Crump v. Boester et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Samuel Dotson, Francis G. Slay, and St. Louis Metropolitan Police Departments Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim # 7 is GRANTED. Defendants Doston, Slay, and St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department are DISMISSED without prejudice from this case. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 1/15/15. (ARL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARIO CRUMP,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MATTHEW E. BOESTER, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:14 CV 1975 RWS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mario Crump brought this suit alleging violations of his civil rights, Missouri state law, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act arising from an incident with St. Louis Metropolitan Police
officers. Police Chief Samuel Dotson and Mayor Francis G. Slay move to dismiss the claims
against them in their official capacities because the claims are redundant of the claims brought
against the City of St. Louis. The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) moves to
dismiss the claims against it because the police department as an administrative arm of the City is
not a suable entity. After careful consideration, I will grant the motion to dismiss Dotson, Slay, and
the SLMPD from this case.
I.

Standard of Review
When ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, I am required to accept the

complaint's factual allegations as true and to construe them liberally in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. In essence, this mandates that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief. Midwestern Machinery, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, 167
F.3d 439, 441 (8th Cir. 1999); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). An action fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A
“plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formalistic recitation of elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s factual allegations “must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555.
II.

Background
This case was originally filed in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri on

October 27, 2014. In the complaint, Crump claims that he was unlawfully assaulted and battered by
SLMPD officers; that the officers then conspired to unlawfully arrest Crump and to falsify
statements to cover up their actions; that he was maliciously prosecuted on those charges; and that
these actions were caused by the problematic policies or customs of the City of St. Louis and
SLMPD. Crump also alleges that defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, because he suffers from major depressive disorder, a disability
covered by Title II of the ADA, and defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his
disability during the events in question.
The complaint alleges the following facts which in consideration of a motion to dismiss are
taken as true. On the evening of March 21, 2014, Crump was at home with his wife. Crump had
recently been discharged from the psychiatric ward, and his wife became concerned that he was
behaving strangely. Ms. Crump called 911 for assistance and told the dispatcher that Crump might
need to go back to the psychiatric ward. SLMPD Officers Boester and Schaffer responded to the
call, and found Crump in an unconscious or semiconscious condition. Ms. Crump told the officers
about Crump’s mental state. When Crump was unresponsive to the officers’ questions, the officers
allegedly assaulted and battered him, causing injuries to his hands and face. Following the
altercation, Defendant Doe, who was acting as Boester and Schaffer’s supervisor, arrived at

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Crump’s home. Crump was then taken into custody and transported to Barnes Hospital for
treatment of his injuries. Later, Crump was charged with Assault on a Law Enforcement Officer in
the Second and Third Degrees and Resisting Arrest. Crump was held in jail until March 31, 2014,
when he was released on bond.
The defendants named in the complaint are SLMPD Officers Matthew Boester, Gregory
Schaffer, and John Doe; Samuel Dotson, in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the SLMPD;
Francis Slay, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of St. Louis; and the City of St. Louis
(“the City”).
On November 26, 2014, defendants removed this case from the Missouri state court to this
Court. On the same date, defendants Dotson, Slay, and SLMPD filed the instant motion to dismiss.
III.

Discussion
A. Crump’s Claims against Dotson and Slay are Redundant
Suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state official in his official capacity “generally

represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). For that reason, it is proper for a court to dismiss a
claim against a government officer in his official capacity if it is redundant of a claim asserted
against the governmental entity. Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir.
2010).
Moving defendants argue that since Crump has asserted the same claims against the City of
St. Louis that he has asserted against Dotson and Slay, and since Dotson and Slay are both
government officers of the city, the claims are redundant and should be dismissed. Crump argues
that the claims against Dotson are not redundant because the City only admits that Dotson was
“Chief of Police for SLMPD” and that he had “limited authority to promulgate some rules and

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regulations for those under his authority.” However, the City has admitted that at all times relevant
it operated and maintained the SLMPD, that SLMPD was a department of the City, and that Dotson
was the Chief of Police. As Chief of Police, Dotson is, by any reasonable definition, an officer of
the City of St. Louis.
Crump also appears to argue that his claims against Slay are not redundant because, in
addition to being Mayor, Slay is a final policymaker in his role as a member of the Board of Police
Commissioners. This argument, however, fails. While Crump does state in the complaint that Slay
is a final policymaker for the SLMPD, he never alleges that this policymaking authority derives
from Slay’s membership in the Board of Police Commissioners. In fact, the Board of Police
Commissioners is never mentioned in the complaint. Additionally, the only capacity in which
Crump names Slay as a defendant is in his official capacity as Mayor. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d),
when matters outside the pleadings are presented on a motion to dismiss, the court may either treat
the motion as one for summary judgment and provide the parties with an opportunity to provide
additional materials, or treat it as one to dismiss and exclude the matters outside the pleadings. See
Gibb v. Scott, 958 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1992). Generally, a court “must ignore materials outside
the pleadings” unless they are part of the public record, do not contradict the complaint, or are
necessarily embraced by the pleadings. Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 395 (8th Cir.
2014).
Here, Crump never alleges that Slay’s membership in the Board of Police Commissioners is
a basis for liability in the complaint. It was Crump’s decision not to name Slay or any other
member of the Board of Police Commissioners. It would be imprudent for me to construe his
complaint as bringing a claim when he chose not to do so. Any argument regarding Slay’s
membership in the Board of Police Commissioners is outside of the pleadings and I decline to
consider it.

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Crump also argues that his complaint should be construed as bringing claims against Dotson
and Slay in their individual capacities as well as their official capacities. In order to sue a public
official in his individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the
pleadings, otherwise it will be construed that the defendant is sued only in his official capacity.
Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). Here, there are no clear
statements that Dotson and Slay are being sued in their individual capacities. In fact, the complaint
expressly states that Dotson and Slay are sued “in their official capacities only.” [Doc. #1, Ex. C, p.
6]. Crump attempts to cure this defect by stating that he will seek leave to amend the complaint to
more clearly state claims against Dotson and Slay in their individual capacities. But Crump’s
representation that he will seek leave to amend the complaint does not cure the defects in the
complaint. As a result, I will only consider the official capacity claims, which were brought against
Dotson and Slay in the complaint. See Gibb v. Scott, 958 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1992).
Because Crump only brings claims against Dotson and Slay in their official capacities, and
because these claims are redundant of the claims brought against the City of St. Louis, I will dismiss
defendants Dotson and Slay from this case.

B. SLMPD is not a Suable Entity
In the complaint, Crump claims that the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department is
vicariously liable for the torts allegedly committed by the named officers. Crump also charges
SLMPD with violating the Americans with Disabilities Act. The moving defendants argue that the
claims against SLMPD should be dismissed because SLMPD is not a suable entity. Moving
defendants are correct. It is well-established that the SLMPD is not a suable entity. See Ketchum
v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir.1992) (departments or subdivisions of
local government are “not juridical entities suable as such.”); Jordan v. Kansas City, 929 S.W.2d

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882, 887–88 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (“Where a department of a City is not a legislatively-created entity,
but rather is an administrative arm of the City, it lacks a legal identity apart from the City and is
therefore not a suable entity unto itself.”); See also Williams v. St. Louis Metro. Police Dep't, 2009
WL 2245160, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 27, 2009) (“According to Missouri law, the Board of Police
Commissioners and the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department are not suable entities, and
therefore, neither is a proper party defendant in this action.”); Edwards v. Baer, 863 F.2d 606, 609
(8th Cir. 1988) (“Jurisdiction can only be obtained by suing [the Board of Police Commissioners’]
individual members”) (internal citations omitted). As a result, Crump can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief and Crump’s claims against the SLMPD will be
dismissed.
The parties argue about whether respondeat superior is a proper basis for establishing
SLMPD liability.1 But because it is established that SLMPD is not a suable entity, I will not
address the merits of this argument.
Crump argues that the SLMPD is a proper defendant for his Americans with Disabilities Act
claim because Title II of the statute prohibits public entities from discriminating in the provision of
services, programs, or activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Under the ADA, “public entity” is defined as
“any state or local government” or “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or State’s local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12313(1)(A)(B). Crump cites
to Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998), for the proposition that a local police
department is a “public entity” under the ADA. In Gorman, however, the plaintiff sued the proper
defendants under Missouri’s operating scheme - the individual members of the Board of Police
Commissioners. Id. at 909, 912. See also Edwards v. Baer, 863 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1988).

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Moving defendants spend much time arguing that respondeat superior is not a proper basis for liability for a § 1983
claim. In the complaint, however, Plaintiff does not seek to impose respondeat superior liability on SLMPD for either
of its § 1983 claims. Rather, Plaintiff seeks to establish respondeat superior liability only for its state law tort claims.

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When the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was referring to the “police department,” it was referring
to the members of the Board of Police Commissioners. The fact that the ADA provides for suit to
be brought against a police department does not change the fact that in Missouri, the proper
defendant for claims against the police department is not the SLMPD, but rather, the individual
members of the Board of Police Commissioners. See id.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, I find that Crump has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted in respect to his claims against moving defendants Dotson, Slay, and SLMPD.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Samuel Dotson, Francis G. Slay, and St.
Louis Metropolitan Police Department’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim #[7] is
GRANTED. Defendants Doston, Slay, and St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department are
DISMISSED without prejudice from this case.

RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 15th day of January, 2015.

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