Tucker v. BNSF Railway Company et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Tucker's Motion to Remand, (ECF No. 14 ), is GRANTED, and this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri. A separate order of remand will accompany this Memorandum and Ord. Signed by District Judge Jean C. Hamilton on 02/27/2015. cc: copy to Circuit Court Of St. Louis County(CLK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LUCAS A. TUCKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 4:14CV2123(JCH)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Lucas Tucker’s Motion to Remand. (ECF No.
14). The Motion has been fully briefed and is ready for disposition.
BACKGROUND
Tucker initiated this action on November 18, 2014 by filing a Petition in the Circuit Court
of St. Louis County, Missouri. (Removal Notice, ECF No. 1, ¶ 1). Tucker claims he was fired by
Defendant BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act
(“MHRA”). (Petition, ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 33, 34). According to the Petition, Tucker was employed by
“Defendant BNSF from August 1, 2005 to December 3, 2012.”1 Id. ¶ 9. “In 2007, [Tucker]
suffered an injury to his left eye. The injury resulted in the partial loss of vision in the left eye.
[Tucker] also experienced depression and migraine headaches.” Id. ¶ 11. Tucker claims these
conditions rendered him “disabled within the meaning of the MHRA.” Id. ¶ 14.
“From January 3, 2011 to June 4, 2012, [Tucker] was on medical leave from work in
connection with his medical conditions. Defendants knew about [Tucker’s] disabilities and knew
he had a record of such disability or disabilities.” Id. ¶ 16. Tucker received clearance to return to
work from Dr. John Memken, Tucker’s medical doctor, on or about June 4, 2012. Id. ¶ 17.
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The remaining defendants allegedly acted on BNSF’s behalf in various capacities. (Petition ¶¶ 3-5, 7).

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“Despite the medical documentation provided by Dr. Memken, Defendants refused to allow
[Tucker] to return to work on June 4, 2012.” Id. ¶ 19. Instead, Defendants requested more
information and initiated an investigation, which ultimately resulted in Tucker’s termination. Id.
¶¶ 20-32. Tucker claims this termination resulted at least in part from Defendants’ perception
that he was disabled and as retaliation for Tucker’s complaints about Defendants’ refusal to
return him to work, in violation of the MHRA. Id. ¶¶ 34-35.
Defendants timely removed to this Court on December 31, 2014. According to
Defendants, the Court has original jurisdiction in this matter because Tucker’s “claim that BNSF
refused to return him to work is completely pre-empted by the” Railway Labor Act (“RLA”).
(Removal Notice ¶ 9). Tucker contests the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and seeks remand
to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. (Motion, ECF No. 14, at 1).
DISCUSSION
Tucker contends this matter should be remanded because it does not involve a federal
question. He asserts that “the ultimate issue is whether [Tucker’s] disability discrimination claim
under the MHRA involves interpretation or application of a [collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”)], or whether [Tucker’s] claim is independent of the CBA.” (Remand Support Memo,
ECF No. 15, at 6). This is the ultimate issue, according to Tucker, because interpretation of a
CBA presents a federal question under the RLA, but “it is well established that a state law cause
of action is not preempted by the RLA if it involves rights and obligations independent of a
CBA.” Id. at 6 (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 260 (1994)). Since
Tucker’s claim is purely a question of rights and obligations under the MHRA, there is no
federal question on which to base federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

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Defendants respond that Tucker’s state claim presents a federal question because “even
suits based on torts, rather than on breach of a CBA, are governed by federal law if their
evaluation is ‘inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract.’”
(Defendant Response, ECF No. 17, at 4 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399, 410 (1988)). Defendants contend that Tucker has pleaded such a claim because
resolution of his claim will necessarily involve interpretation of a Memorandum of Agreement
between BNSF and Tucker’s union (“MOA”). (Defendant response at 6).
“Removal statutes are strictly construed, and any doubts about the propriety of removal
are resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction and remand.” Manning v. Wal-Mart Stores East,
Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (citing Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 119 F.3d 619, 625 (8th Cir. 1997)). The party invoking
federal jurisdiction and seeking removal has the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence. Hartis v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 778, 781-82 (8th Cir.
2009); see also Nicely v. Wyeth, Inc., 2011 WL 2462060 at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jun. 17, 2011).
A civil action brought in state court may be removed to the proper district court if the
district court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The alleged basis for
federal jurisdiction here is “federal question” jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The federal question
statute grants to district courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. “[T]he question whether a claim ‘arises
under’ federal law must be determined by reference to the ‘well-pleaded complaint.’” Merrell
Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (citation omitted).
One situation in which a claim can be said to arise under federal law is when it is a
“minor dispute” under the RLA, meaning a controversy “over the meaning of an existing

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collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation.’” Norris, 512 U.S. at 253 (quoting
Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 33 (1957)). This is because minor disputes,
even if facially pleaded only under state law, have been pre-empted by the RLA. Id. The pivotal
question in determining whether a state law claim qualifies as a pre-empted minor dispute is
whether the “state-law claim is dependent on the interpretation of a CBA . . . .” Id. at 262. There
is no federal pre-emption, however, if the state claim is “independent of the collective bargaining
agreement.” Taggart v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 F.3d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing
Norris, 512 U.S. 246).
The parties have cited two Eighth Circuit cases that more clearly define the contours of
this inquiry. Tucker contends that Taggart is controlling here. In Taggart, a flight attendant was
placed on medical leave after undergoing a hip replacement surgery. 40 F.3d at 270. After a
medical examination, the defendant airline determined that the flight attendant could no longer
perform her duties and therefore terminated her. Id. The flight attendant filed suit under the
MHRA, alleging that the airline “had unlawfully terminated her because it had ‘perceived’ that
she had a physical impairment without regard to whether her perceived impairment interfered
with her job performance or whether the perceived impairment could be reasonably
accommodated.” Id. “The complaint did not refer to any provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement.” Id. Nevertheless, the airline asserted that interpretation of the CBA would be
necessary because the flight attendant “was placed on medical leave and later terminated
pursuant to that agreement.” Id. at 272. The Eighth Circuit found the flight attendant’s claim was
not an RLA minor dispute because the CBA “was not the ‘only source’ of [the flight attendant’s]
right not to be terminated wrongfully” and because the mere potential of a claim under the CBA
is not enough to qualify a claim as a minor dispute. Id. at 274. The court also found to be

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irrelevant any determination of whether the flight attendant’s “termination was justified by the
collective bargaining agreement.” Id.
Defendants respond that Davis v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 21 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 1994)
provides better guidance in this case than Taggart. In Davis, a production worker at a
manufacturing company suffered a back injury. Id. at 867. About one year later, the production
worker’s physician said he could return to work. Id. The manufacturing company did not allow
the worker to return, and the production worker brought suit under the MHRA. Id. The
manufacturing company contended the production worker’s claim was pre-empted by § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), to which the interpretation-dependent standard
also applies, since interpretation of a CBA was necessary. Id. at 868. This was so, according to
the manufacturer, because the production worker made a claim that he was discriminated against
based on a “handicap.” Id. To show the existence of a handicap under the MHRA requires
demonstration of a condition “‘which with or without reasonable accommodation does not
interfere with performing the job.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 213.010(10)). Citing the Missouri regulation that defines “reasonable accommodation,” the
manufacturing company asserted such a demonstration could only be made through an analysis
of the manufacturing company’s obligations under the CBA. Id. (citing 8 CSR § 603.060(1)(G)(3)(D)). The Eighth Circuit agreed, noting specifically that the reasonableaccommodation determination would require an examination of the seniority rights set forth in
the CBA. Id.
Defendants contend that Tucker’s claim is substantially similar to the claim in Davis
because Tucker “claims Defendants refused to return him to work following his medical leave.”

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(Defendant Response at 6). This claim, Defendants assert, will require interpretation of the MOA
because the MOA
outlines detailed requirements for employees to return to work after medical
leave. More specifically, this Court will need to interpret the MOA to
determine whether, “with or without a reasonable accommodation,”
[Tucker’s] vision interfered with his ability to return to work and perform
his job duties. As recognized in Davis, and consistent with 8 Mo. Code
Regs. Ann. 60-3.060(1)(G)(3)(D), this Court must look to the provisions of
any bona fide CBA in making this determination.
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). “This Court will also need to interpret the
MOA to determine whether BNSF was entitled to require additional information” beyond the
approval of Dr. Memken before allowing Tucker to return to work. Id.
Defendants’ latter contention is foreclosed by Taggart. The argument is essentially that
Defendants followed the procedure required under the MOA when they terminated Tucker, and
that they were justified in firing Tucker when he refused to provide that information. Under
Taggart, as noted above, the justification for termination under the MOA is irrelevant to the
determination of whether Tucker’s MHRA claim depends upon an interpretation of the MOA.
Defendants’ former contention is unavailing because it rests on an overbroad reading of
Davis. The Davis court found only that interpretation of the CBA was necessary in that case, not
that the reasonable-accommodation determination under the MHRA always requires
interpretation of a bona fide CBA. The MHRA defines “disability” as a “physical or mental
impairment . . . which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with
performing the job” at issue. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(4). Among the relevant factors used to
determine whether an accommodation is reasonable are “[t]he size and nature of a business,
including . . . the structure and composition of the work force” and “[t]he ownership interest in
the subject of the proposed accommodation including the authority to make the accommodation

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under the terms of any bona fide agreement such as a lease.” 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(G)(3)(B)&(D).
It is thus undoubtedly correct that the determination will sometimes involve interpretation of a
CBA. But unlike the manufacturing company in Davis, who pointed to a CBA provision
establishing seniority rights, Defendants make no attempt to relate the MOA to the reasonableaccommodation inquiry. Defendants’ broad assertion that resolution of Tucker’s claim will
depend upon an interpretation of some unspecified portion of the MOA is insufficient to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that this case involves a minor dispute under the
RLA. The Court therefore is not satisfied that subject-matter jurisdiction exists in this case.

Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Tucker’s Motion to Remand, (ECF No. 14), is
GRANTED, and this case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri.
A separate order of remand will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 27th day of February, 2015.

/s/ Jean C. Hamilton
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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