Natoli v. District Lodge No. 837, International Association of Machinists Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant District Lodge 837s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 25 ), is GRANTED, and Plaintiff Colleen Natolis Amended Complaint is DISMISSED. A separate judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that District 837s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Request for Punitive Damages and Damages for Emotional Distress and Mental Anguish, (ECF No. 23 ), is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by District Judge Jean C. Hamilton on 3/9/15. (KJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
COLLEEN NATOLI,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DISTRICT LODGE NO. 837,
)
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF )
MACHINISTS AEROSPACE WORKERS )
AFL-CIO,
)
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. 4:14CV2017JCH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by
Defendant District Lodge 837 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO (“District 837”). (ECF No. 25). The Motion has been fully briefed and is
ready for disposition.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Colleen Natoli initiated this action by filing a Petition in the Circuit Court of St.
Louis County, Missouri on September 26, 2014. (Removal Notice, ECF No. 1). District 837
timely removed the matter to this Court, and Natoli filed an Amended Complaint on January 12,
2015. (Removal Notice; Amended Complaint, ECF No. 20). According to her Amended
Complaint, Natoli “was employed by The Boeing Company (henceforth “Boeing”) from April
13, 2001 to May 10, 2013” and was during that time a member of District 837. (Amended
Complaint, ¶¶ 3, 4).
“On Saturday January 19, 2013, [Natoli] worked on a Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) wing
assembly work order, and during the process of completing the wing assembly order, cut three
1

wires too short.” Id. ¶ 5. Natoli reported one of the incidents to her manager. Id. ¶ 6. Natoli also
“disassembled the SBD wing assembly, removed the non conforming components, and
reassembled the SBD wing with conforming components.” Id. ¶ 7. Natoli intended to report her
actions the following Monday but forgot to do so “due to her abuse of alcohol . . . and the
deleterious effect the alcohol abuse had on her work performance and her memory.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.
Natoli was terminated as a result of her actions “for violating the Expected Conduct for All
Boeing Employees in particular #4, ‘Concealing Defective Work and #3, ‘Failure to Comply’
. . . .” Id. ¶ 10.
Natoli further alleges that “at the time of her termination, [Natoli] filed a grievance with
the Plant Chairman Ron Evola stating that she felt that she was unjustly terminated.” Id. ¶ 17.
Evola offered her no information other than the time frame in which her grievance must be filed.
Id. Among Evola’s alleged omissions was a reference to Boeing’s “Drug and Alcohol Free
Workplace (“DFW”)” policy. Id. The DFW policy allows Boeing employees to qualify for a
“‘Discharge-in-Abeyance’ (hereafter ‘DIA’) if the employee displays attendance or performance
issues due to alcohol or substance abuse.” Id. ¶ 12. “If an employee qualifies for the DIA
program, then the employee’s discharge is abated and the employee participates in a ‘Substance
Abuse Rehabilitation Plan’ with the guidance of the ‘Employee Assistance Program’ (henceforth
‘EAP’) and the employee maintains her employment.” Id. ¶ 14. Evola’s failure to notify Natoli of
the DIA policy at the time of her termination allegedly caused Natoli to lose the privileges to
which she was entitled under the policy. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.
Natoli claims that Evola’s handling of her termination, due to his failure to disclose
information about the DIA policy, was a breach of District 837’s Duty of Fair Representation. Id.

2

¶¶ 30-33. District 837 seeks to dismiss Natoli’s Amended Complaint on the ground that she has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief’ . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. 8(a)(2)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Courts must also “accept the
allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005). A Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss must be granted if the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007). Stated differently,
to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Id. at 555 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
District 837 contends that Natoli’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed because the
DIA policy would not have applied to Natoli. (Support Memo, ECF No. 26, at 7). This is so
because the policy covers only “those employees whose substance abuse resulted in discharge
for the offenses of ‘unacceptable attendance or work performance.’” Id. (quoting Amended
Complaint, ¶ 13). Natoli’s termination fell under neither category. Id. Instead, Natoli pleads in
her Amended Complaint that “she was fired for ‘concealing defective work’ and ‘failure to
comply.’” Id. (quoting Amended Complaint ¶ 10). Any failure by Evola to inform Natoli of the
policy therefore could not have breached the duty of fair representation.

3

Natoli responds that, contrary to District 837’s assertions, she did plead that she was fired
for problems related to her work performance. (Natoli Response, ECF No. 29, ¶ 2 (quoting
Amended Complaint ¶ 8)). She would therefore have been covered under the DIA policy. See id.
¶¶ 8, 9. But she was not given the opportunity to take advantage of the policy because Evola
failed to inform her of it. Id. ¶¶ 6, 14. Moreover, Evola’s reason for failing to inform Natoli of
the policy was allegedly that he felt he had other obligations to meet and therefore did not give
Natoli the attention to which she was entitled. Id. ¶ 6. Evola, as a representative of District 837,
therefore acted in an arbitrary and perfunctory manner, which amounts to a breach of District
837’s duty of fair representation. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 10, 16.
“A breach of the duty of fair representation by a union occurs only when the union’s
conduct is ‘arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.’” Smith v. United Parcel Serv., 96 F.3d
1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)). “A union’s
conduct is arbitrary if, considering all the circumstances at the time of the union’s action or
inaction, ‘the union’s behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be
irrational.’” Id. (quoting Beavers v. United Paperworks Int’l Union, Local 1741, 72 F.3d 97, 100
(8th Cir. 1995)). A union acts in bad faith when it engages in “‘fraud, deceitful action or
dishonest conduct’ . . . .” Id. at 1069 (quoting Schmidt v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 949,
980 F.2d 1167, 1170 (8th Cir. 1992)). “Discriminatory conduct occurs when the union fails to
serve ‘the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any.’” Thompson v.
United Transp. Union, 588 F.3d 568, 572 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177).
The Supreme Court has found that one example of a breach of the duty of fair
representation is when a union “‘arbitrarily ignore[s] a meritorious grievance or process[es] it in
[a] perfunctory fashion.’” Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979)

4

(alterations in original) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190). The Eighth Circuit has defined
“perfunctory” to mean that the union “acted without concern or solicitude, or gave plaintiff’s
grievance only cursory attention.” Brown v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 1354, 1357 (8th
Cir. 1984). To survive this motion to dismiss, Natoli must have alleged sufficient facts to support
a plausible claim that District 837 breached its duty.
Natoli has alleged that Evola, the plant chairman, failed to inform Natoli of the DIA
policy prior to her leaving the Boeing premises. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 12-17). Evola
allegedly did not alert Natoli to the DIA policy “because he said he ‘had to be somewhere’ and
did not have time to properly discuss [Natoli’s] termination with her.” Id. ¶ 19. Because of
Evola’s failure, Natoli was allegedly unable to take advantage of the DIA policy and unable
subsequently to raise it “in defense during the course of the grievance and arbitration process.”
Id. ¶ 25.
These allegations provide insufficient support for the claim that District 837, through
Evola, acted in a manner that was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. At most, they
arguably support a plausible claim that Evola acted in a perfunctory manner. But there is no
indication that Natoli’s grievance had merit, which is a requirement under the Vaca perfunctoryaction standard.1 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190. As District 837 correctly points out, the DIA policy
applies only to Boeing employees who are terminated for two specific reasons: “‘unacceptable
attendance’ and ‘work performance’ problems[,]” which are clearly defined categories. (District
837 Reply, ECF No. 30, at 3 (citing Employee Corrective Action Process Requirements,
“ECAPR,” ECF No. 30-3, at 15, 18, 32, 33)). Natoli’s termination, as described in her Amended
The Court assumes here that Evola’s actions were taken in the processing of a grievance, also a
requirement of the Vaca standard. Baker v. Constr. and Gen. Laborers, Local No. 264, AFL-CIO, 822
F.2d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1987). While the Amended Complaint does not make clear that the meeting with
Evola was part of the grievance process, it is arguably a reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts
alleged.
1

5

Complaint, fell under neither. Id. (citing Employee Corrective Action Memo, “ECAM,” ECF No.
30-2). 2 Natoli therefore has provided no factual support for her claim that the DIA policy was
applicable to her. Without factual allegations to support the existence of a meritorious grievance,
there is insufficient support for a plausible perfunctory-action claim under Vaca. Natoli has
therefore failed to state a plausible claim for breach of District 837’s duty of fair representation.

Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant District Lodge 837’s Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 25), is GRANTED, and Plaintiff Colleen Natoli’s Amended
Complaint is DISMISSED. A separate judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that District 837’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Request
for Punitive Damages and Damages for “Emotional Distress and Mental Anguish,” (ECF No.
23), is DENIED AS MOOT.

Dated this 9th Day of March, 2015.

/s/ Jean C. Hamilton
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Natoli contends that the ECAPR and ECAM are “matters outside the pleadings” that cannot be
considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion into one for summary judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. (Natoli Surreply, ECF No. 33, ¶¶ 3-5). These documents are cited and quoted in
several paragraphs of Natoli’s Amended Complaint. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 12-15). They are
therefore in the category of “‘matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim’” that federal
courts may consider in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab.,
Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)).
2

6