Crump v. Boester et al

Filing 126

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Mario Crump's Motion to Allow Discovery Necessary to Respond to Defendant Dotsons Motion to Dismiss and for Continued Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants Motion # 112 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Mario Crumps Motion to Allow Discovery Necessary to Respond to Board Defendants Motion to Dismiss and for Continued Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants Motion # 115 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Briefing on Defendant Dotsons Motion to Dismiss # 104 and Board Defendants Motion to Dismiss # 108 will proceed as follows: Plaintiffs opposition briefs shall be filed no later than April 1, 2016. Any reply briefs may be filed no later than April 13, 2016. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 3/21/16. (ARL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARIO CRUMP,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MATTHEW E. BOESTER, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:14 CV 1975 RWS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendants Thomas Irwin, Bettye Battle-Turner, Richard Gray, Erwin
Switzer, and Mayor Francis G. Slay (the Board Defendants) and Defendant Samuel
Dotson filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff Mario Crump’s claims against them.
Crump moved for an extension of time and leave to conduct additional discovery
before responding to the Board Defendants’ and Dotson’s motions. I will deny
Crump’s motions and order that briefing on the motions to dismiss proceed.
Crump filed his First Amended Complaint on December 30, 2015, alleging,
among other things, that Dotson and the Board Defendants are liable for damages
because the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD), under the control
of Dotson, Mayor Slay, the City of St. Louis, and/or the Board Defendants “failed
on a continuing basis to train, instruct, supervise, control and discipline” SLMPD
officers, including the SLMPD officer defendants in this case, and that “said

failure was a result of official policy or the custom and practice” of the SLMPD
and “caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights secured by the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and the laws of the State of Missouri.”
Dotson moved to dismiss Crump’s claims against him under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing Dotson is entitled to qualified immunity because
Crump failed to allege that Dotson, through his own individual actions, violated
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. The Board Defendants also
moved to dismiss Crump’s claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing
Crump failed to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for municipal
liability against them. Crump moved for an extension of time and leave to conduct
discovery before responding to both motions. Crump asks that he be allowed to
depose Dotson, the Commander of Internal Affairs for the SLMPD, and Mayor
Slay; request additional responses to his Request for Production; and serve the
Board Defendants with written discovery requests and requests for admissions so
he can “adequately respond” to the motions to dismiss and amend his complaint.
Crump has failed to persuade me that he should be allowed to conduct this
discovery before responding to the motions to dismiss. Insofar as he argues that
Defendants deny some of his allegations and put forward a different version of the
facts, I remind Crump that at the motion to dismiss stage, I must accept as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to

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him. Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1148 (8th Cir. 1993). The federal rules do not
require “detailed factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). Crump has provided no authority suggesting he could survive a motion to
dismiss by supplementing the allegations in his complaint with additional evidence
in his opposition briefs or should be allowed an extension of time before
responding to a motion to dismiss to conduct discovery so he can amend his
complaint to cure any deficiencies. See Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1184 (8th
Cir. 1981) (“Discovery should follow the filing of a well-pleaded complaint. It is
not a device to enable a plaintiff to make a case when his complaint has failed to
state a claim.”).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Mario Crump’s Motion to Allow
Discovery Necessary to Respond to Defendant Dotson’s Motion to Dismiss and for
Continued Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant’s Motion #[112] is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Mario Crump’s Motion to
Allow Discovery Necessary to Respond to Board Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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and for Continued Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants’ Motion #[115] is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Briefing on Defendant Dotson’s Motion
to Dismiss #[104] and Board Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss #[108] will proceed
as follows: Plaintiff’s opposition briefs shall be filed no later than April 1, 2016.
Any reply briefs may be filed no later than April 13, 2016.

______________________________
RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 21st day of March, 2016.

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