Moore v. St. Francois County Jail

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -....IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.[Doc. 2] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $1.00 within thirty days(30) of th e date of this Order.....IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 USC §1915(e)(2)(B). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for order for inmate account is DENIED as moot. [Doc. 4] An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. ( Initial Partial Filing Fee due by 2/6/2015.). Signed by District Judge Charles A. Shaw on 1/7/2015. (MRC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ADAM WAYNE MOORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
ST. FRANCOIS COUNTY JAIL,
Defendant.

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No. 4:14-CV-1911 CAS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff, an inmate at St. Francois
County Jail, for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee. For
the reasons stated below, the Court finds that plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the
entire filing fee and will assess a nominal partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Furthermore, based upon a review of the complaint, the Court finds that the complaint should be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or
her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an
initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the
prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior sixmonth period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make
monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's
account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these

monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds
$10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff has indicated that he has been unable to attain a copy of his prison account
statement. As such, the Court will simply charge him a nominal initial partial filing fee of $1.00
at this time.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is
frivolous if it Alacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.@ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
328 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). An action is malicious if it is
undertaken for the purpose of harassing the named defendants and not for the purpose of
vindicating a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987),
aff=d 826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not plead
Aenough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.@ Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1950-51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 1949. Second, the
Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51.
This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show
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more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.”

Id.

The Court must review the factual

allegations in the complaint “to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id.
at 1951. When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may
exercise its judgment in determining whether plaintiff’s proffered conclusion is the most
plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. Id. at 1950, 1951-52.
The Complaint
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil
rights. The sole defendant named in this action is the St. Francois County Jail (“Jail”).
Plaintiff complains about the conditions of confinement at the Jail, asserting that he was
placed in the “hole” for two months, there is overcrowding in the cells, mold on the walls of the
cells, federal and state prisoners are housed together, cell searches are conducted late at night,
and the inmates are not served enough food. Plaintiff also alleges that he has only one pair of
clothing, and that there is no law library “to study law to see thing [sic] about my case.” Plaintiff
also makes claims relative to the alleged mistreatment of another inmate by a deputy at the Jail.
Finally, plaintiff alleges that his bond amount is excessive.
In his request for relief, plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.
Discussion
To the extent plaintiff is attempting to assert claims against the St. Francois County Jail,
his claims are legally frivolous because the Jail is not a suable entity. Ketchum v. City of West
Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (departments or subdivisions of local government
are “not juridical entities suable as such.”).
As previously stated, the Jail is the only named defendant.

To the extent plaintiff

believes he has made claims against some unnamed individual defendants, such claims are
subject to dismissal. The complaint is silent as to whether any such defendants are being sued in
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their official or individual capacities. Where a “complaint is silent about the capacity in which
[plaintiff] is suing defendant, [a district court must] interpret the complaint as including only
official-capacity claims.” Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir.
1995); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). Naming a government official in his
or her official capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity that employs the
official. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). To state a claim against
a municipality or a government official in his or her official capacity, plaintiff must allege that a
policy or custom of the government entity is responsible for the alleged constitutional violation.
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). The instant complaint does not
contain any allegations that a policy or custom of a government entity was responsible for the
alleged violations of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As a result, the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Even if plaintiff had made claims against an individual defendant in his or her individual
capacity, which he has not, his assertions would still fail to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff’s
complaint is entirely devoid of specific factual allegations against any individual defendant, to
the extent the complaint asserts plaintiff’s own claims as opposed to the claims of another
inmate. ALiability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged
deprivation of rights.@ Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990); see also
Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983
where plaintiff fails to allege defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for
incidents that injured plaintiff); Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (respondeat
superior theory inapplicable in § 1983 suits). In the instant action, plaintiff has not set forth any
facts indicating that an individually named defendant was directly involved in or personally

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responsible for the alleged violations of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

As a result, the

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Additionally, even if plaintiff had made individualized allegations against a defendant,
his conclusory and generalized allegations regarding what he believes to be unlawful conditions
of confinement are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. In order to establish an unlawful conditions of confinement claim in violation of the 8th
Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that he has been subjected to “extreme” deprivations and
been denied “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” See Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992); Howard v. Adkinson, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989); Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The focus in a “conditions of confinement” case often falls on the
length of exposure to the purported unsanitary conditions and the level of alleged filthiness the
inmate was supposedly exposed to. See Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th
Cir. 2003); Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1994) (length of time
required for conditions to be unconstitutional decreases as level of filthiness increases).
Plaintiff’s allegations of inadequate changes of clothing, overcrowded cells, insufficient
diet, moldy walls and late night cell searches, are not connected to any unlawful actions
allegedly taken by one particular defendant against plaintiff. Simply put, plaintiff’s nonspecific
claims lack any detailed accompanying information, other than his bald legal conclusions that
such conditions are unlawful. Just like the allegations in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, plaintiff’s assertions
are nothing more than a A[t]hreadbare recital[] of a cause of action=s elements@ and are not
entitled to an assumption of truth. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Further, plaintiff’s allegation
that state and federal prisoners are housed together is not, by itself, an unconstitutional practice.
For these reasons, plaintiff’s claims for unlawful conditions of confinement will be dismissed.

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Plaintiff’s claim that he was held in the “hole” for two months, by itself, does not
constitute an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life
so as to give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484 (1995); see also Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding
administrative segregation is not an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin).
Plaintiff’s conclusory claim that he has not been provided with a law library fails to
allege a First Amendment violation.

“The Supreme Court has held that ‘the fundamental

constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.’” Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d
998, 1004 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)). “Nevertheless,
Bounds ‘did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library.’” Id. at 1005 (quoting
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)). “Instead, prison officials must provide inmates with
‘meaningful access to the courts,’ Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824, and providing a law library is merely
one way to comply with this obligation.” Id. “Because ‘meaningful access to the courts is the
touchstone,’ id. at 823 (internal quotation omitted), an inmate alleging a constitutional violation
must show an ‘actual injury’ by ‘demonstrat[ing] that the alleged shortcomings in the library or
legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.’ Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.”
Entzi, 485 F.3d at 1005.
The Eighth Circuit has held that even if an inmate can show a “complete and systematic
denial of access to a law library or legal assistance,” he must still “‘demonstrate that the alleged
shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal
claim.’” Klinger v. Department of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis, 518
U.S. at 351). To succeed on a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must show that
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he suffered actual injury as a result of the defendants’ actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353. In order
to satisfy the actual injury requirement, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal
claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.” Johnson v. Missouri, 142 F.3d 1087, 1089
(8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353). Plaintiff has failed to allege an injury to his
nonfrivolous ongoing legal claims. As such, he has not stated a claim for relief.
Plaintiff also alleges that his bond has been set too high, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. However, an inmate’s bond is not set by the Jail, but rather is set by the state court
or one of its judicial officers. See, e.g., Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 874 (8th Cir. 1998)
(setting bail is entirely at discretion of presiding judge). As a result, this claim is not properly
directed against the Jail under § 1983.1
Finally, plaintiff cannot attempt to bring the claims of another inmate before this Court.
Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims alleging mistreatment of other inmates, as plaintiff must
allege a personal loss. See Martin, 780 F.2d at 1337. Further, plaintiff is not an attorney and is
not authorized to assert constitutional claims on behalf of the inmates who reside at the Jail with
him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Therefore, the Court does not address plaintiff’s claim concerning
treatment of another inmate incarcerated at the Jail.

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Further, under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971), a federal court must
abstain from interfering with pending state criminal proceedings “when the moving party has an
adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” The
Younger abstention doctrine is premised upon a fundamental “public policy against federal
interference with state criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 43. In this case, plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law regarding the amount of his bond because he may pursue the claim through the
state court system in his ongoing state criminal proceeding. Even if plaintiff had properly
exhausted his state court remedies with respect to the bond, the appropriate avenue of relief
would be a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
GRANTED. [Doc. 2]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $1.00 within
thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to
“Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison
registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original
proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for order for inmate account is
DENIED as moot. [Doc. 4]
An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

CHARLES A. SHAW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 7th day of January, 2015.

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