-7]. Defendant Lively was
42 years old, bald, and weighed 285 pounds.3
II.
Legal Standard
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary
judgment shall be entered if the moving party shows “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the court is required
to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must give
that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying
facts. AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). The moving
party bears the burden of showing both the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations of his pleadings but must set forth
specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of
material fact exists. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Honea, 458 F.3d 788, 791
(8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
Rule 56 “mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.” Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
III.
Discussion
3
The record does not state the race of either Siler or Lively, though plaintiff identified Siler
as the white man who hit him.
5
A.
Excessive Force
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures includes the right to be free from law enforcement officers using excessive
force in effectuating an arrest.4 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). “Not
every push or shove . . . violates the Fourth Amendment, but force is excessive
when the officers’ actions are not objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them.” Rohrbough v. Hall, 586 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s §
1983 claim. Qualified immunity shields government officials from suit unless their
conduct violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable official would
have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “The contours of the
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987). While the Supreme Court’s “case law do[es] not require a case directly on
point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, No. 16-67,
2017 WL 69170, at *4 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). “When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the plainly
4
The parties have proceeded on the assumption that plaintiff was an arrestee, rather than a
pretrial detainee, at the time of their encounter. See Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052,
1060–61 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that there is not a “bright line dividing the end of the
arrestee’s status and the beginning of the pretrial detainee’s status”). Because the
“objective reasonableness” standard applies to his excessive force claims regardless of his
status, the distinction is not critical to the analysis. Id. (“objective reasonableness” standard
applies to excessive force claims of arrestees under the Fourth Amendment and of pretrial
detainees under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
6
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct.
2042, 2044 (2015) (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).
“To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right
to be free from excessive force, the test is whether the amount of force used was
objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Henderson v. Munn,
439 F.3d 497, 502 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because
law
enforcement
officers
“are
often
forced
to make
split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,”
courts evaluate the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force “from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. In conducting this analysis, a court must
consider the totality of the circumstances. Cook v. City of Bella Villa, 582 F.3d 840,
849 (8th Cir. 2009). Circumstances relevant to the reasonableness of an officer’s
conduct include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
There are genuine disputes of fact regarding the circumstances and amount
of force and used against plaintiff, precluding summary judgment. While there is
agreement that the three defendants restrained plaintiff on the floor, there is a
dispute as to how he came to be on the floor in the first instance. Defendants claim
plaintiff was placed on the floor in a controlled manner when he resisted Siler’s
efforts to exchange the handcuffs. Plaintiff contends that he was knocked
unconscious from a blow to the head while walking toward the nurse’s station.
There is also a dispute as to the amount of force that was used in restraining
7
plaintiff while he was on the floor. Defendants contend that they used only the
amount of force necessary to restrain an arrestee who was struggling and
attempting to kick. Plaintiff states that he was unconscious and in handcuffs and
thus offering no resistance. Plaintiff’s version of the facts, if accepted by a factfinder, is sufficient to establish an objectively unreasonable use of force in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, it was clearly established at the time of
this incident that an unresisting, cooperative, restrained arrestee had the right to
be free from the application of force that was allegedly used here. See Rohrbough
v. Hall, 586 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 2009) (officer not entitled to qualified immunity
on claims he punched plaintiff in the face, took him to the ground face down,
landed on top of him and caused him serious injury was illegal).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because
plaintiff’s description during deposition of the corrections officer that hit him cannot
plausibly describe any of them. As noted above, plaintiff states by affidavit that he
recognized Siler as the man who hit him when he attended Siler’s deposition.
Defendants argue that this recognition is not in any way reflected in the transcript
of Siler’s deposition.5 This argument goes to the credibility and weight that a factfinder may give to plaintiff’s testimony, factors that cannot be considered on
summary judgment. Defendants also argue that plaintiff has admitted he does not
know what defendants Jones and Lively did to him while he was unconscious.
5
Defendants do not argue that plaintiff’s affidavit is a “sham affidavit” drafted to create a
genuine dispute of material fact. Such an argument would not succeed in this case because
plaintiff’s affidavit is not plainly inconsistent with his deposition testimony. See Blackwell v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 399 F.Supp.2d 998, 1004 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (finding the “sham
affidavit rule” only applies if the affidavit is “plainly inconsistent” with prior testimony); see
also Schiernbeck v. Davis, 143 F.3d 434, 438 (8th Cir. 1998) (refusing to consider
statements in affidavit plainly inconsistent with deposition testimony in a summary
judgment motion).
8
However, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that they participated in the
restraint and that plaintiff sustained serious injuries. A fact-finder could reasonably
infer that defendants caused those injuries.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be denied with respect to
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
B.
Assault and Battery
Under Missouri law, “public officials acting within the scope of their authority
are not liable in tort for injuries arising from their discretionary acts or omissions.”
Davis v. White, 794 F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Seiner v. Drenon,
304 F.3d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 2002)). A law enforcement officer’s decision to use
force in the performance of his duties is discretionary rather than ministerial. See
id. (citing Davis v. Lambert–St. Louis Int’l Airport, 193 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Mo. banc
2006) (“An act is discretionary when it requires the exercise of reason in the
adaption of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether an act
should be done or a course pursued.”)). Official immunity “does not apply to
discretionary acts done in bad faith or with malice.” Id. (quoting Blue v. Harrah’s
North Kan. City, LLC, 170 S.W.3d 466, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)). “A defendant acts
with malice when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence
would know to be contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or
injurious to another.” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443,
447 (Mo. 1986)). “Bad faith” means “conscious wrongdoing” or “breach of a known
duty through some ulterior motive.” Id. Plaintiff’s version of events on March 20,
2012, if accepted by the fact-finder, would preclude the application of official
immunity.
9
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be denied with respect to
plaintiff’s assault and battery claim.
***
For the reasons discussed above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment
[Doc. # 56] is denied.
CAROL E. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 17th day of April, 2017.
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?