Willis v. St. Louis Real Estate et al

Filing 58

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Ryan Wessels's motion for summary judgment (ECF #41) is GRANTED.IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that defendant John Morgan's motion for summary judgment (ECF #43) is GRANTED. IT IS FINALLY HEREBY ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of defendants John Morgan and Ryan Wessels and against plaintiff Cleo Willis, Sr.. Signed by District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr on 6/24/16. (MRS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CLEO WILLIS, SR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN MORGAN and RYAN WESSELS,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:15CV00037 SNLJ

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on defendants’ separate motions for summary
judgment. Plaintiff filed a response to defendant John Morgan’s motion. Plaintiff failed
to file a response to defendant Ryan Wessels’s motion and the time for doing so has
expired. The motions are ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, the Court will
grant both motions.
I.

Background
Plaintiff Cleo Willis, Sr. filed this action against defendants John Morgan and

Ryan Wessels alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act.1 According to the complaint,
plaintiff was a tenant in a house owned by defendant Morgan. Defendant Morgan sold
the house to STL Real Estate Properties, LLC and, thereafter, defendant Wessels acted on
behalf of the new owner. Plaintiff alleges gender discrimination by defendant Morgan in
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Plaintiff also alleged a claim for violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but did not identify any
specific provisions. [ECF #1] He was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and after a 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e) review, he was granted leave to proceed only on his Fair Housing Act claims. [ECF #5]
Additionally, plaintiff named STL Real Estate Properties, LLC as a defendant. The Court did not grant
him leave to proceed against STL Real Estate Properties, LLC and dismissed that defendant. [ECF #5]

selling the house without providing him adequate notice while giving adequate notice of
the sale to defendant Morgan’s female relatives who lived on the premises. Plaintiff, who
is African-American, claims that defendant Wessels, a Caucasian male, acted in a racially
discriminatory manner by harassing him to move, demanding payment of the rent to the
new owner, and evicting him from the property.
II.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists in

the case and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The initial burden is on the moving party. City of Mt.
Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). After
the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show
that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of
setting forth affirmative evidence and specific facts by affidavit and other evidence
showing that there is a genuine dispute of a material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
A plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse him from responding to a defendant’s
motion with specific factual support for his claims to avoid summary judgment, Beck v.
Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 2001), or from complying with local rules, see
Schooley v. Kennedy, 712 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1983). The movant’s statement of facts
are deemed admitted if not specifically controverted by the opposing party. E.D. Mo.
L.R. 4.01 (E). However, “[t]he Eighth Circuit has determined that when a plaintiff fails
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to respond adequately to a motion for summary judgment, a district court should not treat
such a non-response as sufficient to dispose of the motion.” Lowry v. Powerscreen USB,
Inc., 72 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1064 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (citing Canada v. Union Electric Co.,
135 F.3d 1211, 1213 (8th Cir. 1997). “Courts should proceed to examine those portions
of the record properly before them and decide for themselves whether the motion is well
taken.” Id. “In so ruling, even on an unopposed motion for summary judgment, the court
should review the facts in a light most favorable to the party who would be opposing the
motion.” Id.
III.

Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) protects buyers and renters from discrimination

“because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §
3604(a)-(b). Specifically, § 3604(a)-(b) of the FHA makes it unlawful:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.
“Disparate-treatment claims under the FHA are tested under the same framework
as Title VII disparate-treatment claims.” Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th
Cir. 2010) (citing Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th
Cir.1993) (applying the three-stage Title VII analysis to a FHA disparate treatment
claim)). “The standard is familiar—did the defendant(s) treat the plaintiff(s) less
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favorably than others based on their race, color, religion, sex or national origin?”
Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 831. “Proof of discriminatory purpose is crucial for a disparate
treatment claim.” Id. (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)). “Summary judgment is warranted if the
plaintiff cannot produce either (a) direct evidence of discriminatory intent or (b) indirect
evidence creating an inference of discriminatory intent under the McDonnell Douglas2
burden-shifting framework.” Id. (citations omitted).
IV.

Defendant Ryan Wessels’s Motion for Summary Judgment
A.

Facts

Plaintiff failed to file a response to defendant Wessels’s motion. Even if
plaintiff’s response to defendant Morgan’s motion could be construed as a response to
both motions, he failed to specifically controvert defendant’s statement of facts and,
therefore, those facts are deemed admitted for this motion. O’Connell v. Accurate
Plumbing, LLC, 4:04CV1368 FRB, 2005 WL 2176926, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2005)
(citing Northwest Bank & Trust Co. v. First Ill. Nat’l Bank, 354 F.3d 721, 724-25 (8th
Cir. 2003); Harris v. Interstate Brands Corp., 348 F.3d 761, 762-63 (8th Cir. 2003)).
The undisputed facts, as supported by the record, are set forth below.
Plaintiff asserts a racial discrimination claim under the FHA against defendant
Wessels. Plaintiff’s complaint includes a three-page narrative of his allegations against
the defendants. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Wessels engaged in the
following allegedly discriminatory conduct:
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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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 “Wessell[s] called me and began to harass me and railroad me to move, to give
him rent money, yet never produce document that he bought the building.”
 “Wessell[s] is white, I am black.”
 “The house was quickly sold [by John Morgan] to a Ryan Wessel[s].”
 “Ryan Wessel[s] began to harass me to move out in the cold weather of
February.”
 “He even told me there were grounds to evict me.”
 “I am being harassed by the new owner.”
 “Wessel[s] still calling me, harassing me and told me to give him the rent
money and to be out by February.”
 “Wessel[s] never returned the Housing Authority second call as it relates to
proof that he bought the building.”
The uncontroverted facts submitted by defendant Wessels establish that he was
acting on behalf of STL Real Estate Properties, LLC, the new owner of the house bought
from defendant Morgan. In so doing, he notified plaintiff that there was a change in
ownership of the property. He made a demand for rent payments on behalf of the new
owner for the months of January and February, 2015. The new owner elected to not enter
into a new lease or extend or otherwise renew an expired lease for the property with
plaintiff or any other tenant then occupying the house.
Wessels, on behalf of the new owner of the property, terminated the holdover
tenancy, month to month tenancy, or lease of plaintiff by providing notice of the

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termination of the tenancy of plaintiff and by making a demand upon plaintiff to quit or
otherwise surrender possession of the property on or before February 28, 2015. The new
owner’s non-discriminatory business reasons for choosing not to lease the property to
plaintiff included: (1) the purchase of the property with the intent to rehabilitate it and to
sell it after rehabilitation; and (2) the failure and continued refusal of plaintiff to pay the
monthly rent when due. The new owner declined to participate or continue to participate
in the Housing Assistance Payment Program and/or the Section 8 Voucher Program.
Defendant Wessels lawfully threatened to evict plaintiff by judicial process where: (1)
plaintiff failed and refused to acknowledge STL Real Estate Properties, LLC as the new
owner of the property; (2) plaintiff failed and refused to pay the monthly rent when due to
the new owner for the months of January and February, 2015; and (3) plaintiff clearly and
unequivocally expressed an intention to remain in possession of the property after the
termination of his right to occupy the property without the payment of rent.
Plaintiff, in response to discovery requests, has not offered any evidence to
support his claim of race discrimination, except his repeated allegation that
discrimination is established because “Wessel[s] is white, I am black” and he believes the
transfer of the property to STL Real Estate Properties, LLC was illegal. In his answers to
interrogatories, plaintiff stated he called the police on STL Real Estate Properties, LLC,
defendant Morgan, and defendant Wessels because of their discriminatory acts. He also
stated, “[t]hey would not have treated me the way they did if I was white.” He alleged
that they lied about owning the building “because I was black and on Section 8.”

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B.

Discussion

Defendant Wessells contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because plaintiff has not offered any evidence of racial discrimination under the FHA.
Specifically, he states that plaintiff has not offered any evidence to support his allegations
that after defendant Morgan sold the property, defendant Wessels “began to harass me
and railroad me to move” without proof that he purchased the building and that such
actions were racial discrimination because “Wessel[s] is white, I am black.”
Defendant Wessels has submitted uncontroverted affidavit testimony that the
decision to purchase the property by STL Real Estate Properties, LLC, and his actions on
its behalf, were not based on any racial discrimination. According to the uncontroverted
testimony, the new owner and Wessels complied with Missouri law in providing notice of
the change in ownership, demanding payment of rent due, electing not to enter into a new
lease or renew an expired lease with plaintiff or any other tenant, in providing notice of
the termination of the tenancy, and demanding plaintiff to surrender possession of the
premises for failure to pay rent. In March 2015, judgment was entered in favor of the
new owner in state court ordering plaintiff to surrender possession of the premises and to
pay past due rent and court costs.
There is no evidence that defendant Wessels denied or refused, or otherwise made
unavailable, a dwelling for plaintiff based on his race. There is no evidence of dissimilar
treatment – all of the tenants in the building were requested to vacate the premises based
on the new owner’s purchase and plans for the property. There is no evidence that the
decision to purchase the property, rehabilitate the property, and sell the property after
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rehabilitation was motivated by racial discrimination. Further, there is no evidence that
the demand for rent due, notice of termination of tenancy, or threatened eviction was
motivated by race. Plaintiff’s claim of racial discrimination boils down to nothing more
than his statement that “Wessel[s] is white. I am black.” This statement is not direct
evidence of discrimination or indirect evidence creating an inference of racial
discrimination. The Court finds that plaintiff’s claim for race discrimination is not
supported by the uncontroverted evidence. As a result, defendant Wessels’s motion will
be granted.
V.

Defendant John Morgan’s Motion for Summary Judgment
A.

Facts

Although plaintiff filed a response to this motion, he failed to specifically
controvert defendant’s statement of facts and, therefore, those facts are deemed admitted
for this motion. O’Connell v. Accurate Plumbing, LLC, 4:04CV1368 FRB, 2005 WL
2176926, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2005) (citing Northwest Bank & Trust Co. v. First Ill.
Nat’l Bank, 354 F.3d 721, 724-25 (8th Cir. 2003); Harris v. Interstate Brands Corp., 348
F.3d 761, 762-63 (8th Cir. 2003)). The undisputed facts, as supported by the record, are
set forth below.
Plaintiff asserts a gender racial discrimination claim against Morgan under the
FHA. Plaintiff was renting one of the units of a two-family flat located at 4153 Flad
Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri from defendant John Morgan. Plaintiff rented the unit under
the St. Louis Housing Authority, receiving rental subsidy. Plaintiff rented the unit from
defendant Morgan from 2010 until December 2014. Under the St. Louis Housing
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Authority, Plaintiff was required to recertify each year, providing a subsequent twelvemonth lease to continue receiving rental subsidy.
Defendant Morgan verbally informed plaintiff of his intent to sell the property and
posted a “for sale” sign in the yard. The property was sold to STL Real Estate Properties,
LLC on December 24, 2014. A new twelve-month lease for 2015 was not entered into or
submitted to St. Louis Housing Authority for recertification as to plaintiff.
In plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges defendant Morgan: (a) “informed his mother
and aunt that lived downstairs unit that he was going to sell the house and did not tell
me;” (b) “they are females, I am male;” and (c) “they were his relatives, I am not.” In his
response to defendant Morgan’s motion, plaintiff’s allegation of gender discrimination is
summed up in one paragraph:
Morgan’s female relatives … told me that the building was going to be sold – not
Morgan. They had already found a place and they were packing. They possibly
were informed before me weeks, or months before the females told me. Morgan
told the females and did not tell me, a male. This is the basis of my discrimination
[claim]. This is unfair and against the Fair Housing Act because they were his
relatives and females.
B.

Discussion

Defendant Morgan contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because plaintiff has not offered any evidence to support his allegations that defendant
Morgan sold the property and discriminated against him based on gender. Instead,
defendant Morgan has submitted uncontroverted affidavit testimony that his decision to
sell the property to STL Real Estate Properties, LLC was not based on any discriminatory
act of gender.

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In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Morgan’s mother and aunt, who
are both female were informed that the building was going to be sold but Morgan did not
tell him. This allegation is contradicted in his complaint by the statement that he spoke
with defendant Morgan on the phone about the for sale sign in the yard at which time
defendant Morgan told plaintiff that he was selling the building. The sole fact that
defendant Morgan told his female relatives that he was selling the building before he told
plaintiff is not direct evidence of discrimination or indirect evidence creating an inference
of gender discrimination. In his response to the motion, plaintiff has not provided any
evidence or testimony supporting his claim of gender discrimination. Defendant Morgan
did not deny or refuse plaintiff dwelling based on his gender. Defendant Morgan’s sale
of the property did not discriminate against plaintiff. The Court finds that plaintiff’s
claim for gender discrimination is not supported by the uncontroverted evidence. As a
result, defendant Morgan’s motion will be granted.
VI.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court will grant the separate motions for summary

judgment filed by defendants Morgan and Wessel. There are no remaining defendants in
this matter.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Ryan Wessels’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF #41) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that defendant John Morgan’s motion
for summary judgment (ECF #43) is GRANTED.
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IT IS FINALLY HEREBY ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of
defendants John Morgan and Ryan Wessels and against plaintiff Cleo Willis, Sr.
A separate judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 24th day of June, 2016.

___________________________________
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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