Leffall v. City of Elsberry, Missouri et al
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Voluntary Dismissal of Count II 26 , construed as a motion to dismiss Count II, is GRANTED. Count II of Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED, with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 21 D efendants' MOTION for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. With respect to Count I, the motion is DENIED. With respect to Count II, the motion is DENIED as moot. With respect to Count III, the motion is GRANTED. With respect to Counts IV and V, the motion is GRANTED with respect to Defendant City of Elsberry and DENIED with respect to Defendant Brandin Raney. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shirley Padmore Mensah on 5/17/16. (CAR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CITY OF ELSBERRY, MISSOURI, and
Case No. 4:15-CV-398-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
City of Elsberry, Missouri and Defendant Brandin Raney. (Doc. 21). The parties have consented to
the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(1). (Doc. 3). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and
denied in part.
On April 5, 2014, the Elsberry Police Department received a report of a domestic assault
and child endangerment committed by Plaintiff Levelt Leffall (“Plaintiff”). Defendant Brandin
Raney (“Defendant Raney”), then a law enforcement officer employed by the City of Elsberry
(“the City”), was dispatched to find and arrest Plaintiff. Peyton Archer (“Deputy Archer”), then a
deputy of the Lincoln County Sherriff’s Department, was called as an outside agency assist by the
City to assist Defendant Raney with the arrest of Plaintiff. The officers found Plaintiff’s vehicle at
the address where Plaintiff lived. Defendant Raney went to the back door of the residence and
made contact with Plaintiff, and Deputy Archer then walked to the back of the house and joined
them. Defendant Raney advised Plaintiff that he was under arrest. The details of what happened
next are in dispute. According to the deposition testimony of Deputy Archer, Plaintiff was
argumentative and used passive resistance to avoid being handcuffed, the officers pushed him up
against the door of his house to secure him, Plaintiff tried to turn sideways or “blade” to avoid
being handcuffed, Plaintiff tried to pull his right arm away, the officers took him to the ground and
were able to handcuff him. Deputy Archer also testified that Plaintiff used passive resistance and
attempted to fall to the ground when the officers were attempting to take him to the police car, such
that the officers had to hold him up. (Deposition of Deputy Archer, Doc. 22-2, at pp. 21-28).
Plaintiff, on the other hand, has submitted an affidavit contradicting several of those facts. He
states that he did not argue with Defendant Raney or Deputy Archer, did not attempt to turn
sideways or pull his arm away when he was shoved up against the door of his residence, and
walked to the police car without attempting to fall to the ground. (Affidavit of Plaintiff, Doc. 28-1).
After his arrest, Plaintiff was taken to the Lincoln County Jail. The corrections officer there
indicated on a check-box form that he did not observe any signs of obvious injuries. (Doc. 22-3, at
p. 5). According to Plaintiff’s affidavit, Plaintiff requested to be taken to the hospital for treatment
while at the jail, and his requests were refused. (Affidavit of Plaintiff, Doc. 28-1). On April 9,
2014, the day Plaintiff was released from jail on bond, he went to the Emergency Department of
SSM St. Joseph Hospital West, complaining of left elbow pain and swelling from an incident four
days earlier in which “he was handcuffed and officer slammed him to the ground.” (Doc. 22-5, at
p. 4). An X-ray showed that Plaintiff’s elbow was fractured. His arm was placed in a sling, he was
prescribed Percocet and other medications, and he was advised to follow up with orthopedics.
According to Plaintiff’s affidavit, his left elbow was not injured in any way prior to the arrest on
April 5, 2014, and was not harmed by any person or object between the arrest and his visit to the
On March 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant action, asserting that Defendant Raney
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by using excessive force
(Count I); that the City violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
by delegating policymaking duties to Defendant Raney, by failing to train, supervise, or control
Defendant Raney, and through a pattern of transgressions that included Defendant Raney’s actions
(Count II); that the City was liable for Defendant Raney’s actions under a respondeat superior
theory (Count III); that Defendant Raney and the City are liable for assault under Missouri state
law (Count IV); and that Defendant Raney and the City are liable for battery under Missouri state
law (Count V). On March 11, 2016, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on
all of Plaintiff’s claims.
The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Avon State Bank v. BancInsure, Inc., 787 F.3d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 2015). “A dispute is
genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either
party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.” Othman v. City of Country
Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986)). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the
basis of its motion and of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving
party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party must then set forth affirmative evidence from
which a jury might return a verdict in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. The
nonmoving party “may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 256. In ruling on a summary
judgment motion, the Court must review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and must give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those
facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Littrell v.
City of Kansas City, Mo., 459 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2006).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts several counts against Defendant Raney and several
counts against the City, and Defendants move for summary judgment on each count. The Court
will address each in turn.
A. Count I: Excessive Force (Against Defendant Raney)
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Raney used excessive and unreasonable force
in conducting Plaintiff’s arrest, thereby violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant Raney moves for summary judgment, arguing that the amount of force he used during
the arrest was reasonable and that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
“‘Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983 action unless
the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” De Boise v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir.
2014) (quoting Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009)). A government
official is entitled to qualified immunity unless “(1) the facts alleged or shown, construed in the
light most favorable to [the plaintiff], establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and
(2) the right was clearly established as of [the date of the alleged violation], such that a reasonable
official would have known that his actions were unlawful.” Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 728, 732
(8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[i]f there is a genuine dispute
concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, the defendant is not entitled to
summary judgment.” White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2008).
The Court first considers the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis. In assessing
whether there has been a violation of the right to be free from excessive force under the Fourth
Amendment, “the test is whether the amount of force used was objectively reasonable under the
particular circumstances.’” Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497, 502 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Littrell
v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 583 (8th Cir. 2004)). The factors to be considered in assessing
reasonableness include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight.’” Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). The reasonableness of a particular use of force is
determined “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. “[T]he calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97.
The Eighth Circuit has noted that an “actual injury” may be required to prove a Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim. Davis v. White, 794 F.3d 1008, 1012 (8th Cir. 2015). A de
minimis injury may support the conclusion that the officer did not use excessive force. See id.; see
also Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 906 (8th Cir. 2011).
After review of the record, the Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist
regarding whether Defendant Raney’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant Raney
shoved Plaintiff up against his house and pushed him to the ground during the course of the arrest,
using sufficient force to fracture his elbow, despite the fact that Plaintiff was not arguing with the
officers, threatening the officers, physically resisting arrest, or attempting to flee. The Eighth
Circuit has made it clear that in the absence of physical resistance, threats, or attempts to flee, it is
not reasonable for an officer to use more than de minimis force in effecting an arrest. See Shannon
v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 864 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Assuming, then, that [the plaintiff’s] story is
true—i.e., assuming he was not threatening anyone, not resisting arrest, and so on—it was not
reasonable for [the officer] to use more than de minimis force against him.”); Bauer v. Norris, 713
F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1983) (“‘Force can only be used to overcome physical resistance or
threatened force.’”) (quoting Agee v. Hickman, 490 F.2d 210, 212 (8th Cir. 1974)); Feemster v.
Dehntjer, 661 F.2d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1981) (“There is no occasion for the use of any force against
[an arrestee] who quietly submits.”). Defendant cites no authority to suggest that pushing someone
to the wall and ground with sufficient force to break his elbow constitutes a de minimis use of
force, nor is a fractured elbow the sort of minor injury that courts have previously found suggests
that officers used only de minimis force. See Davis, 794 F.3d at 1012 (collecting cases and noting
that courts had sometimes found “relatively minor scrapes and bruises” and “soreness and bad
headache” to be de minimis but had not so held for more serious injuries).
Defendant Raney argues that his use of force was reasonable in light of Plaintiff’s verbal
and physical resistance to the arrest and the serious and violent nature of the charges against
Plaintiff. He relies on several cases finding it objectively reasonable for an officer to use force to
arrest a suspect who was physically resisting arrest and/or attempting to flee. See Mann v. Yarnell,
497 F.3d 822, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment in officers’ favor where the
officers testified that the suspect had physically resisted arrest and attempted to escape and the
plaintiff produced no evidence that contradicted the officers’ account); Wertish v. Krueger, 433
F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment in officers’ favor where the
officers forcibly pulled a noncompliant suspect from his truck, forcibly pulled his hands behind his
back to handcuff him when he persisted in lying on his hands, and then forcibly stood him up when
he refused to stand; noting that “[w]hen a suspect is passively resistant, somewhat more force may
reasonably be required”); McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354, 359-60 (8th Cir. 2011) (officer’s
use of Taser was reasonable where the arrestee “made a sudden movement toward the window,
which the officers reasonably interpreted as an active attempt to evade arrest by flight,” because
“the officers were entitled to use force to prevent [the suspect’s] escape and effect the arrest”).
These cases are inapposite in light of the factual dispute in this case. To accept Defendant
Raney’s argument and apply these cases, the Court would have to accept as true Deputy Archer’s
testimony that Plaintiff did physically move his body in ways that prevented the officers from
handcuffing him, despite Plaintiff’s affidavit stating that he did not. Defendant Raney argues that
the statements in Plaintiff’s affidavit are “conclusory” and “self-serving” and implicitly suggests
that the Court should disregard or discount them. That suggestion is without merit. First, the
statements in Plaintiff’s affidavit are not conclusory; they are straightforward statements of fact
regarding Plaintiff’s own actions during the incident, based on his own personal knowledge.
Second, the fact that the statements in Plaintiff’s affidavit are “self-serving,” in the sense that they
support his case, does not provide a basis on which to disregard them. As the Eighth Circuit
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly contemplate the use of affidavits,
depositions, interrogatory answers, and declarations as permissible forms of
evidence at the summary judgment stage. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (c)(4).
Neither the absence of written reports nor the self-serving nature of affidavits,
interrogatory answers, or deposition testimony serve to make such evidence
inherently infirm. As such, we generally do not discount such evidence at the
summary judgment stage.
Stewart v. Rise, Inc., 791 F.3d 849, 860 (8th Cir. 2015). Although the Eighth Circuit has
recognized that the court “may discount a plaintiff’s self-serving affidavit or deposition testimony
as a matter of law where it clearly contradicts the plaintiff’s earlier testimony under oath and where
the plaintiff offers no explanation for the inconsistencies,” id., this case does not present such a
situation. There is no deposition testimony from Plaintiff in the record before the Court, and
Defendants point to no contradictions between Plaintiff’s statements in the affidavit and any prior
statements by Plaintiff. Thus, the Court will not disregard Plaintiff’s affidavit.
Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence, through his affidavit and hospital records,
from which a reasonable jury could conclude Defendant Raney used a level of force in arresting
Plaintiff that was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. The Court acknowledges that
a jury may ultimately weigh the evidence and decide that Defendants’ evidence regarding what
happened during the arrest is more credible than Plaintiff’s evidence. However, such weighing of
the evidence is not the role of the Court at the summary judgment stage. See Torgerson v. City of
Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury questions, not those of a
judge.”) (quotation marks omitted). Because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding
whether Plaintiff resisted the officers’ attempts to arrest him, the Court cannot say as a matter of
law that Defendant Raney’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See
Henderson, 439 F.3d at 503 (affirming denial of summary judgment on an excessive force claim
where the defendant officer’s position was that the plaintiff was resisting arrest but the plaintiff
denied resisting arrest; noting that the officer’s argument “ignores our duty at the summary
judgment stage to view the evidence in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], the nonmoving
The Court next turns to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Under this
prong, the Court must determine whether the right in question was “clearly established at the time
of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” De Boise, 760 F.3d at 896 (quoting Brown, 574 F.3d at
496). “[A] defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s
contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have
understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014).
The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist that preclude entry of summary
judgment based on this prong. “[T]he right to be free from excessive force in the context of an
arrest is a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against searches and
seizures.” Munn, 439 F.3d a 503 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 394). Moreover, the case law
discussed above clearly established, long before the incident at issue here, that it is unreasonable
for an officer to use more than de minimis force against a suspect in the absence of physical
resistance, threats, or attempts to flee. See Shannon, 616 F.3d at 86; Bauer, 713 F.2d at 413;
Feemster, 661 F.3d at 89. In light of this clearly established law, no reasonable officer could have
believed that it was reasonable to push a suspect against the wall and to the ground with sufficient
force to fracture his elbow when the suspect was not physically resisting, threatening the officer, or
attempting to flee. When the disputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, that
is what Defendant Raney did. Thus, Defendant Raney is not entitled to summary judgment based
on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
Defendant Raney argues that because Plaintiff was resisting arrest, a reasonable officer in
his position would have believed it was reasonable to use force. However, as with the first prong,
accepting this argument would require the Court to ignore the genuine factual dispute concerning
Plaintiff’s behavior during the incident. While the jury may credit Defendants’ version of events
and discredit Plaintiff’s version of events at trial, “it is not [the court’s] function to remove the
credibility assessment from the jury.” Henderson, 430 F.3d at 504 (finding genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis
because of the parties’ “sharply conflicting accounts” with respect to whether Plaintiff resisted
For all of the above reasons, Defendant Raney is not entitled to qualified immunity on
Count I, and his motion for summary judgment on Count I will be denied.
B. Count II: Delegation, Failure to Train, and Pattern of Transgressions (Against
In Count II, Plaintiff asserts several theories of liability against the City related to
Defendant Raney’s actions. First, he alleges that the policy maker for the City delegated to
Defendant Raney the authority to make policy, which rendered the City liable for constitutional
violations committed by Defendant Raney. Second, he alleges that the City failed to properly train,
supervise, and control Defendant Raney. Third, he alleges that the acts of Defendant Raney were
part of a pattern of transgressions of which Defendant City of Elsberry knew or should have
known. Defendants moved for summary judgment on Count II in its entirety.
After Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff filed a “Voluntary
Dismissal” of Count II, which the Court construed as a motion for leave to dismiss Count II
without prejudice. The City filed a memorandum requesting that the Court issue an order
dismissing Count II with prejudice, noting that a dismissal without prejudice would be prejudicial
to the City because it would leave open the opportunity for Plaintiff to re-file a claim that could
have been disposed of through the already-pending summary judgment motion and would result in
unnecessary use of the City’s and the Court’s time and resources. Plaintiff has not submitted any
response to the motion for summary judgment on Count II and has not presented any argument to
support a dismissal without prejudice.
For the reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum, the Court finds that Defendants’
motion to dismiss Count II should be granted and that the dismissal should be with prejudice.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count II will be denied as moot.
C. Count III: Respondeat Superior Liability (Against the City)
In Count III, Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City based on a
respondeat superior theory. However, as Plaintiff acknowledges in his response brief, this claim is
foreclosed by controlling Supreme Court precedent. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60
(2011) (“[U]nder § 1983, local governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts. They
are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions.”) (citations and quotation
marks omitted); Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403
(1997) (“We have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat
superior.”); Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 967 (8th Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established,
however, that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
Because it is undisputed that this claim fails as a matter of law under existing Supreme
Court precedent, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count III will be granted.
D. Counts IV (Assault) and V (Battery) (Against Defendant Raney and the City)
In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Raney’s actions constituted assault under
Missouri law, and in Count V, he asserts that Defendant Raney’s actions constituted battery under
Missouri law. He also asserts each claim against the City based on a respondeat superior theory.
Each defendant moves for summary judgment on these claims.
1. The City’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts IV and V
The City argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Counts IV and V based on
sovereign immunity. Under Missouri law, “political subdivisions have sovereign immunity from
state tort claims under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600, except in three enumerated circumstances.”
Hammer v. City of Osage Beach, 318 F.3d 832, 841 (8th Cir. 2003). Sovereign immunity may be
waived (1) where public employees are involved in an automobile accident, (2) where injuries are
cause by the condition of public property if the land is kept in a dangerous condition, or (3) when a
political subdivision purchases liability insurance. Id. (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.600 &
537.610). The only type of waiver relevant here is the one based on insurance. Where the insurance
waiver is at issue, “[w]hether sovereign immunity is waived in a particular case depends on
whether the plaintiff’s claims fall within the purposes covered by the defendant’s policy.” Epps v.
City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 594 (8th Cir. 2003).
The City argues that it has not waived its sovereign immunity here, because its liability
insurance policy is limited to coverage for injuries resulting from the operation of motorized
vehicles and dangerous conditions of a public entity’s property and does not cover the incident at
issue in this case. In his response, Plaintiff states that he has reviewed the insurance policy and that
he acknowledges that sovereign immunity applies to the assault and battery claims he asserted
against the City. See Pl’s. Mem. Opp., Doc. 29, at p. 11. Because it is undisputed that sovereign
immunity bars these claims against the City, the Court will grant the City’s motion for summary
judgment in its favor on Counts IV and V.
2. Defendant Raney’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts IV and V
Defendant Raney argues that the assault and battery claims against him are barred by
official immunity. “[U]nder Missouri law, ‘the doctrine of official immunity shields public
officers and state officials from civil liability for injuries arising out of their discretionary acts,
functions, or omissions performed in the exercise of their official duties.’” Hawkins v. Holloway,
316 F.3d 777, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Harris v. Munoz, 43 S.W.3d 384, 387 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2001)). 1 Official immunity does not apply to discretionary acts done in bad faith or with
malice. Id. “Bad faith or malice generally requires actual intent to cause injury.” Blue v. Harrah’s
N. Kansas City, 170 S.W.3d 466, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). “A defendant acts with malice when he
wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty
and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Bad faith “embraces more than bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior
motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
official immunity doctrine “can also be overcome by showing conscious wrongdoing.” Id.
Defendant Raney argues that he is entitled to official immunity because the amount of
force he used during Plaintiff’s arrest was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and
thus there could be no bad faith or malice. The Court disagrees. As discussed above, if Plaintiff’s
version of events is taken as true, as it must be at this stage, Defendant Raney inflicted physical
harm on Plaintiff that was sufficient to break his elbow, despite an absence of physical resistance
or even verbal argument from Plaintiff. This is sufficient to suggest that Defendant Raney was
engaged in conscious wrongdoing or had an intent to injure Plaintiff, such that official immunity
The parties appear to agree that Defendant Raney’s use of force to effect an arrest here was a
would not apply.
Other than official immunity, Defendant Raney offers no other basis on which the Court
could grant summary judgment in his favor on Count IV or Count V. Because Defendant Raney
has not shown that he is entitled to summary judgment based on official immunity, the Court will
deny his motion for summary judgment on Counts IV and V.
For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that Count II should be dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to Plaintiff’s motion; that the City is entitled to summary judgment on Counts
III, IV, and V; and that genuine issues of material fact preclude entry of summary judgment on the
claims against Defendant Raney on Counts I, IV, and V.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Voluntary Dismissal” of Count II (Doc.
26), construed as a motion to dismiss Count II, is GRANTED. Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint is
DISMISSED, with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. With respect to Count I, the motion is DENIED.
With respect to Count II, the motion is DENIED as moot. With respect to Count III, the motion is
GRANTED. With respect to Counts IV and V, the motion is GRANTED with respect to
Defendant City of Elsberry and DENIED with respect to Defendant Brandin Raney.
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 17th day of May, 2016.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?